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Hezbollah

Key statistics

1983
First Recorded Activity
1982
First Attack
2026
Profile Last Updated

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How to Cite

Crenshaw, M., & Robinson, K. (2025). Mapping Militants Project. Rice University. https://doi.org/10.25613/G0K4-WF70

Mapping Militants Project. “Hezbollah.” Last modified January 30, 2026. https://mappingmilitants.org/node/393/

Profile Contents

Narrative

Narrative of the Organization's History

Organization

Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations

Strategy

Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics

Major Attacks

First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks

Interactions

Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences

Maps

Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps

Global Islamic State
Aleppo
Iraq
Syria

Main Tabs Group

Overview
Formed: 
April 9, 1983

Disbanded: Group is active. 

First Attack: April 9, 1983: A group called Islamic Jihad, later to become Hezbollah, claimed responsibility for the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, which killed sixty-three (63 killed, unknown wounded).

Last Attack: December 2, 2024: Hezbollah fired projectiles at Mount Dov in northern Israel as a “warning” over alleged ceasefire violations (no casualties).

Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shia military and political group that emerged during the Lebanese Civil War and the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982. In an inaugural 1985 manifesto, Hezbollah announced that its goals were to destroy Israel and expel Western influence from Lebanon and the Middle East.  The group became notorious for suicide bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings of foreigners as well as attacks abroad. Its primary targets were the US and Israel.  In 1992, Hezbollah formed a political party and won seats in subsequent parliamentary elections. Iran provided critical support for Hezbollah’s foundation and was the group’s primary patron. During the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah supported Bashar al-Assad, providing thousands of troops to aid the regime. After Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah opened a northern front in support of Hamas, but Israel’s retaliation crippled Hezbollah and destroyed its leadership.  The December 2024 change of regime in Syria and loss of Iranian supply routes also weakened Hezbollah, which faces existential challenges to its long-term role as Iran’s proxy and Lebanon’s dominant armed actor.

Narrative

Armed Campaigns and Political Integration (1983–2003)

Hezbollah is a Shia political and military organization based in Lebanon that is anti-Israeli and anti-American. It began as a loose collection of underground terrorist cells and evolved into a hybrid organization woven into the structure of Lebanese society and politics. It provides social services and actively participates in politics, while also engaging in domestic and international terrorist attacks and regional military operations.[1]  

When Lebanon became independent in 1943, Shiites were economically and politically marginalized compared to Sunni Muslims and Christians.[2] After the Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975, several Islamic revivalist movements took root in Lebanon, fueled by mounting Shia discontent. The Amal movement – from which Hezbollah eventually split –became the most prominent Shia militia during the civil war, active particularly in the southern, Shia-dominated region of Lebanon.[3]

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization from southern Lebanon.[4] Some Shiites initially supported Israeli forces, but opinion turned against Israel as civilian deaths mounted.[5] The United States brokered a settlement providing for the withdrawal of the PLO.  American troops were deployed to Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force established to oversee the withdrawal and ensure the safety of Palestinian civilians left in Lebanon.  However, in September 1982, the Israeli Defense Force was complicit in allowing a Christian Lebanese militia to massacre at least 800 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.[6]

Subsequently, several Shiite  Amal movement leaders broke away to form a new organization, Islamic Amal, espousing a more militant response to the Israeli occupation of the south.[7] The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was essential to its formation. Several thousand IRGC members were dispatched to support Islamic Amal, along with financial backing.[8]

This precursor to Hezbollah first attracted international attention with the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy as well as American and French military barracks in Beirut, deployed as part of the multinational peacekeeping force.[9] In September 1984, Hezbollah, with Iranian support, carried out another suicide car bombing targeting the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut, killing 23 people.[10] Following the attacks, the peacekeeping force was withdrawn in 1984.

Before Israel’s partial withdrawal in 1985, Hezbollah primarily targeted Israeli forces, carrying out twelve suicide attacks and other assaults that solidified its reputation as the most prominent resistance actor. [11] From 1982 to 1992, Hezbollah-linked groups abducted nearly one hundred foreign citizens, mostly Americans, French, and British nationals. The kidnappings of CIA station chief William Buckley and U.S. Marine Lt. Colonel William Richard Higgins, both later killed in captivity, were particularly significant events.[12] By 1985, Israeli forces had withdrawn to a security zone along the border (with full withdrawal in 2000).[13] 

In 1985, Islamic Amal published a manifesto under the new name of Hezbollah (“Party of God”). The precise organizational relationship between Islamic Amal and Hezbollah remains unclear. [14] In the 1985 manifesto, Hezbollah rejected Israel’s right to exist and opposed Western influence in Lebanon and the wider Middle East. The group identified internal enemies like the Christian Phalange Party and promoted the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon..[15] Hezbollah, aligned with Iran, competed with the Syria-aligned Amal movement for leadership of the Shia community, leading to clashes between 1985 and 1989. [16]

From 1985 through the 1990s, Hezbollah maintained an active global presence. Its External Security Organization (the Islamic Jihad Organization or the External Services Organization) was responsible for planning and executing attacks outside Lebanon. In 1985, for example, branch members hijacked TWA Flight 847 from Cairo to Athens. The hostages were held for weeks, and Robert Dean Stethem, a U.S. Navy diver, was killed to draw attention to Lebanese prisoners held in Israel.[17] After Israeli released 300 Lebanese prisoners, the remaining hostages were freed.[18] In March 1992, Hezbollah operatives bombed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, killing twenty-nine and wounding hundreds. In July 1994, the group was accused of bombing the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association, which killed nearly 100 and wounded more than 200. Hezbollah denied responsibility.[19] In June 1996, the group assisted in bombing the American Khobar Towers military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. Air Force personnel.[20]

The 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, opened the door for Hezbollah to officially join the Lebanese political process and ensured Syrian domination over Lebanon. The transition was favored both by Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyid Abbas al Musawi and by Iranian president Hashimi Rafsanjani.[21] Hezbollah competed in its first Lebanese national elections in 1992 and won eight seats in Parliament. Hezbollah also participated in national elections in 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009, and 2018.

As a political party, Hezbollah was often at odds with the Lebanese government. After the 2005 elections, Hezbollah opposed the U.S.-and Saudi Arabia–backed government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. In December 2006, Hezbollah led a sit-in aimed at forcing the government to resign, resulting in 18 months of political deadlock.[22] Tensions erupted again in May 2008 after the government moved to shut down Hezbollah’s private telecommunications network. Violence broke out in Beirut between Hezbollah and government supporters. The deadlock ended later that year when the Arab League brokered the Doha Agreement which granted Hezbollah veto power in the government.[23]

Hezbollah continued attacks against Israeli forces.[24] Israel departed southern Lebanon in 2000, a move widely attributed to Hezbollah that increased the group’s popularity.[25] Following this, Hezbollah sought the release of Lebanese citizens held in Israeli prisons.  In July 2006, Hezbollah crossed into Israel, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed eight Israeli soldiers.[26] The incident triggered the 34-day war with Israel. Lebanon’s air and sea routes were blockaded; Beirut’s airport was struck. It led to the evacuation of around 15,000 American citizens, one of the largest U.S. government non-combatant evacuations at the time.[27] The war resulted in around 1,300 Lebanese deaths, over 4,400 Lebanese wounded, and 165 Israeli deaths.[28] Supporters lauded Hezbollah’s supposed victory against Israel, while critics accused it of instigating an unnecessary and highly destructive war.[29]

Expanding Regional Role (2003–2023)

After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Hezbollah established Unit 3800. According to U.S. intelligence, Unit 3800 trained, armed, and funded Iraqi Shia militant groups that targeted U.S. forces in Iraq.[30] The Hezbollah-sponsored groups carried out several attacks in Iraq, including the 2007 Karbala Joint Coordination Center attack that killed five Americans.[31]  In 2014, Hezbollah aided Iraqi groups to fight against the Islamic State after its declaration of a caliphate.[32] Starting in 2014, Hezbollah also sent militants and resources to support Houthi insurgents in the Yemeni Civil War. Initially, Hezbollah focused on transferring funds and training insurgents[33] As the war progressed, Hezbollah began sending militants to the region.[34]

In 2011, Hezbollah sent military advisors to aid the al-Assad regime in Syria’s civil war. In June 2013, Hezbollah officials confirmed that combat forces had been deployed to fight alongside Assad’s troops, Russian forces, and other allied Shia organizations.[35] Hezbollah intervened to defend the Assad regime as a strategic ally against Israel and to maintain access to Syrian territory for transporting Iranian missile parts and weapons.[36].

Hezbollah forces in Syria initially concentrated in the city of al-Qusayr on the border of Syria and Lebanon.  By 2014, Hezbollah expanded operations other parts of Syria, from Aleppo in the north to Daraa in the south. [37] Hezbollah played a critical role in the Aleppo Offensive in late 2016, assisting Assad forces in retaking control.[38] Hezbollah also trained and organized Syrian Shia militias and recruited thousands of foreign fighters.[39] Bolstered by external aid, the Assad regime regained some of its influence in Syria, and it reasserted control over many Shia militias by 2017.[40] Throughout the war, Hezbollah fought alongside both Iranian and Russian troops as well as other pro-Assad forces. Its opponents were the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and elements of the Free Syrian Army.[41] After 2018, fighting subsided, and Hezbollah withdrew much of its personnel. However, Hezbollah troops remained near Damascus, in Deir al-Zour, and throughout southern Syria.

Despite their effectiveness, Hezbollah suffered more casualties in Syria than during Israel’s eighteen-year occupation of Lebanon, including the deaths of senior commanders Abu Jaafar and Ali Fayyad.[42] Available estimates indicate that 7,000–10,000 fighters were deployed, with roughly 1,600–2,000 killed and 5,000–6,000 wounded.[43]  In addition, Hezbollah’s reputation suffered.   Growing unpopularity may have been a reason for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in spring 2016.[44]

Nevertheless, the war in Syria greatly increased Hezbollah’s fighting capabilities and weapons stockpile. The group received significant amounts of high-tech military equipment and weaponry from Russia and Iran.[45] Hezbollah militants also gained experience fighting other non-state actors, such as the Islamic State, and operating in dense urban environments.[46] Additionally, reports suggest that the group’s recruiting capabilities in Lebanon expanded significantly as a result of participation in the civil war.[47]

During the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah’s attention was largely diverted from Israel. In 2018, Assad forces regained control of the Syrian-administered portion of the Golan Heights, a region bordering Israeli-occupied territory. Hezbollah then began establishing cells and militias and stationing weapons in the area.[48] It also recruited hundreds of local Syrians to form new militias.[49] Hezbollah began scaling back its involvement in Syria around 2019. The decision was driven by growing domestic opposition in Lebanon and by the Assad regime’s consolidation of control over much of the country. [50]

After 2019, Hezbollah faced financial constraints. U.S. sanctions on Iran – Hezbollah’s primary patron –reduced Iran’s ability to finance the group. Hezbollah shut many offices around the country and cut the pay of its employees and militants.[51] According to the U.S. State Department, Iran provided Hezbollah with an estimated $700 million annually. In 2020, this figure declined to approximately $280 million per year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced oil revenues, and U.S. sanctions on Iran.[52]

The U.S. killing of Qassem Soleimani in 2020 reshaped Hezbollah’s role in Iraq. Soleimani was the commander of the Quds Force who coordinated IRGC foreign operations. Iran assigned this role to Hezbollah after his death.[53] Hezbollah then expanded its training of Iraqi militias and provided strategic guidance for attacks on U.S. and coalition forces, including strikes on bases and convoys.[54] Hezbollah also increased its political influence over pro-Iranian factions within the Iraqi government. Along with Kataib Hezbollah, it was a key member of the Iranian sponsored Axis of Resistance. 

 

October 7 and Aftermath (2023–Present)

On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched a large-scale surprise attack on Israel, killing more than 1,200 people, primarily civilians, and taking over 240 hostages into Gaza.[55] The following day, Hezbollah opened a second front by firing rockets, mortars, and artillery shells at Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms area and along the border. The group described it as “solidarity with the Palestinians.[56] On 11 October, the United States announced the deployment of two aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean to deter foreign intervention and warned Hezbollah against joining the war.[57] Israel responded to Hezbollah’s early cross-border fire with artillery strikes on positions in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah carried out near-daily attacks on northern communities.[58]

Between October and November 2023, hostilities intensified along the border, displacing tens of thousands on both sides.[59][60] On 3 November 2023, Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah confirmed the group’s involvement and emphasized that Hamas had not informed Hezbollah before the 7 October attacks and that the groups had not planned a joint strategy. Nasrallah described Hezbollah’s role as supportive rather than an effort to expand the war into a full-scale regional conflict. He confirmed that 57 Hezbollah fighters had been killed in the first 26 days of fighting.[61]

Throughout November 2023, Hezbollah employed heavier weaponry, including Grad rockets, large-scale salvos, and multiple anti-tank missile strikes. Its attacks struck Israeli military positions as well as civilian areas such as Kiryat Shmona, Manara, and Moshav Dovev. The attacks injured at least 7 Israeli soldiers and more than 20 civilians. Israeli retaliatory airstrikes and drone operations targeted Hezbollah cells and infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[62]  On 22 November Israeli strikes killed 5 Hezbollah fighters, including the son of a Hezbollah parliamentarian and a commander in the group’s elite Radwan Force. The following day, Hezbollah carried out one of its largest assaults since the outbreak of the war, firing more than 80 rockets, mortars, and missiles. The barrage included a salvo of 35 rockets and another 48 reportedly aimed at an Israeli base near Safed.[63]

On 24 November, Israel and Hamas entered a temporary truce to exchange hostages for Palestinian prisoners.[64] Hezbollah announced that it would respect the ceasefire.[65] Military operations on both sides halted.  The truce collapsed on 30 November. Exchanges of fire soon resumed along the border.[66] Violence intensified in 2024, fueling concerns of a wider regional war.[67] In January 2024, Nasrallah called for border delimitation talks with Israel, but he made the negotiations conditional on a Gaza ceasefire.[68]

Between January and July 2024, Hezbollah lost more than 400 fighters and at least 15 mid-and senior-level commanders in Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon and Syria. The assaults eliminated commanders who oversaw rocket and missile operations, coastal defense, and field units in areas such as Tyre and Jouaiyya, which marked one of the heaviest leadership losses since the 2006 war.[69]

Between June and August 2024, U.S. Special Envoy Amos Hochstein mediated between Lebanon and Israel to ease cross-border tensions.[70] In July, Nasrallah reiterated that Hezbollah would halt attacks on Israel only if a ceasefire were reached in Gaza.[71]

On 27 July, a missile hit the Druze town of Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights, killing twelve children. Israel attributed the attack to Hezbollah.[72] Hezbollah acknowledged firing rockets at a nearby Israeli base but denied responsibility.[73] On 30 July, an Israel airstrike in Beirut killed Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah commander accused of involvement in the Majdal Shams attack.[74] On 25 August, Hezbollah retaliated by launching rockets and drones at Israel in one of the heaviest barrages since October 2023. [75] 

In mid-September 2024, thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah members and supporters exploded almost simultaneously across Lebanon and Syria.[76] The shock was devastating:  Nasrallah described the incident as a “major blow” and an act of war.[77] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated that the attack marked the beginning of a “new phase” of the conflict.[78] The pager blasts injured nearly 3,000 people, including Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon.[79] The following day, a second wave targeted walkie-talkies, killing about 30 more people and wounding hundreds at funerals for earlier victims.[80] According to Hezbollah, about 1,500 of its fighters were incapacitated.[81] The blasts disrupted Hezbollah’s chain of command. Days later, Hezbollah responded with rocket fire into northern Israel. (In November, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged responsibility for the operation, later referred to as Operation Grim Beeper.[82])

On 25 September, the United States, Qatar, the European Union, and other international actors proposed a 21-day ceasefire.[83] Apparently Nasrallah privately indicated support for the cease-fire to the Lebanese foreign minister.[84]  Days later, on 27 September, Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut, which was a major blow to both Hezbollah and Iran.[85]

On 1 October 2024, the Israeli military invaded southern Lebanon. Israel described it as “limited, localized and targeted raids” aimed at securing northern communities and enabling displaced residents to return home.[86] Hours later, Iran fired at least 180 ballistic missiles at Israel, citing the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah as justification.[87] Hezbollah continued firing rockets and anti-tank weapons at advancing units and launching barrages deeper into Israel, including in the city of Haifa. On 3 October, Hashem Safieddine, who was considered Nasrallah’s likely successor, was also killed.[88]

In late October, Israeli officials claimed that most of their military objectives had been achieved, setting conditions for negotiations.[89] On 29 October, Hezbollah’s leadership council elected Naim Qassem, long-time deputy secretary-general, as new Secretary-General.[90]

A 60-day ceasefire was proposed in late October.[91] On 26 November, President Biden announced that Israel and Hezbollah had reached an agreement: Hezbollah agreed to move its fighters north of the Litani River and reverse its earlier commitment to continue fighting if Israel pursued its war in Gaza.[92] The ceasefire has largely held, although both sides have accused each other of violations. held.  Prime Minister Najib Mikati called for unity in Lebanon, expressing hope for a “new page” after the ceasefire.[93] In January 2025, Lebanon’s parliament elected Joseph Aoun as president, ending a two-year leadership vacuum.[94] Aoun pledged to extend Lebanese state authority throughout the south, signaling his intention to confront Hezbollah’s weapons.[95] On 13 January, Aoun appointed Nawaf Salam as prime minister, a decision that Hezbollah opposed. Middle East experts interpreted Salam’s appointment as a sign of the group’s weakened position following the death of Nasrallah.[96] In April, Aoun declared that weapons in Lebanon would remain only in the hands of the state. He added that Hezbollah’s disarmament would proceed through dialogue rather than force.[97] A senior Hezbollah official indicated a willingness to discuss disarmament with Aoun if Israel withdrew from five southern hilltops and ended cross-border strikes.[98] Hezbollah’s limited cooperation was reportedly motivated by the need to preserve domestic political support and avoid harsher international sanctions.[99]

During the Gaza war, Hezbollah suffered some of the heaviest casualties in its history. An internal estimate indicated that the group might have lost up to 4,000 fighters during fourteen months of hostilities.[100] Lebanese authorities reported that around 3,800 people had been killed, without distinguishing between combatants and civilians.[101] As of December, the IDF estimated that roughly 3,800 Hezbollah fighters were killed after 8 October 2023. The number included 2,672 during the invasion of Lebanon and 44 after the ceasefire.[102] The attrition of Hezbollah’s senior leadership left major gaps in its command structure.[103]

Israeli airstrikes destroyed and damaged bases, tunnels, weapons depots, and fortifications across southern Lebanon. Strikes on the Syrian border disrupted Hezbollah’s arms supply.[104] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported confiscating more than 155,000 weapons and pieces of military equipment. These included about 12,000 explosive devices, drones, and other explosive weapons. Israel also captured more than 13,000 anti-tank missile launchers, rockets, and anti-aircraft missiles.  IDF said that over 121,000 communication devices, computers, electronic equipment, and documents were also captured.[105]

On 27 November 2024, Syrian opposition forces launched a major offensive against government-held territories, exploiting Hezbollah’s absence and its heavy losses in Lebanon.[106] Although Hezbollah initially said it would not deploy fighters, it later sent “supervising forces” in an unsuccessful attempt to halt the offensive.[107] In December 2024, the fall of President Assad’s regime dealt a significant blow to Hezbollah.[108] According to a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, the loss of this route hindered the group’s ability to replenish its missile stockpiles and maintain its military infrastructure in Lebanon.[109] It also cut off access to the wartime economy, which had supplemented Hezbollah’s finances through smuggling and cross-border trade.[110] Israeli strikes on Iranian missile facilities in Damascus further degraded the group’s military capacity.[111] The new Syrian leadership, aligned with Sunni Islamist factions, blocked Iranian transfers.[112] Ali Fayyad, a senior Hezbollah official, acknowledged that Assad’s fall represented a “major strategic loss.” It significantly weakened Hezbollah’s position as Iran’s frontline ally against Israel.[113]

In  July 2025, Qassem warned that Hezbollah would not surrender its weapons or accept normalization with Israel. He accused the United States and Arab states of pressuring Lebanon’s leadership to disarm the group.[114] Lebanon’s Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri criticized the United States’ push to disarm Hezbollah and instead called for a national dialogue to decide the fate of its weapons.[115] Hezbollah continues to project resilience; however, its material and organizational losses cast doubt on its long-term viability as both a regional proxy and a dominant actor in Lebanon.[116] Hezbollah’s current weapons holdings are uncertain. Its rearmament to the same extent is hindered by the breakdown of its regional backing from Iran and Syria. Since 2024, U.S. maximum-pressure sanctions, Israeli strikes, nationwide unrest against the Islamic Republic’s government, and ongoing fiscal shortfalls constrain Iran’s ability to restore Hezbollah’s financial and operational capacity. The fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 further severed a key supply route used by Hezbollah to smuggle money and weapons.[117]

On September 19, 2025, Secretary-General Naim Qassem called on Saudi Arabia to “turn a new page” to form a unified front against Israel, amid growing pressure on Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah.[118] Hezbollah has publicly committed to the ceasefire—not a formal signatory. Its fighters began withdrawing from southern Lebanon. Supported by a UN observer force, the Lebanese Army reported removing 90 percent of Hezbollah’s weapons from southern Lebanon. Hezbollah did not obstruct Lebanese Army efforts to locate and confiscate its weapons caches. However, it insists that the disarmament provisions apply only to southern Lebanon.[119]

On November 23, Ali Tabatabai, Hezbollah’s chief of staff, was killed in an Israeli strike on southern Beirut, marking a post-ceasefire operation against a senior Hezbollah figure.[120] On November 28, Naim Qassem stated that Hezbollah retained the right to respond to Israel’s killing of its top military commander, but the group has shown only limited retaliation. [121]On December 23, 2025, Lebanon rejected Israeli claims that a Lebanese soldier killed in an airstrike near Sidon had links to Hezbollah. Israel stated that the strike targeted militants involved in rebuilding Hezbollah’s infrastructure. A Hezbollah official denied any link between the group and members of the Lebanese army.[122]

Israeli and U.S. officials stated that Hezbollah is rebuilding military capabilities that threaten Israel’s security and undermine the ceasefire. Hezbollah denies rebuilding its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon and states that it remains committed to the ceasefire, noting that it has not fired on Israel since the agreement took effect.[123] On January 8, 2026, Lebanon announced the completion of the first phase of the disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed groups in southern Lebanon. Israel responded that the progress was “far from sufficient,” citing renewed concerns that the ceasefire could unravel.[124] On January 14, 2026, a senior Hezbollah official warned that extending disarmament efforts beyond southern Lebanon could trigger chaos or civil war and refused to relinquish its arsenal elsewhere.[125] Progress outside the south remains uncertain. Progress outside the south remains uncertain. The Lebanese Army has proceeded cautiously to contain tensions and allow Lebanese leaders more time to decide on the group’s weapons in other regions of the country. [126]

Organization

Vertical Tabs

Leadership

Hezbollah’s organizational structure has evolved since its founding in 1982. The group has a hierarchical and centralized structure led by the Shura Council, its top decision-making body. The council selects the secretary-general. The secretary-general, Hezbollah’s top leader, chairs the Shura Council and directs military operations through the Jihad Council. The council oversees both regional and functional committees, which address issues related to ideology, finances, policy, military affairs, social affairs, and legal affairs.[127]

Hezbollah has five council assemblies that divide responsibilities, each reporting directly to the Shura Council: the Executive Council, Jihad Council, Political Council, Parliamentary Council, and Judicial Council. This structure allows Hezbollah to operate as a “state within a state.”[128]

The Jihad Council directs the Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah’s armed wing. It oversees recruitment, training, equipment, and combat. The council consists of smaller units responsible for leadership security, domestic and international surveillance, counterintelligence, and foreign operations. Each unit reports directly to the Jihad Council. The council maintains a high degree of secrecy.[129]

 

Sayyad Abbas Musawi (unknown - February 16, 1992): Musawi was Hezbollah’s cofounder and first secretary-general. He was killed in 1992 by an Israeli helicopter strike that also killed six other militants.[130]

Hassan Nasrallah (1992 - September 27, 2024): Nasrallah served as Hezbollah’s secretary-general from 1992 until his death in an Israeli airstrike.  Nasrallah took over Hezbollah’s leadership at the request of Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei after Musawi’s assassination in 1992.[131] Under his leadership, Hezbollah became a potent paramilitary and political force in Lebanon and the Middle East.[132] In 2013, Nasrallah announced Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in support of President Bashar al-Assad. He maintained close coordination with Iran and Hamas. Nasrallah oversaw cross-border clashes with Israel after the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks.[133]

Hashem Safieddine (1994 – October 22, 2024): Safieddine headed Hezbollah’s Executive Council, overseeing financial and administrative affairs. As the organization’s second-most powerful figure, he was considered a likely successor to Nasrallah. He was a member of both the Shura Council and the Jihad Council.[134] Following Nasrallah’s death, Safieddine was seen as running the group with deputy secretary-general Naim Qassem. He was killed in an Israeli airstrike on Beirut’s southern suburb in 2024.[135]

Imad Mughniyeh (1983 - February 12, 2008): Mughniyeh was Hezbollah’s senior military commander and was reportedly responsible for a number of overseas attacks. He was killed in a car bombing in 2008 that was allegedly carried out by Israeli intelligence in coordination with the CIA.[136]

Mustafa Badr al-Din (2008 - May 10, 2016): Badr al-Din allegedly replaced Imad Mughniyah as Hezbollah’s military commander in 2008. He was killed in Syria on May 10, 2016, in an explosion at Damascus International Airport. The cause of the explosion remains disputed.[137]

Sheikh Naim Qassem (1992 - present): Qassem became Hezbollah’s secretary-general in October 2024, after the death of Nasrallah and Safieddine. Qassem is a founding member of Hezbollah. He became deputy secretary-general in 1991. He oversaw educational and scouting activities as part of the group’s Shura Council.[138] In 2004, he published a history of Hezbollah entitled Hezbollah: The Story from Within,” which was translated into several languages.[139]

Ibrahim Aqeel (1980s – September 20, 2024): Aqeel, also known as Tahsin, was the second-in-command of Hezbollah’s armed forces and a key figure in the elite Radwan Force, which operates along the Israeli border. According to U.S. officials, he was linked to the 1983 U.S. Embassy bombing in Beirut that killed 63 people and the Marine barracks bombing that killed 241 U.S. personnel. Aqeel was killed in an Israeli airstrike on the Dahiyeh area of Beirut in 2024.[140]

Fuad Shukr (1982 – July 30, 2024): Shukr, also known as al-Hajj Mohsen, was a senior Hezbollah military commander and a close adviser to Nasrallah.[141] He was one of the founding members of Hezbollah’s military wing. Shukr was accused by U.S. officials of involvement in the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks bombing in Beirut. Shukr was killed in an Israeli airstrike in 2024.[142]

Haytham Ali Tabtabai (1980s – November 23, 2025): Tabtabai served as Hezbollah’s military chief of staff following the ceasefire and was involved in efforts to reconstitute the group’s military capabilities. He was killed in an Israeli airstrike south of Beirut in 2025.[143] A member of Hezbollah’s second generation of commanders, he rose through the organization’s military ranks during the 2023–2024 conflict with Israel.[144]

Talal Hamiyah (unknown - present): Hamiyah leads the group’s External Security Organization (ESO), the branch of Hezbollah that plans and executes attacks outside of Lebanon. Hamiyah is believed to have been behind Hezbollah’s 1994 attack on a Jewish center in Argentina that killed 85.[145] According to reports from Lebanese sources, he traveled to Iraq regularly and was in contact with the leaders of the Shia militias fighting against U.S. forces.[146] On October 10, 2017, the U.S. government offered a reward of up to $7 million for information on Hamiyah.[147]

Ali Musa Daqduq (1983 - 2024): Daqduq – also known under the alias Abu Hussein Sajed – led Hezbollah’s military network in the Syrian Golan Heights. Daqduq was sent to Iraq in 2006 to assist Shiite militias in operations against U.S. forces.[148]He reportedly helped plan the 2007 Karbala attack in Iraq that killed five U.S. soldiers. Captured by U.S. forces in 2007, he was released by the Iraqi government in 2012. In 2018, Daqduq was appointed commander of the Golan Portfolio to prepare for potential operations against Israel. He was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Syria in 2024.[149]

Ibrahim al-Amine al-Sayyid (2001 – present): Al-Sayyid has served as Hezbollah’s Chairman of the Political Council since 2001, replacing Mohammad Raad. He is a cleric and a former Amal member. Al-Sayyid became Hezbollah’s official spokesman and announced the group’s 1985 Open Letter.[150]

Muhammad Yazbak (1995 – present): Yazbak is one of Hezbollah’s founders. He is the head of Hezbollah’s Judicial Council and a member of the Shura Council. In 1995, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Yazbak as his religious representative in Lebanon. The appointment placed Yazbak at the head of the Judicial Council.[151] He oversaw a military command in central Lebanon, supervised training camps, coordinated weapons smuggling, and managed Hezbollah's bank accounts.[152]

Mohammad Raad (1992 – present): Raad is a senior Hezbollah lawmaker and a member of the Lebanese parliament representing the Nabatieh District. He leads Hezbollah’s Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, the group’s main parliamentary faction.[153]

 

Size Estimates
  • 2006: 3,000-5,000 full time and part time fighters (Jane’s Intelligence Review)[155]
  • 2008: About 1,000 core members and between 3,000 and 10,000 reserve fighters (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism)[156]
  • 2015: Hezbollah MP Nawwaf Moussawi went on record to say that the group’s membership had “increased significantly” since the 2006 war against Israel[157] 
  • 2017: 25,000 fully trained and active combatants with an estimated 20,000-30,000 reservists (Jane’s Intelligence Review)[158]
  • 2019: 7,000-10,000 fighters in Syria alone (Center for Strategic and International Studies)[159]
  • 2020: 30,000 regular fighters and 10,000–20,000 reservists (Atlantic Council)[160]
  • 2023: 50,000 or more regular fighters and reservists (Library of Congress)[161]
Name Changes

Hezbollah first announced its existence as a cohesive group in 1985. Before that, its members were part of organizations like Islamic Amal, which many analysts deem an early iteration of Hezbollah.[154] The U.S. government considers Islamic Jihad, the name that the group used to claim its first attack, to be an alias of Hezbollah.

Resources

Hezbollah has long relied on Iranian support, supply routes through Syria into Lebanon, and fundraising networks worldwide, including in the Gulf, Europe, the Middle East, South America, and the United States.[162] After the United States left the Iran Nuclear Deal in May 2018, U.S. sanctions on Iran reduced Hezbollah’s finances. The group froze spending, merged institutions, and closed hundreds of offices and apartments in Lebanon. Hezbollah cut social services and fighter pay; the report suggested that married fighters received about half of their expected salaries ($600–$1,200 per month), while single fighters received about $200 per month. Hezbollah also reportedly drew more on state-linked resources after gaining control of three Lebanese ministries in early 2019 and increased smuggling along the Lebanon–Syria border to finance its operations.[163] In March 2019, Hassan Nasrallah appealed for donations to offset the impact of U.S. sanctions.[164]

Although most members of Hezbollah are Lebanese Shiites, the organization recruits globally. In the early 2000s, Hezbollah especially sought foreign-born recruits and Arab Israelis living abroad. Their passports allowed them to pass through Israeli security more easily, enabling Hezbollah to carry out attacks inside Israel. Hezbollah also recruited thousands of foreign Shiites for the Syrian war, drawing heavily from Pakistani and Afghan volunteers.[165]AIPAC’s 2019 report stated that Hezbollah had built a large arsenal over several decades. It estimated that Hezbollah had stockpiled 120,000–150,000 rockets and missiles of various ranges and sizes.[166] Hezbollah also reportedly developed drone capabilities far more advanced than any other terrorist group in the world. In 2018, an assessment claimed that Hezbollah used Karrar armed drones to destroy numerous Islamic State targets in Syria over several years.[167]

Since the 1990s, Hezbollah expanded and diversified its global networks. The group built a sophisticated financial architecture that integrates diaspora communities, front companies, and partnerships with transnational organized crime groups.[168] Debate continues over these criminal networks and the extent to which they are directly affiliated with and controlled by Hezbollah.[169] Hezbollah engages in money laundering, counterfeiting, human trafficking, cigarette smuggling, extortion, cybercrime, and other illicit activities through its extensive networks. These interconnected systems provide Hezbollah with a resilient revenue base and enable it to evade international enforcement mechanisms.[170]  While Hezbollah’s operations span Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America, its activities were  most pronounced in South  America and West Africa, where weak regulatory environments and entrenched diaspora networks prevailed.[171]

In the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, Hezbollah exploits weak governance, limited regulatory oversight, and porous borders to establish a parallel criminal economy.[172] The group benefits from access to three jurisdictions, three currencies, and inconsistent enforcement to launder funds, obscure financial flows, and evade detection.[173] The region hosts an estimated 9.6–10 million people of Lebanese birth or descent, concentrated in Brazil and Argentina.[174] Many are engaged in trade, tourism, and commercial enterprises in local economies. Hezbollah leverages networks within the Lebanese and Shiite diaspora communities— from active sympathizers to individuals with loose or indirect connections to the organization — to generate revenue.[175]

Lebanese families — including the Rada, Saleh, Nassereddine, and Akil clans — act as facilitators within this network. These clans maintain extensive communal ties and operate through legitimate businesses, enabling Hezbollah to funnel funds from exchange houses, tourist services, and front companies into its broader global financing infrastructure. They also have strategic relationships with the Maduro regime in Venezuela and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), providing cover for sensitive operations and ensuring plausible deniability for senior state actors.[176]

Hezbollah’s role in narco-terrorism illustrates its integration into the broader criminal ecosystem. A notable case involves Ghazi Nassereddine, a key figure within the Lebanese Nassereddine clan.[177] He allegedly coordinated a meeting to facilitate the exchange of military-grade weapons from Hezbollah for cocaine supplied by Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC).[178] This transaction was supported by the Cártel de Los Soles (“Cartel of the Suns”), a network involving senior Venezuelan officials. The arrangement reportedly extended beyond narcotics trafficking, seeking to recruit Hezbollah and Hamas operatives for joint training in Venezuela with cartel personnel.[179]

West Africa has emerged as a critical node in Hezbollah’s global financing network. The region hosts an estimated 120,000 Lebanese immigrants who are mostly in import-export businesses.[180] Hezbollah leverages the network to generate resources through donations, illicit enterprises, and recruitment efforts.[181] By embedding itself within these commercial networks, Hezbollah has established multi-layered money-laundering operations that link South America, West Africa, and Europe.[182] The group collaborates with Mexican and Colombian cartels, local gangs, terrorist organizations, and other criminal groups to move narcotics, weapons, and funds across continents.[183]

West Africa functions as a strategic storage and transit hub.[184] Hezbollah reportedly stockpiles drugs and weapons in the region and exploits maritime routes, including through Guinea-Bissau, to transport narcotics into Europe.[185] Additionally, Hezbollah operatives are deeply involved in the illicit diamond trade, particularly in Sierra Leone, using global markets in Belgium, Bombay, and Dubai to circumvent enforcement measures.[186] Many financiers and facilitators hold multiple citizenships, such as French and Belgian passports, enabling them to cross borders with minimal scrutiny.[187]

Hezbollah has operated sophisticated criminal networks in the United States and European countries. The group uses legitimate businesses as fronts to launder money and finance its operations, creating a crime-terror nexus. From 1995 to 2000, Hezbollah supporters in North Carolina ran a cigarette smuggling network that moved low-tax cigarettes to Michigan. The scheme generated approximately $1.5 million for Hezbollah.[188] In 2002, federal authorities dismantled the operation. In 2003, network leader Mohamad Hammoud was convicted in the first U.S. trial for providing material support to Hezbollah. Investigations found that many individuals involved were opportunistic criminals and sympathizers, rather than formal Hezbollah operatives.[189]

Operation Bathwater began with a credit card fraud investigation in Dearborn, Michigan, in the early 2000s. The U.S. law enforcement investigation expanded into a broader operation exposing Hezbollah-linked criminal networks across the United States and abroad. Imad Hammoud, identified as a Hezbollah supporter, managed a counterfeit scheme involving cigarettes, passports, and Viagra. The operation spanned multiple U.S. states as well as Canada, Lebanon, Brazil, Paraguay, and China.[190] Hammoud’s associates included Hassan Ali Moussawi, who later became a Hezbollah Member of Parliament and was linked to counterfeit Viagra sales in the United States.[191]

In 2008, as part of Project Cassandra, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), with Eurojust and Europol, tracked hundreds of millions of dollars laundered from North America through Europe and West Africa to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Investigations and arrests revealed that Hezbollah established ties with South American drug cartels to traffic drugs to Europe and the United States.[192] In July 2014, the U.S. Treasury Department designated three individuals for operating a key Hezbollah procurement network. They used the Lebanon-based Stars Group Holding as a front for various illicit activities. The network allegedly procured technology from suppliers in North America, Europe, Dubai, and China to support Hezbollah’s UAV program.[193]

In 2016, Project Cedar, a joint U.S.–EU investigation, targeted Hezbollah operatives and criminal facilitators involved in a large-scale drug and money-laundering scheme. The operation uncovered that Hezbollah developed extensive ties with La Oficina de Envigado and the Medellín Cartel, which supplied cocaine to markets in the United States and Europe. Debate continues over how closely these criminal networks are affiliated with and controlled by Hezbollah.[194]

Hezbollah is also said to receive funds through cryptocurrency transactions. According to Israeli government seizure orders and blockchain-analytics reports, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hezbollah collectively raised more than $134 million in digital currency between August 2021 and June 2023.[195] Reportedly, Hezbollah obtained approximately $3.7 million.[196] Blockchain analysis further indicates that Hezbollah and PIJ may have exchanged up to $12 million in cryptocurrency since 2021 through transfers between digital wallets.[197]

Following the war with Israel after October 7, Hezbollah’s operational structure in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq was significantly degraded; Iran’s capacity to provide financial support diminished.[198] According to a RAND policy analyst, Hezbollah’s South American networks could become increasingly valuable as alternative operational hubs far from its primary theater.[199] Hezbollah is reportedly expected to lean more heavily on its global criminal and financial networks to rebuild capabilities and secure revenue streams.[200]

Locations

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

Hezbollah is based in southern Lebanon, and its headquarters are located in the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon.[201] While the group conducts the majority of its planning, logistical, and military operations in Lebanon, it also operates cells globally. Militant members abroad fundraise, recruit, or plan operations for the group.[202] For example, Hezbollah deployed dozens of commanders to Iraq in 2003; Hezbollah militants helped train and establish Shia militias in Iraq to fight against U.S. and Coalition forces.[203] From 2014-2019, Hezbollah also deployed militants to Yemen to support the Houthi insurgency. Hezbollah also formed cells in the West; in 2017, the U.S. intelligence community identified and arrested a Hezbollah sleeper cell operating in New York City. The cell had plans to create a stockpile of weapons and target prominent Israelis in the city.[204]

Beginning in 2013, Hezbollah also deployed significant troops in Syria to fight alongside the forces of Bashar al-Assad.[205] Hezbollah forces were initially concentrated in the city of al-Qusayr, on the border of Syria and Lebanon. By 2015, Hezbollah operations had spread to other areas of Syria, including in the northwest cities of Idlib and Aleppo, in the south near Daraa, and even in the central and eastern parts of the country. In 2018, the group participated in offenses near the Deir Ezzor province in eastern Syria.[206]

In 2019, Israeli forces discovered Hezbollah cells in border villages on the Syrian Golan Heights. After Syrian government forces took control of the Syrian Golan Heights in 2018, Hezbollah took advantage of the victory to establish infrastructure there to threaten Israel near the border.[207] In 2019, Hezbollah operatives recruited hundreds of men from the Golan Heights to assist in their fight against Israel. .[208] This development challenged Assad’s long-standing understanding with Israel to leave the Golan front alone, in accordance with a 1974 armistice agreement. In response, Israel declared that Hezbollah’s operations to build a military capacity in Syria would not stand; after May 2018, Israel carried out strikes on Hezbollah units in the Golan Heights.[209]

Strategy

Vertical Tabs

Ideology and Goals

According to Hezbollah’s 1985 manifesto, its original goals were to destroy Israel, expel Western influences from Lebanon and the wider Middle East, and combat its enemies within Lebanon, particularly the Christian Phalange Party. The group would “permit” Lebanese people to choose their own government, with the caveat that “only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of imperialistic infiltration into [the] county.” [210] The group deemed the international system and the 1985 Lebanese government to be subject to imperial influences and hostile to Islam, and it denied Israel’s right to exist.[211] As Hezbollah’s constituency broadened to include more moderate Shiites, organization leaders like Hassan Nasrallah and Naim Qassem suggested that the manifesto was becoming more disconnected from the group’s operations and goals.[212]

In the early 1990s, Hezbollah transformed from a non-state revolutionary group to a hybrid state actor, employing both political and violent means to achieve its goals. Hezbollah began to consider the established Lebanese political system an appropriate channel through which to gain influence. Today, Hezbollah’s activities and structure encompass many state-like characteristics.[213]

A new 2009 manifesto reflected shifts in Hezbollah’s ideology since 1985. The 2009 manifesto emphasized national unity, denounced sectarianism, and did not single out Islamic governance as the only option for Lebanon’s future. However, the group still sought to liberate Palestine, oppose the United States, and fight Israeli “expansion and aggression.”[214]

In 2011, the group vocally supported many of the Arab Spring uprisings.[215] In Syria, however, Hezbollah also aimed to protect the Assad regime, one of its key allies. The group sent troops to support the Assad government in Syria and expel extremist Sunni militias from the country.[216] In 2016, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah vowed to continue the group’s military support of the Assad regime until it regained control of Syria.[217]

In January 2020, Nasrallah called for “just retribution” for the U.S. killing of Qassem Soleimani. He declared that the American military presence in the Middle East must end and warned that U.S. soldiers would return in coffins.[218]

Following the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Nasrallah issued a statement praising Hamas and other Palestinian factions who joined in the assault. He reaffirmed Hezbollah’s support for resistance and the goal of complete victory and liberation for Palestine.[219]

Political Activities

Hezbollah is active in Lebanese politics as a political party known as the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc. The party was formed following the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese Civil War.  Previously, Hezbollah used the media to participate in national political discourse. In 1984, the group began publishing a weekly newspaper, al-Ahad, and started broadcasting from two radio stations soon thereafter. In 1989, Hezbollah created its own television station, al-Manar. These media outlets published political commentary, news, cultural and Islamic programs, and propaganda associated with the organization’s fight against Israel and Western forces.[220]

After the 1989 Taif Agreement, Hezbollah militants had extensive internal debates about whether to enter the Lebanese political system. The organization eventually created a party that would act within the Lebanese political system but would also employ violence and the threat of violence as a tool in its political dealings. It ran in national parliamentary elections for the first time in 1992 and won eight seats.[221] Hezbollah also participated in the 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009, and 2018 national elections. The party focused largely on nonreligious themes, but Hezbollah members are required to support the party.[222]

In December 2006, Hezbollah led an opposition sit-in that resulted in eighteen months of political deadlock.[223] Tensions between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government escalated again in May 2008 and fighting broke out due to the government’s decision to dismantle the group’s private telecommunications network. Hezbollah briefly seized parts of the capital, raising fears of a coup. [224] These tensions were defused when the Arab League brokered the Doha Agreement, which granted Hezbollah veto power in the government and pledged that no political group would use weapons for domestic disputes. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement also formed the March 8 Alliance, a coalition of primarily Shiite and pro-Syrian parties, through which Hezbollah maintained a minority presence in parliament until the alliance collapsed in 2013.[225]

Hezbollah supported some Arab Spring movements but opposed the uprisings in Syria. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was a critical ally and supporter of Hezbollah. His fall subsequently would jeopardize Hezbollah’s power and security in the region, as well as weaken Hezbollah’s geographical access to Iran.[226]  Hezbollah heavily invested in the Syrian civil war, sending nearly ten thousand troops and training dozens of Shia militias to fight against Syrian opposition forces.

In 2018, the March 8 Alliance emerged victorious from the Lebanese general election. The coalition – which included Hezbollah, the Shia Amal Movement, the Maronite Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and allied parties – won 68 of 128 seats in parliament. Hezbollah itself secured 13 of the 68 coalition seats, neither gaining nor losing any seats won in the previous election.[227] The coalition secured enough seats to ensure a majority. The election notably weakened the U.S.-backed prime minister, Saad Hariri, and his supporters.[228]

In the 2018 elections, Hezbollah also gained control of three of the 30 ministries in the Lebanese government, including the Ministry of Health.[229] In February 2019, U.S. officials warned that Hezbollah could exploit these ministries to funnel money or undertake terrorist activity throughout the region.[230]

After 2019, the United States pressured other countries to designate Hezbollah’s political wing as a terrorist organization, which the United Kingdom did in February 2019.[231] In July 2019, the U.S. Treasury added two top Hezbollah political leaders to its list of sanctioned individuals, the first instance the United States had designated a member of Lebanon’s government on a terrorist sanctions list.[232]

In January 2019, Prime Minister Saad Hariri formed a national unity government after nine months of negotiations.[233] Hezbollah and its allies secured 19 of 30 ministries, and a Shiite ally was appointed minister of public health.[234] In October 2019, nationwide protests erupted over a proposed WhatsApp tax, economic decline, and frustration with Lebanon’s sectarian political system. The demonstrations evolved into a broader anti-establishment movement.[235] Clashes occurred between protesters and Hezbollah supporters, prompting security forces to intervene.[236] On October 29, 2019, Prime Minister Hariri resigned, after nearly two weeks of unrest. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, both part of Hariri’s coalition, opposed his resignation.[237]

In December 2019, Hezbollah and its allies nominated Hassan Diab as prime minister.[238] His appointment triggered renewed protests over perceptions that it reinforced the sectarian political system.[239] In January 2020, Prime Minister Diab formed a 20-member cabinet. It was the first government fully backed by Hezbollah and its allies. Hezbollah nominated Hamad Hasan as minister of public health and Imad Hoballah as minister of industry.[240]

On August 4, 2020, a massive explosion at the Port of Beirut killed over 220 people and displaced thousands.[241]  Critics accused Hezbollah of exercising influence at the port and alleged it attempted to limit the judicial investigation.[242] On August 10, 2020, Prime Minister Hassan Diab resigned.[243] In September 2021, Prime Minister Najib Mikati formed a 24-member cabinet after more than a year without a fully functioning government. Hezbollah and its March 8 Alliance allies secured 16 ministerial portfolios, including public works, transport and labor.[244]

In May 2022, Lebanon held parliamentary elections amid rising public dissatisfaction. Hezbollah and its allies won 62 seats, falling short of a parliamentary majority. Voters elected more than a dozen independent candidates. The results reflected widespread dissatisfaction with the political establishment. Hezbollah retained its 13 seats, and ally Nabih Berri was re-elected as speaker of parliament.[245] In June 2022, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon sentenced Hezbollah members Hassan Habib Merhi and Hussein Hassan Oneissi to life imprisonment in absentia for their role in the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.[246]

In October 2022, President Michel Aoun completed his six-year term without a successor. Parliament failed to elect a new president, and a caretaker government assumed responsibility.[247] Hezbollah and its March 8 Alliance allies boycotted sessions and cast blank ballots, preventing a quorum.[248] By October 2023, Lebanon remained without a president after 12 failed voting rounds, prolonging the political deadlock.[249]

In January 2024, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah called for border delimitation talks with Israel, including the Shebaa Farms area. Nasrallah made the negotiations conditional on a Gaza ceasefire.[250] In July 2024, Nasrallah confirmed that Hezbollah would stop attacking Israel if a ceasefire in Gaza was reached.[251]  Between June and August 2024, U.S. Special Envoy Amos Hochstein mediated between Lebanon and Israel to ease cross-border tensions. In Beirut, Hochstein met with Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, who had Hezbollah’s support to negotiate[252] On September 25, 2024, the United States, European Union, Qatar, and other international actors proposed a 21-day ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.[253] Hassan Nasrallah privately indicated support for the ceasefire to the Lebanese foreign minister. However, the group’s position was not formally shared with the U.S. officials.[254]

Nasrallah was assassinated by Israel on September 27. A 60-day ceasefire was proposed in late October.[255] In November 2024, U.S. Special Envoy Amos Hochstein returned to the Middle East to finalize a ceasefire framework between Israel and Lebanon. In Beirut, Hochstein joined the meeting with Speaker Nabih Berri.[256] On November 26, President Joe Biden announced that Israel and Hezbollah had reached a ceasefire agreement, which took effect the following day.[257]

Prime Minister Najib Mikati called for unity in Lebanon, expressing hope for a “new page” after the ceasefire.[258] In January 2025, Lebanon’s parliament elected Joseph Aoun as president, ending a two-year leadership vacuum.[259] Aoun pledged to extend Lebanese state authority throughout the south, signaling his intention to confront Hezbollah’s weapons.[260] On 13 January, Aoun appointed Nawaf Salam as prime minister, a decision that Hezbollah opposed. Middle East experts interpreted Salam’s appointment as a sign of the group’s weakened position following the death of Hassan Nasrallah.[261] In April, Aoun declared that weapons in Lebanon would remain only in the hands of the state and that Hezbollah’s disarmament would proceed through dialogue rather than force.[262] A senior Hezbollah official indicated a willingness to discuss disarmament with Aoun if Israel withdrew from five southern hilltops and ended cross-border strikes.[263] Hezbollah’s limited cooperation was reportedly motivated by the need to preserve domestic political support and to avoid harsher international sanctions.[264]

In  July 2025, Qassem warned that Hezbollah would not surrender its weapons or accept normalization with Israel. He accused the United States and Arab states of pressuring Lebanon’s leadership to disarm the group.[265] Lebanon’s Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri criticized the United States’ push to disarm Hezbollah and instead called for a national dialogue to decide the fate of its weapons.[266]

On September 19, 2025, Secretary-General Naim Qassem called on Saudi Arabia to “turn a new page” to form a unified front against Israel, amid growing pressure on Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah.[267] Hezbollah has publicly committed to the ceasefire—not a formal signatory. Its fighters began withdrawing from southern Lebanon. Supported by a UN observer force, the Lebanese Army reported removing 90 percent of Hezbollah’s weapons from southern Lebanon. Hezbollah did not obstruct Lebanese Army efforts to locate and confiscate its weapons caches. However, it insists that the disarmament provisions apply only to southern Lebanon.[268]

Israeli and U.S. officials stated that Hezbollah is rebuilding military capabilities that threaten Israel’s security and undermine the ceasefire. Hezbollah denies rebuilding its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon and states that it remains committed to the ceasefire, noting that it has not fired on Israel since the agreement took effect.[269] On January 8, 2026, Lebanon announced the completion of the first phase of the disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed groups in southern Lebanon. Israel responded that the progress was “far from sufficient,” citing renewed concerns that the ceasefire could unravel.[270] On January 14, 2026, a senior Hezbollah official warned that extending disarmament efforts beyond southern Lebanon could trigger chaos or civil war and refused to relinquish its arsenal elsewhere.[271] Progress outside the south remains uncertain. The Lebanese Army acts cautiously to manage tensions and allow time for political agreement on the group’s arsenal in other parts of the country.[272]

Targets And Tactics

Hezbollah’s tactics have evolved since its creation. Beginning in the 1980s, the group commonly kidnapped foreigners and locals as leverage to bargain with the West and Israel.[273] Other forms of violent attacks against Israel during the occupation of Lebanon were largely limited to military targets.[274] In the 1980s and 1990s, Hezbollah engaged in large-scale attacks on Western and Israeli targets, which resulted in hundreds of casualties and drew attention to the group. In recent years, Hezbollah has developed elements of a more traditional military force, though it still engages in acts of terrorism. The group demonstrated its capabilities as a high functioning military in the Syrian civil war.[275]  

After the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, an extensive internal debate reportedly took place within Hezbollah concerning whether to focus on Lebanese politics at the expense of countering Israel.  Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah reportedly consulted with Iranian Ayatollah Khamenei on the decision. The group chose to continue carrying out attacks against Israeli military targets. Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah attacks along the “Blue Line” and in contested farming areas in the south killed seventeen Israeli soldiers and one Israeli civilian.[276] 

Hezbollah’s focus on Israel diminished during the Syrian civil war, and the group used its resources to train Syrian militias and fight for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In 2019, Hezbollah turned its attention back to Israel and began preparing for future conflict. The group began setting up cells and recruiting militants in the Syrian Golan Heights.[277] Later that year, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) discovered systems of underground tunnels enabling Hezbollah militants to enter Israel undetected.[278] In 2019, Secretary-General Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah’s missile capabilities were advanced enough to reach any Israeli town or city.[279]

Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian war provided it with access to advanced capabilities and operational competencies, which allowed Hezbollah to adopt tactics commonly used by conventional militaries while maintaining asymmetric strategies.[280] Hezbollah was widely regarded as one of the most heavily armed non-state actors in the world, with an estimated arsenal of 120,000 to 200,000 rockets and missiles. The group developed the ability to conduct coordinated maneuvers, employ suppressive artillery, and manage logistics for complex operations.[281] Most of its stockpiles consisted of short-range, unguided projectiles, with expanded access to longer-range missiles after 2006.  The group also maintained a diverse fleet of unmanned aerial systems (UASs). The UASs included commercial quadcopters, loitering munitions, suicide drones, and advanced surveillance-strike platforms.[282]

After 2019, Hezbollah  increasingly targeted Israel, embedding its operations within the broader framework of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Its primary targets included Israel Defense Forces (IDF) observation posts, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, air-defense installations, and forward operating bases along the Lebanon–Israel border. Hezbollah aimed to deter a large-scale Israeli ground invasion, prepare for a prolonged war of attrition, and maintain multi-front pressure alongside regional allies within the Axis of Resistance[283]

Following October 7, 2023, Hezbollah escalated near-daily cross-border strikes from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[284] The group attempted at least 40 UAS attacks against Israeli targets. Several of the attacks breached Israeli air defense systems, killing IDF soldiers and damaging military infrastructure.[285] On March 4, 2024, Hezbollah coordinated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to launch simultaneous rocket attacks against Israel. Between October 2023, and October 2024, Hezbollah and allied groups fired approximately 12,400 projectiles from Lebanon into Israel, killing at least 30 civilians.[286]

Hezbollah demonstrated its ability to strike deeper inside Israel.[287] From September to November 2024, the group launched rocket salvos and drone strikes beyond the designated “evacuation zone” along the border. Several of these strikes hit populated civilian areas, killing at least 15 civilians and causing widespread destruction to residential buildings, orchards, schools, and other civilian infrastructure in northern Israel.[288]

However, Hezbollah suffered some of the heaviest casualties in its history during the war in Gaza. Hezbollah’s current weapons holdings are uncertain. Its rearmament is hindered by the breakdown of its regional backing like Syria and Iran. An internal estimate indicated that the group might have lost up to 4,000 fighters during fourteen months of hostilities.[289] The attrition of Hezbollah’s senior leadership left major gaps in its command structure.[290] Israeli airstrikes destroyed and damaged bases, tunnels, weapons depots, and fortifications across southern Lebanon. Strikes on the Syrian border disrupted Hezbollah’s arms supply.[291] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported confiscating more than 155,000 weapons and pieces of military equipment. Israel captured more than 13,000 anti-tank missile launchers, rockets, and anti-aircraft missiles and over 121,000 communication devices, computers, electronic equipment, and documents.[292] Hezbollah’s current weapons holdings are uncertain. Its rearmament to the same extent is hindered by the breakdown of regional backing from Iran and Syria. [293]

As of 2023, beyond Israel, Hezbollah expanded its reach by recruiting individuals who are neither Shia nor Lebanese to plan attacks abroad. In November 2023, Brazilian officials arrested three nationals accused of planning attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Brasília and several local synagogues. Investigations revealed ties to Hezbollah facilitators embedded within diaspora networks. These included Mohamed Khir Abdulmajid, a Syrian-Brazilian national, and Haissam Houssim Diab, a Lebanese-Brazilian national, both allegedly involved in recruiting Brazilian nationals to participate in the planned attacks.[294] In December 2023, authorities disrupted a planned attack on the Jewish Pan-American Maccabiah Games in Buenos Aires. The attack reportedly involved operatives linked to Hezbollah who were recruited from outside traditional Lebanese diaspora networks.[295]

Attacks

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

Hezbollah is known for its attention-grabbing attacks worldwide, many of which are listed below. However, authorities have foiled a number of Hezbollah operations. A plan to attack the Israeli Embassy in Azerbaijan was stopped before it reached fruition, as was a 2008 plan to target Israeli tourists and ships in the Suez Canal. Other disrupted plots may be unknown to the public.[296]

 

November 1982: Hezbollah member Ahmad Qasir carried out a truck bombing against an Israeli headquarters in Tyre, killing at least 75 Israelis and fourteen Arab prisoners (89+ killed, unknown wounded).[297]

April 19, 1983: A suicide bombing on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut killed 63 people. The attack was attributed to militants of the Islamic Jihad, an early alias of Hezbollah (63 killed, unknown wounded).[298]

October 23, 1983: Hezbollah carried out suicide bombings on U.S. and French military barracks in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French servicemen. Despite no claim of responsibility, the attack is widely attributed to Hezbollah and prompted the U.S. to withdraw its Marines from Lebanon (299 killed, unknown wounded).[299]

June 14, 1985: Hezbollah members hijacked TWA flight 847, holding hostages for weeks. The group killed one hostage before ultimately freed the rest in exchange for the release of 300 Lebanese prisoners in Israel (1 killed, unknown wounded).[300]

March 17, 1992: Hezbollah operatives carried out a truck bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, killing twenty-nine and wounding 242 (29 killed, 242 wounded).[301]

July 18, 1994; Hezbollah was implicated in the bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association, which killed 85 people and wounded more than 200. The group denied responsibility (85 killed, 200+ wounded).[302]

June 25, 1996: Hezbollah bombed the American Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 (19 killed, unknown wounded).[303]

February 14, 2005: In 2011, the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon indicted four members of Hezbollah for the February 2005 car bomb assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. The attack also killed 20 others (21 killed, unknown wounded).[304]

July 12, 2006: Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed eight more, sparking a month-long war with Israel (8 killed, unknown wounded).[305]

January 2007: In January 2007, a Shia militant group attacked the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Iraq, killing five American soldiers. The United States claims that Hezbollah helped plan and provide resources for the attack (5 killed, unknown wounded).[306]

May 2008: Hezbollah seized parts of Beirut after the government called for the group to disarm, triggering street clashes that left over 60 dead. The subsequent agreement granted Hezbollah veto power in the national cabinet (60 killed, unknown wounded).[307]

May 2011: Hezbollah carried out two attacks against United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon in late May 2011 (0 killed, 11 wounded).[308]

July 18, 2012: Hezbollah’s international wing bombed an Israeli tour bus in Bulgaria, killing five Israelis and the Bulgarian bus driver. This was the first successful attack in a campaign to increase global operations beginning around 2008. Hezbollah has denied responsibility for the bombing (6 killed, unknown wounded).[309]

May 29, 2013: Hezbollah collaborated with and led Syrian Army forces in an attack on al-Qusayr, a rebel stronghold. The operation marked Hezbollah’s first major involvement in the Syrian civil war and a shift in control as Syrian government forces regained key strategic territory (casualties unknown).[310]

January 28, 2015: Hezbollah fired anti-tank missiles at Israeli soldiers in the disputed Har Dov area between Lebanon and Syria, killing two. In a separate border incident on the same day between Israel and Hezbollah, a United Nations Interim Force member was killed (3 killed, 7+ wounded).[311]

May–June 2015: In late May, Hezbollah forces fought Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State across the Qalamoun Mountains in western Syria. By early June, Hezbollah had recaptured much of the range and reopened a route from Lebanon into Syria (casualties unknown).[312]

April 2, 2016: Hezbollah and Syrian government forces clashed with Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and Free Syrian Army rebels troops near Tal al-Ais outside Aleppo; 8 Hezbollah fighters, 25 pro-Assad troops, and 18 rebels were killed (51 killed, unknown wounded).[313]

November 2017: Hezbollah led an offensive against the Islamic State in Syria’s Deir Ezzor province, inflicting heavy civilian casualties. Hezbollah fought alongside Iran-sponsored Iraqi Shia militias supported by Russian air strikes (50+ killed, unknown wounded).[314]

February-April 2018: Hezbollah and Syrian forces launched an assault on Ghouta, Syria, deploying at least 3,000 Hezbollah fighters; around 100 were killed. By March 2018, at least 1,100 civilians had also been killed (1,200+ killed, unknown wounded).[315]

June 2018: A senior Hezbollah field officer executed 23 Syrian soldiers near Hirbat Ghazala after they refused to cross “Death Bridge,” where they would have been vulnerable to rebel fire (23 killed, 0 wounded).[316]

September 2019: Hezbollah militants fired anti-tank missiles at an Israeli military base in northern Israel in retaliation for attacks on its members in Syria (no casualties).[317]

August 25, 2020: Hezbollah snipers fired at Israeli troops across the Lebanon–Israel border, allegedly using United Nations peacekeepers’ positions for cover; Israel retaliated the next day with strikes on Hezbollah observation posts in Lebanon (0 killed, 0 wounded).[318]

August 6, 2021: Hezbollah fired a barrage of rockets toward Israel in the disputed Shebaa Farms area in retaliation for Israeli airstrikes the previous day. Israel responded with artillery fire in an escalation between the two sides (no casualties).[319]

July 12, 2023: On the 17th anniversary of the Second Lebanon War, about four Hezbollah members detonated explosives at the security fence between Lebanon and Israel. The attempt failed to breach the fence. At least 3 Hezbollah members were wounded, with the cause unspecified (0 killed, 3+ wounded).[320]

October 8–9, 2023: Hezbollah fired missiles and anti-tank rockets at three Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms in support of the Palestinian people.[321] The following day, Hezbollah targeted two Israeli barracks with guided missiles and mortar shells. The two-day attacks killed 4 Israeli civilians and 9 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers (13 killed, unknown wounded).[322]

November 12, 2023: Hezbollah launched anti-tank missiles and mortar shells in Manara and Dovev, northern Israel.[323] The attacks killed one Israel Electric Corporation employee and injured 21 others, including 7 IDF soldiers (1 killed, 21 wounded).[324]

May 15, 2024: Hezbollah struck a military post near Tiberias in northern Israel by using a drone that fired two missiles. Three IDF soldiers were wounded. It marked Hezbollah’s use of new and more advanced weaponry in its clash with Israel (0 killed, 3 wounded).[325]

June 12, 2024: Hezbollah fired more than 200 rockets at northern Israel in response to an Israeli strike the previous day that killed senior commander Taleb Abdullah. It was one of its largest attacks since October 2023 (no casualties).[326]

June 30, 2024: Hezbollah launched a drone attack in the northern Golan Heights, wounding at least 18 IDF soldiers. Hezbollah later stated that it had bombed the headquarters of Israel’s 91st Brigade in northern Israel (0 killed, +18 wounded).[327]

July 27, 2024: A rocket launched from Lebanon struck a soccer field in the Druze town of Majdal Shams in Israel’s Golan Heights. It killed at least 12 people and wounded more than 30 between the ages of 10 and 20.[328] Hezbollah claimed responsibility for firing rockets at a nearby Israeli base but denied involvement in the soccer field strike (12 killed, 30+ wounded).[329]

August 25, 2024: Hezbollah launched around 230 rockets and 20 drones at Israel after Israel struck Lebanon to prevent a larger attack by Hezbollah. It marked one of the most intense clashes since October 2023.[330] An Israeli Navy soldier was killed, 2 Israeli soldiers were wounded, and 3 Hezbollah fighters were killed. Hezbollah claimed the attack was a reprisal for the assassination of senior commander Fuad Shukr in July (4 killed, 2 wounded).[331]

September 18, 2024: Hezbollah fired at least 20 rockets toward Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel. The attacks came a day after hundreds of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah exploded simultaneously across Lebanon and Syria; Israel was reportedly behind the attack. It marked a “new era” of war (no casualties).[332]

October 19, 2024: A drone strike claimed by Hezbollah damaged the beachside home of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Caesarea (no casualties).[333]

October 22, 2024: Hezbollah fired at least 60 rockets at northern Israel. A drone infiltration triggered bomb shelter alerts for around one million Israelis. Two Israeli reservists were killed and three others wounded (2 killed, 3 wounded).[334]

December 2, 2024: Hezbollah fired a volley of projectiles at Mount Dov in northern Israel, calling it a “warning” over alleged ceasefire violations.[335] Hezbollah fired a volley of projectiles at Mount Dov in northern Israel. Hezbollah stated that it was a “warning” over alleged ceasefire violations, and no casualties were reported (no casualties).[336]

 

Interactions

Vertical Tabs

Designated / Listed

The designations listed below largely focus on Hezbollah in its entirety, encompassing its military apparatus and its political wing, the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc. Since 2019, international designations have expanded considerably. A wave of European, Latin American, and Asia-Pacific countries, listed below, designated Hezbollah in its entirety. The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Kosovo expanded their initial designations of Hezbollah’s military wing to encompass the group in its entirety.

It should also be noted that Lebanon does not consider Hezbollah to be a terrorist organization[337]

  • The U.S. Department of State designated Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization: October 8, 1997, to present[338]
  • The U.S. Department of State designated Hezbollah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist: October 31, 2001 to present[339]
  • The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, for providing support to the Syrian Government: September 13, 2012[340]
  • The U.S. Department of State designated Ali Damush, a senior Hezbollah leader and aide to Hassan Nasrallah, and Mustafa Mughniyeh, a Hezbollah commander, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists: January 9, 2017[341]
  • The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, in coordination with the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center members (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE), designated members of Hezbollah’s Shura Council: May 16, 2018 to present[342]
  • The U.S. Department of State designated Hashem Safieddine, a senior Hezbollah leader and member of the executive council: May 19, 2017[343]
  • The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Hezbollah Members of Parliament Amin Sherri and Muhammad Hasan Ra’d and Hezbollah security official Wafiq Safa: July 9, 2019[344]
  • The Government of Canada designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: December 10, 2002 to present[345]
  • The Government of Australia designated Hezbollah's External Security designated Hezbollah's External Security Organization (ESO) as a terrorist 2003 to present: June 5, 2003 to present[346]
  • The Government of Australia designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization under the Criminal Code: December 10, 2021 to present[347]
  • The Netherlands designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization, becoming the first country in the European Union to designate the entire group: 2004 to present[348]
  • The Government of New Zealand  designated the “military wing” of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization: October 11, 2010 to present[349]
  • The Government of New Zealand designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: November 20, 2024 to present[350]
  • Government of Bahrain designated Hezbollah as a terrorist group, becoming the first Arab country to blacklist the group April 9, 2013 to present[351]
  • The European Union designated the “military wing” of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization: July 22, 2013 to present[352]
  • The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) designated Hezbollah as a terrorist group: March 2, 2016 to present[353]
  • Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Saudi Arabia, placed 10 Hezbollah leaders on their government terrorism lists: May 17, 2018 to present[354]
  • The Arab League designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization: March 11, 2016 to June 29, 2024 [355]  
  • The Government of the United Kingdom designated Hezbollah’s External Security Organization as a terrorist group: 2001 to present[356]
  • The Government of the United Kingdom designated “the whole of Hizballah’s military apparatus, namely the Jihad Council and “all the units reporting to it” as a terrorist group: 2008 to present[357]
  • The Government of the United Kingdom designated the entirety of Hezbollah as a terrorist group: March 2019 to present[358]
  • The Government of Republic of Kosovo designated Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist group: June 27, 2019 to present[359]
  • The Government of Republic of Kosovo designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: June 23, 2020 to present[360]
  • Government of Argentina: July 18, 2019 to present[361]
  • The Government of Paraguay designated Hezbollah as an international terrorist organization: August 19, 2019 to present[362]
  • The Government of Honduras designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: January 20, 2020 to present[363]
  • The Government of Colombia designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization:  January 20, 2020 to present[364]
  • The Government of Germany designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: April 30, 2020 to present[365]
  • The Government of Serbia designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: September 13, 2020 to present[366]
  • The Government of Latvia designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: September 25, 2020 to present[367]
  • The Government of Estonia designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: October 22, 2020 to present[368]
  • The Government of Guatemala designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: October 23, 2020 to present [369]
  • The Government of the Czech Republic designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: October 28, 2020 to present[370]
  • The Government of Slovenia designated Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization: November 30, 2020 to present[371]
Community Relations

After World War II, Shia Muslims became a marginalized group in Lebanon. They bore the brunt of the struggle with Israel, suffered poor economic conditions, and traditionally wielded little political power.[372] The Lebanese government also regularly ignored civilian needs in the Shia-dominated south.[373] The state grew particularly ineffective as a service provider during the Lebanese Civil War. It was during this time that civil service organizations, including Hezbollah, developed a reputation for providing necessary services to Shiite Lebanese citizens.[374]

While the exact date Hezbollah first became involved in social services is not known, it earned a reputation as a movement of the poor early in the 1980s.[375] Hezbollah has been  deeply engrained in Lebanese Shia society. It has used social outreach to cement the political support of the Shia community, recruit new members, and spread its interpretation of Islam.[376] Hezbollah has provided a number of social services throughout Lebanon, most of which have been concentrated in the south. The group has operated schools, clinics, and hospitals. It has also collected garbage, provided credit assistance, and delivered drinking water.[377] In 2006, it was estimated that Hezbollah’s schools assisted about 14,000 students.[378]

Hezbollah’s social services sector is composed of multiple non-governmental organizations  (NGOs) grouped under three branches: the Social Unit, the Islamic Health Unit, and the Education Unit. The work of the Social Unit spans across a number of areas, from the construction of neighborhood infrastructure to the assistance of the families of killed Hezbollah militants. The Islamic Health Unit operates a number of hospitals, clinics, and social health programs. The Education Unit oversees schools and provides tuition scholarships to gifted students.[379]

Hezbollah also built local trust by providing humanitarian assistance in the wake of Israeli attacks. In southern Lebanon, Hezbollah provided social services, including Christian families returning to southern Beirut after 1985.[380] In 1996, the group claimed to have rebuilt 5,000 homes in 82 villages after an Israeli attack. After the 2006 war with Israel, the group suspended its military efforts to provide reconstruction and social services to Lebanese citizens. Hezbollah has often advertised their health services to the Lebanese population after an Israeli attack and has received heightened media coverage in turn.[381] While Hezbollah targets the Shia community with its services, the organization’s efforts also reach members of other Lebanese sects.[382]

Beyond Lebanon, Hezbollah leverages its diplomatic organization, the Foreign Relations Department (FRD), to maintain a semi-overt international presence and engage Shia diaspora communities worldwide.[383] The FRD facilitates Hezbollah’s ability to disseminate propaganda, recruit operatives, radicalize supporters, and establish.[384]

In South America and West Africa, the FRD has provided logistical and operational support to Hezbollah’s External Security Organization (ESO), the group’s militant wing. Through community centers serving Arab and Muslim populations, particularly in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela.[385] FRD has replicated Hezbollah’s social welfare model overseas, mirroring the structures developed in Lebanon. These initiatives include establishing or affiliating with local mosques and clergy, facilitating schools aligned with Hezbollah’s educational framework, and supporting youth movements such as the Mahdi Scouts.[386]

A similar approach is observed in West Africa, particularly in the Ivory Coast. Some Lebanese community organizations, such as the Al-Ghadeer Association and the Al-Ghadeer Scouts, are reportedly affiliated with Hezbollah. These networks integrate schools, mosques, and social programs under Hezbollah’s ideological framework, enabling the organization to embed itself within diaspora communities and promote the Iranian-Shia model of governance and identity.[387]

Though its relations with the Shia population remained positive, Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian Civil War worsened its relationship with Lebanon’s Sunni population. Many Lebanese Sunnis initially supported the Syrian opposition, most of which was composed of Sunni militias. Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime caused many Lebanese Sunnis to turn away from Hezbollah. Some Sunnis near Tripoli adopted a radicalized, anti-Hezbollah agenda and mounted attacks in Hezbollah territory. The most of these attacks took place in November 2015 and resulted in the deaths of 43 people.[388]

The 2018 sanctions on Iran—Hezbollah’s primary patron— affected the group’s ability to serve the Lebanese population. The group froze all financing, merged several institutions, and closed hundreds of offices and apartments in Lebanon.[389] Hezbollah’s social services budget also decreased, following an early reduction in 2013. Although Hezbollah gained support from the community by providing social services, it had also been criticized by many in Lebanese society for its role in inciting Israeli attacks.[390]

Hezbollah reduced its involvement in Syria in 2019, partly due to growing domestic opposition in Lebanon to its role in the conflict.[391] Before the October 7 attacks, Hezbollah’s support among Shia communities was gradually declining.[392] Hezbollah’s prolonged involvement in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq diverted attention from the resistance to Israel, a central element of the group’s narrative. Lebanon’s worsening economic crisis further intensified public resentment, fueling mass anti-government protests and periodic clashes between Hezbollah supporters and opponents. Many Lebanese blamed Hezbollah for shielding a corrupt political class amid the deepening economic collapse. The war in Gaza has partially reversed this trend.[393]

Arab Barometer data in 2024 suggests that perceptions of Hezbollah's positive role in regional politics have risen by 9% since 2022. Support among Lebanese Shia remains consistently high at 78%, compared to 13% of Sunnis, 12% of Christians, and 16% of Druze. Importantly, the recent gains originate primarily from non-Shia communities, with increases of 10 points among Druze, 8 among Sunnis, and 7 among Christians. Analysts assess that this shift reflects sympathy for Hezbollah’s stance on Israel rather than a broader ideological alignment.[394]

Reportedly, Hezbollah reasserted its “resistance” credentials against Israel, consolidating its Shia base. Hezbollah has sought to broaden its influence beyond the Shia community through targeted outreach efforts. In Akkar, one of Lebanon’s largest and poorest Sunni regions, Hezbollah provided financial assistance, created employment opportunities, and offered social aid as part of a broader strategy to consolidate Hezbollah’s presence and influence among non-Shia communities.[395] Despite the group’s efforts, Hezbollah continues to lack broad popular support across Lebanon. Hezbollah’s role in engaging Israel from Lebanese territory has sparked mixed and polarizing reactions among the Lebanese public.[396]

Relationships With Other Groups

Hezbollah has had a complicated relationship with Amal since it originally splintered from the group. As Hezbollah expanded, it came into direct competition and conflict with Amal. Whereas Amal operated as a secular and reformist organization, Hezbollah mirrored Iran’s model of clerical rule.[397] Amal also chose to cooperate with the Maronite and Sunni factions from northern Lebanon, while Hezbollah preferred to work outside the existing political system. Finally, whereas Amal received most of its funding from the Assad Regime in Syria, Hezbollah was financed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and clashed with the Syrian-backed Christian and Sunni groups from northern Lebanon. Competing over the support of the southern Lebanon’s Shia population, Amal and Hezbollah came into direct conflict during the 1980s. The most prominent conflict arose in 1988 when they clashed over the kidnapping of U.S. Marine Lt. Colonel William R. Higgins, leading to a lasting feud between the two groups.[398]

The end of the Lebanese civil war shifted the nature of the relationship between Amal and Hezbollah. Amal surrendered its arms following the civil war, while Hezbollah remained the only armed Lebanese militia. This changed the relationship between the two groups; Hezbollah’s decision to remained armed allowed them to become the most important non-state actor in the region, passing Amal. Since the 1990s, the groups have often worked together in politics. For example, an Amal-Hezbollah bloc won all parliamentary seats in southern Lebanon in the 2000 national elections.[399] Although signs of traditional competition and rivalry remain between the two groups, necessary alliance and accommodation is required to face mutual political opponents.

Hezbollah has trained and assisted Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Al-Aqsa Martyrs and Hamas. Hezbollah has a special unit – Unit 1800, or the “Nun Unit” – solely responsible for supporting Palestinian militants.[400] It also maintains close ties with Hamas, providing financial support and military training to its armed branch. Some analysis claim that Hezbollah has acted as “a role model” for Hamas due to its own political success.[401] In 2019, Hezbollah financed a radio tower based in Hamas-controlled Gaza in 2019 with the power to broadcast into Israeli territory.[402] In June 2021, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah hosted Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, in Beirut. The meeting was Haniyeh’s first visit to Lebanon in 27 years. The talks focused on coordination between Hezbollah and Hamas following the May 2021 conflict with Israel.[403]  After Hamas’s assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, Hezbollah opened a front in the conflict. On 8 October, the group fired guided rockets and artillery at Israeli positions in the Shebaa Farms.[404] Hezbollah announced that the attacks were carried out in support of Hamas and in response to Israel’s retaliatory airstrikes on Gaza.[405] Following October 7, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and allied militias in Iraq and Syria launched attacks on Israel and U.S. forces in the Middle East.[406]

Hezbollah has had a troubled relationship with Sunni militant groups. In April 2006, Al Qaeda attempted to assassinate Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah because of his frequent condemnations AQ attacks.[407] In 2013, Hezbollah began sending fighters to Syria to assist Assad’s army in the fight against Sunni rebel groups, including the Islamic State, Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, and elements of the Free Syrian Army.[408]

In Iraq, Hezbollah has sustained relationships with several Shiite militant groups, including the Mahdi Army (now known as the Peace Brigades), the Dawa Party, and the Badr Organization.[409]  These groups have significant experience training and cooperating with Hezbollah. Hezbollah was particularly instrumental in training the initial members of these groups following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.[410] Hezbollah created Unit 3800 in 2003 with the purpose of supporting Iraqi Shiite militant groups targeting U.S. forces. According to U.S. intelligence, Unit 3800 sent personnel to Iraq with the purpose of training hundreds of Shia militants.[411] Hezbollah supplied the militants with funds and weapons. The Hezbollah sponsored groups were instrumental in planning several attacks in Iraq, including the 2007 attack on the Karbala Joint Coordination Center, which caused deaths of five Americans.[412]

After 2014, Hezbollah also became increasingly involved in the insurgency in Iraq, sending aid and military advisors to Iranian-backed Shiite paramilitaries. The two most prominent recipients of Hezbollah aid in Iraq were Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH).[413] Hezbollah has helped finance and train both KH and AAH since their inception in the mid-2000s. Hezbollah  also fought alongside AAH and KH militants in the Syrian civil war. [414] The U.S. killing of Qassem Soleimani in 2020 reshaped Hezbollah’s role in Iraq. Soleimani was a central figure to control Iran’s proxy network. Iran assigned Hezbollah to take on this role after his death.[415] Hezbollah has expanded its training of Iraqi militias to advanced tactics, urban warfare, and the use of sophisticated weapons. The group has also provided strategic guidance for attacks on U.S. and coalition forces. These operations involved strikes on bases and convoys.[416] At the political level, Hezbollah has increased its influence over pro-Iranian factions within the Iraqi government. The group has advocated for the withdrawal of the remaining 2,500 U.S. troops.[417]

After 2014, Unit 3800 was put to work in Yemen. Hezbollah militants helped the Houthis, a Shiite rebel group, conduct an insurgency against Yemen’s government. Hezbollah was initially involved in transferring funds and training insurgents and later sent militants to the region as the war progressed. [418] Houthi-affiliated radio stations in Yemen collected donations for Hezbollah in response to U.S. sanctions on Hezbollah and Iran, with some campaigns exceeding $132,000.[419]  

In Bahrain, Hezbollah engages in covert activities supporting Shiite opposition groups. Reportedly, Hezbollah worked with Iran to form a Shiite militia known as al-Ashtar Brigades. Since its creation in 2013, al-Ashtar Brigades is suspected of carrying out more than 20 attacks against Bahraini security forces and police.[420]

State Sponsors And External Influences

Since Hezbollah’s formation, Iran, a key state sponsor, and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have played a large role in training, supplying, and funding the group.[421] The IRGC has trained thousands of Hezbollah militants; it has provided supplies.[422] The level of Iranian support has fluctuated over time. During its early period, Iranian support was generous under Ayatollah Khomeini, who is often credited with the Hezbollah’s inception; this support declined for a period following his death in 1989.[423] According to a 2005 report, Iran  provided financial and material support to Hezbollah in the range of $100 million to $200 million per year.[424] In 2019, according to the U.S. State Department, Iran provided Hezbollah with an estimated $700 million annually.[425] In 2020, this figure declined due to the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced oil revenues, and U.S. sanctions imposed in 2018 targeting individuals linked to the IRGC. These sanctions disrupted Iran’s oil industry and diminished its ability to fund Hezbollah.[426] Iran’s financial support reportedly fell from $700 million to approximately $280 million per year.[427]

Since 2023, Iran’s efforts to establish strategic depth in the Middle East have faced severe setbacks. The war in Gaza altered Iran’s calculations and drew Iran into a direct confrontation with Israel. Simultaneously, the loss of regional allies undermined Iran’s ability to sustain Hezbollah as the core of its deterrence network. According to Middle East analysts, Iran’s ability to fund Hezbollah has come under increasing strain.[428] Hezbollah’s sustained clashes with Israel depleted its arsenal and forced Iran to divert resources at a time of economic weakness.[429] In October 2024, Iran’s Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance acknowledged a budget deficit of about $8 billion, underscoring the depth of the crisis.[430] Since 2024, U.S. maximum-pressure sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, Israeli strikes, nationwide unrest against the Islamic Republic’s government, and ongoing fiscal shortfalls constrained Iran’s ability to restore Hezbollah’s financial and operational capacity.[431] The fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 further cut off Iran’s land corridor to Lebanon, limiting its capacity to supply Hezbollah with weapons and financial assistance.[432]

Until the collapse of the Assad regime in 2024, Syria played a key role as an intermediary between Iran and Hezbollah. For years, Syria has been a critical corridor for Iranian weapons, advisors, and missile technology, while also providing bases for training and arms storage.[433] One of Hezbollah’s primary objectives in the Syrian civil war was to maintain Syrian territory as a corridor for Iranian weapons transfers. Syria also provided weapons directly to the group.[434] After Russia joined the Syrian civil war, the Syrian government provided Hezbollah with a number of advanced Russian-made anti-aircraft weapons. Among these systems were SA-17 Buk missile batteries, which can directly target Israeli aircraft operating over northern Israel and Syria.[435]

In November 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department revealed that Hezbollah officials, Iranian operatives, the Central Bank of Syria, and Russian companies collaborated to illegally deliver millions of barrels of Iranian oil to the Assad regime in Syria. This operation enabled the IRGC to transfer hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars to fund both Hamas and Hezbollah. In a letter to the Central Bank of Iran, Mohammad Qasir, a senior Hezbollah operative, and a Syrian associate confirmed obtaining $63 million from the scheme for Hezbollah.[436]

Hezbollah had a multifaceted relationship with Syria. During the Syrian occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s, Hezbollah clashed with Syrian forces and with the Shia group Amal, which was backed by Damascus.[437] After Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, Hezbollah viewed its relationship with Syria as essential to its resistance against Israel. Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2013 strengthened its position vis-à-vis the Assad regime, which it leveraged to pursue political and security objectives in Syria, including efforts to establish cells in the Golan Heights.[438]

In December 2024, the fall of the Assad regime disrupted most of Hezbollah’s support channels in Syria. According to a senior fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, the loss of this route hindered the group’s ability to replenish its missile stockpiles and maintain its military infrastructure in Lebanon.[439] It also cut off access to the wartime economy, which had supplemented Hezbollah’s finances through smuggling and cross-border trade.[440] Israeli strikes on Iranian missile facilities in Damascus further degraded the group’s military capacity. The new Syrian leadership, aligned with Sunni Islamist factions, blocked Iranian materiel transfers.[441] A senior Hezbollah official, Ali Fayyad, acknowledged that Assad’s fall represented a “major strategic loss,” both materially and politically. This development significantly weakened Hezbollah’s ability to act as Iran’s frontline deterrent against Israel.[442]

Footnotes
Footnotes: 

[1] Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36.11 (2013): 899-916. Web.

[2] Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. In the Path of Hizbullah. Syracuse University Press, 2004. Print.

[3] Harik, Judith Palmer. Hezbollah – The Changing Face of Terrorism, I.B. Tauris & Co, 2004. Print

[4] Goldberg, Jeffrey. “In the Party of God: Are Terrorists in Lebanon Preparing for a Larger Goal?” The New Yorker, Oct. 14, 2002.

[5] Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. 33. Print.

[6] Israel. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Historical Documents. 104 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut. N.p., 8 Feb. 1983. Web. 13 Mar. 2015; Anziska, Seth. "A Preventable Massacre." The New York Times. N.p., 16 Sept. 2012. Web. 13 Mar. 2015.

[7]  "Profile: Lebanon's Hezbollah." BBC News. 4 Dec. 2013. Web. 30 Jan. 2015; Addis, Casey, and Christopher Blanchard. CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 3 Jan. 2011: 7. Web. 8 Feb. 2015; Deeb, Marius. Syria’s Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

[8] Hudson, Rex. “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 17 Aug. 2006.

[9] Robert F. Worth, “Hezbollah’s Rise Amid Chaos,” New York Times, January 15, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/weekinreview/16worth.html

[10] John Kifner, “23 Die, Including 2 Americans, in Terrorist Car Bomb Attack on the U.S. Embassy at Beirut; Blast Kills Driver,” New York Times, September 21, 1984, https://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/21/world/23-die-including-2-americans-terrorist-car-bomb-attack-us-embassy-beirut-blast.html

[11] Mahmud A. Faksh, “The Shi'a community of Lebanon: a new assertive political force,” Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies, XIV (3), Spring 1991, p 51, fn. 61; Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. 80. Print.

[12] Matthew Levitt, “Why the CIA Killed Imad Mughniyeh,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 9, 2015, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/why-cia-killed-imad-mughniyeh; UPI Archives, “List of Western Hostages in Lebanon,” May 28, 1985, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/05/28/List-of-Western-hostages-in-Lebanon/2506486100800/; Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis(London: Macmillan, 1996), 2–3.

[13] Addis, Casey, and Christopher Blanchard. CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 3 Jan. 2011: 7-8. Web. 8 Feb. 2015.

[14] Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007, pp. 34-45.

[15] "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program." Council on Foreign Relations, 01 Jan. 1988. Web. 27 June 2014.

[16] Mahmud A Faksh, 'The Shi'a community of Lebanon: a new assertive political force', Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies, XIV (3), Spring 1991.

[17]  Thomas Collelo, ed. Lebanon: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987; Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. 42. Print; Levitt, Matthew. Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God. London: C. Hurst and, 2013. 13 and 222. Print; “Suspected Lebanese Hijacker Arrested in Greece,” DW, September 21, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/suspect-arrested-in-greece-over-1985-twa-plane-hijacking/a-50528542

[18] Pearson, Erica. The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Ed. Gus Martin. Second ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2011. 595-6. Print.

[19] United States. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992. N.p., n.d. Web. 27 June 2014; United States. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994. N.p., Apr. 1995. Web. 27 June 2014.

[20] Leonnig, Carol D. "Iran Held Liable In Khobar Attack." Washington Post. N.p., 23 Dec. 2006. Web. 27 June 2014

[21] Hamzeh, Nizar. “Lebanon's Hizbullah: from Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation.” Third World Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2, 1993. American University of Beirut.

[22] Worth, Robert, and Nada Bakri. "Deal for Lebanese Factions Leaves Hezbollah Stronger." The New York Times. 21 May 2008. Web. 30 Jan. 2015; Shadid, Anthony. "In Lebanon, Saniora Stiffens His Resistance / Prime Minister Rallies His Backers, Mostly Sunnis, against Hezbollah and Its Allies." SFGate. San Fransisco Chronicle, 15 Dec. 2006. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[23] "Lebanon Rivals Agree Crisis Deal." BBC News. BBC, 21 May 2008. Web. 26 June 2014; Worth, Robert F., and Nada Bakri. "Deal for Lebanese Factions Leaves Hezbollah Stronger." The New York Times. N.p., 21 May 2008. Web. 09 Mar. 2015; Worth, Robert, and Nada Bakri. "Hezbollah Seizes Swath of Beirut From U.S.-Backed Lebanon Government." The New York Times. 9 May 2008. Web. 30 Jan. 2015.

[24] Norton, Augustus R. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007. 90.

[25] Worth, Robert. "Hezbollah’s Rise Amid Chaos." New York Times. N.p., 15 Jan. 2011. Web. 26 June 2014; Charles D. Freilich, “Leaving Lebanon: The Unilateral Withdrawal, 2000,” in Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9780801451041.003.0007; Deborah Sontag, “Retreat From Lebanon: The Triumphal Procession; Israelis Out of Lebanon After 22 Years,” New York Times, May 24, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/24/world/retreat-lebanon-triumphal-procession-israelis-lebanon-after-22-years.html  

[26] “Hezbollah Reveals New Details of 2006 Kidnapping.” Times of Israel. July 21, 2013. https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-reveals-new-details-of-2006-kidnapping/; “Timeline of Hezbollah Violence.” CAMERA. July 17, 2006. https://www.camera.org/article/timeline-of-hezbollah-violence/

[27] Matthews, Matt M. We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah–Israeli War. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2008. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/we-were-caught-unprepared.pdf; Feltman, Jeffrey. “Echoes of 2006: Israel, Hezbollah, and the Potential for Regional War.” Brookings Institution, August 9, 2024. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/echoes-of-2006-israel-hezbollah-and-the-potential-for-regional-war/

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