Summary
Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthi Movement, or the Houthis, is a Zaydi Shi’a militant organization operating in Yemen. Ansar Allah originally began in 1992 as a religious movement named Believing Youth (Shabab al-Mumanin), founded by Zaydi scholar Mohammed Azzan, in response to growing foreign ideological influences in Yemen.[7] The goal of Believing Youth was to “revive Zaydi beliefs and ideals” in Yemen “regardless of tribal or ancestral origins”, especially amongst its young population.[8] However, within ten years of its founding, Believing Youth was radicalized by the powerful al-Houthi family, adopting a more militant strain of Zaydism strongly influenced by Iranian Shi’a doctrine.[9] The al-Houthis quickly transformed Believing Youth into a powerful militant organization, adopting the name Ansar Allah. Despite its relative newness, Ansar Allah considers itself the legitimate heir to the thousand-year tradition of Zaydi theocratic rule in Yemen.
Historical Background: Zaydism in Yemen
Zaydism is a minor branch of Shi’a Islam with looser rules of theocratic succession than the more popular “Twelver” school—which is practiced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.[10] Zaydi beliefs were spread to Yemen when early adherents fled there from the Sunni Umayyad Caliphate’s persecution.[11] Yemen was far from the Umayyad heartland of Syria and possessed easily defensible mountainous terrain. After gaining the support of local tribes, the Zaydis founded the Rassid Imamate in 897 AD.[12] For the next one-thousand-years, a series of Zaydi states ruled over Yemen, in whole or in part, entrenching the religious minority group’s political power.[13]
In 1962, the final Zaydi polity, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, was overthrown by a military coup d'état, leading to the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen).[14] The new Yemen Arab Republic encompassed the northern territories, while the south, a British protectorate since 1839, remained under London’s control.[15] When Marxist Arab nationalists overthrew British rule in 1967, the liberated southern provinces became the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen).[16] Eventually, in 1990, the two Yemens reunited to form the Republic of Yemen, with Abdullah Saleh—the Zaydi military-ruler of North Yemen since 1978—as the first president.[17]
The instatement of democracy weakened Zaydi political power—as they comprised only one-third of Yemen’s population in 2022.[18] Moreover, the newly formed republic, seated in Sana’a, allowed Salafism, Wahabism (the branch of Islam followed by the House of Saud), and secularism to gain influence in traditional Zaydi heartlands.[19] The loss of entrenched privileges led to widespread Zaydi discontent against the central government in Sana’a, and a sense that their unique religious identity was being threatened.[20]
1990-2003: The Beginning of the Houthi Movement
In 1992, scholar Mohammed Azzan founded Believing Youth, an organization that ran instructive summer camps and social programs for young Yemenis, to preserve the Zaydi identity.[21] At this time, President Saleh tacitly supported Believing Youth, because of its relatively moderate religious convictions, to counterbalance against more radical Islamist groups.[22] In the long-term, however, Believing Youth encouraged tens of thousands of young Yemenis to prioritize “their Zaydi identity over the republican identity of the state”, inadvertently cultivating the core Houthi recruiting pool.[23]
In Sa’ada governorate (the Yemeni equivalent to a province), Zaydi revivalism was vigorously advocated for by the family of Badr al-Din al-Houthi. The al-Houthi family, from which the Houthi Movement derives its name, are influential Hashemites (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) who gained distinction after the collapse of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom for their outspoken Zaydism.[24] Badr al-Din al-Houthi, a Zaydi cleric described as the family’s “modern patriarch,” taught a hardline position of Hashemite superiority, proclaiming that “Wilaya, [which means] the Power [to govern], is (…) for those whom Allah made the power to in his book and his prophet's sayings, whether the people accept it or not. This is a matter decided from Allah not by Shoura [a council or referendum].”[25] In short, Badr al-Din believed that political legitimacy is derived from divine mandate, not the assent of the governed.
The family’s views are informed by the Jarudi tradition of Zaydism, which is doctrinally similar to Iranian Twelver Shi’ism, and a deep admiration for the Iranian Revolution.[26] Unlike Yemen’s mainstream Zaydi tradition (Haduwi), Jarudi Zaydis believe that Hashemites descending from al-Hussain, a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, “have a right to do whatever it takes, including by violent means, to bring society back to order.”[27] As claimants of the al-Hussain lineage, the al-Houthi family believe that they have the divine right to leave the Republic of Yemen’s guardianship—Zaydi terminology for a righteous rebellion—and rule the country.[28] Members of the al-Houthi family, directed by Badr al-Din, strategically intermarried with notable Hashemites in the region, creating a powerful and well-respected coalition that became the backbone of the Houthi Movement.[29] All major Houthi leaders have come from this core cadre, or their descendants.[30]
Hussein al-Houthi, scion of the al-Houthi clan, joined Believing Youth between 1993 and 1999.[31] Along with Hussein came many members of the extended al-Houthi family, including future Houthi leader Abdul Malik and his associates.[32] Using his familial influence, Hussein al-Houthi attempted to import Iranian Twelver ideas into Believing Youth, which he thought to be a truer expression of Zaydism, but faced resistance from the organization’s leadership, especially its founder, Mohammed Azzan.[33] The differences stemmed from Azzan’s Haduwi beliefs, which are less radical than al-Houthi’s Jarudi convictions. Moreover, al-Houthi’s focus on global geopolitics and militaristic zeal were not shared by many members of Believing Youth, which was primarily a network of religious summer camps. As Zaydi discontent with republican rule grew, however, al-Houthi was able to radicalize and absorb Believing Youth into the broader Houthi Movement (which had not yet taken on the name Ansar Allah).[34] By 2004, under Houthi stewardship, Believing Youth took on increasingly militarized characteristics which were more in line with the teachings of Badr al-Din than its founding ideals, inciting Mohammed Azzan’s public denouncement of the organization.[35]
2004-2011: The Houthi Wars Against the Yemeni State
In June 2004, in response to Houthi criticism of President Saleh’s support for the Iraq War, which Saleh “perceived as undermining his authority”, Sana’a arrested 640 Houthi followers, ordered Houssein al-Houthi’s arrest, and issued a $55,000 ransom for the militant leader.[36] The Houthis reacted to the provocation with arms. In this first war, the Houthis only had between a few hundred to 10,000 dedicated fighters, mostly Believing Youth graduates, who significantly lacked training or equipment.[37] The Houthis organized into teams of 20-30 fighters and waged an extraordinarily violent campaign of guerilla warfare.[38] Any local tribes that supported Saleh’s forces were subject to retaliatory measures including the execution of religious leaders and children, with decapitated bodies placed on display as warning.[39] However, the small Houthi forces were quickly defeated by the professional Yemeni military and Hussein al-Houthi was captured and executed on the battlefield in September 2004.[40]
Hussein al-Houthi’s death, considered a martyrdom by many local Zaydis, proved a watershed moment in garnering public support and sparked a surge in recruitment.[41] The Saleh government did much to accidentally legitimize al-Houthi’s death as a martyrdom. For one, they “posted images of his body on walls” throughout Sa’ada, which is normally associated with martyrs in Shi’a tradition.[42] Additionally, Saleh’s military indiscriminately disfigured Zaydi shrines and sacked Zaydi majority cities in its campaign, regardless of their affiliation with the Houthis.[43] Many Zaydis who did not agree with Houthi religious views began supporting the movement “because of ethnic affiliation” and a sense of shared marginalization at the hands of the state.[44]
Badr al-Din selected Abdul Malik, his ninth son, over five remaining elder brothers, to succeed Hussein as supreme commander of the Houthi Movement.[45] Abdul Malik, only in his early twenties at the time, shared Badr al-Din and Hussein’s admiration of Iran and is reportedly a gifted scholar.[46] In 2005, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, secured leadership of the organization and continued the fight against the government, initially utilizing raids, assassinations, and other guerrilla tactics.[47] As of 2024, in his approximately twenty years in power, Abdul Malik al-Houthi cultivated a second-generation cadre of competent generals, transformed the organization from a few hundred north Yemeni zealots to a state-level actor in the “Axis of Resistance,” has taken the Red Sea hostage, and withstood punishing reprisals from the national militaries of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
In 2005, a short second war broke out between Sana’a and the Houthis. In this conflict, the Houthis conducted acts of terror against the state, leaving hundreds dead.[48] However, the Houthi’s highest-ranking commander was forced to surrender to Saleh’s military.[49] That November, the Houthis fought a third war against the state, once again using guerrilla tactics. This time, however, the war ended with President Saleh offering concessions, including amnesty for 600 Houthi fighters.[50] Throughout these early conflicts, Houthi militants gained expertise in fielding a growing army against superior forces and managing complex logistics networks. Equally important was the Houthi’s increased political warfare capabilities—as they established a strengthening coalition of northern Yemeni tribes in opposition to Sana’a.
As a career-general, President Saleh personally directed the campaigns against the Houthis.[51] In his battle plans, President Saleh mostly committed forces commanded by Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar against the militants.[52] Ali Mohsen, reportedly, had been one of the staunchest opponents of Saleh’s plan to implement hereditary succession for the Yemeni presidency.[53] Some reports claim that Saleh purposefully hamstrung General Ali Mohsen’s forces to prevent him from attaining complete victory over the Houthis, lowering the general’s prestige, and may have even secretly armed the militants.[54] This would explain the professional military’s failure to terminate the Houthi rebellion early on, given the militant’s initially feeble forces. Additionally, the elite soldiers of the Republican Guard, loyal to Saleh and commanded by his son, Brigadier General Ahmed Ali, were held in reserve to preserve their strength as Ali Mohsen’s forces were being depleted.[55] It’s possible that early on, President Saleh saw General Ali Mohsen as a greater threat to his power than the Houthis, and therefore sought to use the militants to further his plans.
In 2007, the fourth Houthi war was fought. In the six-month conflict, the militants displayed impressive advances in their development of more sophisticated strategies and tactics, which was partially enabled by their enlarged numbers.[56] Houthi fighters displayed the capability to defend towns from armored assaults and lead counterattacks against government-held buildings.[57] In the fifth war, fought in 2008, the Houthis advanced as far south as parts of the capital, Sana’a, and interfered with government logistics by strategically capturing or demolishing critical roads and bridges.[58]
In the sixth and final Houthi war (2009-2010), the militants stormed the government-held city of Sa’ada, the capital of Sa’ada governorate, with armored vehicles and forces large enough to merit tactical units sized between 240-360 fighters.[59] By this final conflict, the Houthi war machine had been developed to rival, and often surpass, Yemen’s state military. Additionally, Saleh and Ali Mohsen’s shadow rivalry created tension in the command structure and hindered the troops’ combat effectiveness.
To bolster the Yemeni state and prevent regional instability, the neighboring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supplied Saleh’s military with air support and intelligence.[60] However, the Riyadh-Sana’a alliance was plagued by distrust. Once, Saleh gave the Saudi Air Force coordinates to General Ali Mohsen’s headquarters while claiming it was a Houthis target.[61] The Saudi bomber pilots were suspicious about the unusual location and aborted the mission. Upon reviewing the coordinates, they “discovered that they had almost unwittingly assassinated one of their close allies in Yemen.”[62] Nonetheless, Riyadh’s advanced U.S.-equipped air force continued suppressing Houthi targets. In response, the militants boldly launched attacks into Saudi Arabia, garnering the attention of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Saudi’s main regional rival.[63] Reportedly, Tehran (and subsequently, Lebanese Hezbollah) began supporting the Houthis at this time, hoping to turn Yemen into an anti-Riyadh Shi’a-stronghold on the Arabian Peninsula.[64] A 2015 U.N. Security Council report confirmed that there was a “pattern of [Iranian] arms shipments to Yemen by sea which can be traced back to at least 2009.”[65] This would mark the beginning of a profitable relationship between the Shi’a actors, with the Houthis eventually joining Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance.”
Growing foreign interest in Yemen has not proved beneficial for the country, adding geopolitical elements to an already complex civil war. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has a long history of influencing Yemen. Since 1967, when the newly independent South Yemen allied itself with the Soviet Union, Riyadh has tensely observed Yemeni politics.[66] The U.S.-aligned kingdom could not accept communism on its border, which might spill revolutionary sentiments into the country. Saudi concerns were significant enough that, in 1989, Saudi intelligence head Prince Turki bin Faisal seriously considered Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s offer to “lead a jihad to liberate the south from communism.”[67] Riyadh ultimately chose to refuse the proposition, but the impulse to affect Yemen remained in Saudi policy circles.[68] In 1990, when President Saleh sided with Saddam Houssein during the Kuwait Crisis, the Saudis mass-deported one million Yemeni workers in retaliation.[69] Four years later, the kingdom sponsored a coup d'état against President Saleh, which captured the important city of Aden, but was quickly crushed by Yemen’s military.[70]
2011-2014: Ansar Allah Captures the Yemeni State
In 2011, the Houthis established a political umbrella organization named Ansar Allah, meaning supporters of God, over all segments of its diverse movement.[71] The adoption of the title Ansar Allah marked the beginnings of an institutional reformation of the Houthi Movement, developing a “totalitarian” apparatus over all Houthi militants, and eventually all subjected Yemenis.[72] This was chiefly accomplished through the formation of the Houthi Jihad Council. The nine-member Jihad Council is headed by Abdul Malik al-Houthi and oversees every area of Houthi operations.[73] The council has been noted for its “unmistakable similarity to Lebanese Hezbollah’s own Jihad Council,” reflective of the Houthi’s strengthening Iranian and Hezbollah ties.[74] In fact, advisors from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard and Lebanese Hezbollah, called “Jihad Assistants,” retain important seats on the Jihad Council.[75] Reportedly, Abdul Malik al-Houthi and the two Jihad Assistants “make up a triad at the heart of the Houthi war machine.”[76]
When the Arab Spring democratization movements swept across the Middle East and North Africa, the Saleh government was unable to reconcile with protestors demands for free and fair elections.[77] Ansar Allah militants joined the protests against President Saleh and continued to demonstrate even after he agreed to step down.[78] Notably, after years of mutual distrust, Major General Ali Mohsen defected from his powerful position in the Saleh regime.[79] In addition to popular unrest, Saudi Arabia covertly supported efforts to replace Saleh with his vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi—a south Yemeni affiliated with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood.[80] Facing extreme political pressure, the authoritarian President Saleh, who had led Yemen for 33 years, was ousted in November 2011, in accordance with a Gulf Cooperation Council brokered compromise.[81] Capitalizing on the insecurity, Ansar Allah rapidly captured strategically valuable territories throughout the north, including the port of Midi, and took full control of the Sa’ada governorate.[82] Evidence suggests that once Ansar Allah fully captured Midi in November 2011, Iran began supplying the militants with similar armaments and advisors as it has done for Hezbollah, deepening their cooperation.[83] In response to this development, the U.S. Navy began seizing illegal Iranian weapons shipments to Yemen.[84]
Upon Saleh’s resignation, the Gulf Cooperation Council agreement called for the election of a successor tasked with forming a “government of national unity.”[85] After running unopposed, incumbent vice president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi was sworn in as president of Yemen’s transitional government in February 2012.[86] The plebiscite entrusted Hadi with presidential powers for a shortened two-year term to manage the transition, after which Yemenis would return to the polls.[87] Ansar Allah criticized the move to replace Saleh with Hadi, who was a Saudi-backed Sunni Muslim from southern Yemen.[88] Hadi used his two-year term to draft a new constitution for Yemen but failed to pass any substantial reform because of backlash from varying Yemeni political parties.[89]
Additionally, Saleh’s resignation prompted a U.N.-facilitated National Dialogue Conference (NDC) amongst all Yemeni political factions, with the aim to bring about the “full transition of Yemen into a state that upholds democracy, freedom, rule of law, human rights and good governance.”[90] Preparatory work began in 2012, but the NDC officially commenced on March 18, 2013.[91] Thirty-five Ansar Allah representatives were included in these discussions, of 565 available seats, showing that the militants had gained international recognition as a fixed actor in Yemeni politics.[92] Nonetheless, Ansar Allah conducted offensives against President Hadi’s forces even while participating in the NDC.[93] In 2014, the NDC published its Outcome Document, which would function as a “roadmap” for democratization.[94] Notably, the NDC achieved consensus on implementing federalism in Yemen to resolve the ongoing issue of southern separatism.[95] An NDC special committee determined that the new federal state of Yemen would “comprise of six regions,” each created from several preexisting governorates.[96] The committee’s proposal, however, ensured that Sa’ada governorate, Ansar Allah’s principal base of support, and other Zaydi-majority areas would be combined into a landlocked and resource-poor region.[97] Dissatisfied by the results, Ansar Allah rejected the NDC Outcome Document.[98] However, the Outcome Document was approved and adopted by the conference-at-large.[99]
After rejecting the NDC Outcome Document, in 2014, Ansar Allah forged an unlikely alliance with former President Saleh in mutual opposition to the Hadi government.[100] President Saleh, who had killed Houssein al-Houthi a decade earlier, was not a likely partner for Ansar Allah. However, each possessed capabilities that were useful for the other. Saleh, after 33-years in power, retained many influential contacts throughout Yemen’s tribal, military, and governmental leadership.[101] His political prestige within Yemen would instill legitimacy to Ansar Allah’s activities. The militant group, on the other hand, possessed one of the most powerful military formations in Yemen, as well as a growing array of tribal and international alliances—most notably, Iran and Hezbollah.[102] Ansar Allah’s ability to create tribal coalitions has been described as “brilliant moves on the chessboard” honed by their “historic skill as tribal mediators” and their budding intelligence capabilities.[103] Saleh and Ansar Allah’s alliance of convenience would later split in 2017, leading to the former president’s assassination by the militant groups.[104]
The Houthi-Saleh alliance advanced on Sana’a, the capital, in September 2014.[105] President Saleh ordered Yemeni military units still loyal to him to stand down, which left the capital lightly guarded.[106] By September 21, Ansar Allah and Saleh had taken control over most of Sana’a—probably benefiting from Hezbollah’s strategic advice.[107] Ansar Allah used the successful coup d'état to strengthen its forces, while sabotaging Saleh’s efforts to rebuild the vaunted Republican Guard—formerly the most well-trained and loyal unit in Yemen’s military.[108]
In Sana’a, Ansar Allah incorporated many high-ranking Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials into its organization, eventually replacing them with al-Houthi relatives.[109] The Ansar Allah-run Ministry of Defense created the General Mobilization Authority, which exercised the militants’ newfound state-level human resource management capacity.[110] The militant organization claimed in February 2024 that the General Mobilization Authority could muster 873,123 trained reserves.[111] In addition, Ansar Allah infused 40,000 militants into the captured Yemeni military and required all soldiers to undergo “varying degrees of ideological indoctrination” to further assimilate the force into its war machine.[112] Integration with the Ministry of Defense also instilled a heightened sense of professionalism into Ansar Allah units and a superior command and control system was adopted.[113] The militants’ kinetic capabilities were dramatically augmented when it seized “entire brigade sets of tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons” from state arsenals and appropriated “Yemen’s strategic missile and coastal defense forces, as well as national intelligence agencies.”[114]
In October 2014, Ansar Allah coerced President Hadi, who was still in Sana’a, into adopting policies friendly to the militant group. Ansar Allah officials dissolved parliament and forced Hadi to appoint Khalid Bahah, a technocrat with affinity for the militants, as Prime Minister.[115] Meanwhile, Ansar Allah continued its offensive against government forces and captured the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, the second largest port in Yemen, which broadened avenues to import Iranian armaments.[116] Frustrated with the government, in January 2015, Ansar Allah officials and placed President Hadi under house arrest and forced him to resign.[117] The next month, Hadi secretly escaped Sana’a, withdrew his resignation, and fled to Aden, the largest port city in Yemen.[118] President Hadi marshalled government forces still loyal to him and began directing the war effort from Aden. However, Ansar Allah’s relentless offensive quickly caught up with the President and the militants seized the temporary capital in March 2015.[119] Hadi was forced to flee to Riyadh, where he governed until being deposed by the Saudi government in April 2022 and replaced by the current president, Rashad al-Alimi.[120]
2015-2023: Ansar Allah’s War Against a Saudi-led Coalition
In March 2015, at the request of the exiled President Hadi, a Saudi-led coalition of nine Arab states launched a military offensive against Ansar Allah called Operation Decisive Storm.[121] Then-Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman, the principal advocate for intervention in the royal court, supervised strategy and managed relations with coalition partners, chiefly the United Arab Emirates.[122] At the time, Mohammed bin Salman was the Deputy Crown Prince—aiming to succeed his father as king—and led a faction of the House of Saud “who are out to prove the kingdom’s military prowess as they pursue Arab world leadership.”[123]
Decisive Storm poured in troop and material support for the beleaguered Hadi government, recapturing Aden by September and slowly progressing north.[124] The Saudi coalition benefited from provisions of “intelligence and war material” from the Obama administration—with support extending so far as the U.S. Navy refueling Saudi Air Force squadrons to extend their bombing runs.[125] U.S. support alone, however, would prove insufficient to offset the $200 million per day cost of the coalition’s military operations at the end of 2015.[126] Additionally, to replenish their arsenal, and possibly hoping to cement Washington’s backing, Saudi Arabia purchased $1.3 billion of U.S. armaments, approximately 20,000 “smart” and “dumb” bombs, in December.[127]
When the campaign failed to yield quick results, the coalition began to fray. For one, the Saudi’s alliance with al-Islah militia forces proved to be a source of conflict with the United Arab Emirates.[128] Al-Islah is a Yemeni Sunni faction associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been involved in attempts to overthrow the Emirati government.[129] Over this disagreement, the United Arab Emirates withdrew 2,000 soldiers, around half their forces at the time, and hired hundreds of Colombian mercenaries to take their place.[130]
Additionally, the Saudis were subject to widespread international criticism for its total naval blockade, intended to deprive Ansar Allah of Iranian weapons, and its air campaign which “inflicted massive collateral damage on civilian targets like factories, hospitals, schools, homes, and even wedding parties.”[131] As of 2024, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have conducted over 25,000 air strikes resulting in around 19,000 civilian casualties.[132] The mass civilian casualties reflect the sheer scope of the aerial bombardment, which had to be expanded to make up for the Yemeni Army’s deficiencies and the coalition’s reluctance to commit sufficient ground forces.[133] Attempting to minimize non-military casualties, Riyadh adopted “virtually the same targeting tactics and rules of engagement (…) as [what] the U.S. and its allies use” in addition to “advanced command and control displays,” which warn pilots of civilian presence.[134] Despite the high human and financial cost of the conflict, results were slim. By December 2015, coalition forces had only reached the city of Taiz, which is about 150 miles south of Sana’a.[135]
Between 2015 and 2017, Ansar Allah agreed to several ceasefires with Saudi Arabia under the sponsorship of the United Nations.[136] Both sides have accused the other of breaking ceasefire agreements and progress toward a permanent peace was not made in this period. Ansar Allah capitalized on its resources from Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) to launch missiles into Saudi Arabia, particularly oil fields, despite ceasefire efforts.[137] Between 2015 and 2018, Ansar Allah launched over 66,000 short-range rockets into Saudi Arabia, causing almost a thousand civilian casualties and “depopulating several hundred small villages.”[138] Additionally, Ansar Allah forces deployed offensive antipersonnel landmines in “at least six governorates” since the beginning of the Saudi intervention, a humanitarian hazard a and violation of international law.[139] From 2015-2017, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center has found and destroyed “65,272 landmines, including 20,807 antipersonnel landmines”, although Ansar Allah is not solely responsible for the mines.[140]
In south Yemen, the secession movement (al-Hirak) gained enough traction to split off from the Hadi government in 2017.[141] The secessionists formed a United Arab Emirates supported government under the name Southern Transitional Council, which is seated in Aden and headed by former Aden governor Aidarous al-Zubaidi.[142] President Hadi denounced the Southern Transitional Council from Riyadh.[143] The formation of the Southern Transitional Council is reflective of the continued degradation of the Saudi coalition in Yemen, as two so-called partners began backing opposing Yemeni factions in the civil war.
In December 2017, former-President Saleh publicly announced the cessation of his alliance with Ansar Allah, whom he denounced as an Iranian insurgency, and called for the Saudi coalition’s assistance in defeating the militants.[144] Saleh, a skilled politician, was a pragmatist specializing in “negotiating with his greatest enemies and turning them into his allies”, which he did in 2014 by partnering with Ansar Allah.[145] Saleh’s betrayal likely came after successful negotiations with Saudi Arabia and careful preparations.[146] Initially, Saleh’s forces had the upper hand against the surprised militants. However, Ansar Allah units recovered their ground and quickly surrounded Saleh’s soldiers.[147] On December 4, two days after hostilities began, Ansar Allah fighters ambushed Saleh’s armed convoy as he was escaping Sana’a and killed him.[148] Militants were recorded chanting praises to Allah for finally avenging Hussein al-Houthi, the group’s founder who was executed by Saleh during the first Houthi war.[149] Militants combatted the remnants of Saleh’s forces in Sana’a and purged 200 high-ranking Saleh supporters from official positions.[150] Notably, Saleh’s favored Republican Guard, renamed the Presidential Protection Brigades, was retained as an elite unit, albeit with extensive “re-staffing and indoctrination.”[151] The complete victory over Saleh secured Ansar Allah’s position in northwestern Yemen.
In 2018, as fighting erupted between the Saudi coalition and Ansar Allah over Hodeidah, the Stockholm Agreement was negotiated between Ansar Allah and the exiled President Hadi.[152] The agreement called for (1) Ansar Allah’s withdrawal from Hodeidah, (2) a prisoner exchange, and (3) establishment of a committee to further discuss ending the siege of Taiz.[153] Ansar Allah had an established presence in Hodeidah and controlled smuggling operations within the port for financing, but the port was a necessary location for government and humanitarian access to transport supplies to the rest of Yemen, especially Sana’a. However, the Stockholm Agreement never achieved its goals: Ansar Allah didn’t surrender Hodeidah, 95 percent of prisoners were still in captivity a year after signing, and no progress was made on lifting the siege of Taiz.[154] Minor agreements allowed humanitarian aid to flow through the port.[155] Ansar Allah used the negotiations as time to regroup and recover its forces. As the Stockholm Agreement was deliberated, the restrengthened militants violated the ceasefire with a powerful offensive that aggressed three governorates and began to threaten Marib, the last northern Hadi stronghold.[156]
Despite further efforts to broker a ceasefire, Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah continued to clash. Ansar Allah targeted Saudi Aramco’s oil processing facilities in 2019, which are the largest in the world, likely using Iranian drones.[157] A September 2019 drone strike on the Abqaiq-Khurais plant caused huge fires to erupt across the facility, shutting down half of Saudi Arabia’s daily oil output (around 5 million barrels of crude production).[158] The group also continued targeting military facilities throughout the south of Saudi Arabia, concurrently causing civilian casualties.[159] Furthermore, the Southern Transitional Council continued to divert the Yemeni Army’s attention away from Ansar Allah. In August 2019, President Hadi and the Southern Transitional Council’s forces engaged in an escalating series of clashes.[160] Saudi Arabia exerted pressure on the warring factions to negotiate an end to what has commonly been referred to as the “civil war within a civil war” and refocus on combatting Ansar Allah.[161]
On November 5, 2019, the Hadi government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) signed the Riyadh Agreement under Saudi mediation.[162] The deal provisions for the formation of a Hadi-STC unity government, seated in Aden, with equal representation of northerners and southerners in the cabinet.[163] Additionally, to keep the peace, government and STC forces were required to redeploy away from Aden and be replaced by local security units.[164] The signing of this deal was lauded as “a milestone towards a political solution to end the war” and set the foundation for a “new period of stability in Yemen” according to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.[165] By brokering the agreement between the so-called coalition partners, Saudi Arabia hoped to foster unity “within the anti-Houthi alliance, re-establish a strategic relationship with the UAE in southern Yemen, integrate STC forces into a unified Yemeni military, and further the prospect of a federal state in Yemen.”[166] However, within a year of signing the treaty, it became clear that Saudi aims would not be achieved by the Riyadh Agreement. A large factor in this was Hadi and the STC’s mutual distrust of each other, which functionally limited the scope of the treaty to a ceasefire, not a lasting merger.[167]
An Ansar Allah attack in December 2020 against the Hadi-STC government’s cabinet officials in Aden airport, killed at least two dozen people, but no ministers.[168] This led U.S. President Donald Trump to designate the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.[169] However, these designations were revoked by President Joseph Biden in February 2021 to foster cooperation with Ansar Allah in distributing much needed humanitarian supplies and rebuking Riyadh for its part in prolonging the civil war. A report published by the United Nations Development Program in 2021 described Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian and development crisis.”[170]
In March 2021, Ansar Allah rejected a ceasefire proposal from Saudi Arabia. The kingdom’s offer provisioned for reopening Sana’a International Airport and the port of Hodeidah, which had been under Saudi blockade since 2015, to ease the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.[171] Ansar Allah spokesman Mohamed Abdel Salam accused the Saudis of empty posturing and bartering with the lives of the Yemeni people.[172]
Throughout 2021, Ansar Allah and Hadi’s forces battled for control over the city of Marib, the last major northern city in government hands. Holding Marib is economically lucrative as it is one of the most productive oil regions in Yemen.[173] Strategically, the city borders Sana’a and is therefore imperative to take or defend the capital.[174] In addition, Marib guards the main road from northern Yemen to Aden.[175] For Ansar Allah, taking Marib would improve its negotiating hand. For Hadi, losing Marib would severely undermine his legitimacy.
By the beginning of the 2021 offensive, Marib had already been contested for six years.[176] In that time, Ansar Allah seized 12 of 14 districts in Marib governorate but has repeatedly failed to capture the most significant district, the city of Marib itself.[177] Marib has become the new home for as many as 2.5 million war refugees fleeing Ansar Allah’s campaigns to conquer northern Yemen.[178] Many of these refugees are affiliates of the Sunni Islah party, a major faction in the Hadi government. Ansar Allah mobilized fierce attacks against Marib, which caused many civilian casualties, utilizing ballistic missiles, drone strikes, tanks, and tens of thousands of soldiers, many of them “boys barely old enough to carry a gun.”[179] Government forces narrowly repelled assaults and have maintained their defensive lines, but only with extensive Saudi air support.[180] Ansar Allah accused the Saudi coalition of employing Al-Qaeda and Islamic State fighters to assist the defense of Marib.[181] Coalition leaders did not respond to the allegation. By July 2021, the battle was identified by analysts as “the bloodiest in the past seven years of the Yemeni conflict.”[182] In line with this statement, Ansar Allah’s defense minister admitted that between June and December 2021, 14,700 of its fighters were killed.[183]
On April 2, 2022, a United Nations mediated two-month ceasefire went into effect between Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah which has tentatively held, as of July 2024, despite lapsing.[184] While active combat between Saudi and militant forces have stopped, Ansar Allah’s battle for Marib continued against government forces through early 2023. The U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen claimed that “the truce is broadly holding” although he yielded that “reports of military operations, particularly around Marib, are concerning” at a Security Council briefing.[185] In addition, Ansar Allah claims that Riyadh has not eased its total air and sea blockade of Yemen, which the militants note is a violation of the ceasefire agreement.[186]
On April 7, 2022, President Hadi removed Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a major military figure since Saleh’s presidency, and then personally resigned on Yemen’s state TV station.[187] Hadi transferred the powers of his office to an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council, which was tasked with forging a permanent peace in Yemen.[188] The council is headed by Islah party associate Rashad al-Alimi, who held prominent positions in both Hadi and Saleh’s cabinets.[189] Councilmembers also include Yemeni notables: Southern Transitional Council president Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the governor of Marib, and Saleh’s nephew who leads a United Arab Emirates-backed militia.[190] The political reorganization is widely recognized as a Saudi-initiated attempt to create unity after years of frustration over Hadi’s weak leadership.[191] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pledged a combined $3 billion in aid to support the Yemeni economy as a signal of confidence in the new government.[192]
2023-2024: Ansar Allah’s Offensives Following October 7th
In August 2023, the People’s Republic of China exercised its growing diplomatic strength by mediating the contentious relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the principal foreign backers of the Yemeni civil war, which revived hopes of a resolution.[193] This time, however, peacemaking efforts proved more substantive. Both the Saudis and Ansar Allah were seriously engaging in backchannel negotiations for a permanent peace treaty. By October 2023, the terms of the treaty were almost completed, and the signing appeared imminent.[194] However, the onset of the Gaza Crisis on October 7th and Ansar Allah’s direct strikes against Israeli territory using Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles, land attack cruise missiles, and drones have halted peacemaking efforts.[195] As of July 2024, the ceasefire between Ansar Allah and Saudi Arabia have held, albeit the militants continue to combat the Yemeni government.[196]
Ansar Allah officially declared war against Israel on October 31, 2023.[197] Aiming to pressure Tel Aviv, Ansar Allah began targeting Israel-affiliated container ships crossing the Red Sea, a critical naval route through which around 15% of global trade passes.[198] Ansar Allah has claimed that its attacks were in support of Palestine, and it has vowed to continue aggressive action until the cessation of hostilities in Gaza.[199] This threat to global economic activity spurred the United States to launch Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval mission protecting the Red Sea, in cooperation with several other countries.[200] Notably missing from this alliance is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which may not want to risk derailing progress made towards permanent peace. Leading Operation Prosperity Guardian, the United States and the United Kingdom have launched dozens of air strikes against Ansar Allah targets in Yemen since January 2024.[201] However, Ansar Allah militants have already adapted to a decade of comprehensive Saudi Air Force bombings by moving important facilities underground, making them a difficult target to strike.[202] The Biden administration also redesignated Ansar Allah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in January 2024.[203]
Ansar Allah’s aggressive posturing toward Israel is reported to be popular in Yemen, and the group has experienced a marked uptick in recruiting.[204] In total, the militant group claims to have enlisted over 167,000 new soldiers in the first seven months of the Gaza Crisis.[205] Drawing from its enlarged fighting force, in January 2024, 50,000 militants were deployed to the Marib frontline.[206] Many of these soldiers are newly recruited children as young as thirteen who have been tricked into believing that they will be sent to Gaza to relieve Palestinians.[207] Marib has been the site of fierce combat since 2021 but has experienced less intense fighting since Ansar Allah agreed to the U.N. ceasefire in 2022.[208] Nonetheless, both Ansar Allah and the Yemeni government have retained tens of thousands of soldiers on the front. Analysts are concerned that Ansar Allah may resume major operations against the city, which currently hosts at least one million refugees, out of a desire to capitalize on its strengthened popular support since the beginning of the Gaza crisis.[209]
