Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Crenshaw, M., & Robinson, K. (2025). Mapping Militants Project. Rice University. https://doi.org/10.25613/G0K4-WF70
Mapping Militants Project. “The Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade.” Last modified June 30, 2018. https://mappingmilitants.org/node/308/
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
Despite its split from AQIM, the AMB claimed to remain loyal to the ideology and command of Al Qaeda Central.[28] The militant group aimed to spread jihad through all of the Sahara and impose Shariah law in North Africa. Belmokhtar encouraged his militants to fight against Western nations, both within the confines of Mali and outside of it; however, the groups’ attacks were mainly focused on Westerners and Western interests in North Africa.[29]
There are no recorded political activities for this group.
The AMB employed car bombings, suicide attacks, and kidnappings. Its main targets included western civilian interests in North Africa, the French and Malian militaries, and anyone who aided the French military in its invasion of northern Mali, including the Nigerien and Algerian governments and militaries.[30]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
January 16, 2013: AMB forces took control of a British Petroleum gas complex near the town of In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria and held Algerian and foreign workers hostage in retaliation for Algeria permitting France to use its airspace to launch attacks against the rebel forces in northern Mali.[31] The crisis ended on January 19 when the Algerian military intervened. Those killed included 39 hostages and 29 attackers.[32]
May 23, 2013: The AMB and MUJAO carried out simultaneous, coordinated suicide bombing attacks against a military camp in Agadez, Niger and a French-run uranium mine in Arlit, Niger (25 killed, 20 wounded).[33]
June 1, 2013: The AMB and MUJAO attacked a prison in Niamey, Niger with small arms, permitting 22 inmates to escape. The militant groups claimed that the attacks were in retaliation for Niger’s military intervention, which drove them out of northern Mali in January (2 killed, 3 wounded).[34]
Mokhtar Belmokhtar maintained extensive and lucrative smuggling routes for drugs, weapons, and humans throughout the Sahel. This was allegedly made possible because of his family ties to the local tribes in Mali, formed through his marriages to four different women from local Arab and Tuareg communities.[37] The 2013 In Amenas attack in Algeria was conducted in cooperation with a local group that grew out of protests by southern Algerian populations dissatisfied with the regime, extractive industries, and unemployment.[38]
The AMB formed in December 2012, when Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his soldiers split from AQIM. Although the groups split due to tensions in the leadership, it is unclear whether Belmokhtar chose to leave or was expelled. Belmokhtar remained loyal to AQ and continued taking direction from AQ Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri, although AQ did not recognize the AMB as an affiliate.[39]
Following the Malian coup of March 2012 and the consolidation of militant-held territory in northern Mali in June 2012, the AMB, as a semi-autonomous faction of AQIM, coordinated attacks with MUJAO and Ansar Dine against the MNLA. Belmokhtar later posted to jihadist websites on July 1, 2012 that despite the attacks against the MNLA, he remained open to accommodating the group.[40] After the French invaded and expelled the militant groups in northern Mali in January 2013, the fully independent AMB and MUJAO coordinated attacks in Mali, Niger and Algeria. In August 2013, the AMB merged with MUJAO into a new organization called Al Murabitoun.[41]
There are no publicly available external influences for this group.
[1] "Al-Mulathamun Battalion." Jihad Intel, n.d.
[2] Porter, Geoff D. “Terrorist Outbidding: The In Amenas Attack,” CTC Sentinel 8, 5 (May 2015) https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-outbidding-the-in-amenas-attack/; Guidère, Mathieu. “The Timbuktu Letters: New Insights about AQIM,” Res Militaris, 4:1, Winter-Spring (2014).
[3] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "Mali's Red Cross Fears for Missing Staff." BBC News, February 11, 2014; "Niamey Prison Break: Niger Confirms 22 Escaped." The BBC News, June 2, 2013.
[4] For a history of these developments, see Mémier, Marc. “AQMI et Al-Mourabitoun: le djihad sahélien réunifié?” Études de l’Ifri, Ifri, janvier 2017. See also Chivvis, Christopher S. and Andrew Liepman, North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response. Santa Monica: Rand, 2013.
[5] Black, Ian. "Mali Militants: Who's Who among Islamist Rebels." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, January 16, 2013.
[6] “Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” BBC News, June 15, 2015 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21061480. Gollom, Mark. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Al-Qaeda's Man in the Sahara?" CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, January 18, 2013.
[7] Wojtanik, Andrew. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar: One-Eyed Firebrand of North Africa and the Sahel." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2015.
[8] "Mali Tuareg Rebels Control Timbuktu as Troops Flee." BBC News, April 2, 2012.
[9] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Feb. 5, 2013; Roggio, Bill. "US Adds MUJAO Operative to Terrorism List," Long War Journal, August 21, 2013; "In Mali, Islamists Oust Tuareg Rebels From Gao," VOA News, June 28, 2012.
[10] Ely Ould Maghlah, "Bellawar raconte sa version des affrontements de Gao et appelle au calme et à la concertation," Agence Nouakchott d’Information, July 1, 2012.
[11] Wojtanik, Andrew. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar: One-Eyed Firebrand of North Africa and the Sahel." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2015; Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 5, 2013.
[12] Hall, John. "'You Never Answer Your Phone, You Don't File Expenses and You Miss Important Meetings': International Terrorist Moktar Belmoktar Receives Dressing down from Al-Qa'ida Leadership in Newly Discovered Letter." The Independent. May 29, 2013; Guidère, Mathieu. “The Timbuktu Letters: New Insights about AQIM,” Res Militaris, 4:1, Winter-Spring (2014).
[13] Chivvis, Christopher S. and Andrew Liepman. North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response. RAND Corporation, 2013. Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).” Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015.
[14] Black, Ian. "Mali Militants: Who's Who among Islamist Rebels." The Guardian, January 16, 2013.
[15] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm; "Those Who Sign With Blood / Masked Battalion / El-Moulethamine Battalion / Jama’at Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya ("Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa," MUJWA / MUJAO)." Global Security, June 14, 2015.
[16] Gollom, Mark. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Al-Qaeda's Man in the Sahara?" CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, January 18, 2013.
[17] Armstrong, Hannah, “The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest,” CTC Sentinel, Africa Special Issue, Volume 7, Issue 2 February 2014 (https://CTC.USMA.edu/The-In-Amenas-Attack-In-The-Context-Of-Southern-Algerias-Growing-Social-Unrest/).
[18] Porter, Geoff D. “Terrorist Outbidding: The In Amenas Attack,” CTC Sentinel 8, 5 (May 2015). https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-outbidding-the-in-amenas-attack/
[19] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao," BBC News, August 22, 2013; "Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'masterminded' Niger Suicide Bombs," BBC News, May 24, 2013.
[20] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao." BBC News, August 22, 2013; Weiss, Caleb, "Jihadists in Mali Step up Attacks, Kill 7 Soldiers,” The Long War Journal, January 5, 2015.
[21] "Mali: Lawlessness, Abuses Imperil Population." Human Rights Watch, April 14, 2015; Weiss, Caleb. "Jihadists in Mali Step up Attacks, Kill 7 Soldiers | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, January 5, 2015.
[22] Gollom, Mark. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Al-Qaeda's Man in the Sahara?" CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, January 18, 2013; Morgan, Andy. "Mr. Marlboro Lands a Seismic Blow." The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, January 19, 2013.
[23] Although the United Nations designation gives the date as 2003 (https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summari...), this must surely be 2013. See the West Point Combatting Terrorism Center Jihadi Bios Project biography, “Mokhtar Belmokhtar: One-Eyed Firebrand of North Africa and the Sahel,” 2015 (author Andrew Wojtanik,) https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/01/CTC_Mokhtar-Belmokhtar-Jihadi-Bio-February2015-2.pdf.
[24] Schmitt, Eric. "U.S. Airstrike in Libya Targets Planner of 2013 Algeria Attack," The New York Times, June 14, 2015.
[25] Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm
[26] Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015; "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar." BBC News, June 25, 2015.
[27] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm
[28] Roggio, Bill, and Thomas Joscelyn. "Al Qaeda-linked Group Claims Credit for Kidnappings in Algeria,” The Long War Journal, January 16, 2013.
[29] "Those Who Sign With Blood / Masked Battalion / El-Moulethamine Battalion / Jama’at Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya ("Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa," MUJWA / MUJAO)." Global Security, June 14, 2015.
[30] "How 'Mr Marlboro' Mokhtar Belmokhtar's Reign of Terror Struck Fear into the Heart of Mali." The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, January 18, 2013.
[31] "Al-Mulathamun Battalion." Jihad Intel, n.d.
[32] Porter, Geoff D. “Terrorist Outbidding: The In Amenas Attack,” CTC Sentinel 8, 5 (May 2015) https://ctc.usma.edu/terrorist-outbidding-the-in-amenas-attack/; Guidère, Mathieu. “The Timbuktu Letters: New Insights about AQIM,” Res Militaris, 4:1, Winter-Spring (2014).
[33] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao." BBC News, August 22, 2013; "Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'masterminded' Niger Suicide Bombs." BBC News, May 24, 2013.
[34] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "Mali's Red Cross Fears for Missing Staff." BBC News, February 11, 2014; "Niamey Prison Break: Niger Confirms 22 Escaped." The BBC News, June 2, 2013.
[35] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, “Terrorist Designation of the al-Mulathamun Battalion,” December 18, 2013. The Department of State considers the Those Who Sign in Blood group as a unit of the al-Mulathamun Battalion: “Both the “Those Who Sign in Blood” battalion and “al-Murabitoun” are included in the designation as aliases of the al-Mulathamun Battalion, and, as a result, all consequences of these designations will also apply to them.”
[36] "ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List." United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, June 24, 2016. https://scsanctions.un.org/en/?keywords=al-qaida#alqaedaent. Further information provided by INTERPOL available at https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5794759.
[37] Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters. "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." Council on Foreign Relations, March 27, 2015; "Profile: Mokhtar Belmokhtar." BBC News, June 15, 2015.
[38] Armstrong, Hannah, “The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest,” CTC Sentinel, Africa Special Issue, Volume 7, Issue 2, February 2014 (https://CTC.USMA.edu/The-In-Amenas-Attack-In-The-Context-Of-Southern-Alg...).
[39] Gollom, Mark. "Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Al-Qaeda's Man in the Sahara?" CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, January 18, 2013.
[40] Ely Ould Maghlah, “Bellawar raconte sa version des affrontements de Gao et appelle au calme et à la concertation,” Agence Nouakchott d’Information, July 1, 2012.
[41] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao," BBC News, August 22, 2013; Mémier, 2017. For background see also Congressional Research Service, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Murabitoun,” April 7, 2015.