Al Shabaab is a large militant organization in the Horn of Africa aiming to establish an Islamic state. The group’s name translates to “The Youth” or “The Young Men” in Arabic.[3] Al Shabaab’s exact origins are somewhat ambiguous. The group may have ties to Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI), an armed group active in Somalia and Ethiopia between 1984 and 1997. Al Shabaab’s first leader, Aden Hashi Ayro, served in AIAI from 1991 to 1997. Sometime after 1997, Ayro joined the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a court system founded by Somali locals who sought to take control of and infuse order in Mogadishu due to chaos after Somali dictator Siad Barre’s death.[4]
A series of ICU leaders were assassinated in 2005, allegedly by Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The armed enforcement wing of the ICU — Al Shabaab, led by Ayro — thereafter rose to prominence. The group developed into a cohesive and effective militant organization under Ayro’s leadership, during which he helped recruit and train its fighters. Al Shabaab advocated for violent revenge against TFG personnel, drawing criticism from Hassan Dahir Aweys, another former AIAI member who served as ICU legislative council chair. Aweys also criticized Ayro’s other brutal actions, such as the 2005 disinterment of an Italian colonial-era cemetery, arguing it would damage the ICU’s reputation. In June 2006, the ICU gained control of Mogadishu and other areas in central and southern Somalia. As the courts spread their influence, they began to make tangible improvements to civilian quality of life. They removed roadblocks and trash from the Mogadishu streets, provided peace and security, and returned property to locals that was commandeered by US-backed warlords. For these reasons, the ICU enjoyed a large degree of support from the civilian population under its control. [5]
The ICU’s reign over Mogadishu was short-lived, lasting approximately 3 months. This was partly due to escalating tensions within ICU leadership. Aweys, who was considered a Salafist, advocated for a nationalistic agenda of establishing an Islamic Somali state ruled by locals. On the other hand, Ayro pushed for the group to connect the struggle in Somalia to a broader international jihadist agenda. These struggles foreshadowed what would become to be Al Shabaab’s greatest weakness: its ideological lack of cohesion. As the group became increasingly outspokenthroughout 2006, the TFG became concerned. On December 20, 2006, a coalition of United Nations-backed Ethiopian troops, TFG forces, and competing warlords launched an offensive against the ICU. The ICU effectively disintegrated soon after this offensive. The ICU’s leaders left Mogadishu six days later and formally resigned their leadership on December 27, 2006. Although the ICU had been effectively demolished as an organization, Al Shabaab remained active under Ayro’s leadership and broke away to become an independent militant group.[6]
The Ethiopian-TFG offensive was a crucial event for Al Shabaab. It led to the dissolution of the ICU, making Al Shabaab one of the main anti-government and anti-foreign forces in Somalia.[7] Ahmed Abdi Godane — former AIAI member who served as executive chairman of Al Shabaab — fundamentally reorganized the group and laid the groundwork for its insurgency.[8] Although Al Shabaab has a designated central commander – its first was Ayro – the group operates with a decentralized leadership structure. Top leaders, known as emirs, operate specific regional areas, each with its own political and administrative entities. This decentralized structure allows Al Shabaab to manage its network across South and Central Somalia. The Ethiopian offensive led to the widespread elimination of other Islamist factions, allowing Al Shabaab to further radicalize and expand its influence.[9] Beginning in January 2007, Al Shabaab conducted attacks against Ethiopian and TFG forces using a wide variety of tactics, including bombs, rocket-propelled grenades, and firefights. Frequent attacks in Mogadishu killed dozens, with over 1,000 civilian deaths in April 2007 alone. In early 2007, the African Union authorized peacekeeping forces from the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to stabilize the country. Troops from Uganda and Burundi arrived to support the AMISOM mission, and Al Shabaab launched attacks against those troops as well.[10]
In September 2007, former ICU leaders and members met with elements of other Somali opposition groups in Asmara, Eritrea to form an alliance, reemerging as the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS).[11] ARS-Asmara, led by Aweys, sought to continue the Somali resistance against foreign occupation.[12] However, Al Shabaab refused to attend the meeting in Eritrea and denounced the new group for failing to adopt a global jihadist agenda.[13] Al Shabaab leader Ayro sought to expand the group’s struggle beyond Somalia and link it to the broader jihadist movement. In his previous role as a member of AIAI, Ayro established connections with Al Qaeda (AQ), which he further cultivated after the disintegration of the ICU. In several statements between 2006 and 2007, AQ leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri called on Muslims to aid Al Shabaab’s efforts in Somalia. The group also adopted AQ tactics, including suicide bombings.[14]
In February 2008, the United States designated Al Shabaab a foreign terrorist organization. Three months later, a U.S. missile strike killed Ayro, and Ahmed Abdi Godane — also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr — became Al Shabaab’s top leader. Under Godane, Al Shabaab aligned itself more closely with AQ in ideology and tactics, leading to fundamental changes within the group.[15] Godane published a statement that praised AQ, and for the first time, publicly and explicitly framed the group’s struggle in Somalia as part of a larger global jihad. Al Shabaab leveraged its relationship with AQ to attract foreign fighters and monetary donations from AQ’s supporters. Al Shabaab members traveled abroad to train with AQ, and the group increasingly focused on conducting AQ-style suicide attacks. Although Al Shabaab retained most of its local Somali leaders, like regional commander Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, it began including AQ militants in its leadership after 2008.[16] These changes led to a rapid transformation of Al Shabaab from a local Islamist-nationalist group into an internationally oriented, AQ-aligned terrorist organization.
In mid-2008, Al Shabaab launched a violent campaign to avenge Ayro’s death, attacking government targets in Somalia. Among other attacks during that campaign, Al Shabaab simultaneously executed five suicide attacks against U.N. and other government targets on October 29, 2008, killing almost 30 people.[17] Al Shabaab continued using guerrilla and terror tactics against Ethiopian troops throughout 2008, gaining control of most of southern Somalia and some of Mogadishu by early 2009. During this time, Al Shabaab also gained control of important Somali cities like Baido and the port city of Kismayo.[18] These successes in 2008 and 2009 emboldened the group, allowing it to rally considerable support for its cause in south-central Somalia.
In January 2009, Ethiopian forces withdrew completely from Mogadishu in accordance with a 2008 U.N.-backed agreement between the TFG and the ARS, which also stipulated the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers.[19] Al Shabaab claimed that it had successfully expelled the Ethiopians from Somalia and turned its attention to forcing other foreign soldiers from the country. Its attacks targeted TFG and AMISOM troops. Under the terms of the U.N.-backed agreement, the ICU’s former leader, Sheikh Sharif, became the TFG’s president. Sharif’s ascension provided some stability in the country, and he vowed to implement Shariah law. After Sharif became president and Ethiopian troops left the country, Al Shabaab lost some of its basis for popular support. The group accomplished its goal of forcing out the Ethiopians, and Sharif took up its efforts to implement Shariah law. To remain relevant and undermine the TFG, Al Shabaab established its own governing structures in the territories it controlled. These local governments transcended existing clan divisions by drawing leadership from a wide representation of kinship groups.[20] Through these structures, the group collected taxes and provided social services.[21]
In February 2009, Hizbul Islam emerged as a coalition of Somali Islamist groups opposed to the U.N.-backed agreement and cooperation with the TFG. ARS-Asmara, previously led by Hassan Aweys, was one of the four organizations that merged to form the coalition. Between May and July 2009, Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam cooperated to target TFG forces and secure control of large areas of south-central Somalia and most of Mogadishu. The two groups had a shared interest in combating the TFG, but their cooperation ended there. Hizbul Islam and Al Shabaab competed militarily for influence over the Somali insurgency and control of territory. Ideologically, the groups clashed on a number of topics. For example, Hizbul Islam supported TFG president Sharif’s efforts to implement Shariah law, while Al Shabaab staunchly opposed them. In addition, Aweys strictly opposed Godane’s efforts to court AQ and have foreign jihadists interfere in Somalia. These tensions led to armed clashes between the two groups in late 2009.[22] Hizbul Islam slowly lost ground and ultimately chose to merge with Al Shabaab in late 2010 after a series of internal defections.[23] Some observers saw the merger as a takeover of Hizbul Islam by Al Shabaab.[24] In 2012, disagreements between Al Shabaab’s militants and its Hizbul Islam members led Hizbul Islam to ultimately split from the group.[25] The two factions disagreed about the nature and extent of the organization’s goals. Al Shabaab militants fought to internationalize the Somali conflict in the name of global jihad, while Hizbul Islam militants had more nationalist objectives and wanted to focus strictly on Somalia.[26] After the split, Hizbul Islam became inactive and renounced violence.[27]
Al Shabaab members increasingly criticized Godane following the failed Mogadishu Ramadan offensive of August 2010. The operation, which was reportedly planned by Godane, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of militants.[28] In August 2011, mounting pressure from a coalition of TFG and AMISOM forces caused Al Shabaab to withdraw from Mogadishu. The coalition also expelled Al Shabaab from major seaports south of the capital, which the group has not been able to regain as of 2021.[29] As of 2025, the group has not recaptured the seaports. Al Shabaab offensives now target central Somalia, where territorial control is contested.[30] The control of these port cities, principally Kismayo and Barawe, allowed the group to gain revenue from smuggling and taxing overseas shipping.[31] These losses were reportedly a major humiliation for Godane. Two weeks later, Godane removed Mukhtar Robow and Ibrahim al-Afghani — both founding members of Al Shabaab — as deputies over their criticism of his leadership abilities. Godane also suspended meetings of Al Shabaab’s Shura leadership council.[32] Despite setbacks and internal tensions, the group maintained control over large swaths of territory in central and southern Somalia. Al Shabaab later made the southern Somali city of Jilib its de facto capital following the loss of Mogadishu.[33]
Al Shabaab’s internal struggles surfaced in February 2012 with Godane’s announcement of a formal affiliation with AQ.[34] The move caused disputes between the group’s leaders, reflecting disagreements over AQ’s role that have divided Al Shabaab since its ICU days.[35] In March 2012, an American Al Shabaab militant named Omar Hammami posted a video online announcing his defection from the group. Hammami said his life was in danger, leading him to join other Al Shabaab defectors in publicly criticizing Godane’s dictatorial methods.[36] The ensuing public relations nightmare concerned Godane, who feared that dissidents might break away from Al Shabaab. He issued a statement shortly after warning that anyone who tried to “weaken and tear Muslims apart” would be considered the enemy. Hassan Aweys responded publicly a week later by accusing Godane of being “far removed from Islam.”[37]
In early 2013, Al Shabaab leaders began calling for Godane’s removal. An Al Shabaab militant known as Abu al-Muhajir accused Godane of serious abuses in an open letter issued in March. The following month, Ibrahim al-Afghani published an open letter to AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Afghani, who was a longstanding friend of Godane, reiterated al-Muhajir’s accusations and warned that Al Shabaab’s jihad risked failure. Godane quickly and decisively responded to quell opposition. In June, he ordered the Amniyat, Al Shabaab’s intelligence unit, to arrest al-Afghani along with another founding member of the group, preacher Mu’allim Burhan. They were both killed shortly after under disputed circumstances.[38] In September, the Amniyat tracked down Omar Hammami, killing him and other dissidents. Other Al Shabaab pragmatists fled for safety, including Aweys, who was captured by the Somali government when attempting to escape the country. Although Godane and his loyalists ultimately succeeded in their goal to consolidate power, it came at a great cost to the group. Analysts argue that the removal of respected leaders within the group cost Al Shabaab substantial leverage with local populations. Godane and his loyalists reportedly suffered alienation from the broader Somali Salafi community.[39]
Foreign deployments continued to attack Al Shabaab throughout 2012-2014, leading the group to respond by conducting large-scale attacks on civilian and military personnel abroad.[40] In September 2013, Al Shabaab attacked Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, sparking a four-day siege in which at least 67 people were killed.[41] Six months later, the group struck a nightclub in Djibouti, killing Turkish and EU nationals.[42] In June 2014, over 48 people were killed after Al Shabaab attacked hotels, restaurants, and a police station in the Kenyan coastal city of Lamu.[43] Al Shabaab claimed that its attacks on foreign targets intended to pressure troops to withdraw from Somalia.[44] The foreign attacks also appeared to raise the group’s profile, boosting recruitment and morale of its troops. Godane enjoyed the increased media attention that followed these attacks for only a short time before being killed by a U.S. airstrike in September 2014. Following Godane’s death, Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah, also known as Ahmed Diriye, became the emir of Al Shabaab. He previously served as one of Godane’s deputies and was reportedly a leader in the 2013 Amniyat crackdown on internal dissidents.[45] Al Shabaab leaders also considered another candidate — Mahad Karate — to become the new emir, but analysts argue they opted for a conservative figure like Abu Ubaidah to ensure a smooth transition of power.[46]
Under Abu Ubaidah’s leadership, Al Shabaab continued to launch high-profile attacks with the goal of forcing foreign troops out of Somalia, especially the Kenyan armed forces and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).[47] In April 2015, Al Shabaab militants targeted Kenya’s Garissa University College, killing at least 147.[48] A month later, the IS began challenging Al Shabaab’s greatest vulnerability by encouraging defections from the group. The media apparatus of IS produced numerous propaganda films starting in May 2015, featuring Somali foreign fighters in Iraq urging Somalis to join the Islamic State. The IS claimed that they were “the only group truly fighting against the oppression of Ethiopian Christians.” The Islamic State’s propaganda saw limited success in Somalia, yet elicited a strong response from Al Shabaab leadership. In November 2015, Abu Ubaidah ordered the Amniyat to crackdown on internal dissidents. However, a small group of pro-IS defectors from Al Shabaab survived the purge.[49] They operate in the northern Somali region of Puntland, where occasional clashes between Al Shabaab and defectors have erupted.[50]
Despite the ideological struggles and setbacks Al Shabaab experienced in 2015, the group managed to carry out several major attacks in 2016. In January, militants killed over 100 soldiers at a Kenyan AMISOM base, becoming one of Al Shabaab’s deadliest attacks on a foreign operation.[51] The next month, in an attempt to target Western intelligence officials, a group member detonated a bomb concealed in a laptop on a flight headed from Mogadishu to Djibouti City. The explosives only killed the bomber, and the plane landed safely. These attacks demonstrated the effectiveness of Al Shabaab’s evolving military strategy involving high-profile strikes against majority civilian targets, guerrilla warfare, and attacks on vulnerable AMISOM or government positions.[52] In fact, Al Shabaab grew to become the deadliest militant group in Africa in 2016.[53] The next year, Al Shabaab killed more than 500 people in a twin truck bomb strike in Mogadishu.[54] This incident is considered to be the deadliest attack since the inception of Al Shabaab’s insurgency in 2006.
Despite Al Shabaab’s increasingly devastating attacks, countries participating in AMISOM began planning in 2017 to gradually withdraw from Somalia. Foreign leaders were angered by their own domestic security concerns and the European Union’s decision to decrease its contributions to AMISOM.[55] However, a series of extensions by the United Nations Security Council has delayed the departure of AMISOM troops until at least the end of 2021.[56] At the time that AMISOM exit plans were floated, analysts were concerned that the Somali Federal Government (SFG) would be unable to counter Al Shabaab, enabling the militant organization to recapture swaths of territory.[57] In April 2022, AMISOM’s mandate expired, and the African Union (AU) reconfigured AMISOM into the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The AMISOM troops were replaced by a new configuration with troops from the AU.[58]
Starting in 2017, the United States increased its involvement in the fight against Al Shabaab. In March 2017, the United States expanded its rules of engagement to allow for more strikes, including preemptive strikes against members of Al Shabaab.[59] Previously, U.S. airstrikes only targeted high-value targets, such as past Al Shabaab emir Ahmed Godane. In June 2017, a U.S. airstrike destroyed an Al Shabaab camp in the Middle Juba region of south Somalia. According to Somali government officials, the camp was “a key command and supply hub.”[60] The surge in U.S. drone strikes, however, did not significantly degrade Al Shabaab’s capabilities. Instead, Al Shabaab remained adaptable, moving away from direct confrontations with enemy armed forces and engaging in more bombings against soft targets.[61]
Though the group survived external threats, it continued struggling with internal leadership disputes in 2017-2019. Al Shabaab’s leader, Abu Ubaidah, was reportedly bedridden due to illness in early 2018. Abu Ubaidah’s incapacity likely triggered a leadership crisis within Al Shabaab later that year. In June 2018, he was believed to be near death. The cost of his medication diverted funds meant for Al Shabaab’s operations.[62] Abu Ubaidah’s failing health and its drain on Al Shabaab’s resources were believed to have weakened his control over the group, spurring a power struggle.[63] Meetings of Al Shabaab’s Shura council of senior leaders in 2018 reportedly ended in deadlock, unable to coalesce around a single figure to succeed Abu Ubaidah as emir.[64]
According to Kenyan intelligence sources, Al Shabaab financial administrator Hussein Ali Fiidow allegedly attempted to organize a coup to replace Abu Ubaidah during the first half of 2018.[65] Additionally, Shura council member Mahad Karate — who had been serving as head of the Amniyat since Godane’s death — allegedly attempted to wrestle power from the emir.[66] At the time, these organizational disputes and increased military efforts led many analysts to believe that Al Shabaab was on the decline.
However, Al Shabaab’s operations in 2019 challenged analysts’ assumptions about the group’s decline and clearly signaled that the group was still able to coordinate complex attacks.[67] In January 2019, Al Shabaab attacked a five-star hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, resulting in over 15 deaths and severe injuries. The group claimed that the attack was retaliation for the increase in U.S. military activity in the region and retribution for U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to move the U.S. Israeli embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018.[68] However, given the length of time elapsed between the embassy’s move and the hotel siege, some observers assert that the attack was just part of Al Shabaab’s broader campaign to end Kenyan military intervention in Somalia.[69] On September 25, 2019, Al Shabaab carried out twin attacks on U.S. and E.U. troops using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).[70]
In August 2020, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) announced that Abu Ubaidah had temporarily transferred power to Abukar Aden, who was serving as his deputy.[71] According to NISA’s Twitter announcement, Aden took over the group’s activities amidst a bitter power struggle between Abu Ubaidah’s supporters and those of Mahad Karate. For some time, Karate targeted Ubaidah by refusing to provide the emir with access to the group’s finances. Karate also killed several kinsmen from the Rahawein clan, where the majority of Ubaidah’s support came from. In retaliation, the emir attempted to expel Karate and his supporters. Abu Ubaidah’s actions drew criticism from clan elders who demanded that the emir “cede power to a new generation.”[72] These internal clashes exacerbated existing financial struggles, brought on by the loss of important port cities, reportedly leading to “massive defections” from the group.[73]
In response to the global COVID-19 pandemic’s onset in early 2020, Al Shabaab provided public medical services for Somalis. Al Shabaab opened a dedicated COVID-19 treatment center in Jilib, south of Mogadishu.[74] In addition to providing specialized care for the virus’s respiratory symptoms, Al Shabaab claimed to have a fleet of vehicles ready to collect and transport civilians showing symptoms of COVID-19. Providing these medical and social services strengthened Al Shabaab’s political strategy of connecting to local communities, which have sometimes provided both material and information to the militant group.[75]
After a brief decline in activity in the first half of 2020, Al Shabaab increased its attacks in the second half of the year. The group carried out several high-profile attacks between September and November in Kismayo, a city previously considered to be safe. One of these attacks targeted Jubaland’s deputy state speaker of parliament.[76] In December 2020, the United States announced it would withdraw all of its troops from Somalia.[77] The highly criticized move crucially coincided with the Somali government’s plan to hold parliamentary and presidential elections in the first months of 2021. Coupled with the November 2020 withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, experts argued that the U.S.’s move would create a security vacuum in Somalia, which would benefit Al Shabaab.[78] Especially concerning was Al Shabaab’s increasing number of suicide attacks, which doubled in number from the first to the second half of 2020.[79] Al Shabaab’s violent activities directly threatened the 2021 Somali election, which the group considered to be an “apostate activity.” Observers worried that Al Shabaab’s threats would intimidate voters and undermine election results.[80] U.S. President Joe Biden recognized this threat and redeployed just under 500 troops in May 2022.[81] As of 2025, the contingent of US troops remains in Somalia to support security forces in military operations against Al Shabaab.[82]
Worries about Al Shabaab’s activities heightened after U.S. President Joe Biden took office in January 2021. The new U.S. administration tightened the previous rules of engagement on counterterrorism drone strikes, causing concern among senior Somali military officials.[83] Unable to control Al Shabaab, the Somali government canceled the February 2021 elections due to security concerns. In April 2021, Somali President Farmaajo signed legislation to extend his presidential term. As a result, political infighting and violence increased in Mogadishu between opposition forces and forces aligned with the Farmaajo government.[84] According to sources, Al Shabaab has taken advantage of the political gridlock by recruiting more fighters to its ranks.[85] In April 2021, prominent international bodies warned of grave consequences for the Somali government if Al Shabaab was allowed to continue taking advantage of the leadership divisions emerging from the political crisis.[86]
Al Shabaab altered its strategy in 2022. The group withdrew from its bases in areas previously assumed to be strongholds, aiming to attract pro-government forces and attack them with explosives. Al Shabaab ceded control of villages and bases in the Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle regions to government-aligned troops and militias. While some of this shift in territorial control occurred non-violently, Al Shabaab’s violent activities increased in 2022. The group lost ground in some regions of Somalia, but it successfully carried out lethal attacks on government and civilian targets in Mogadishu.[87] This included an attack on the Ministry of Education in October 2022 in which the group exploded two car bombs at a busy intersection, killing over 100 people and wounding at least 300 more. The bombing was the deadliest attack in Somalia since October 2017, when Al Shabaab detonated a car bomb at the same intersection to kill more than 500 people.[88]
On March 31, 2022, the mandate for AMISOM expired. The mission of African Union forces in Somalia shifted, now prioritizing a drawdown of AU troops and the ultimate transfer of security responsibilities to Somali government forces by December 2024. The new mission, African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), was very similar to AMISOM, though the new forces were more agile and mobile than AMISOM troops.[89] With new support from ATMIS, Somali government forces launched a major offensive campaign in 2022 in the Hiraan and Galmudug regions of Somalia. The offensive built upon local resistance to Al Shabaab and initially proved to be successful. By April 2023, government forces had reclaimed over 200 settlements across the Hiraan and Galmudug regions. The offensive pushed Al Shabaab forces out of their normal strongholds to regions near the Kenyan border. The group found hideouts in the terrain, taking advantage of vegetation cover and the Boni forest. The lack of a strong state presence in northeastern Kenya gave Al Shabaab space to launch attacks on ATMIS security forces.
As cross-border activity skyrocketed, AU forces initiated a key part of the transition plan: the troop drawdown. In June 2023, 2,000 AU troops withdrew from Somalia and ceded control of five Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to Somali government forces. Al Shabaab capitalized on this withdrawal, raising concerns about the security of these bases. In July 2023, Al Shabaab attacked and nearly captured a FOB in a village near the Kenya-Somalia border.[90] Additionally, the group attacked several towns in central Somalia in August 2023. The attacks forced Somali forces to withdraw from territory they had recently captured from Al Shabaab.[91] Al Shabaab’s counterattacks eventually brought the war to another stalemate.[92] On August 6, 2023, President Mohamud declared “Total War” against Al Shabaab as the government launched another campaign that ultimately proved unsuccessful in dealing significant losses to Al Shabaab.[93]
Amid growing security concerns, Somalia’s national security adviser, Hussein Sheikh Ali, requested that the UNSC pause the withdrawal in September 2023.[94] While the request was supported by AU members, the extensions exacerbated financial issues within ATMIS and highlighted growing fears that Somali forces could not provide security in the country.[95] In addition to an unrealistic timeline, the effectiveness of ATIMS was further undermined by its prioritization of military operations and limited efforts to address social and political drivers of insecurity, including weak state capacity.[96]
Al Shabaab’s resilience drove the UNSC to revise the ATMIS timeline further several times. In November 2023, the UNSC extended ATMIS until June 30, 2024.[97] In June 2024, the UNSC voted again to extend ATMIS until August 12, 2024.[98] The UNSC then granted ATMIS a short, three-day extension to August 15, 2024.[99] ATMIS received one final extension until December 31, 2024.[100]
In December 2024, the UNSC launched a new mission in Somalia: the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). This new mission differed from ATMIS in multiple ways. Instead of focusing on a transition, AUSSOM forces aimed to strengthen Somalia’s own security forces and engage in capacity-building operations to build long-term social and political stability. Additionally, Egypt joined the mission in Somalia and began contributing troops to AUSSOM. While ATMIS had less than three years to achieve its transitional mandate, AUSSOM forces will have five years (until 2029) to complete their objectives. AUSSOM will faces many of the same challenges that ATMIS experienced, including funding and logistical challenges, as well as the resilient threat posed by Al Shabaab.[101]
Clashes between Al Shabaab and security forces declined in 2024. Political infighting within the Somali government and clan disputes led to a decrease in government operations as leaders struggled to agree on a course of action.[102] In February 2025, Al Shabaab launched its Shabelle offensive, expanding its foothold in central Somalia while exploiting the overstretched resources of Somali and AUSSOM forces.
Ansar Allah, a militant group based in Yemen, also known as the Houthis, supported this new offensive. Evidence of a relationship between Al Shabaab and Ansar Allah first surfaced in 2024.[103] In February 2025, the United Nations Security Council reported evidence that Ansar Allah members traveled to Somalia and participated in at least two meetings about providing Al Shabbab with weapons and training. In exchange for this support, “Al-Shabaab was to increase piracy activities within the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, targeting cargo ships and disrupting vessel movement as well as collecting ransom from the captured vessels.” The UNSC report stated that Al Shabaab received arms and training from Ansar Allah, which supported the group’s attacks against AUSSOM forces in Shabelle Hoose in late 2024.[104]
In 2025, Al Shabaab continued to increase its activities in the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions of south-central Somalia. By one estimate, the group launched fifty percent more attacks in those areas than it did in 2024. [105] In March 2025, Al Shabaab attempted to assassinate Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud with a bomb that targeted his motorcade.[106] Following President Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2025, the United States increased the frequency of its airstrikes against Al Shabaab. Between January and mid-May 2025, the United States carried out approximately 30 airstrikes in Somalia (compared to 51 total U.S. airstrikes under the Biden Administration between 2021-2024).[107] Other operations have been carried out by Somali forces, but none have been successful in repelling the escalating threat of Al Shabaab.[108] As of May 2025, Somali forces and Al Shabaab continue to fight for territorial control in Somalia, particularly in the district of Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle north of Mogadishu.[109] One critique of operations against Al Shabaab in Somalia has been their military focus and failure to coordinate with civilian authorities on improving local governance and security.[110]
