Origins and background:
Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin established the Wagner Group in conjunction with Dmitry Utkin, a former Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian Military Intelligence service (GRU).[1] In 2013, Utkin left the GRU to join a firm called Moran Security Group. Utkin deployed to Syria in 2013-2014 with a Moran-affiliated private military company called the Slavonic Corps, but it faced significant logistical challenges and was quickly defeated.[2] In 2014, Utkin quit Moran and formed a new private military company with Prigozhin, naming it “Wagner” after the 19th century German composer Richard Wagner. “Wagner” was also Utkin’s call sign in the military. The moniker likely refers to Utkin’s Nazi ideology; the 19th century composer Richard Wagner was reportedly a favorite of Hitler’s. Utkin also sports various Nazi tattoos, including SS bolts on his neck.[3]
From 2014 to 2022, Wagner’s corporate structure distinguished it from traditional private military companies (PMCs). On paper, there was no single entity registered as the Wagner Group, meaning that legally and officially it did not exist. Instead, Wagner grew as a network of companies, organizations, and high-profile individuals under Prigozhin’s holding company, Concord Management.[4] In September 2022, Wagner opened its first official headquarters building in St. Petersburg. Prigozhin announced the opening on the website for his umbrella company, Concord Management, stating “The mission of the PMC Wagner Center is to provide a comfortable environment for generating new ideas to improve Russia’s defense capability.”[5]
The complex network of companies and assets operating under Concord Management often makes it difficult to distinguish between Wagner and other actors associated with a wholly different security company. Additionally, other organizations owned and operated by Prigozhin carry out subversive activities, such as the Internet Research Agency.[6] Distinguishing between disinformation activities carried out by Wagner versus another part of Prigozhin’s network is also complicated, if not impossible, using publicly available information.
PMCs are illegal in Russia; the Russian Constitution declares that all matters of security and defense are a state monopoly.[7] However, loopholes allow private companies to still set up security organizations, and Russian owned PMCs are frequently tolerated when registered abroad.[8] Still, United Nations and Russian authorities have confirmed Wagner’s existence at various times. In 2018, Putin called Wagner a military contractor but denied that it had ties to the Russian government. A U.N. Panel of Experts published a report blaming mass killing and looting in the Central African Republic on “Russian instructors.” Although the report itself did not name Wagner, the U.N. Working Group on mercenaries did.[9] This U.N. Working Group also later released a report stating that Wagner “doesn’t seem to have a legal existence in Russia while operating in several countries across the globe.”[10]
In general, it is debatable whether the terms “mercenary” and “PMC” are apt descriptors of Wagner. Wagner is unique in that it acts both as a private business and as an agent of the Russian state. In Russia, oligarch control blurs the line between state and private interests, making it difficult to determine the extent of Russian government involvement in or oversight of the Wagner Group. However, it is clear that – until at least June 2023 – the group’s operations have consistently served the interests of the Russian government.[11] The U.S. Treasury Department defines Wagner as “a designated Russian Ministry of Defense proxy force.”[12]
Media reports have also suggested close connections between Wagner and the Russian intelligence services. For example, as noted above, the founder and commander of Wagner is allegedly Dmitry Utkin, a former Brigade Commander in the GRU.[13] Wagner’s training facilities are housed at Russian special forces bases in Krasnodar.[14] Social media analysis of Islamic State sources show Wagner has used weaponry exclusively available to the GRU in Syria.[15]
Organizations like Wagner may be a useful proxy force for the Russian government for several reasons. Using Wagner provides deniability to the Kremlin, allowing the Russian government to distance itself from Wagner’s actions and claim that it does not have a presence in a given location. Casualties amongst Wagner ranks are easier to conceal and less politically costly to the Russian state than casualties among conventional military forces. As a nominally private company, Wagner is much more mobile than official military units. Contractors are also significantly cheaper than supporting the logistical and operational costs of maintaining conventional military operations. However, the ability of Wagner to operate in distant theaters without direct support also means that Wagner personnel are more exposed and vulnerable to external threats.[16]
Wagner first began combat operations on behalf of the Russian government in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, organizing and supporting pro-Russian separatist forces.[17] Wagner engaged in direct action, trained, and supervised pro-Russian separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. Russian military intelligence likely directed these actions, including the assassinations of separatist leaders seen as threats to Russian interests.[18]
2015-2022: Global expansion
Wagner began to expand its global operations outside of Ukraine in 2015. Their presence in Ukraine persisted, Ukrainian intelligence claimed to identify almost 1600 Wagner fighters in the Donbas in 2017.[19] The group conducted operations to earn profits while advancing Russian foreign policy interests.[20] Prigozhin and his subordinates developed a model of selling Wagner’s paramilitary capabilities to governments facing security threats in exchange for natural resource concessions.
First, Wagner deployed to Syria in support of the Assad regime, a Russian ally. The Wagner Group was not the first Russian PMC to carry out military operations in the Syrian civil war. The Wagner Group’s predecessor, the Moran-affiliated Slavonic Corps, began operations in Syria in 2013, reportedly contracted to provide “protection of oil and natural gas facilities” for the Syrian government.[21] In 2014, Slavonic Corps member Dmitry Utkin quit Moran and formed Wagner with Prigozhin. In 2015, Utkin returned to Syria after the Kremlin dispatched the Wagner Group to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.[22] Wagner provided both stationary guard forces and kinetic operations. The group also trained local militia groups that were later organized into formal security firms.[23] Wagner operatives played a key role in recapturing Palmyra for Assad in 2016.[24] The first Wagner fighter killed in action – retired Major Sergei Chupov – reportedly died during the group’s operations in Syria on March 17, 2017.[25]
Over the course of the Syrian civil war, oil fields administered by Syria’s state-run oil enterprise, the Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC), were lost to various rebel forces such as the Islamic State and Kurdish groups. Some of Wagner’s missions included recapturing these oil fields in exchange for a portion of the fields’ profits. Another Prigozhin affiliated front company, Evro Polis, established a contract that promised to provide security services in exchange for 25% of the profits from every recaptured oil field.[26] U.S. and European Union officials have stated that Evro Polis acts as a corporate front for mercenary operations, effectively serving as a legal cover for Wagner.[27] Wagner’s presence in Syria is current as of April 2023. Wagner still supports government offensives against rebel groups including Islamic State forces.[28]
Starting in 2018, the Wagner Group established a significant presence in Africa, most notably in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Libya, and Sudan. The group has also carried out operations in Madagascar and Mozambique. More details of Wagner operations in Africa are provided in the Geographical Locations section of this profile.
Following a model similar to that in Syria, Wagner-affiliated contractors arrived in CAR in 2018 to support government forces in their fight against rebel groups. The Russian operatives claimed that they were there to conduct training and provide personal security for the president, but social media evidence suggested involvement in direct combat operations and human rights abuses. In CAR, Wagner has used front companies to conceal its activities. Sewa Security Services conducts Wagner’s paramilitary operations, while Lobaya Invest is the mining company that extracts gold and diamonds in exchange for their services.[29] Lobaye Invest and M Finans in CAR are both commercial mining ventures tied into Prigozhin’s corporate network alongside Wagner.[30] By late 2020, the Wagner Group had expanded its activities in CAR to include active combat. Wagner fighters joined CAR government forces to target rebel groups, including the Coalition of Patriots for Change led by former CAR President François Bozizé.[31]
In 2018, Wagner also deployed to Madagascar to provide personal security services to political strategists hired by Prigozhin in 2018 to support the presidential elections that year. In exchange, Prigozhin was given a contract to operate a chromite mine. Reports from 2019 suggested Wagner conducted protection operations for Prigozhin’s mine in Madagascar.[32]
Starting in October 2018, the Wagner Group also established a presence in Libya.[33] The group was charged with supporting the forces of Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and opponent of the UN-backed transitional government known as the Government of National Accord (GNA). An estimated 1,000 Wagner personnel were active in Libya between 2019-2020.[34] Wagner personnel initially provided technical support, but their mission grew to include combat support by early 2019. The UN assesses that Wagner’s activities in Libya “acted as an effective force multiplier” for Haftar and his LNA.[35] Wagner reportedly provided training, secured critical infrastructure, and conducted combat operations in support of Haftar’s forces.[36] The Wagner Group extensively placed booby traps and antipersonnel landmines, harming hundreds of civilians in the southern suburbs of Tripoli.[37] Despite a ceasefire in 2021 between the LNA and GNA that required the removal of foreign fighters, Wagner continued to operate in Libya and further entrench its positions.[38]
Also in 2018, the Wagner Group began to conduct operations in Sudan. Wagner initially deployed in support of Sudan President Omar Al-Bashir, providing military training and assisting with the suppression of pro-democracy protests.[39] Leaked documents showed that Wagner used disinformation and public executions to undermine opposition.[40] Front companies – registered as “Meroe Gold” and “M Invest” – are owned and controlled by Yevgheny Prigozhin and have been authorized by the Sudanese government to mine for gold as payment.[41]
Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti, is the commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and governed much of the gold trade in Sudan. This led to close ties between Wagner Group, Hemedti, and the RSF.[42] On occasion, the RSF has provided security for Russian gold transportation.[43] The relationship between Hemedti and Wagner tightened following the 2021 coup in Sudan when the military and security forces seized power. Hemedti visited Moscow in early 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[44]
In April 2023, fighting between the RSF and Sudan army forces erupted, fueled by a power struggle between Hemedti and junta leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan for control of the government.[45] Several days into the crisis, evidence of Wagner’s involvement started to emerge. Some reports claimed that Wagner supplied the RSF with surface to air missiles and munitions. Hemedti has publicly denied accepting any weapons systems from Russia, but evidence suggests that at least some weapons and ammunition transfers to the RSF have taken place from Wagner bases in Libya.[46] It is also possible Libyan forces allied with Wagner sent these weapons since they share several bases with Wagner.[47] Both Hemedti and Burhan have received Russian support in the past, but the RSF has been the primary recipient of Russian weapons and training in the buildup to the current crisis.[48] As of April 2023, Wagner’s role was limited to material support. It was not involved in direct combat operations.[49] In May 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department accused Wagner of supplying the RSF with surface-to-air missiles.[50]
In 2019, the Wagner Group deployed to northern Mozambique to conduct operations against the branch of the Islamic State active in Cabo Delgado. Wagner agreed to aid Mozambique government forces in exchange for a stake in Mozambique's natural resources.[51] By October 2019, an estimated 200 Wagner fighters had arrived in Mozambique to reportedly provide training and combat support.[52] However, Wagner struggled to make progress against the militants. Some sources suggest that Wagner members were not properly equipped to fight in the brush-covered terrain and did not maintain good working relationships with Mozambique forces.[53] The group suffered heavy losses and ceased activity in Mozambique sometime between 2019 and 2020.[54]
In December 2021, the Wager Group arrived in Mali. Wagner was hired by Mali’s military government – which had just taken power in a coup d’etat in June 2021 – to provide security for senior leaders, train local forces, and enable the junta to consolidate its control.[55] Wagner has been behind a rise in violence against civilians in Mali since its arrival.[56] Data collection by Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) estimates that 71% of Wagner’s political violence targets civilians in Mali.[57]
In addition to these activities in Africa, the Wagner Group has also operated in Venezuela. In 2019, Wagner contractors arrived in Venezuela to support President Nicolas Maduro. The Wagner Group’s deployment came in the context of an ongoing presidential crisis that called Maduro’s legitimacy into question. Wagner members provided security for Maduro’s administration in the face of growing opposition protests and challenges to his rule.[58] In addition to these activities, Wagner also recruited informants and trained local, state-backed militias.[59]
Some analysis argues Wagner’s natural resource exploitation serves a primarily political purpose. The amount of money Wagner could hypothetically gain from natural resource exploitation does not exceed much of the operational costs of the Russian mercenaries there. Instead, the co- option of mining and other industries is about “state capture”. This refers to a corrupt form of governance in which a handful of oligarchs hold consolidated control over the economic and industrial assets of a nation as a means of political control. For Wagner, gaining control of gold mines and other natural resource sites is a means through which the Kremlin exerts its foreign policy goals in countries like Syria, Mali, and the CAR.[60]
2022 Invasion of Ukraine
After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denied that Wagner was operating there and claimed that the group had no connection to the Russian state.[61] This statement was notable because it acknowledged that Wagner existed, something Russian officials rarely did. As the invasion continued, Russian media also shifted from avoiding any discussion of Wagner to glamorizing its role in the war.
In support of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Wagner forces have operated under the command structure of Russian military units in particular areas of operation and are integrated into the same supply chain. Former Russian intelligence colonel Igor Girkin attributed Wagner’s effectiveness to their disregard for casualties – Girkin also compared Wagner to the Nazi SS Totenkopf, or Death Head division, and noted Wagner commanders might take that as a compliment.[62] Prigozhin reportedly joked that Wagner forces in Ukraine were protecting Russian military personnel by allowing them to seek safety and “hide behind Wagner’s backs.”[63]
Wagner expanded its recruiting efforts following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, including public advertising. Wagner started calling itself the “orchestra” and its fighters “musicians,” a reference to the group’s namesake, 19th century German composer Richard Wagner who was reportedly a favorite of Adolf Hitler. Wagner actively recruits in Russian cities, on Telegram, and with billboards stating “The W Orchestra awaits you,” featuring Wagner’s skull logo with a harmonica in the hands of a fighter. The company also operates under the name Liga in Russian-occupied Ukraine. (Wagner operated under the name “Liga” in Ukraine before Prigozhin publicly announced its role in September 2022.)[64]
Wagner lowered standards for fighters going to Ukraine, but not to their other global theaters of operation. This included recruitment of convicted criminals, and reducing the training period for new fighters. These changes started due to Wagner’s high casualty rate in Ukraine, especially around Bakhmut.[65] Wagner fighters are significantly better paid than Russian conventional forces, receiving as much as 350,000 RUB (5,800 USD) per month, with bonuses for killed Ukrainian soldiers. Wagner’s social media posts highlight a starting pay of 250,000 RUB.[66] Wagner opened recruitment centers in 26 cities across Russia and, in 2022, expanded its recruitment drive to include prisons as the conflict escalated. Recruits are reportedly trained for two weeks before being deployed to Ukraine.[67]
The Wagner Group began operating around Bakhmut in Eastern Ukraine in May 2022. The Bakhmut campaign concluded in spring 2023. The town had relatively little strategic value and Wagner incurred heavy casualties but pressed forward persistently, perhaps to support a narrative of Russian gains in Ukraine in the wake of major losses in September 2022.[68] In October 2022, Prigozhin acknowledged Wagner operations had slowed as the Russian military lost ground.[69] Wagner’s role in the assault on Bakhmut was notable for the recruitment and deployment of large numbers of Russian prisoners, high casualty rates, and growing criticism by Wagner leader Prigozhin of conventional Russian military forces.
In July 2022, the first group of Wagner fighters recruited out of Russian prisons was sent to Ukraine. According to CNN, an estimated 40,000-50,000 prisoners joined the Wagner group from July 2022 to February 2023.[70] Russia Behind Bars, a Russian non-profit organization, estimates 11,000 inmates signed up to join Wagner by November 2022, and 7,500 were deployed to Ukraine. Reportedly, Wagner initially excluded prisoners with severe convictions but eventually dropped those requirements to facilitate recruitment. Volunteers with more grave convictions, such as sexual assault, are said to be separated into specific units.[71] Ukrainian intelligence officials have claimed that the majority of Wagner Group fighters in Ukraine were enlisted as prisoners. Prisoners also reportedly make up the majority of Wagner fighters killed in action during the conflict.[72] In February 2023, Prigozhin announced that Wagner had suspended recruitment of convicts.[73]
As part of Wagner’s broader recruitment efforts, the group also tried to attract foreign fighters from Moldova, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Czechia, Turkey, and several countries in Latin America. It is not known how successful these efforts have been, but they point to the severe attrition Wagner has suffered in Ukraine.[74]
In Bakhmut, Wagner fought alongside Russian armed forces. Wagner participated in combined armed attacks, which made use of Russian airpower and artillery to support Wagner ground assaults.[75] Prigozhin publicly complained about the lack of ammunition deliveries from the Russian Ministry Of Defense (MOD). In a post of Telegram published in the first week of May 2023, Prigozhin threatened to withdraw Wagner from Bakhmut and claimed the MOD was intentionally using Wagner to shield their own forces from the worst of the casualties.[76] Casualty estimates suffered by Wagner vary. U.S. officials estimated Wagner suffered roughly 30,000 casualties (9,000 of which were killed) between February 2022 and March 2023. At least half of these casualties were from December 2022 to March 2023, when the offensive in Bakhmut dramatically escalated. The high casualty rate suggests Wagner concentrated the bulk of their forces in Ukraine on the Bakhmut offensive.[77]
In April 2023, the Wagner Group asserted that it had secured “legal” control of Bakhmut, a claim the Ukrainian government disputed.[78] Russian forces declared victory in Bakhmut in May 2023 after 250 days of fighting, although Prigozhin acknowledged pockets of the city were still under Ukrainian control. Prigozhin formally announced Wagner’s imminent withdrawal from Bakhmut, stating the group would turn over their positions to the Ministry of Defense forces on June 1, 2023. Russian military units first took over positions in the surrounding suburbs, working their way inward to the city center. The final Wagner forces to withdraw did so from center points in Bakhmut.[79]
An acrimonious public dispute between Prigozhin and the Russian military leadership began to escalate after the conclusion of the assault on Bakhmut.[80] The announcement that Wagner would withdraw from Bakhmut followed several public statements by Prigozhin criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense for providing insufficient ammunition and logistical support to Wagner forces. Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner had lost 20,000 men in the fighting.[81] Criticism of Russian armed forces in the invasion of Ukraine is extremely rare. Prigozhin used his large social media presence to access audiences without going through Russian state media.
The feud between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defense continued to escalate when Russian officials announced Wagner personnel would have to sign contracts with the military directly.[82] This would effectively remove Wagner from the Ukrainian theater of operations as an independent actor. Prigozhin responded by sharing video footage of the aftermath of a missile strike on a Wagner outpost, which he claimed came from the defense ministry.
On June 23, 2023, a column of Wagner fighters in armored vehicles crossed back into Russia and into the city of Rostov-on-Don, effectively capturing it. Rostov-on-Don serves as a significant logistics hub for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and its loss could serve as a serious blow to the Russian military. Wagner occupied the city in a largely peaceful manner; locals took pictures with the fighters, and Prigozhin openly met with the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense and Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Prigozhin demanded the removal of the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, and the removal of the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov. Prigozhin publicly blamed them for insufficiently supporting Wagner in the battle for Bakhmut, leading to thousands of Wagner casualties. Prigozhin stated that if his demands were not met, he would march his column of fighters to Moscow. In response, Putin accused Wagner of treason and promised severe punishments against the “mutineers”.[83]
On June 24, 2023, Prigozhin began to march to Moscow.[84] On the way, Wagner personnel attacked a Russian aircraft and helicopter, killing at least 15 Russian military personnel. Wagner movements were reported to reach as far as Yelets – approximately 250 miles south of Moscow – before Prigozhin stopped the march.[85] Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko brokered an agreement between Prigozhin and Putin, the full details of which are not publicly known. Prigozhin announced that Wagner troops would return to Ukraine, while the Kremlin stated that it would grant Prigozhin and Wagner fighters amnesty from prosecution for the mutiny. Prigozhin was to live in Belarus in exile.[86]
Four days after Wagner’s march to Moscow, a Russian envoy flew to Libya to assure Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the Libyan National Army, that Wagner operatives would remain in Libya to support him and his troops. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated in an interview with Russia Today that “instructors” and “private military contractors” would remain in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. CAR President Touadera also denied any changes to Wagner’s presence in his country. John Kirby, spokesman for the U.S. National Security Council stated there was “no indication Wagner is decreasing its intent to exploit African countries.[87]
Some reports contradict official Russian and CAR government claims. Videos showed dozens of Wagner personnel leaving CAR after Prigozhin’s march on Moscow. Jeune Afrique, a French language publication focused on Africa, reported 400-600 fighters were departing the country. At the time of reporting, it was unclear if this exodus was due to a purge of Wagner by Putin or part of a normal changeover in personnel. Wagner in Mali underwent a normal rotation in personnel following the mutiny reportedly without incident. Some reports suggested the fighters left after refusing to sign new contracts directly with the Russian Ministry of Defense.[88]
On June 30, 2023, Russian military officials stated Wagner would no longer receive state funding or continue fighting in Ukraine.[89] In early July 2023, the Russian Defense Ministry shared a video on Telegram documenting the seizure of Wagner’s heavy weapons and equipment. The Russian government claimed to have confiscated over 2,000 items, including tanks, surface-to-air missile systems, self-propelled artillery pieces, multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-tank guns, mortars, armored troop carriers, small arms, and ammunition.[90] Russian security services raided Wagner HQ in St. Petersburg and other properties owned by or affiliated with Prigozhin, seizing cash and gold worth an estimated $48 million.[91]
For roughly 2 months, from June through August 2023, Prigozhin and Wagner appeared to continue operations. Prigozhin embarked on a global tour of countries with ties to Wagner, especially the CAR and Mali to solidify his holdings and ease any uncertainty with client governments about working with Wagner after the mutiny. Prigozhin also praised the coup in Niger, attempting to win them as a new client government. Prigozhin conducted this travel on a variety of fake passports and Wagner advance teams to secure his arrivals. He also often held meetings on the runways he landed his private jet on to ensure access to a quick getaway if needed.[92]
The Russian Ministry of Defense simultaneously took steps to undercut Wagner’s control over assets in these countries, and gain their own foothold to continue Russian influence. This involved attempting to replace agreements between Wagner and client governments with formalized diplomatic deals between foreign governments and the Russian state. The GRU also worked with new PMCs in Russia to take over contracts from Wagner. Putin reportedly told President Touadera of the CAR it was time to move on from Wagner. In Libya, the Russian Ministry of Defense asserted direct control over some of Wagner’s network on the ground.[93]
On August 23, 2023, Prigozhin and Dmrity Utkin flew on a private jet from St. Petersburg, and died when the airplane exploded and crashed to the ground. U.S. Intelligence Estimates claimed an intentional explosion destroyed the aircraft. The Kremlin denied any involvement in the deaths. After the explosion, Wagner personnel in Ukraine relocated to Belarus and supported President Lukahsenko’s security forces there.[94] In September 2023, reports emerged of some Wagner personnel returning to fight in Ukraine from Belarus. News outlets reported an estimated 500 fighters moved from Belarus back to Ukraine.[95]
Based on publicly available information, the corporate and paramilitary networks comprising Wagner appeared largely unaffected by Prigozhin’s death as of October, 2023. The Russian government took several steps to ensure continuity of operations due to the value of the economic, political, and military relationships Wagner built. Following Prigozhin’s death, Putin reportedly ordered all paramilitary units to swear oaths of fealty to the Russian state, and the Russian Ministry of Defense enforced a requirement for all Wagner personnel to sign new contracts directly with the Russian government. In the first few months after Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin faced a number of options to deal with Wagner: abandoning the group, commandeer the group, or house the group under security services. Each of these is difficult in practice, as Wagner has proved too valuable to abandon, and too complex to wholly coopt.[96]
