Boko Haram was established in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, a well-known Salafi preacher in the Maiduguri, Nigeria.[2] In 2002, Yusuf opened a religious complex with an Islamic school in Maiduguri, which attracted students from poor Muslim families across the country.[3] Yusuf attacked the Nigerian government in his preaching and called for Nigeria to adopt an Islamic style of governance to preserve the morality of its citizens. He rejected Western-style education and democracy as un-Islamic.[4] Initially, Yusuf did not seek to achieve these goals through violence. Instead, Yusuf relied on his lectures to spread his beliefs and develop a large following among students, the poor, and the local elite.[5]
A hardline faction upset with the moderate nature of Yusuf’s teachings broke away in 2002-2003 to establish their own separatist Islamic commune near Kanamma, Nigeria. The group was partially composed of former members of the Nigerian Taliban and led by Muhammad Ali until his death in 2004. In 2005, the group became embroiled in a conflict with the local community, which resulted in Nigerian authorities destroying their camp.[6] In retaliation, the hardliners attacked several towns but were eventually defeated by the Nigerian military. This was the first act of violence perpetrated by Yusuf’s followers.[7] To avoid being associated with this episode, Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia, where he remained until a Nigerian government official helped him to return about a year later.[8] Upon Yusuf’s return to Maiduguri, the group expanded into neighboring states like Yobe, Bauchi, and Gombe.[9] Maiduguri locals then nicknamed the group “Boko Haram,” with “boko” meaning “western education” in Hausa, and “haram” which is an Islamic term designating a forbidden act.[10]
Between 2006-2009, Yusuf grew more radical in his teachings. Despite Yusuf’s initial popularity among Salafis, the mainstream Salafi movement came to reject him and his aversion to democracy and Western-style education.[11] Tensions between Yusuf and the Nigeran government also began to grow. Authorities arrested Yusuf on several occasions, but these arrests only caused Yusuf to gain popularity among Salafis.[12]
In June of that year, Boko Haram members violently clashed with the Nigerian police after being pulled over for violating a new law that required motorcyclists to wear helmets. Group members, who were participating in a funeral procession, viewed this action as provocative and responded with violence. In July 2009, Nigerian police raided the home of one of Yusuf’s followers, who had been making bombs. The group responded to this raid by attacking a police station five days later.[13] Militant violence soon spread throughout Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, and Kano states.[14] Nigerian security forces responded by targeting the group’s headquarters in Maiduguri and arresting Yusuf and other group members. Over 800 people were killed in the violence, including Yusuf who died in custody.[15]
After suffering severe losses in the raid, it is believed that the group fled to a hideout in northern Cameroon. Boko Haram then regrouped in Maiduguri in mid-2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s second-in-command.[16] The frequency, lethality, and sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks increased dramatically under Shekau, allegedly because of increased cooperation with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[17] According to reports, Shekau reached out to AQIM, which later provided training, financial, and material support to Boko Haram.[18] To protest the election of Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from southern Nigeria, Boko Haram carried out a series of bombings during Jonathan’s presidential inauguration in May 2011.[19] The escalation of violence continued throughout the year, including an attack on the United Nations compound in Abuja, Nigeria in August, which served as Boko Haram’s first foreign target.[20] The attack, which killed 23 and wounded dozens, launched Boko Haram into the world news spotlight as a highly capable militant organization.[21] President Jonathan declared a state of emergency later that year due to attacks by Boko Haram, closing parts of Nigeria’s border with Chad, Cameroon, and Niger in order to “crush” the group.[22]
As Boko Haram grew increasingly violent, tensions grew within Boko Haram over operational tactics. In January 2012, members who opposed killing Muslims split off from Boko Haram to form a faction named “Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan,” meaning “Vanguards for the Protections of Muslims in Black Africa,” known commonly as Ansaru.[23] The group, led by Khalid al-Barnawi, painted itself as the humane alternative to Boko Haram that would only attack Christians and the Nigerian government.[24] Analysts suggested that Boko Haram and Ansaru were operationally linked, with one describing Ansaru as the “external operations unit” of Boko Haram.[25] Al-Barnawi and other Ansaru members reportedly received training and support from AQIM.[26] The group conducted numerous attacks against foreigners in northern Nigeria and its neighbors between 2012 and 2014, launching it into the international spotlight.[27] The U.S. State Department designated Ansaru as a foreign terrorist organization in late 2013, and the U.N. Security Council followed suit in June of 2014.[28] However, Ansaru stopped its attacks in late 2014, and authorities captured Khalid al-Barnawi in 2016, effectively ending its campaign.[29]
In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped over 300 young girls from a secular school in Chibok, Nigeria. Just over 50 girls were able to escape immediately after the attack. The Twitter hashtag #BringBackOurGirls inspired several other campaigns on various social media websites in hopes of pressuring the Nigerian government to do more to recover the girls.[30] In October 2014, the government announced that it had negotiated a ceasefire with Boko Haram and that the schoolgirls would be released shortly. However, within two weeks of the announcement, Boko Haram released a video in which Shekau repudiated the ceasefire and claimed that the missing girls had already been converted to Islam and were married to Boko Haram members.[31] The Chibok kidnappings prompted the United States to deploy additional counterterrorism resources to assist Nigerian law enforcement agencies.[32] As of January 2018, 106 girls had been rescued. Kidnapped students were released in exchange for Boko Haram militants in the custody of the Nigerian government.[33] The girls rescued were found living as wives and mothers among Boko Haram fighters. On January 15, 2018, Boko Haram released a video featuring kidnapped women and the remaining Chibok girls. [34]
In January 2015, Boko Haram assaulted the villages of Baga and Doron Baga in Borno State and claimed control over the area. Local officials suggested that as many as 2,000 people were killed in these attacks, but the Nigerian government estimated the death toll to be 150.[35] A few weeks later, militants tried to attack Maiduguri, Borno’s capital city, but government troops prevented the planned takeover.[36] Between May 2011 and December 2015, more than 13,000 people were estimated to have been killed by Boko Haram. An additional 13,000 people died during the same period in clashes between Boko Haram and government security forces.[37]
Boko Haram also extended its operations into neighboring countries. In 2013 and 2014, Boko Haram conducted attacks, kidnapped civilians, and recruited soldiers in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The group also used these cross-border areas as safe havens to escape the reach of Nigerian security forces.[38] By January 2015, some observers estimated that Boko Haram controlled about 20,000 square miles of territory in northeastern Nigeria, a space that represented about 20% of Nigeria’s total territory.[39] On February 7, 2015, Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) announced that national elections would be postponed for six weeks while security forces launched an offensive to regain territory controlled by Boko Haram.[40] Attacks on civilians continued, including across borders in both Chad and Cameroon.[41] On March 28, the Nigerian Election Day, Boko Haram killed 41 people in an attempt to keep voters from the polls, but millions still voted.[42]
Several countries – Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria – banded together to counter the growing international threat posed by Boko Haram. In 2014-2015, they strengthened the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a previously under-resourced military coalition created for counter-terrorism purposes.[43] The coalition, authorized by the African Union on March 3, 2015, was formed to stabilize the Lake Chad region in the face of increasing cross-border Boko Haram attacks. Initially the force consisted of a majority of Chadian troops, and to a lesser extent, troops from Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria.[44] Financial issues burdened the MNJTF from the beginning of its operations, due to the slow arrival of EU funds and the lack of support from the U.N. Security Council.[45] Despite this setback, the coalition served to enhance cross-border cooperation between the Lake Chad countries.[46] The MNJTF weakened Boko Haram by taking back parts of the group’s territory, freeing prisoners, and through securing some border areas between Nigeria and other Lake Chad countries.
In early March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) in an audio message posted online.[47] Reportedly, Boko Haram militants were traveling to train at IS military camps at that time. When IS accepted the pledge in late March, Boko Haram renamed itself Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP).[48] IS also encouraged Muslims to join Boko Haram and other West African militant groups.[49] Some analysts argued that the affiliation between Boko Haram and IS was a desperate move by Boko Haram “to boost its members’ morale, image and attract local support,” especially after the MNJTF drove the group from certain areas it once held.[50] However, the MNJTF’s achievements have been short-lived, partially due to the militants’ resiliency. The coalition struggled to consolidate gains because of poor foresight, planning, and internal communication.[51] Despite these shortcomings, a Nigerian government spokesman told media in April of 2015 that the MNJTF was closing in on the “heart of Boko Haram’s operation” in the Sambisa Forest. The coalition quickly retreated to the outskirts of the forest, however, due to traps and landmines set by Boko Haram, allowing the militants to regroup.[52] Moreover, the group began receiving ideological, operational, and material support from IS following Shekau’s pledge in March, allowing the group to further strengthen.[53]
Despite pledging his loyalty, Shekau allegedly disobeyed IS orders to not kill Muslims. This, along with his dictatorial leadership style and use of child suicide bombers, caused a rift between Shekau and IS leaders.[54] After months of building tension, IS announced in August 2016 that Abu Musab al-Barnawi, son of the founder of Boko Haram, would assume leadership of the group.[55] Al-Barnawi, who once praised IS activities in 2015, previously served as one of Boko Haram’s media spokesmen.[56] Two days after the IS announcement, Shekau responded that Barnawi’s followers were manipulating IS leaders. Shekau accused Barnawi of attempting a coup against him, and he asserted that he and his followers would not accept Barnawi as Boko Haram’s new leader. This dispute reportedly led to splits within Boko Haram.[57] According to military reports, “about half of Boko Haram broke off to a separate group” in 2016, leading to two factions: one known as ISWAP led by Barnawi, and the other known as Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah lil-Dawa wal-Jihad (JAS) led by Shekau.[58] These two organizations have operated independently of each other with distinct leadership. In February 2020, the U.N. Security Council officially designated ISWAP as a “splinter group of JAS.”[59] This profile treats ISWAP as a splinter group of Boko Haram. The members of Boko Haram remaining after the split adopt the name JAS.
Both JAS and ISWAP employed violence to achieve their goals, but they did so against a differing set of targets. The two groups held contrasting beliefs about the appropriateness of targeting Muslims and using child suicide bombers.[60] JAS focused on soft civilian targets like universities and churches, while ISWAP conducted large-scale attacks on military and government installations.[61] Additionally, the groups largely operated in their own areas of Nigeria. JAS concentrated its efforts in areas close to Nigeria’s eastern border with Cameroon. In contrast, ISWAP operated in north-eastern Nigeria, with core operations surrounding Lake Chad.[62] However, the proximity of some JAS and ISWAP operations has made the attribution of certain attacks difficult, and the two groups have often been referred to interchangeably under the name of Boko Haram in many media reports. For this reason, this profile uses ‘Boko Haram’ to refer to JAS or ISWAP militants after 2016 when responsibility for their specific operations cannot be reliably credited to one organization over the other.
In late 2016 and early 2017, the number of killings attributed to Boko Haram declined. Severe food shortages in Nigeria and deadly clashes between splinters JAS and ISWAP appeared to have negatively affected the group’s operations.[63] However, as the MNJTF pulled out of the region, Boko Haram militants returned to their former levels of violence.[64] Between April and September 2017, the group killed an estimated 400 people.[65] The group remained active in northeast Nigeria, using suicide bombers to attack markets, universities, displacement camps, and villages. Most attacks were credited to Barnawi and occurred within Nigeria, such as the 2017 ambush of an oil exploration team from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.[66]
Boko Haram continued to face internal divisions in 2017-2019. In August of 2018, Mamman Nur, an ISWAP military commander, was assassinated by his lieutenants after he released the Dapchi schoolgirls (kidnapped in February 2018) without receiving ransom from the Nigerian government. Nur’s so-called “soft approach” angered his associates who accused him of not being as rough as rival Shekau.[67] Infighting continued into September when Ali Gaga, another ISWAP military commander, was assassinated by his own men.[68] Gaga reportedly planned to release over 300 hostages and surrender to Nigerian troops. Analysts suggested that these assassinations signaled a hardline leadership takeover within ISWAP that shared commonalities with JAS, including similar assault and abduction tactics.[69] However, ISWAP continued to treat Muslim civilians better than JAS.[70]
In March 2019, ISWAP announced that Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi – known as Ba Idrissa – would assume leadership over the group.[71] ISWAP’s then-leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi was demoted within the group.[72] Reports suggest that he was forced to step down from his position in a “bloodless coup.”[73] Although neither ISWAP nor IS offered an explanation for the leadership change, the move coincided with other organizational changes by IS in Africa. In March 2019, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) was reportedly incorporated under the umbrella of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).[74] In subsequent media publications, IS used the term ISWAP to describe the attacks of both of its affiliates in the Sahel and the Lake Chad region.[75] Despite this organizational change by Islamic State, the two groups are easily distinguishable in terms of geography and operation. ISGS operates in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, while ISWAP mainly operates around Lake Chad. As a result, Mapping Militants considers ISWAP and ISGS to be separate militant groups. For more information on ISGS, please see our ISGS profile.
By early 2020, ISWAP far exceeded JAS in operational capacity and size, making them one of the most active IS affiliates.[76] The Nigerian military’s strategy of establishing concentrated “super camps,” rather than spreading troops out over a large area, allowed ISWAP to gain control of rural territory surrounding Lake Chad. This allowed ISWAP to recruit militants and further strengthen its forces.[77] Once an area where ISWAP exclusively operated, JAS began operating in the Lake Chad region by this time while maintaining its headquarters in the Sambisa Forest.[78] For example, Shekau and his followers killed nearly 100 troops on March 25, 2020 in Bohoma in what the President of Chad described as “the worst ever attack on the country’s military.”[79] Also in March 2020, ISWAP leader Ba Idrissa was purged in what some have called “the most bloody and extensive move in the history of the group,” due to the nature of his assassination.[80] Analysts suggested that Ba Idrissa was removed on direct orders from IS because they wanted to “clean house” and exercise more direct authority over ISWAP’s activities.[81]
Al-Barnawi was reappointed as the leader of ISWAP following Ba Idrissa’s death. After allegedly receiving direct orders from Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, leader of Islamic State, in early 2021, Al-Barnawi launched an operation targeting JAS in the Sambisa Forest. Reports suggest that IS had finally had enough with Shekau’s “indiscriminate targeting of believers” that undermined IS efforts to further expand across Africa.[82] Shekau refused to surrender to ISWAP after being pursued through the forest for five days and killed himself via suicide vest around May 18, 2021. On June 6th, Al-Barnawi released a statement encouraging JAS militants to fight on and absorb into ISWAP’s ranks.[83]
In the aftermath of Shekau’s suicide, many members of the JAS faction of Boko Haram surrendered by August 2021. A wave of these militants surrendered in unprecedented numbers at a disarmament center on Cameroon's northern border with Nigeria during this time. Overwhelmed by the influx, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Meri became home to about 750 former fighters. Dieudonne Nkollo Zanga, an administrator at the DDR center, reported that more than 450 militants have sought refuge since May 2021, including 155 in the week of August 3rd. With the current facility stretched to its limits, plans were underway to construct a new center in Meme, capable of hosting 1,500 former JAS combatants.[84]
However, these surrenders did not result in a period of peace. On August 21, 2021, in an overnight assault, hundreds of Boko Haram militants launched an attack on a military outpost in southeastern Niger, near the village of Baroua, resulting in the deaths of 16 soldiers and wounding at least nine others. The group attacked this outpost with overwhelming numbers but was eventually repelled by the Nigerian military, which reported killing 50 militants during the confrontation.[85]
The death of Shekau did not end hostilities between JAS and ISWAP. In 2022, these groups continued to engage in hostilities. For example, in Bama LGA of Borno state, ISWAP engaged in a clash with JAS insurgents on September 16th. It is indicated that ISWAP forces, led by a member named Ba’ana Chigori, launched a surprise attack on JAS strongholds in the Gaizuwa area, which resulted in 29 insurgents dead. The ISWAP fighters eventually overpowered JAS fighters and forced a retreat of the insurgents.[86] This instance is one of many attacks between the Boko Haram splintered groups.
The conflict between JAS and ISWAP weakened both groups. For example, in March 2022 approximately 7,000 members of ISWAP and JAS surrendered in one week alone in the northeast region of Nigeria. [87] The infighting between ISWAP and JAS intensified throughout 2023, leading to substantial losses for both groups. Early in the year, a Lake Chad-based ISWAP subgroup defected to JAS which further weakened ISWAP's position. This internal fighting proved to be more destructive than some battles with the government as well. Former fighters from both factions indicated that the internal fighting had caused more casualties than their engagements with state militaries.[88] ISWAP, struggling with internal dissent and the pressures of JAS's offensive, shifted its focus to consolidating its hold in Borno, temporarily halting its operations in central Nigeria. The conflict's root lies in their differing approaches to civilians; ISWAP's attempts to integrate and tax Muslim civilians contrasts with JAS's goal of plundering and raiding their civilian victims. This ideological clash has driven a wedge between the groups, leading to violence and multiple defections from both sides. [89]
Despite significant internal strife and defections, ISWAP and JAS have continued to conduct military operations. In 2022, ISWAP began their first campaign in central Nigeria, executing a serious attack on a prison near Abuja, the federal capital of Nigeria.[90] ISWAP made tactical adjustments, shifting from large-scale assaults to smaller, more elusive operations, employing roadblocks, complex ambushes, and improvised explosive devices. This tactical pivot allowed ISWAP to maintain a high operational tempo. By February 2022, the group claimed 44 attacks in a single month, marking its second-highest monthly total ever. Expanding its reach, ISWAP also extended its operations into southern Borno, northern Adamawa, and even the Mayo Sava and Mayo Tsanaga regions of Cameroon.[91]
On May 2nd , Abu Umaimata[92] JAS’s leader, in a video showcasing several hundred armed fighters pledging their loyalty to him. The video, featuring militants in disheveled attire, starkly contrasted ISWAP’s well-choreographed and uniformed media presentations. A subsequent video on May 12 reiterated their allegiance to Umaimata, with fighters speaking various regional languages, confirming their location around Lake Chad.  While the true identity of Abu Umaimata remained ambiguous in 2022, he embodied the continuity of leadership post-Shekau. It has been speculated that Umaimata is the pseudonym for Bakura Doro, the current leader of JAS.
In the Nigeria territory of Kuje, more than 400 prisoners went missing following a Boko Haram-led raid on a medium-security prison near Nigeria's capital, Abuja. The attack, which occurred in July 2022, resulted in the deaths of four inmates, a security guard, and several attackers. Loud explosions and gunfire were heard during the raid, which resulted in nearly 1,000 inmates initially escaping, with 443 recaptured afterward. The Defense Minister confirmed that 64 jailed jihadists had escaped, orchestrated by Boko Haram. President Muhammadu Buhari attributed the breach to a failure in the security forces' intelligence system. [93]
Violence against civilians has also continued despite the split between ISWAP and JAS. In April 2023, officials on Cameroon's northern border reported that Boko Haram militants launched large-scale attacks over a week, destroying hundreds of homes, killing at least six villagers and two soldiers, and leaving thousands homeless. In retaliation, Cameroonian troops killed at least 12 militants. [94] In late March 2023, ISWAP fighters massacred over 30 fishermen in Mukdolo village, Borno State, which starkly undermined the Nigerian government's claims that Boko Haram’s violence had decreased. The victims, including internally displaced people from Dikwa LGA and local residents, were gruesomely executed after being bound with their own fishing nets. This attack not only drew condemnation from the United Nations but also prompted calls for justice and adherence to humanitarian laws from UN coordinator Matthias Schmale.[95][96]
Four months laterBoko Haram once again attacked farmers in Borno State. Over a two-week period from June 14 to June 30, the insurgents carried out four major assaults, killing at least 36 people and injuring many more. These attacks targeted farmers in their fields, with the most recent attack killing seven farmers in the Damboa Local Government Area. Similar brutality was reported on June 14, when 15 farmers were killed and some beheaded near Molai. Further violence erupted on June 22, when eight young workers were killed in Mafa, and on June 30, when mortar bombs fired by the militants killed six and injured 21 in Damboa.[97]
InJuly, 2023, ISWAP imposed a ban on farming, fishing, and herding in Marte, punishing communities they accused of spying for the military. This punitive measure followed coordinated airstrikes from the government that killed many ISWAP commanders, forcing them to relocate. The insurgents have vowed to kill anyone found engaging in agricultural activities in the areas they control, further straining the local population.[98]
Boko Haram’s violent surges continued into November 2023. In the first week of the month, they conducted attacks inside Nigeria's Yobe state which resulted in 37 deaths. It is unknown whether this attack was made by the JAS or ISWAP splinter, only stating the report as “Boko Haram.” The first attack occurred when militants raided Gurokayeya village, killing 17 residents who had refused to pay a harvest tax. The following day, 20 mourners returning from the victims' burial fell victim to an explosive device planted by the insurgents, killing 10 instantly and another 10 at a nearby health center.[99]
In March 2024, Boko Haram's ongoing insurgency in northeastern Nigeria continued with the abduction of dozens of displaced people, primarily women, from a camp in Gamboru Ngala town. The victims, who had previously fled their homes due to Boko Haram attacks, were taken while collecting firewood. The United Nations estimated that over 200 people were taken. This incident highlighted the severe impact of the Boko Haram crisis on women and girls in the region. Despite claims from Borno's state government that 95% of Boko Haram fighters are either dead or have surrendered, this recent kidnapping showcases the persistent threat posed by the group and its offshoot, the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), which has been blamed for the kidnappings by local militia leader Shehu Mada.[100]
JAS and its counter splinter ISWAP have been locked in a stalemate with the Nigerian military as of June 2024. Boko Haram remains unable to penetrate fortified military "super camps," and the army avoids deep raids into Boko Haram territory due to the threat of mines and ambushes. ISWAP has achieved some of its founder Muhammed Yusuf’s goals, establishing a partial "Islamic state" under sharia law in northeastern Nigeria. The group's current strategy in the second half of 2024 appears focused on preserving the status quo rather than provoking major military offensives. [101]
