Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed in 2009 when Saudi Arabia pushed the branch of Al Qaeda (AQ) located within its territory across the border into Yemen. This move initiated a merger of the Saudi and Yemeni AQ franchises into a single group that operated with the name AQAP.[3] Though AQAP was officially established in 2009, the organization traces its roots back to the 1990s. After the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan war, mujahideen fighters traveled to Yemen, including both those who were from Yemen and the now stateless foreigners whose countries denied them re-entry. Resettling in Yemen, they were granted sanctuary by the ruling Saleh regime. While most former mujahideen integrated into Yemeni society, a small group remained determined to wage violent jihad. Some reportedly collaborated with the regime to fight the Marxist government in South Yemen until the country was unified, while others fought for the opposition.[4]
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, AQ leader Osama bin Laden began funding the jihadist movement in Yemen. Recruits and resources were rerouted from Afghanistan and instead funneled into southern Yemen.[5] Several predecessors to AQAP formed during this time. The Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IJY) was formed in 1990, though it lacked a clear command structure or coherent organizational structure. IJY had largely dissolved by 1994, and the remaining members combined with other Yemeni and Afghan fighters into the Army of Aden Abyan (AAA). AAA broke down after its leader, Zain al-Abidin al-Mihdar, was executed by the Yemeni government in 1999.[6]
It is unclear when AAA’s successor, Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), officially came together as a cohesive organization. AQY’s first large-scale attack targeted the USS Cole in 2000. U.S. and Yemeni authorities responded to this attack by ramping up counterterrorism operations against AQY. By 2003, these efforts had largely incapacitated AQY.[7] In 2006, AQY began to regroup and carry out attacks after several of its members escaped from prison. The group merged with the AQ branch based in Saudi Arabia to form AQAP in 2009.[8] A video produced by AQAP leaders that announced the merger suggested that AQAP would also include the Yemen Soldiers Brigade, another AQ franchise in Yemen.[9] Four days after this video announcement, the group released a 19-minute video titled, “We Start from Here and We Will Meet at al-Aqsa,” outlining their goals and ideology.[10] (See the AQY profile for more information on Al Qaeda in Yemen.)
Following the merger, AQAP officially began to launch and claim attacks within and beyond Yemen’s borders. In August 2009, an AQAP suicide bomber attempted but failed to assassinate Saudi prince Mohammed bin Nayef. AQAP was also accused of training Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound plane by injecting chemicals into a package of Pentrite explosive in his underwear on December 25, 2009. This attack attempt solidified fears that AQAP had become a global threat and prompted the U.S. to increase development aid to Yemen.[11] On October 29, 2010, AQAP attempted to send parcel bombs on cargo planes to a U.S. address, but the plot was foiled. Nevertheless, the attempt drew more global attention to AQAP and led some analysts to consider it more dangerous than even Al Qaeda’s central branch headquartered in Pakistan.[12] Many Yemenis suspected that the government, despite its collaboration with the U.S., also maintained ties with AQAP. This alleged relationship may partially explain the group’s resilience.[13]
AQAP maintained an active media presence that included a bimonthly magazine tailored to Yemeni audiences called Sada al-Malahim (“The Echo of Battles”).[14] AQAP also produced English language propaganda aimed at Western audiences through Inspire magazine, a project initiated in 2010 by U.S.-born Anwar al-Awlaki and Pakistani-American Samir Khan.[15] Despite the deaths of Awlaki and Khan in an American drone strike in 2011, the magazine continues to be influential.[16]
In 2011, AQAP leaders established an offshoot organization called Ansar al-Shariah Yemen (ASY) in southern Yemen.[17] AQAP leaders admitted that the creation of ASY was an attempt to rebrand the organization to attract more local Yemenis.[18] The U.S. State Department has listed ASY as an alias for AQAP.[19] ASY initially had high organizational and military capacity. The group took over parts of southern Yemen in the spring of 2011 and held them for over a year. Additionally, the group provided services like electricity and water and enforced Shariah law in the areas it controlled. ASY maintained this high level of influence until an anti-militant government offensive drove it out.[20]
Though Yemeni forces (aided by local militias and U.S. airstrikes) were able to take back territory from ASY, dislodging AQAP from Yemen proved to be more difficult.[21] In 2011, U.S. Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan described AQAP as “the most active operational franchise” of Al Qaeda.[22] AQAP claimed responsibility for the January 2015 attack on the Paris headquarters of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, which killed twelve people.[23] Moreover, the civil war in Yemen, which erupted in February and March of 2015, provided AQAP room to expand. From its base in the south and southeast, AQAP fought against both the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels.[24] In April 2015, AQAP seized an airport and a port on the Gulf of Aden and released approximately 300 of its members from prison. Following these operations, U.S. intelligence officers withdrew from Yemen due to security concerns, which temporarily reduced the number of U.S. drones aimed at limiting the group’s movements.[25
The conflict entered a new phase in April 2015 when a Saudi-led coalition comprised of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, and Qatar (until June 2017) initiated military operations targeting the Shia Houthi rebels. These actions worsened humanitarian conditions and further contributed to the power vacuum in which AQAP has successfully thrived. AQAP has been a primary beneficiary of the civil war in Yemen. The group capitalized on the chaos by labeling the Houthi forces as an Iranian proxy, which allowed it to legitimize its actions as a Sunni front against Iran. AQAP’s ability to hold territory, even for limited periods, provided the group with opportunities to raid banks, and tax ports, and gain indirect access to additional weapons.[26]
In 2016, U.S. drone strikes began to increase, nearly doubling from 23 in 2015 to 44. Strikes peaked in 2017 at 131, most of which were directed at AQAP.[27] On January 29, 2017, a U.S. attack on AQAP resulted in the death of a member of the U.S. Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land Forces (SEALs) and the loss of an American aircraft. Several civilians and 14 AQAP fighters also perished in the attack.[28]
By the summer of 2018, AQAP had lost about half of the territory it held in 2015. However, the group maintained a membership of approximately 4,000 fighters dispersed over a wide geographic area. At that time, officials in the United States Department of Defense considered the group to be the most lethal AQ affiliate.[29]
Starting in late 2019 and continuing into 2021, AQAP was significantly weakened by counterterrorism efforts. As a result, the group’s activity levels and geographic reach diminished. In 2021, AQAP experienced the lowest activity in Yemen since 2015.[30] Recently, however, AQAP has begun using armed drones against its adversaries in the Shabwah governorate of Yemen, possibly signaling a resurgence. Analysts have interpreted the attacks in Shabwah in three ways: they are an effort to boost AQAP's image and influence given their declining strength in South Yemen; they may indicate a temporary or long-term strategic rapprochement with the Houthis if they are supplied by them; and they suggest AQAP's shift in focus toward the STC forces.[31]
After the sudden death of their previous leader Khalid Batarfi in March 2024, AQAP announced that Sa’ad Bin Atef Al-Awlaki was their new Emir. Al-Awlaki was a member of AQAP’s top shura council and an influential member of the Awlaki tribe. Now, the US has a $6 million bounty on his head.[32]
