The Gaitanista Army (Gulf Clan)

Main Tabs Group

Overview

Formed:

January 1, 2007

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: October 15, 2008: The Gaitanistas announced its creation and conducted its first armed attack, shutting down several municipalities in the Úruba, Antioquía region to commemorate its “presentation to society” as the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) (Unknown deaths, unknown wounded).[1]

Last Known Attack: April-May 2025: The Gaitanista Army launched its retaliatory “Pistol Plan,” after the killing of senior leader, “Chirimoya” (at least 27 deaths, unknown wounded).[2]

The Gaitanista Army, also known as the Gulf Clan, is Colombia’s largest and richest non-state armed criminal organization, having emerged from the dissolution of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary forces in the mid-2000s. Initially co-founded by former paramilitary leader Daniel Rendón Herrera (alias "Don Mario"), the group later incorporated veterans from the leftist Popular Liberation Army (EPL) guerrillas, adopting a centralized command structure and framing itself as an armed movement dedicated to protecting civilian communities. With an estimated 9,000 members, the Gaitanista Army maintains a presence in approximately one-third of the country’s municipalities. The organization funds its operations through involvement in drug trafficking, controlling crucial supply routes along the Atlantic coast, managing illegal mining, and executing widespread extortion against businesses and large landowners. The Gaitanista Army exerts dominance through coercive measures such as establishing strict rules, imposing curfews and movement restrictions, and creating informal judicial systems within its territories. Following the capture and extradition of its previous leader, Dairo Antonio Úsuga (alias "Otoniel"), the group remains a potent military and economic actor under current leadership. The Gaitanista Army is currently considered a major obstacle to President Gustavo Petro’s national demobilization strategy, "Total Peace," as it continues to expand its territorial control and clash with rival groups.

Narrative

The Gaitanista Army, often referred to by the Colombian government as the Gulf Clan, emerged in the aftermath of the demobilization of the right-wing paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which took place between 2003 and 2006.[3] The Gaitanista Army is considered the largest and wealthiest criminal armed group and drug trafficker in Colombia.[4] It arose from dissidents who rejected the AUC demobilization. The group was co-founded by Daniel Rendón Herrera ("Don Mario"), a known drug trafficker who had managed the finances of a paramilitary branch.[5] Following Don Mario’s arrest in 2009, leadership transitioned to Dairo Antonio Úsuga (“Otoniel”) and his brother, Juan de Dios Úsuga.[6] The Úsuga brothers strengthened the group's political ideology and command structure, drawing on their past experience in the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL).[7] This led the Gaitanista Army to adopt a more political approach and declared itself a force of "armed civil resistance.”[8] However, the Colombian state consistently refuses to recognize the group as a political actor, instead constantly relabeling them as Los Urabeños, Los Úsuga, and finally the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan) in 2016.[9]

In response to intensified military operations launched by the Colombian government in 2015, Otoniel proposed surrendering and demobilizing the organization in 2017.[10] These early negotiations collapsed due to legal obstacles, as the judicial terms offered—including possible sentences of six to ten years—were rejected by the group as insufficient.[11] As a result, instead of demobilizing during this period, the group expanded. Following demobilization of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in 2016, there was a significant power vacuum left in the country. The group worked to seize territory and entered into period of continuous growth.[12] During this time, the Gaitanista Army also engaged in conflict with its main rival group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), a far left-guerilla organization that also sought to capitalize on the FARC’s downfall and fill the void left by their dissolution. This put the groups at odds and has led to frequent skirmishes that are still ongoing.[13]

Otoniel was eventually captured in late 2021, and in May 2022 his extradition to the United States and subsequent 45-year prison sentence triggered an armed strike by the group that same month.[14] During this strike, the group demonstrated its military strength and territorial control over 178 different municipalities in 11 departments by forcing the closure of 26 roads and destroying at least 118 vehicles.[15] Following Otoniel's arrest, leadership transferred to Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego (alias "Chiquito Malo").[16] The Gaitanista Army subsequently expressed interest in participating in President Gustavo Petro’s national demobilization strategy, "Total Peace," which sought simultaneous dialogue with over two dozen armed groups.[17] The Gaitanista Army was one of the groups included in a potential bilateral cease-fire announced in January 2023,[18] but this agreement was subsequently canceled in March 2023 after the government accused the group of violating the terms during a mining strike.[19] Additionally, some believe the ceasefire was a misstep in the Total Peace strategy, as the Gaitanistas were simply leveraging the respite from military targeting to strengthen and expand. The Gaitanista Army subsequently expanded significantly in 2023, increasing its headcount by 23% to 4,999 members, including 1,740 combatants and 3,259 support personnel.[20]

As of early 2024, the Gaitanista Army continues to face legal uncertainty in the peace talks due to its classification as a criminal group. This classification limits the concessions the state can offer, making demobilization difficult.[21] The group remains highly active in combat with rivals, particularly the ELN, fighting for control over drug trafficking and illegal mining areas in departments like Chocó and Antioquia.[22] This ongoing competition and conflict has caused forced displacement and confinement that has disproportionately affected Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities.[23]

In its ongoing pursuit of territorial control and coercion, the Gaitanista Army uses unsavory tactics including the Plan Pistola (or ‘Pistol Plan’, a retaliatory policy of targeting security forces) and exerts dominance over civilian life, sometimes regulating markets, creating judicial systems, and imposing curfews.[24] In the first half of 2023, the Gaitanista Army was recorded as the main alleged perpetrator of attacks against human rights defenders in Colombia.[25] In two separate instances in late 2024 and early 2025, the group publicly announced a plan to assassinate Iván Madero, the president of the human rights organization CREDHOS, as part of its strategy to consolidate political and economic control in the Magdalena Medio region.[26] The Gaitanista Army continues to fund itself through drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion, even levying a tax on multinational companies operating in its territory.[27]

Organization

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Leadership

Vicente Castaño Gil (alias “El Profe”) (2006-2007): Jose Vicente Castaño Gil was a founding member of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and called upon the demobilized AUC members to form what came to be the Gaitanistas.[28] Castaño publicly retracted his commitment to the 2006 AUC peace agreement, citing Colombia’s “failure to comply” with the agreed terms and calling for the arrests of AUC leaders soon after its signing.[29] His rallying of former AUC members as the “Bloque Heroes de Castaño” is recognized as the foundation of the Gaitanista Army.[30] Multiple sources report Castaño’s death during or shortly after the Gaitanista forces’ formation due to adversarial crime organizations, though other sources report his abrupt “disappearance” by 2007.[31] In 2011, Castaño was sentenced in absentia for the 2004 murder of his younger brother, Carlos Castaño, who purportedly gave information on him to the Colombian government in exchange for leniency in his own sentencing.[32]

Daniel Rendón Herrera (alias “Don Mario”) (2006-2009): Daniel Rendón Herrera was Castaño’s second-in-command and took swift control of the Gaitanistas after Castaño’s disappearance in 2007.[33] Herrera was a former financial chief for the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) before following Jose Vicente Castaño to form the Gaitanistas. As head commander, Herrera led the Gaitanistas into transnational coca trafficking prominence and transformed it into “one of the world’s largest and most violent drug cartels,” according to the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Eastern District of New York.[34] By 2008, Herrera was Colombia’s richest and most wanted criminal leader, wanted by the Colombian government for $2 million USD.[35] Herrera’s leadership emphasized the group’s subversive paramilitary philosophy, donning the two new traits of distrusting the government and verbally opposing unjustified violence against civilians in enemy-controlled territories.[36] Additionally, Herrera established the group’s name as the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, or the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.[37] Herrera was captured in 2009 by the Colombian National Police, extradited to the U.S. in 2018, and pleaded guilty in 2021 to federal charges of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise for his role as a leader of the Gaitanista Army and conspiring to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization (the AUC).[38] In 2022, he was sentenced to 35 years in U.S. federal prison for the former charge and 15 for the latter (running concurrently) and ordered to pay $45.7 million in forfeiture.[39] In 2014, it was believed that he still had contact with the group, but whether that is still the case is unknown[40]

Juan de Dios Úsuga (“Giovanni”) (2006-2012): Juan de Dios Úsuga was a co-head commander of the Gaitanistas alongside his brother, Dairo Antonio Úsuga (alias “Otoniel”).[41] Úsuga was a member of the Marxist-Leninist People’s Liberation Army (EPL) guerrillas, where he gained political and structural training that he would later use in his leadership of the Gaitanistas. After the 1991 demobilization of the EPL, Úsuga joined the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary with his brother. During his time in the AUC, Úsuga worked under AUC and Gaitanista founder, Jose Vicente Castaño, in the Calima Bloc in Cauca.[42] Úsuga followed the call for demobilized AUC members to form the Gaitanistas in 2006, and became its military commander under Daniel Rendón Herrera’s leadership.[43] After Herrera’s capture in 2009, Úsuga and his brother became the co-head commanders of the Gaitanista Army.[44] The Úsuga brothers’ political training under the EPL enabled them to launch the Gaitanistas into a strategic turf war against rival armed groups that ultimately expanded its control.[45] Úsuga was killed in a police raid in 2012, which triggered the Gaitanista Army’s large-scale show of force against civilians and police with the armed strike and forced shutdown of several northwestern Colombian towns, along with $1,000 rewards to those who killed police officers in Antioquia, under the leadership of his brother.[46]

Dairo Antonio Úsuga (“Otoniel”) (2006-2021): Dairo Antonio Úsuga was the head commander of the Gaitanistas and Colombia’s most wanted criminal until his capture in 2021. Úsuga was a member of the Marxist-Leninist People’s Liberation Army (EPL) guerrilla group, where he underwent political training that would later help him advance the group’s politicization.[47] After the EPL’s 1991 demobilization, Úsuga joined the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) along with his brother, Juan de Dios Úsuga. During his time in the AUC, Úsuga worked under Daniel Rendón Herrera (alias “Don Mario”), who later became leader of the Gaitanista Army in the Centauro Bloc.[48] Úsuga followed the call for demobilized AUC members to form the Gaitanistas in 2006 and became head commander after Daniel Rendón Herrera’s capture in 2009.[49] The Úsuga brothers political training under the EPL enabled them to launch the group into a strategic turf war against rival armed groups that ultimately expanded its control throughout the northwestern region of Colombia towards the Panamanian border.[50] After the death of his brother in a 2012 police raid, Úsuga became the sole leader of the Gaitanistas and responsively launched an armed shutdown of several Colombian towns and placed a $1000 reward on the killings of police members by civilians and Gaitanista Army members.[51] As the sole commander of the Gaitanistas, Úsuga’s command sought a stronger political identity to “govern the lower, middle, and rich classes of Colombia.”[52] Over the next several years, Úsuga expanded the group to become “the most violent and significant Colombian narcotics trafficker since Pablo Escobar,” according to United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York Breon Peace.[53] In 2017, Úsuga asked the government to negotiate his surrender and the demobilization of the Gaitanistas in response to the government’s intense attacks under Operation Agamemnon—the intense military and police strategy launched against the group in 2015 designed to capture or kill the group’s top leadership—but his request was denied.[54] Úsuga was captured by the Colombian military in 2021 and extradited to the United States in 2022, where he is now serving 45 years in federal prison on narcotics charges and for operating a criminal enterprise.[55]

Jobanis de Jesus Ávila Villadiego (alias “Javier” or “Chiquito Malo”) (2006-Present): Jobanis de Jesus Ávila Villadiego is the current head commander of the Gaitanista Army and a former member of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary’s Urabá bloc. Upon the AUC’s demobilization in 2006, Ávila Villadiego joined the Gaitanistas and became a top leader by 2015 due to his extensive knowledge of his home Urabá region and former AUC-Urabá connections.[56] As second-in-command, upon the 2021 arrest of Dairo Antonio Úsuga (alias “Otoniel”), Ávila Villadiego became the head commander of the Gaitanistas in October 2021.[57] In 2022, the Colombian government offered $5,000 million COP ($1,185.68 USD) for his capture.[58] Under his leadership, the Gaitanistas’ franchise-like structure is shifting to become more centralized to give the group more power, with reports of him ordering the murder in 2023 of a senior Gaitanista leader, “Siopas,” who had been suspected of creating a Gaitanista breakaway faction.[59] Ávila Villadiego introduced the Gaitanista Army into President Petro’s “Total Peace Plan” in 2022 and has since led the organization's attempt to obtain a recognized political status.[60] In April 2025, Ávila Villadiego stated his disappointment in President Petro’s effort to actualize the Gaitanista Army’s official peace negotiations but maintained his willingness to demobilize the group.[61]

Wilmer Antonio Giraldo Quiroz (alias “Siopas”) (Unknown-2023): Giraldo Quiroz was a prominent member of the Gaitanista Army. After the arrest and extradition of Dairo Antonio Úsuga (“Otoniel”) in 2021, he emerged as a rival to Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego (“Chiquito Malo”) in the struggle for influence within the organization. In 2023, he was reportedly killed by fellow group members after attempting to split from the group and establish an independent criminal organization in northern Antioquia.[62]

Size Estimates

2009: 350 (Journal Article/Colombian National Police)[71]
2013: 2,370 (Human Rights Watch)[72]
2014: 2,650 (UN Human Rights)[73]
2018: 3,803 (ABColombia)[74]
2021: 1,700 - 3,260 (Indepaz)[75]
2022: 3,260 (DIJIN Colombia)[76]
2023: 6,015 (ABColombia)[77]
2024: 9,000 (Insight Crime)[78]

Name Changes

The Gaitanista Army is known by several common names, categorized by the organization’s self-determined and state-given names.

Self-determined:

Aguilas Negras (2006) was the name for Daniel Rendón Herrara’s United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) dissident group, but it has also been used as a general term for AUC-splintered crime groups, including the Gaitanistas.[63]

Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), or United Self-DefenseForces of Colombia (2009-2024) was the name of the organization declared under Herrera’s official leadership. This name commemorates Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the martyred politician of liberal socialism in Colombia.[64]

Ejercito Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC), or Gaitanista Army of Colombia (2024-Present) is the organization’s preferred name as of January 2024, as the group attempts to distance itself from its paramilitary roots (“Autodefensas” to “Ejercito”).[65]

State-given:

Bandas Criminales (BACRIM) (2006-Present) was the label established by President Uribe’s administration for many criminal organizations. This umbrella term existed to differentiate criminal groups from political groups by the Colombian state.[66] The Gaitanistas became synonymous with the BACRIM name at the time of the term’s creation and may be found describing the group today; however, the Colombian government no longer uses the BACRIM label.[67]

Los Urabeños (2006-2014) was a commonly used name for the Gaitanistas that referenced the Urabá region of the Antioquia department, from which this group originates. The government moved away from this term because it negatively stigmatized residents of Urabá.[68]

Clan Úsuga (2014-2016) was a name that recognized the group during its leadership under Dario Antonio Úsuga (alias “Otoniel). The Colombian government no longer uses this name due to its negative impact to unaffiliated persons of the Úsuga surname.[69]

Clan del Golfo (CDG) (2016-present) is the Colombian government’s most recent official name for the Gaitanistas. This name refers to the group’s dominance in Colombia’s northwestern region in the Gulf of Urabá of the Caribbean coast. Current head commander, Ávila Villadiego (alias “Chiquito Malo”), acknowledges it as the state’s name for the group, although the organization does not identify with it.[70]

Resources

After the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 2006, the Gaitanista Army, comprised of ex-AUC dissidents, utilized its former AUC networks and became essential to Colombia’s cocaine trafficking market. The Gaitanista Army’s advantageous control of the Urabá Gulf and Darién Gap enabled its command over major ports and drug-trafficking routes.[79] In 2008, the Gaitanista paramilitary taxed drug-traffickers approximately $400 per kilo for access to its speed boats leaving the Gulf of Urabá, netting $20 million in profits per month for then-Head Commander Daniel Rendón Herrera (alias “Don Mario”).[80] The Gaitanista Army now dominates Colombia’s illicit drug market, as it exports approximately 60% of Colombia’s drugs, and thus leads the global cocaine trade.[81] The group’s current leader, Jobanis de Jesus Ávila Villadiego (alias “Javier” or “Chiquito Malo”) stated in a 2025 interview that its role in the drug trade is restricted to its taxation of the “real drug traffickers” within Gaitanista-controlled territory.[82] Ávila Villadiego also stated his disbelief of any Colombian armed group that denies its connection to cocaine trafficking.[83]The localized franchise model of the Gaitanista Army means its cells are largely financially independent of its board of directors in Urabá, as the local groups profit by moving shipments and protecting coca processing labs.[84] These autonomous nodes are integrated into a collective paramilitary structure organized into specialized military, economic, and political branches operating down to the street level.[85] Together, they generate substantial revenue beyond the cocaine market; its annual income of $4.4 billion is generated from a combination of drug trafficking, arms and migrant smuggling, illegal mining, and the “Gaitanista protection fee” extorted from civilians.[86]

The Gaitanista Army’s control of the Darién Gap between Colombia and Panama allows the paramilitary to profit from migrant trafficking.[87] According to Crisis Group calculations, the Gaitanista Army “earns millions of dollars per week” from its taxation of migrant smugglers through the dangerous jungle terrain of the Darién Gap for approximately $50 to $80 per migrant.[88] Though the Gaitanista Army denies its involvement in human trafficking, Colombian officials confirm the group’s strong connection to migrant smuggling into Panama.[89] Gaitanista leadership has stated its aim to protect life within its territories, including those of traveling migrants; however, humanitarian workers and Colombian officials believe this is a means of preserving the Gaitanista Army’s migrant extortion revenue.[90] The group is also known to be involved in arms trafficking, though it denies its involvement in the movement of weapons within the regions under its control.[91]

The Gaitanista Army has stated that it does not own any illegal gold or silver mining operations.[92] However, the group and the demobilized paramilitary group from which it branched, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), have a long-reported history of involvement in taxing illegal mining operations in controlled territories of northwestern Colombia.[93] The Gaitanista paramilitary does, however, state its support for protecting the “ancestral, traditional, and informal miners” of Colombia over the “multinational miners” that are protected by the Colombian government.[94] This protection of small-scale miners serves as a strategic mechanism by the group to preserve its revenue from taxing illegal mining operations within its controlled territories.[95]

Like other organized armed groups, the Gaitanista Army legitimizes its control through the extortion of civilians and businesses in its controlled territories. An unknown portion of the Gaitanista Army’s funding is attributed to the group’s origin as a network of “tax-collecting,” or extorting, organizations for the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).[96] Landowners, small farmers, gas stations, corporate mining firms, and major banana companies alike face the extortionary “Gaitanista Protection Fee” to “protect” against the violence of rival groups, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) or the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC).[97] Following common paramilitary norms, the Gaitanista Army and local elite business and landowners have a “mutually symbiotic” relationship, as elite civilians confide in the militaristic practices of the paramilitary to protect their property due to their lack of confidence in the government’s ability to do so.[98]

Locations

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

The Gaitanista Army is centered in the Urabá region of northwestern Colombia, with prime access to the Pacific Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and the Darién Gap, the jungled terrain that bridges Colombia and Panama. It is a “fundamentally rural group” that waits for rival gangs to battle and take control of a city before approaching to work with the winning organization; experts note that “existing mainly in the countryside has helped them avoid scrutiny and security operations.”[99]

From its beginning, the Gaitanista network has utilized its advantageous location to advance illegal activities and expand its power within Colombia.[100] Some critical operational areas tied to resource extraction include the Magdalena Medio region, encompassing locations like Barrancabermeja in Santander and Cantagallo in Bolívar department, where the Gaitanista Army exercises territorial control.[101] The group is active around the Magdalena River in southern Bolívar and aims to penetrate gold-rich areas like the Serranía de San Lucas.[102] Another key area for its illegal revenue generation also lies in the Darién Gap region, which covers the Chocó municipalities of Acandí, Unguía, Riosucio, and Juradó. Here, the Gaitanista Army controls transnational smuggling routes, primarily dominating migrant trafficking from Necoclí, Urabá Antioquia, into Chocó.[103] The group has extended its influence towards the Pacific coast and the Ecuador border, although its presence in some areas like Putumayo has reportedly weakened.[104] Along the Venezuelan border, the Gaitanista Army’s attempts at expansion have been largely curtailed by rival groups, limiting its operational presence mainly to areas around Puerto Santander and Cúcuta.[105]

Ultimately, the narco-paramilitary group has gained control of central drug corridors from Medellín north to the Caribbean Sea and from the Caribbean Sea through the Caesar department and to the Venezuelan border.[106] The group’s growth in the drug trade enabled its physical expansion outside of the Gulf of Urabá to add the departments of Antioquia, Chocó, and Cordoba into its “stronghold” with its presence extending along the Caribbean coast to Guajira and throughout the Norte de Santander, Santander, and Valle de Cauca departments.[107]

Much of this geographic expansion occurred following the 2016 demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC), where the Gaitanistas rushed to occupy former FARC-controlled regions and faced territorial challenges from the National Liberation Army (ELN).[108] By 2024, the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia reported that the Gaitanista Army was present in 75% of the nation, operating across 316 municipalities in 24 of Colombia’s 32 departments.[109] It demonstrated the scale of its geographical control in the nation a few years prior when it conducted armed strikes across 178 municipalities in 11 departments in May 2022 as a response to former leader Dario Antonio Úsuga (alias "Otoniel") being extradited and sentenced to 45 years in prison in the United States.[110]

As the leader of the cocaine trade in Colombia and the world, the Gaitanista Army has connections beyond Colombia’s borders. The nations of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Panamá, Peru, Venezuela, and Spain are all reported to have contained emissary cells of the Gaitanista Army within the last ten years.[111]

Strategy

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Ideology and Goals

The ideology of the Gaitanista Army is a product of the political ambitions and perspectives of its former commanders, who range from notorious right-wing paramilitary leaders to radical leftist socialist guerrillas. As the Gaitanista Army arose from the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary, AUC founder Jose Vicente Castaño Gil foresaw the Gaitanista Army’s purpose in continuing the work of the AUC.[112] The AUC’s practice of controlling civilian life in its self-declared role as a “security organization” to "re-establish the order and control" in Colombia in the rural northern region of Colombia continued under head commander and former AUC paramilitary leader, Daniel Rendón Herrera (alias “Don Mario”). However, Herrera declared the Gaitanista Army as reformed from its paramilitarism in 2008; in doing so, the Gaitanista Army announced its new perspective as a group that distrusted and felt persecuted by the Colombian state, and that it no longer viewed civilians in enemy territory as fair targets of its violence.[113] In a 2023 interview with Crisis Group, the now-former head commander Herrera explained that the Gaitanista Army enforces authoritative control in its controlled territory because “the state is incapable of doing so, we have to stay, and we have to control.”[114] It is crucial to acknowledge that, unlike typical paramilitaries, the Gaitanista Army does not maintain a positive relationship with the Colombian government, and the government carries out routine attacks against the organization.[115]

While the Gaitanista Army’s paramilitary origin is evident, much of the group’s ideology also stems from Colombia’s socialist guerrilla movement of the 1960s. In fact, the group’s name commemorates Colombian liberal socialist Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.[116] Gaitán was prominent during the 1940s and rejected oligarchical rule, instead advocating for worker and minority group rights.[117] His assassination is cited as the beginning of Colombia’s leftist-socialist movement.[118] Liberal ideologies further shaped the group when the Úsuga brothers came to power following Herrera’s capture in 2009. The brothers brought the structure and ideological framework they adopted from their time in the Marxist-Leninist People’s Liberation Army (EPL) guerrillas. Under the Úsuga leadership, the group’s board of directors, called the Estado Mayor, was created in Urabá, and a guerrilla-like turf war was waged that expanded its territory throughout northern Colombia; it also sought a stronger political identity during this period, seeking to “govern the lower, middle, and rich classes of Colombia.”[119] Like Colombia’s larger socialist movements, the Gaitanista Army expresses disapproval of the government and calls for social reform through expanded social services, especially in the rural and isolated regions like those that it controls.[120] In this period, the group began presenting its struggle as a response to the Colombian political system.[121] To craft a more formal identity, the group revised its internal statutes, composed a hymn and a prayer, and designed a flag.[122] It justified its continued existence based on the Colombian state’s failure to fully comply with the terms of the AUC demobilization, thereby positioning itself as an organization of armed civil resistance.[123] The group asserts that its goals are to achieve territorial, social, economic, and military control to address structural inequalities and injustice in Colombia.[124]

Despite these stated ideologies, the group’s current leader, Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego (alias “Javier” or “Chiquito Malo”), rejects comparisons to other guerrilla and communist groups because he believes that the Gaitanistas will not “become inundated with power and lose control and eventually harm the population” the way he claims other groups have.[125] Ávila Villadiego has also begun to reject the mission of the Gaitanista Army as a political entity, saying that it would not demand seats in the government or other “direct political rights,” and instead described it as a social movement aiming to improve living conditions in communities under its control since the government cannot.[126]

The Gaitanista Army remains open for demobilization in accordance with President Petro’s “Total Peace” plan for militant group demobilization, as it seeks to address the same social changes that the Gaitanistas claim are needed in Colombia.[127] However, this may be unlikely, in part due to the Gaitanistas’ demands in negotiations where it rejects being subject to the regular justice system.[128] Instead, it demands a transitional justice framework that is typically reserved for political insurgents, which would include a broad amnesty for fighters and alternative sentences for commanders.[129] Its stated long-term vision involves maintaining the group's structure and illicit business activities while attempting to make them less violent.[130] However, the Colombian government’s classification of the Gaitanista Army as a non-political drug-trafficking organization denies the group the political leverage that armed political militant groups, like the National Liberation Army (ELN) or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC), have carried in the past.[131] This criminal designation also limits the concessions the government is legally able to offer during negotiations.[132]

Political Activities

The Gaitanista Army opened an exploratory dialogue with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and his administration between 2017 and 2018.[133] During these talks, the Gaitanistas strongly insisted that the security of its members after demobilization was its top priority, referencing the high rates of killings of ex-combatants from groups like the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and other paramilitary predecessors.[134] It also stressed that the economic hardship of civilian life was a major factor compelling former members to return to arms.[135] In 2017, then-leader of the Gaitanista Army, Dairo Antonio Úsuga (alias “Otoniel”), even turned himself over to the government in attempt to negotiate a peace agreement, ultimately to no avail.[136] The negotiation process ultimately collapsed in 2018 because of a final submission law passed by Congress which added longer prison sentences and fewer concessions than the Gaitanistas were willing to accept.[137] Discussions of peace negotiations began again following a Gaitanista leadership change and the election of Colombian President Gustavo Petro in 2022. Petro's election was seen by the Gaitanistas as a dramatic shift, with some reports indicating the group had advised residents in areas they controlled to vote for him.[138] He subsequently authorized his "Total Peace" plan which created a legal framework for dialogue and submission to justice for organized crime groups.[139] The group agreed to a bilateral ceasefire to join the “Total Peace" plan in January 2023, which was later called off after it backed a mining strike in the Bajo Cauca region of Colombia that involved the burning of trucks, road blockades, and caused a shortage of necessary goods for 300,000 individuals.[140]

The Colombian government has publicly noted the challenges posed by the Gaitanista Army’s non-political status. Its “high impact organized crime group” categorization disallows the typical incentives and judicial benefits, such as access to transitional justice frameworks or alternative sentences with no prison times, provided to armed groups in peace negotiations. Furthermore, the Colombian Congress and Attorney General’s Office opposed both negotiating and offering the Gaitanistas incentives to cooperate.[141] Despite the Gaitanista Army claiming to have a social rather than political mission, the group requested a political actor designation by the Colombian government in May 2024, which was rejected.[142] In July 2024, President Petro created the “Socio-legal Dialogue Space” which provided a channel for negotiation talks between the Colombian government and Gaitanista Army . The Colombian government proposed demobilization as an organized crime group in exchange for reduced sentences and other judicial benefits, though these incentives were weaker than those offered to political armed groups.[143] In November 2024, the Gaitanista Army then proposed its three central agenda items for demobilization discussions, which included migration, drug-trafficking, and deforestation. The group wanted to address these issues through a transitional justice framework that would grant broad amnesties for its members, effectively seeking legal forgiveness for their crimes in these areas. However, the Colombian government rejected this request, maintaining that the group should submit to the ordinary justice process which requires certain mandatory sentences.[144] In February 2025, negotiations between the Colombian government and Gaitanista Army commenced, and at the first meeting discussed “transformation of the territory, protection of life and a reduction of violence" [145]. However, these peace discussions have not advanced; the Colombian National Police is still actively pursuing head commander Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego. [146] Academics have speculated that the group’s desire for political demobilization was a strategic move to reduce attacks on its forces while it expands its networks.[148]

In addition to official talks with the Colombian government, the Gaitanista Army also actively attempts to influence politics at the local level. Its primary strategy is to destroy existing authorities and loyalties within communities and then rebuild them in order to serve its interests.[149] One manner through which it does so is by co-opting local action councils, which are the elected civic bodies responsible for neighborhood governance.[150] Additionally, in areas controlled by the Gaitanista Army, candidates running for local office must establish channels of communication with the group to run safely, even if the group publicly states that it will not intervene in the electoral process.[151]

Furthermore, the Gaitanistas coerce public officials through threats of violence and have begun summoning officials from rural development agencies to mandatory meetings as a condition for those agencies to operate in regions like Bajo Cauca.[152] The group has also been known to threaten both rival militant groups and social opponents as a political tactic: in late 2024 and early 2025, the group was publicly denounced for issuing a plan to murder Iván Madero, the president of the human rights organization CREDHOS, and other civil society members in the Magdalena Medio region as part of their strategy for gaining and maintaining territorial, political, and social control.[153]

Targets And Tactics

In its attempt to be recognized as an authoritative organization, the Gaitanista Army’s attacks target civilians, activists, police and military members, and corporations within its controlled territories.

The Gaitanista Army subjects civilians to extortion, imposed curfews, limited access to food and other necessities, and restricted movement.[154] Residents of the Urabá region claim that the armed strikes are “nothing new… every time a member of the Gulf Clan is killed or captured, the public knows that the next step is an armed strike, and that generally lasts three or four days.”[155] The use of such social control tactics reportedly increases when the Gaitanista Army is fighting with other armed groups for contested spaces.[156] Furthermore, the Gaitanista Army is especially hostile toward community activists, who often denounce the group.[157] The targeting of social leaders by the Gaitanista Army is specific and intentional, and the group kidnaps, tortures, and kills them to claim control over their communities.[158]

Beyond targeting civilians, the Gaitanista Army also organizes attacks against the Colombian national police and military. This is known as “Plan Pistola,” or the “Pistol Plan,” a tactic first used by Pablo Escobar’s criminal narco-forces in the 1980s.[159] The Pistol Plan rewards civilians and criminal group members for assassinating police and military members.[160] The Gaitanista Army is known to launch the Pistol Plan in retaliation for the deaths of its high-ranking officials, such as in 2012 for the death of second-in-command Juan de Dios Úsuga or most recently in 2025 for the death of a leader known as “Chirimoya” in early April.[161] The group has also modernized their military capacity by incorporating experience from former FARC members, particularly regarding the use of explosives in combat against the Colombian military.[162] The group is linked to the installation of new Explosive Ordnance (EO), Anti-Personnel Mines (APM), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).[163] These devices are used both to attack security forces and defend the territories and trafficking routes where the group operates. Armed strikes are also a signature tactic employed by the group as means of showing force to demonstrate territorial control. During periods of armed strikes, the Gaitanista Army enforces total lockdowns by shuttering local businesses, blocking major roads, and disrupting transport hubs. They also use violent intimidation tactics to ensure compliance, such as burning vehicles or warning residents that they risk being shot if they venture outside. These strikes often target commercial and logistical infrastructure, which often causes humanitarian emergencies by cutting off supplies of food and gas and preventing medical staff from reaching hospitals. [164]

The Gaitanista Army also targets corporations operating in its regions of control. In May 2025, the Gaitanistas were suspected to be behind several bombings at Colombia’s largest mine in the Antioquia province, owned by the Chinese Zijin Mining corporation.[165] These attacks demonstrate the logistics of the group’s mining operations, where it utilizes private company’s tunnels to carry out illegal gold and silver mining activities. The group is also reported to extract extortionist “protection fees” against banana companies, a tactic it also uses on civilians.[166]

Additionally, the pursuit of peace negotiations has been purported to be a strategic tactic used by the Gaitanista Army to expand its territory and capabilities.[167] Some analysts argue that the Colombian government’s ceasefire in 2023 functioned as a gift that allowed the group to leverage the respite from state military operations for lateral expansion against rivals by filling voids and consolidating control, which resulted in significant growth.[168] This expansion included securing control over major highways, rivers, and sea routes along the Atlantic coast, an area of significantly lower risks for their international drug buyers.[169]

Beyond the use of violence, the Gaitanista Army maintains its dominance through sophisticated operations that analysts often compare to those of a multinational corporation. Its strategy is to destroy existing local authorities and loyalties within communities so that they can be effectively rebuilt to serve the organization’s interests.[170] To ensure compliance and gather intelligence, the group utilizes an extensive network of civilian lookouts (puntos) who are responsible for reporting directly to commanders on all movements of local community members, humanitarian organizations, and public forces.[171] The group also frequently functions as the local judicial authority in many areas, intervening in community decision-making and resolving disputes such as domestic violence cases or the collection of unpaid loans.[172]

Attacks

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

October 15, 2008: The Gaitanistas announced its creation with its first armed strike, shutting down several municipalities in the Úruba, Antioquía, to commemorate its “presentation to society” as the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC). (Unknown killed, unknown wounded).[173]

January 4-5, 2012: The Gaitanista Army forced a 48-hour shutdown of businesses and civilian movement in northwestern Colombia in response to the death of one of its head commanders, Juan de Dios Úsuga (alias “Giovanni”). Head commander Dario Antonio Úsuga (alias “Otoniel”) ordered the deaths of civilians who violated the shutdown and also launched the “Pistol Plan,” which financially rewards individuals for killing police and military members. (Unknown killed, unknown wounded).[174]

2019: The Gaitainista Army enforced strict control over human trafficking operations along the Panama border, which included prohibiting local guides from using certain migrant routes, resulting in the murder of seven guides who failed to comply (7 killed, zero wounded).[175]

June-August 2021: The Gaitanista Army initiated a string of targeted femicides in Tibú as an act of retaliation after a rumor spread that women in the area had passed information to the military (Over a dozen killed, unknown wounded).[176]

May 2022: The group enforced a five-day armed strike throughout a reported 178 municipalities within 11 of Colombia’s 32 departments in response to the extradition of head commander Dario Antonio Úsuga (alias “Otoniel) to the United States (24 killed, unknown wounded).[177]

December 2022: The group was responsible for five verified incidents of sexual violence perpetrated against minor girls in the context of the armed conflict. This specific pattern of gender-based violence reflects a tactic used to exert coercive control over communities (Unknown killed, unknown wounded).[178]

May 2023: The Gaitanistas were accused of backing a mining protest that blocked roads of 12 municipalities, caused necessity shortages for over 300,000 people, destroyed an aqueduct, and resulted in President Petro’s ending of the government’s bilateral ceasefire with the Gaitanistas (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[179]

April-May 2025: After the death of the leader “Chirimoya,” the Gaitanista Army engaged the Pistol Plan, where the murders of police and military members are financially incentivized. This event led to a large shift in President Petro’s approach to negotiations with the Gaitanista Army that informally ended peace discussions and led to heavy military action towards the group (at least 27 killed, unknown wounded).[180]

Interactions

Vertical Tabs

Designated / Listed

Grupo Armado Organizado (GAO) is the label attached to the Gaitanista Army by the Colombian State for meeting three requirements of armed organized groups. These three elements are the use of armed force against the State, the capacity to generate an excessive level of violence, and a leadership structure that leads its members into violence against the public or national forces on national soil.[181]
The United States has designated the Gaitanista Army as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).[182]

Community Relations

The Gaitanista Army has a complex relationship with the local population, which they seek to both coerce and co-opt. The group exerts significant social control over the locals, governing and acting as the arbiters of daily life in the territories it holds, to the extent that local residents refer to their network of influence as la empresa ("the firm").[183] Additionally, the Gaitanista Army’s initial forces were built from the financial support of wealthy landowners and local merchants who knew the paramilitary group would permit their illicit business activity.[184]

The demographic make-up of the Gaitanista Army is unique and reflective of its recruiting populations, which include a mix of paramilitary and guerrilla dissidents, former military members, and members of Gaitanista-franchised criminal organizations.[185] The group recruits particularly heavily from youths under 24 years old who lack alternative economic prospects.[186] It has established several education centers for 14- to 22-year-olds to learn the organization’s politics and military standards.[187] Recruits are placed as either foot soldiers, administrators, or politicians, depending on their previous experiences and training.[188] Enticements used to attract new members, especially young people, include promises of mobile phones, motorcycles, social prestige, protection, and steady income.[189] Beyond youth, the Gaitanista Army also recruits individuals with prior military or combat experience, such as former FARC members and ex-soldiers, who bring valuable expertise in weapons and trafficking routes.[190] Furthermore, it has been known to actively recruit children, sometimes as young as eight, initially involving them in small errands for food before drawing them into the group's intelligence network and ranks.[191] These children usually become informants, coca leaf harvesters, or guards for the group’s illegal mining operations.[192]

Some adult residents of Gaitanista-controlled regions in northwestern Colombia view the Gaitanista Army as a provider of social services and employment opportunities.[193] The group has been reported to provide many benefits to the community like paved roads, electricity, health services, Christmas presents for children, and food-price stability.[194] Simultaneously, the group offers salaried positions to civilians who see their association with the Gaitanistas as a means of survival. Some academics view the Gaitanista Army’s efforts to increase its popular support as an attempt to minimize the use of violent social control tactics.[195] It also operates as the primary judicial authority in many areas, quickly resolving disputes such as domestic violence and unpaid loans and enforcing their decisions through fines, community labor, or more severe punishment.[196] These actions are employed to exert leverage over the population, fill the institutional vacuum left by the state, and compel the community to comply with the group’s directives.[197]

Relationships With Other Groups

The Gaitanista Army emerged following the demobilization of its predecessor, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).[198] The organization traces its origins to AUC dissidents and former paramilitary commanders, making it a successor in the lineage of AUC. Although it maintains a paramilitary unit, the group rejects the paramilitary label.[199] Since its creation, the Gaitanista Army has had its share of complex relationships with criminal and guerrilla groups alike. The most significant is with the National Liberation Army (ELN), a Colombian Marxist guerrilla organization (See “National Liberation Army (Colombia)” profile for more), with which it has both cooperated with and competed against at different points in time.[200] InSight Crime reported collaboration between the Gaitanistas and the ELN in the coca production and trade in the town of Simití and a non-aggression pact in 2016.[201] However, since 2018, the ELN has become the Gaitanista Army’s main rival, as both groups seek control over areas formerly controlled by the FARC after its demobilization in 2016.[202] From February to March 2019, clashes between the Gaitanista Army and the ELN forced approximately 2,800 people into confinement in Bojayá, a city along two major drug trafficking routes in northern Colombia.[203] Confrontations between the two groups have significantly increased since the COVID-19 pandemic as they fight to control major drug-trafficking and illegal mining areas in Colombia.[204] The Gaitanista Army-ELN rivalry has caused the ELN to lose significant territory in its historically dominated departments and continues to both displace and confine thousands of civilians in the process in their contests for land in Chocó, Antioquia, Bolívar and La Guajira.[205] As of 2025, the fight between the two groups continues along the Pacific coast and near the Venezuelan border, and in agricultural heartlands, with the ELN often launching armed strikes to prevent Gaitanista Army incursions.[206] In 2025, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office pointed to the Gaitanista Army-ELN conflict in the Chocó department as the cause of one of Colombia’s most critical humanitarian emergencies.[207]

The Gaitanistas have established tumultuous relationships with other groups to combat the ELN. Following the FARC’s demobilization, a number of dissidents who refused to dissolve created the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central or EMC), which is speculated to hold an alliance with the Gaitanistas in order to drive the ELN out of its long-held territory in Chocó.[208] The group had also engaged in armed action against the EMC in several areas including “Bolívar, Córdoba, Antioquia, and around the port city of Buenaventura” in 2024.[209] It also had a complex relationship with the Rastrojos, a now largely defunct criminal group that reached its height in 2010, that had expanded into territory in Antioquia and stripped it away from the Gaitanista Army throughout the 2000s.[210] Throughout the 2000s and by its height in 2010, Los Rastrojos had expanded into traditional Gaitanista Army territory in Antioquia; however, following the arrest of several of its leaders and the disarmament of the FARC and the subsequent rapid power increases of the ELN and Gaitanista Army, Los Rastrojos faced significant challenges that threatened its survival.[211] In an attempt to maintain its control over its territorial holdings from the rapidly growing ELN, the Rastrojos allied with the Gaitanista Army in 2021, but even with this alliance, Los Rastrojos was unsuccessful; it is speculated that Los Rastrojos have been absorbed into the Gaitanista Army as a franchise cell.[212]

Beyond the ELN or groups relating to the ELN, the Gaitanista Army has also experienced consistent conflict with the Caparros, a former faction of the United Self-Defense of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary.[213] After the AUC’s demobilization in 2006, the faction joined the Gaitanista Army as a franchise cell and continued its control of regions in the Antioquia and Córdoba departments.[214] In 2017, the Caparros disagreed with the Gaitanista Army’s willingness to approach demobilization talks with the Santos government and subsequently split from the organization.[215] The Caparros have maintained a rivalry with the Gaitanistas since its split from the organization as it continues pressuring Gaitanista cells for territory.[216] The Colombian government announced it had dismantled the Caparros in 2021, despite contradicting reports from Colombian media of continued skirmishes between the two groups.[217]

State Sponsors And External Influences

As one of the largest cocaine trafficking groups in the world, the Gaitanista Army has established a complex international drug-smuggling network involving foreign third parties. It facilitates the massive sale and transport of cocaine into international markets, including the United States and Europe, and relies on various criminal organizations as buyers and facilitators.[218] Mexican cartels make up the main purchasers for the U.S. route, acquiring cocaine primarily along the Atlantic coast, where the Sinaloa Cartel appears to dominate purchases in Gaitanista areas.[219] These foreign groups typically take possession of shipments in Central America, with Honduras identified as a principal handover point.[220] For shipments directed toward Europe, Albanian and other European crime groups are instrumental in handling the subsequent trafficking and logistics.[221]

The Gaitanista Army also has adversarial influence with foreign governments, notably the United States, which has classified the Gaitanista Army as a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) since 2018.[222] This pressure involves U.S. sanctions against commanders for drug trafficking and culminated in the extradition of former leader Dario Antonio Úsuga (alias “Otoniel”) to the U.S. for prosecution in May 2022.[223]

Regarding direct external conflict with foreign non-state groups, the Gaitanista Army clashes frequently with the Venezuelan criminal gang Tren de Aragua, often fighting for control over border crossings (trochas) used for migrant smuggling and contraband, highlighting a key conflict related to illegal markets.[224]

Footnotes

Footnotes:

[1] VerdadAbierta.com. “Los ‘Gaitanistas’, un pulpo que creció en las narices del Estado.” VerdadAbierta.com, May 15, 2022. https://verdadabierta.com/los-gaitanistas-un-pulpo-que-crecio-en-las-narices-del-estado/

[2]The City Paper Staff. “Petro to Announce Security Measures as Gulf Clan Escalates Violence across Colombia.” The City Paper Bogotá, May 5, 2025.; Adriaan Alsema, “Colombia Seeks to Intensify Offensive Against EGC Paramilitaries,” Colombia Reports, April 30, 2025, https://colombiareports.com/colombia-seeks-to-renew-offensive-against-egc-paramilitaries/

[3] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.; Badillo, Reynell, and Víctor M. Mijares. “Politicised crime: causes for the discursive politicisation of organised crime in Latin America.” Global Crime 22, no. 4 (2021): 312–335. doi:10.1080/17440572.2021.2024804.

[4] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.

[5] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.; Badillo, Reynell, and Víctor M. Mijares. “Politicised crime: causes for the discursive politicisation of organised crime in Latin America.” Global Crime 22, no. 4 (2021): 312–335. doi:10.1080/17440572.2021.2024804.

[6] Badillo, Reynell, and Víctor M. Mijares. “Politicised crime: causes for the discursive politicisation of organised crime in Latin America.” Global Crime 22, no. 4 (2021): 312–335. doi:10.1080/17440572.2021.2024804.

[7] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.; Badillo, Reynell, and Víctor M. Mijares. “Politicised crime: causes for the discursive politicisation of organised crime in Latin America.” Global Crime 22, no. 4 (2021): 312–335. doi:10.1080/17440572.2021.2024804.

[8] Badillo, Reynell, and Víctor M. Mijares. 2021. “Politicised Crime: Causes for the Discursive Politicisation of Organised Crime in Latin America.” Global Crime 22 (4): 312–35. doi:10.1080/17440572.2021.2024804.

[9] Badillo, Reynell, and Víctor M. Mijares. “Politicised crime: causes for the discursive politicisation of organised crime in Latin America.” Global Crime 22, no. 4 (2021): 312–335. doi:10.1080/17440572.2021.2024804.

[10] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.

[11] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.

[12] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.; UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.

[13] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.; UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.

[14] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.; UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.

[15] UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.

[16] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.

[17] UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.; Freeman, Will. “Colombia Tries a Transformative Left Turn.” Current History 122, no. 841 (January 2023): 69–74.

[18] Ellis, R. Evan. “Colombia’s Security Challenges, the Government Response, and the Future of U.S.-Colombia Relations.” Report. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2023.

[19] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.

[20] UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.

[21] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.

[22] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.; UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.

[23] UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.

[24] UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.

[25] UK Visas and Immigration. “Country policy and information note: armed groups and criminal gangs, Colombia, November 2024 (accessible).” Guidance. London: UK Visas and Immigration, 2025.

[26] Amnesty International. “Urgent Action: Protect Defenders from Armed Groups.” AMR 23/8924/2025. London: Amnesty International, 2025.

[27] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.; McDermott, Jeremy. “The BACRIM and Their Position in Colombia’s Underworld.” InSight Crime, March 27, 2017. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/bacrim-and-their-position-in-colombia-underworld/

[28] International Crisis Group. "The Unsolved Crime in "Total Peace": Dealing with Colombia's Gaitanistas." Latin America Report N°105, (2024). Accessed February 19, 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/105-unsolved-crime-total-peace-dealing-colombias-gaitanistas

[29] Aselma, Adriaan. "Vicente Castañp." Colombia Reports (2017). Accessed April 7, 2025. https://colombiareports.com/amp/vicente-castano/; Rosser, Emma. "Urabeños Founder Says AUC Demobilization Failed Due to Government Betrayal." Colombia Reports, (2015). Accessed April 7, 2025. https://colombiareports.com/amp/urabenos-founder-says-auc-demobilization-failed-due-to-government-betrayal/.

[30] McDermott, Jeremy. "The Last Man Standing? The Rise of Colombia’s Urabeños." Friedrich Ebert Stiftung en Colombia (FESCOL): Observatorio Colombiano de Violencia y Gobernanza N°4, (2014). Accessed February 19, 2025. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kolumbien/11089-20150116.pdf; McDermott, Jeremy. “The Evolution of the Urabeños.” InSight Crime, March 25, 2014. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/the-evolution-of-the-urabenos

[31] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report No. 105, March 19, 2024. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/105-unsolved-crime-total-peace-dealing-colombias-gaitanistas; “El enigma del exjefe paramilitar Vicente Castaño: ¿asesinado o vivo?” El Tiempo, December 4, 2023. https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/el-misterio-que-sigue-rodeando-la-identidad-del-temido-exparamilitar-vicente-castano-832322; U.S. Department of State. “Vicente Castaño Gil (Deceased).” Narcotics Rewards Program Target Information. https://www.state.gov/narcotics-rewards-program-target-information-brought-to-justice/vicente-castano-gil-deceased/; McDermott, Jeremy. “The Evolution of the Urabeños.” InSight Crime, March 25, 2014. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/the-evolution-of-the-urabenos/

[32] LADB Staff. "Castano's Brother Accused of His Murder." (2006). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/13523; BBC News. "Carlos Castano Murder: Nine Men Sentenced in Colombia." March 17, 2011. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-12779945.

[33] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report No. 105, March 19, 2024. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/105-unsolved-crime-total-peace-dealing-colombias-gaitanistas; “El enigma del exjefe paramilitar Vicente Castaño: ¿asesinado o vivo?” El Tiempo, December 4, 2023. https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/el-misterio-que-sigue-rodeando-la-identidad-del-temido-exparamilitar-vicente-castano-832322; U.S. Department of State. “Vicente Castaño Gil (Deceased).” Narcotics Rewards Program Target Information. https://www.state.gov/narcotics-rewards-program-target-information-brought-to-justice/vicente-castano-gil-deceased/; McDermott, Jeremy. “The Evolution of the Urabeños.” InSight Crime, March 25, 2014. https://insightcrime.org/investigations/the-evolution-of-the-urabenos/

[34] Insight Crime. “Colombia to Extradite Paramilitary Drug Capo Don Mario.” InSight Crime, December 17, 2024.. https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/colombia-to-extradite-paramilitary-drug-capo-don-mario/; U.S. Department of Justice. “Colombian Drug Kingpin and Paramilitary Leader Pleads Guilty to Operating a Continuing Criminal Enterprise.” https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/colombian-drug-kingpin-and-paramilitary-leader-pleads-guilty-operating-continuing

[35] NBC News. “Colombia Arrests ‘Most Wanted’ Drug Suspect.” NBC News, April 15, 2009. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna30227059; McDermott, Jeremy. "The Last Man Standing? The Rise of Colombia’s Urabeños." Friedrich Ebert Stiftung en Colombia (FESCOL): Observatorio Colombiano de Violencia y Gobernanza N°4, (2014). Accessed February 19, 2025. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kolumbien/11089-20150116.pdf.

[36] International Crisis Group. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas. Latin America Report N°105. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.

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