Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Main Tabs Group

Overview

Formed:

January 1, 1998

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: February 16, 1999: Militants launched 5 simultaneous car bombs in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, one of which almost killed President Karimov. The Uzbek government blamed the IMU for the attack, but this allegation has not been independently verified (16+ killed, 100+ wounded).[1]

Last Attack: February 2015: The IMU took around 30 Hazara men hostage in Zabul province, Afghanistan. The group published a video of the beheading of one of the hostages, an Afghan National Army soldier, the following month. The kidnapping was allegedly in response to the arrest of female IMU supporters by the Afghan government (1 killed, unknown wounded).[2]

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a Salafi-jihadist militant group seeking to overthrow the Uzbek government and install an Islamic, Sharia-driven government. The IMU clashed with US forces during the American-led military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, after which the group relocated to Pakistan. For most of its existence, the IMU was closely allied to Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and frequently conducted joint operations with the organizations. Its most notable attacks include the April 2012 attack on Pakistan’s Bannu Prison, which freed 384 prisoners, and the June 2014 attack on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, Pakistan. In August 2015, the IMU pledged loyalty to the Islamic State (IS).

Narrative

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is an Islamist militant group operating in Central Asia. IMU co-founders Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani originally founded a militant organization, Adolat, in 1991 to establish Islamic law in Uzbekistan. When the group was outlawed by Uzbek President Karimov, the leaders established a new base in Tajikistan, from which they launched cross-border attacks in Uzbekistan. In 1998, as the Karimov government began increasingly to crack down on Uzbek Muslim communities, Yuldashev and Namangani formally established the IMU and received Taliban permission to establish a base in Afghanistan.[3] The new group declared jihad in Uzbekistan and declared its intent to expel Karimov and install shariah law in Uzbekistan.[4]

At the time of its inception, the IMU received substantial funds from Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Osama bin Laden, which proved crucial to the establishment of the group. As a result, the IMU launched multiple high-profile attacks, such as the August 2000 assault on Tajik border villages. It is unclear if the group was responsible for the February 1999 Tashkent bombings.[5] Following the bombings, the Uzbek government initially accused Hizb ut-Tahrir, a Pan-Islamic party, leading to the mass arrest and torture of Muslims.[6]

Until late 2001, the IMU maintained a targeted guerrilla campaign against the Uzbek government and security forces, with supporting bases in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Following 9/11 and the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU shifted its focus to battling US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, an effort which strengthened collaboration and ideological ties between the IMU, AQ, and the Afghan Taliban.[7] In 2002, a faction of IMU militants split away from the central group, reportedly motivated by disagreements concerning IMU’s expansion aborad. The faction – which would become known as the Islamic Jihad Group and later the Islamic Jihad Union – supposedly argued that the group should focus on fighting the Uzbekistan government, though it is difficult to confirm the true source of the split.[8]

The IMU increasingly began to target all those opposed to its goal of establishing a transnational caliphate in Central Asia, and attacked Western and allied interests in the region. The IMU also maintained close relations with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The two groups collaborated to attack the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, Pakistan, in 2014, and established a joint militant group, Ansar al-Aseer, to free TTP militants in Pakistani prisons.[9]

Following the Pakistani government’s launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014 against militant groups in the country, the IMU suffered heavy casualties and relocated many of its operations in Pakistan to northern Afghanistan. From its Afghan bases, the group supported the Afghan Taliban’s offensive in spring 2015 against government forces in the country.[10]

After a period of declining relations with the Afghan Taliban, the IMU leadership began to move toward the Islamic State. In September 2014, IMU leader Usman Ghazi released a public statement: “On behalf of members of our Islamic Movement, I herewith announce to the world that we are siding with the Islamic Caliphate.” An important distinction is that his announcement did not include the term “Bay’a,” which would indicate an official pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State (IS).[11] In spring 2015, IMU factions in northern Afghanistan pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), which prompted the Taliban to attack them.[12] Then, in August 2015, a statement issued by the IMU outlined several grievances against the Taliban, and the IMU issued an official pledge of allegiance to IS.[13]

The IMU's alignment with the Islamic State was not a group-wide decision, and this decision was not accepted by all IMU fighters. Factions of the IMU stayed loyal to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.[14] The disagreements among IMU factions over relations with IS and the Taliban reflected a deep internal split rooted in the group's longstanding decentralized structure. This can be interpreted as a product of the group’s dependence on Taliban patronage for shelter and financing, rather than any deliberate organizational design.[15]

The Taliban's response to Ghazi's declaration was swift and violent. Following the August 2015 announcement, the Taliban demanded that the IMU renounce the pledge or leave Afghanistan.[16] Ghazi's IS-aligned IMU fighters joined forces with the Islamic State in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, but they were defeated by the Taliban in late 2015. Many IMU fighters were killed, and Ghazi was reported killed by Taliban forces during this period, though not immediately confirmed.[17] The IS-aligned faction carried the IMU's official media infrastructure, including its primary outlets, into the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP).[18] ISKP is the official regional affiliate of the Islamic State that was formed in early 2015 by defectors of the Tehrik-e-Taliban, Afghan Taliban, and al-Qaeda.[19]

In June 2016, the surviving Taliban-aligned IMU faction re-emerged and issued statements rejecting IS, reaffirming loyalty to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and acknowledging the period of silence. Though Ghazi had reportedly been killed, the faction did not name a new emir at that time. One source argues that the lack of a public statement about new leadership may be due to operational security concerns, given that the group's previous leaders had been killed in US drone strikes.[20]

Following the Taliban's return to governing Afghanistan in August 2021, the IMU's relationship with the Taliban shifted from one of mutual dependence to compliance.[21] Taliban authorities censored IMU's social media output and policed the movement of IMU leaders.[22] Meanwhile, ISKP used narratives of Taliban violence against Uzbek IMU members as a propaganda tool designed to undermine Taliban credibility among Central Asian audiences.[23]

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 did not produce a meaningful operational reorientation for the surviving Taliban-aligned IMU faction. The group had ceased conducting attacks against Western or Afghan government forces years earlier. Its post-2021 posture may have reflected its continued constraint under Taliban oversight, rather than renewed independent ambition.[24] Uzbekistan, which was aware of the IMU's continued presence across northern Afghanistan’s provinces, pursued engagement with the Taliban government in Kabul. In public statements, Uzbekistan President Mirziyoyev urged the Taliban to end its support to terrorist groups.[25]

A United Nations report claims that the IMU leader at the time was “killed by unknown attackers” in September 2022. Samatov Mamasoli, an Uzbek national, assumed leadership of the IMU following the death of his predecessor. He had previously served as the IMU's deputy and head of finance.[26] By 2023, Mamasoli maintained an estimated 150 to 550 fighters in northern Afghanistan.[27] The group no longer operates as a unified organization. Multiple factions with competing visions have persisted since the 2015 split. The IMU's decentralized structure, which is characterized by semi-independent commanders spread across difficult terrain and constrained by reliance on the Taliban, has prevented any central authority from asserting meaningful control over the group.[28]

Organization

Vertical Tabs

Leadership

Juma Namangani (1998 to November 2001): Namangani co-founded the IMU with Tahir Yuldashev and served as its head military leader. He died during a raid by anti-Taliban fighters in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan.[29]

Tahir Yuldashev (November 2001 to August 27, 2009): Yuldashev co-founded the IMU and served as its first emir. He was allegedly a senior commander resisting US forces during Operation Anaconda in 2002, in eastern Afghanistan. He also served on Al Qaeda’s Shura Majlis top council. Yuldashev was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan.[30]

Abu Usman Adil (August 17, 2010 to April 29, 2012): Adil was an associate of his predecessor Yuldashev. Under Adil’s leadership, the IMU expanded its operations in northern and eastern Afghanistan, and the Central Asian republics. He was killed in a US drone strike in 2012.[31]

Usman Ghazi (August 2012 to December 2015): Ghazi was Adil’s deputy and became emir of IMU after his death. He declared support for IS in September 2014 and pledged the IMU’s loyalty to the group in August 2015.[32] Ghazi was killed by Taliban forces in late 2015.[33] His successor was not publicly identified.

Unnamed Tajik leader (circa 2016 to circa 2022): Following the collapse of the IS-aligned faction and Ghazi's death, a Taliban-aligned remnant reconstituted itself under the IMU name in June 2016.[34] This faction was subsequently led by a Tajik national whose identity was not publicly confirmed. One source argues that the lack of a public statement about new leadership may be due to operational security concerns, given that the group's previous leaders had been killed in US drone strikes.[35] A United Nations report names the leader as “Usmon” (Madumarov Kholimzhon Paradayevich) and states that he was “killed by unknown attackers” in September 2022.[36]

Mamasoli Samatov (circa 2022 to Present): Samatov Mamasoli, an Uzbek national, assumed leadership of the IMU following the death of his predecessor. He had previously served as the IMU's deputy and head of finance.[37] Under his leadership, the IMU has maintained an estimated 150 to 550 fighters operating in northern Afghanistan under Taliban oversight.[38]

Size Estimates

2001: 1,500 – 2,000 (New York Times)[39]
Late 2001: 500 (UN Security Council)[40]
2010: 2,500 – 4,000 (The Long War Journal)[41]
2015: 5,000 – 7,000 (Azamy)[42]
2016: 200 – 300 (Australian National Security)[43]
2017: 200 – 300 (United State Department of States)[44]
2023: 150 – 550 (United Nations Security Council)[45]
2025: 500 – 800 (Amu TV)[46]

Name Changes

There are no recorded name changes for this group.

Resources

The group’s main sources of funding include racketeering, ransom payments for hostages, and collecting foreign donations. It allegedly maintained lucrative drug trafficking networks throughout Central Asia. The IMU also receives funds from the Uzbek diaspora and donors in Europe, Central/ South Asia, and the Middle East.[47]

In the late 1990s, the IMU, alongside other militant groups, received weapons, financial support, training, and leadership support from Osama bin Laden, which helped the group to begin launching major attacks.[48]

From 1998 to 2014, the IMU received funding from the Taliban and al-Qaeda before it announced its allegiance to ISIS. The IMU also received funding from the Uzbek diaspora from other Islamic countries, specifically Saudi Arabia, and other Arab and Turkish foundations through black-market economic activities, drug trafficking and racketeering.[49]

Following the reconstitution of the Taliban-aligned IMU faction in 2016, the group's primary source of external support shifted to Taliban patronage. The group's dependence on the Taliban for shelter and financing, rather than any diversified funding base, has been identified as a structural constraint on its operational independence. This prevents any central IMU leadership from asserting control over dispersed commanders.[50] A 2025 report claimed that the IMU had continued to make money by trafficking people, weapons, and heroin, even as the organization declined.[51]

Locations

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

From 1998 to 2001, the IMU operated mainly in Afghanistan, cooperating with the Afghan Taliban regime and Al Qaeda forces in the country. In its efforts to wage a guerrilla campaign against the Uzbekistan government, the group also maintained supporting bases in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. After the collapse of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in late 2001, the IMU shifted its main base of operations to Pakistan, along the Afghan-Pakistan border, with some forces located in northern Afghanistan.[52] The IMU is reported to have activities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan.[53] IMU militants are suspected of having engaged in attacks in Syria. Uzbek and other Central Asian militants with possible connections to the IMU have also carried out attacks in the US and Western Europe.[54]

The Ferghana Valley, at the intersection of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan’s borders, was reported to be an important recruitment area for IMU. The group also has training bases in Afghanistan’s northern and central provinces.[55]

According to a former head of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security, splintered groups from the IMU have joined the Taliban’s military and intelligence units in the northern Afghanistan provinces. These provinces include Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, Faryab, Kunar and Sar-e-Pol.[56] Following the Taliban's return to governing Afghanistan in August 2021, the IMU consolidated further around northern Afghanistan, where the group operated under Taliban oversight.[57] A source published in October 2021 described the IMU’s operations in the preceding years “as little more than an auxiliary force for the Taliban in Afghanistan.”[58]

Strategy

Vertical Tabs

Ideology and Goals

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a Salafi-jihadist militant group. The group initially sought to overturn the secular, authoritarian government of Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov. The IMU later expanded its goals to include the establishment of an Islamic caliphate throughout Central Asia. [59] The IMU shared IS’s belief in a radical Salafist ideology and its commitment to global jihad, an important factor in its ultimate support for the group.[60]

Political Activities

The IMU had a conflictual relationship with the authoritarian and anti-Islamic government of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who imposed many policies intending to restrict the religious practices of the Muslim majority. The subsequent spread of Islamic extremism among the Uzbek population was allegedly an expression of anti-authoritarianism and opposition to the administration’s violence and corruption.[61]

Targets And Tactics

Prior to October 2001, the IMU targeted Uzbek government forces and affiliated subjects, conducting bombings and hostage-taking operations. During US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, the group shifted its focus to battling US and international forces in Afghanistan, alongside AQ and the Afghan Taliban. After 2001, the IMU began targeting government forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and all those opposed to the IMU’s vision of a regional Islamic caliphate.[62] The group conducted suicide attacks, bombings, and raids on coalition forces, the International Security Assistance Force, and other western interests in Central Asia. [63]

The organization also publishes propaganda material and audio statements via its media branch, Jundullah Studio. The IMU has conducted extensive propaganda activity, publishing videos of executions and IMU fighters launching attacks, and video messages urging individuals throughout the Caucasus to join the jihadi cause.[64]

Attacks

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

February 16, 1999: Militants launched 5 simultaneous car bombs in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, one of which almost killed President Karimov. The Uzbek government blamed the IMU for the attack, but this allegation has not been independently verified (16+ killed, 100+ wounded).[65]

August 1999: On August 9, an IMU guerrilla group kidnapped the mayor and three officials from a small village in western Kyrgyzstan. Within a week, the Kyrgyzstani government fulfilled IMU demands for a ransom payment and a helicopter for safe passage to Tajikistan. On August 23, the IMU took four Japanese geologists and eight Kyrgyz soldiers’ hostage in southern Kyrgyzstan. The final hostages were freed after two months (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[66]

December 2002 – May 2003: The IMU launched four explosions in the Kyrgyz cities of Osh and Bishkek that killed eight people (8 killed, unknown wounded).[67]

July 2007: The IMU allegedly participated in the Red Mosque siege in Islamabad, Pakistan. Militants held at least 250 people hostage as they fought Pakistani forces for control of the mosque (62 killed, unknown wounded).[68]

September 19, 2010: The IMU claimed responsibility for the ambush of a convoy of Tajiki soldiers in the Rasht Valley in Tajikistan, killing an estimated 25 soldiers (25 killed, unknown wounded).[69]

April 15, 2012: The IMU, with Pakistani Taliban and TTP militants, attacked the Bannu Prison in Pakistan and freed 384 prisoners, including several that were described as “very dangerous” (unknown killed, 5 wounded).[70]

June 8, 2014: The IMU participated in the attack on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, Pakistan, alongside the TTP and Pakistani Taliban. All 10 attackers died in the attack (36 killed, unknown wounded).[71]

February 2015: The IMU took around 30 Hazara men hostage in Zabul province, Afghanistan. The group published a video of the beheading of one of the hostages, an Afghan National Army soldier, the following month. The kidnapping was allegedly in response to the arrest of female IMU supporters by the Afghan government (1 killed, unknown wounded).[72]

Interactions

Vertical Tabs

Designated / Listed

U.S State Department Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO): September 25, 2000 to Present.[73]
UNSC “ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List”: October 6, 2001 to Present.[74]
United Kingdom Home Office Proscribed Terrorist Organization: November 2002 to Present.[75]
Government of Canada Listed Terrorist Entity: April 2, 2003 to Present.[76]
Australian National Security Terrorist Organization: April 11, 2003 to Present.[77]
Kazakhstan Listed Terrorist Organization: October 15, 2004 to Present.[78]

Community Relations

The IMU and other militant groups have carried out extensive propaganda and recruitment campaigns in Central Asia. However, they have limited appeal among Muslim communities in the region, which are typically opposed to calls for a regional Islamic caliphate.[79]

Relationships With Other Groups

The IMU had long-standing relations with the Afghan Taliban. In 1998, IMU co-founders Namangani and Yuldashev formally established the group and began conducting operations in Afghanistan as guests of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In exchange for Taliban patronage, the IMU trafficked the group’s illegal drugs throughout Central Asia. The IMU also supported the Taliban in fighting against Northern Alliance forces during the group’s reign in Afghanistan and in battling US-led coalition forces under Operation Enduring Freedom. After the overthrow of the Afghan Taliban regime, the IMU maintained close relations with its shadow government in northern Afghanistan.

The IMU also maintained strong relations with Al Qaeda. In the late 1990s, AQ leader Osama bin Laden provided funding that contributed to the establishment of the IMU. AQ provided weapons, training, and financial and logistical support to the IMU until 2002, while the IMU operated primarily in Afghanistan. This aid allowed the nascent IMU to launch several high-profile attacks in 1999 and 2000.[80]

After the IMU relocated to Pakistan in late 2001, it established training camps in the country under the protection of the Pakistani Taliban. Around this time, the group also developed a strong cooperative relationship with the AQ-aligned Haqqani Network. The two groups collaborated to launch multiple attacks. Moreover, the Haqqani Network helped to train IMU militants, and the IMU, in turn, provided fighters for attacks.[81]

Another close ally of the IMU in Pakistan was Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP); the two groups cooperated to launch multiple attacks against Pakistani security forces. In 2013, the IMU and TTP also formed a joint unit, Ansar al-Aseer, to free TTP members from Pakistani prisons.[82]

After a period of declining relations with the Afghan Taliban, the IMU leadership began to move toward the Islamic State. In September 2014, IMU leader Usman Ghazi released a public statement: “On behalf of members of our Islamic Movement, I herewith announce to the world that we are siding with the Islamic Caliphate.” An important distinction is that his announcement did not include the term “Bay’a,” which would indicate an official pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State (IS).[83] In spring 2015, IMU factions in northern Afghanistan pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), which prompted the Taliban to attack them.^{^[84]} Then, in August 2015, a statement issued by the IMU outlined several grievances against the Taliban, and the IMU issued an official pledge of allegiance to IS.[85]

While aligned with the Islamic State, the IMU helped expand the ISKP’s propaganda network to include Uzbekistan audiences. ISKP incorporated the stories of past IMU members who were killed by the Taliban upon switching allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) into their history and lore. The IMU’s ideologies are published by Dabiq magazine, the IS former central publication, and shared throughout the IS Uzbek-language sphere of influence.[86]

The IMU's alignment with the Islamic State was not a group-wide decision, and this decision was not accepted by all IMU fighters. Factions of the IMU stayed loyal to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.^{^[87]} The disagreements among IMU factions over relations with IS and the Taliban reflected a deep internal split rooted in the group's longstanding decentralized structure. This can be interpreted as a product of the group’s dependence on Taliban patronage for shelter and financing, rather than any deliberate organizational design.[88]

The Taliban's response to Ghazi's declaration of allegiance to IS was swift and violent. Following the August 2015 announcement, the Taliban demanded that the IMU renounce the pledge or leave Afghanistan.^{^[89]} Ghazi's IS-aligned IMU fighters joined forces with the Islamic State in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, but they were defeated by the Taliban in late 2015. Many IMU fighters were killed, and Ghazi was reported killed by Taliban forces during this period, though not immediately confirmed.[90] The IS-aligned faction carried the IMU's media infrastructure, including its primary outlets, into ISKP.[91]

The surviving Taliban-aligned core, which had continued operating quietly throughout the split without access to the IMU's official media outlets because the IS faction had taken them with it, publicly reconstituted itself in June 2016, denouncing IS and reaffirming loyalty to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.[92] This faction retained the IMU name and resumed its pre-2014 relationship of cooperation with and dependence on the Taliban. The transition from conflict back to cooperation was not a reconciliation between former enemies, but rather the re-emergence of a faction that had never broken with the Taliban.[93] Following the Taliban's return to power in August 2021, the group remained under the Taliban’s influence and operated in northern Afghanistan's provinces within the Taliban's military and intelligence framework.[94] A source published in October 2021 described the IMU’s operations in the preceding years “as little more than an auxiliary force for the Taliban in Afghanistan.”[95]

Several splinter groups formed out of the IMU over the course of the group’s lifetime. Jamaat Ansarullah, a Tajik splinter group, formed in response to the IMU’s declaration of support for IS and reaffirmed its allegiance to the Taliban. Jundullah, a militant group based in Afghanistan, split from the IMU in 2009 following the death of emir Yuldashev. Jundullah shared similar goals with the IMU, and the two groups maintained cooperative relations. The Islamic Jihad Group, later renamed the Islamic Jihad Union, formed in 2002 after the IMU relocated to Pakistan; the group cooperated with the IMU and the Haqqani Network for operations in southeast Afghanistan.[96]

State Sponsors And External Influences

In the late 1990s, the IMU received substantial support, including weapons, financial support, training, and leadership support from AQ leader Osama bin Laden, which was critical for the establishment of the IMU. [97] The Taliban regime in Afghanistan also served as an early patron for the IMU and allowed the group to operate in Afghanistan until the regime’s collapse. Following the Taliban's return to power in August 2021, the group remained under the Taliban’s influence and operated in northern Afghanistan's provinces within the Taliban's military and intelligence framework.[98] A source published in October 2021 described the IMU’s operations in the preceding years “as little more than an auxiliary force for the Taliban in Afghanistan.”[99]

Footnotes

Footnotes:

[1] Rabasa, Angel, et al. “The Caucasus and Central Asia.“ Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement, RAND Corporation, 2006. Pp. 105–118. JSTOR.

[2] Mehl, Damon. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Opens a Door to the Islamic State.” CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Jun. 2015. Web. 25 Aug. 2018. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-opens-a-doo...

[3] Sharipzhan, Merhat. “IMU Declares It Is Now Part of the Islamic State.“ Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 06 Aug. 2015. Web. 22 Aug. 2018.

[4] Roggio, Bill. “Tahir Yuldashev confirmed killed in US strike in South Waziristan.“ The Long War Journal, 04 Oct. 2009. Web. 22 Aug. 2018.

[5] Rabasa, Angel, et al. “The Caucasus and Central Asia.“ Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement, RAND Corporation, 2006. Pp. 105–118. JSTOR; Chivers, C. J. “Threats and Responses: Central Asia; Uzbek Militants’ Decline Provides Clues to U.S.“ New York Times, 2002. Web. 30 Aug. 2018.

[6] Ilkhamov, Alisher. “Mystery Surrounds Tashkent Explosions.“ Middle East Research and Information Project, 15 April 2004. Web. 30 Aug. 2018.

[7] Rabasa, Angel, et al. “The Caucasus and Central Asia.“ Beyond Al-Qaeda: Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement, RAND Corporation, 2006. Pp. 105–118. JSTOR.

[8] Sanderson, Thomas M., Daniel Kimmage, and David A. Gordon. “From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2010. https://web.archive.org/web/20260118071544/https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEB_0.pdf

[9] Kaura, Vinay. “Uzbekistan ups its involvement in Afghanistan.“ Middle East Institute, 31 Jan. 2018. Web. 22 Aug. 2018.

[10] Azamy, Hekmatullah. “Will the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Trade the Taliban for ISIS?“ Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, vol. 7, no. 6, 2015, pp. 30–35. JSTOR.

[11] Mehl, Damon. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Opens a Door to the Islamic State.” CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Jun. 2015. Web. 25 Aug. 2018. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-opens-a-doo...“”

[12] “Uzbek Group In Afghanistan Pledge Allegiance To Islamic State.” Radio Free Europe, March 30, 2015. https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbek-group-in-afghanistan-behead-afghan-soldier... ; Roggio, Bill, and Caleb Weiss. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Faction Emerges After Group’s Collapse.” FDD’s Long War Journal, 14 Jun. 2016. Web. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-movement-of-uzbe...

[13] Wyatt, Edward. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)’s Limits of Leadership from Tahir Yuldashev to Usman Ghazi.” Militant Leadership Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, October 6, 2021. https://jamestown.org/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-imus-limits-of-leadership-from-tahir-yuldashev-to-usman-ghazi/ ; Roggio, Bill, and Caleb Weiss. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Faction Emerges After Group’s Collapse.” The Long War Journal, 14 Jun. 2016. Web. 25 Jun. 2026. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-faction-emerges-after-groups-collapse.php ; Sharipzhan, Merhat. “IMU Spells Out Grievances With Afghan Taliban.” Radio Free Europe, August 4, 2015. https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-imu-calls-out-taliban-on-mullah-omar/27170682.html

[14] Roggio, Bill, and Caleb Weiss. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Faction Emerges After Group’s Collapse.” The Long War Journal, 14 Jun. 2016. Web. 25 Jun. 2026. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-movement-of-uzbe...

[15] Wyatt, Edward. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)’s Limits of Leadership from Tahir Yuldashev to Usman Ghazi.” Militant Leadership Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, October 6, 2021. https://jamestown.org/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-imus-limits-of-...

[16] Barr, Nathaniel. “Wilayat Khorasan Stumbles in Afghanistan.” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, March 3, 2016. https://jamestown.org/wilayat-khorasan-stumbles-in-afghanistan/

[17] Roggio, Bill, and Caleb Weiss. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Faction Emerges After Group’s Collapse.” The Long War Journal, 14 Jun. 2016. Web. 25 Jun. 2026. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-faction-emerges-after-groups-collapse.php

[18] Webber, Lucas, and Bruce Pannier. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's Enduring Influence on IS-Khurasan.” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, 03 Mar. 2023. Web. 25 Jun. 2026. https://gnet-research.org/2023/03/03/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistans-enduring-influence-on-is-khurasan/

[19] Doxsee, Catrina. “Examining Extremism: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 08 Sep. 2021. Web. 25 Jun. 2026. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-islamic-state-khorasan-province-iskp

[20] Roggio, Bill, and Caleb Weiss. “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Faction Emerges After Group’s Collapse.” The Long War Journal, 14 Jun. 2016. Web. 25 Jun. 2026. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-movement-of-uzbe...

[21] Shayan, Yasin. “Exclusive: Fearing IMU, Uzbekistan Turns to Taliban.” Amu TV, 14 Apr. 2025. Web. https://amu.tv/168596/

[22] Wyatt, Edward. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)’s Limits of Leadership from Tahir Yuldashev to Usman Ghazi.” Militant Leadership Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, October 6, 2021. https://jamestown.org/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-imus-limits-of-...

[23] Webber, Lucas, and Bruce Pannier. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's Enduring Influence on IS-Khurasan.” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, 03 Mar. 2023. Web. 25 Jun. 2026. https://gnet-research.org/2023/03/03/the-islamic-movement-of-uzbekistans...

[24] “Thirty-Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.” UN Security Council, S/2023/370, 01 Jun. 2023. Web. 25 Jun. 2026. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2023/370 ; Congressional Research Service. Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan (In Focus No. IF10604). U.S. Congress, August 12, 2021. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10604/IF10604.12.pdf

[25] “Uzbekistan Navigates Relations with Afghanistan.” IntelBrief, The Soufan Center, 09 Jun. 2022. Web. 25 Jun. 2026. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2022-june-9/; “Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Uzbekistan.” U.S. Department of State, 2023. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2022/uzbekistan/

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