Main Tabs Group

Overview
Formed: 
September 1, 2011
Disbanded: 
January 1, 2015

Disbanded: Group is active as a member of the National Liberation Front in Syria.

First Attack: May 28, 2012: Suqour al-Sham and the Shuhada Jebel al-Zawiyah Battalion attacked a government checkpoint outside the village of Mughara in Idlib province. The militants seized weaponry, including a tank and an anti-aircraft armored personnel carrier (unknown casualties).[1]

Last Attack: February-April 2018: Suqour al-Sham fought alongside Jabhat Tahrir Souriya (JTS) against HTS. The fighting successfully pushed back HTS, but was ended in April following a ceasefire, reportedly after the son of Suqour al-Sham leader, Abu Issa al-Sheikh, was killed in the fighting. (unknown killed, unknown wounded) [2]

Suqour al-Sham was a Syrian opposition group that sought to replace the Assad regime with an Islamic State. Ahmad Abu Eissa founded the group in Syria’s Idlib governorate after his brothers were killed in armed civilian clashes with the Assad regime in 2011. Through a series of mergers with smaller brigades, Suqour al-Sham quickly became one of the most powerful local opposition groups. Suqour al-Sham was active in multiple Syrian opposition coalitions, including the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) umbrella organization linked to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). However, the group began to distance itself from the FSA in 2013. In November 2013, Suqour al-Sham joined the Islamic Front, an umbrella group advocating the establishment of Shariah law in Syria. Although it was once one of the strongest groups in the Islamic Front, Suqour al-Sham declined in strength after two of its most prominent brigades defected over disagreements regarding whether to target the Islamic State (IS). After the dissolution of the Islamic Front in mid-2014, the group continued to coordinate intermittent attacks against the Assad regime in conjunction with Ahrar al-Sham and Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra). In March 2015, Suqour al-Sham merged with Ahrar al-Sham in advance of a major assault on Idlib. In September 2016, the group left Ahrar al-Sham, only to rejoin Ahrar al-Sham later on in the wake of conflicts between Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (JFS/HTS, both later iterations of Al-Nusra). Ahrar al-Sham was defeated by HTS in July 2017, though Suqour al-Sham successfully resisted HTS’ assault and appears to have left Ahrar al-Sham again. In 2018, Suqour al-Sham fought alongside Jabhat Tahrir Souriya (JTS, a later iteration of Ahrar al-Sham) against HTS and then merged into the Turkish-led National Liberation Front (NLF). 

Narrative

Suqour al-Sham was a Syrian opposition group that sought to replace the Assad regime with an Islamic state ruled by Shariah law.[3] Ahmad Abu Eissa founded the group in Syria’s Idlib governorate after his brothers were killed in armed civilian clashes with the Assad regime in 2011. Through a series of mergers with smaller brigades, Suqour al-Sham quickly became one of the most powerful opposition groups in Idlib, and it expanded to the Aleppo and Damascus provinces by 2013.[4]

Suqour al-Sham was active in multiple Syrian opposition coalitions. It was affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2011, and it became a founding a member of the FSA-linked Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) umbrella organization in 2012.[5] Additionally, Suqour al-Sham leader Ahmad Abu Eissa was elected as the head of the SILF in 2012.[6] Despite its close FSA ties, Suqour al-Sham did not take orders from the FSA’s Syrian National Council, and it began to distance itself from the FSA in 2013. On September 23, 2013, Suqour al-Sham joined the Islamic Coalition, a political group that called for the implementation of Shariah law in Syria and for the opposition to the Assad regime to be run only by groups fighting inside Syria. It also opposed the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, which had the support of the FSA’s Syrian National Council, a group comprised mostly of exiled Syrians.[7] In November 2013, Suqour al-Sham left SILF in order to join a new  conglomerate known as the Islamic Front.[8]

In November 2013, Suqour al-Sham helped found the Islamic Front, an umbrella group of 40,000-70,000 fighters that sought to replace the Assad regime with an Islamic government.[9] Suqour al-Sham’s commander, Ahmad Abu Eissa, served as the Islamic Front’s leader.[10] Although it was once one of the strongest members in the Islamic Front, Suqour al-Sham weakened after it began targeting the Islamic State (IS) on January 3, 2014.[11] The decision to target IS disgruntled many senior Suqour al-Sham leaders such as the group’s top religious leader, Abu Abderrahman al-Sarmini, who defected from the group in January 2014 in protest. Conflict with IS also prompted Liwa Dawoud and Liwa Siyoof al-Haq, two of Suqour al-Sham’s strongest factions, to declare peace with IS and defect from Suqour al-Sham. These two splinter factions would later form Jaysh al-Sham (the Army of the Levant) with deserting IS members.[12] In February, 2014 IS members assassinated of Suqour al-Sham’s top military commander, Mohamad al-Dik. The group was severely weakened by the assassination and defections.[13]  In February 2014, IS militants clashed with Suquor al-Sham members in the Sha’er oil fields in the province of Hama. IS successfully besieged 500 Suqour al-Sham militants in the fighting, prompting Suqour al-Sham to sign a ceasefire with IS within days of the start of the siege.[14]

In early 2014, the Islamic Front collapsed due to disagreements between Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam. [15] After the Islamic Front’s dissolution, Suqour al-Sham continued to coordinate attacks against the Syrian army with Ahrar al-Sham and Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra). On March 22, 2015, Suqour al-Sham merged into Ahrar al-Sham. Suqour al-Sham’s former leader, Ahmad Abu Eissa, became a deputy responsible for Ahrar al-Sham’s political affairs.[16] Suqour al-Sham participated with Ahrar al-Sham in offensives on Idlib in June 2015 and maintained a significant presence there through the end of the year.[17] Suqour al-Sham appears to have fought alongside Ahrar al-Sham until around September 2016, when it broke off from the group.[18] According to the group’s spokesperson, Suqour al-Sham then joined the umbrella group Jaish al-Fatah as an independent entity and seized significant amounts of Syrian Army equipment in Aleppo.[19]

In January of 2017, Suqour al-Sham fought alongside Ahrar al-Sham in the latter group’s clashes with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS, formerly al-Nusra).[20] In response to the escalating conflict, Suqour al-Sham merged with Ahrar al-Sham (for the second time) alongside four other groups, cumulatively adding around 8,000 fighters to Ahrar al-Sham’s ranks.[21] In January, Suqour al-Sham, independently of Ahrar al-Sham, also sent representatives to the Astana peace talks with the Assad regime.[22] None of the Syrian opposition groups, including Suqour al-Sham, signed the ceasefire agreement negotiated by Russia, Turkey, and Iran.[23] Suqour al-Sham also participated in the clashes between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly JFS) and Ahrar al-Sham in July.[24]  Suqour al-Sham was reportedly one of the few subgroups of Ahrar al-Sham that was able to repel HTS’ offensive.[25] It appears as if though Suqour al-Sham became independent of Ahrar al-Sham again during this time period. Later reporting referred to Suqour al-Sham as having a greater degree of independence, but publicly available information on Suqour al-Sham’s activities from August 2017 to February 2018 (when Suqour was again involved in clashes with HTS) is difficult to find.[26]

The conflict between HTS and Suquor al-Sham was first borne out of the formation of Jabhat Tahrir Souriya (JTS) from Ahrar al-Shamand Nour al-Din al-Zinki, a group which HTS quickly turned against.[27] As JTS started to claim victories against HTS, Suqour al-Sham started to support JTS’ military posture.[28] By mid-March 2018, Suqour al-Sham had pushed HTS back alongside JTS. [29] As the conflict extended into April, however, the fighting came to a standstill and a ceasefire between the two parties was signed; this allegedly came after the son of Suqour al-Sham leader Abu Issa al-Sheikh was wounded in the clashes.[30] In August, Suqour al-Sham merged into the Turkish-led National Liberation Front (NLF) alongside JTS.[31] As of mid-2019, Suqour al-Sham remains active as part of the NLF.[32]

Organization

Vertical Tabs

Leadership

Ahmad Abu Eissa (2011 to Present): Eissa, also known as Abu Issa and Ahmed al-Sheikh, served as Suqour al-Sham’s commander until the group merged with Ahrar al-Sham in 2015. Eissa and his brothers joined the opposition in 2011 as armed civilians during clashes with the Assad Regime in Idlib. After his brothers were killed in 2011, Eissa founded Suqour al-Sham. Eissa also led the founding the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front umbrella group and became its leader in 2012. In 2013, Eissa was named as the head of the Islamic Front umbrella organization.[33] 

Abu Abderrahman al-Sarmini (Unknown to January 12, 2014): Sarmini was Suqour al-Sham’s top religious leader. He resigned in 2014 to protest Suquor al-Sham’s growing violence against the Islamic State (IS).[34]

Mohammed al-Dik (Unknown to February 2014): Dik, also known as Abu Hussein, was Suqour al-Sham’s military commander. He was killed by the Islamic State in February 2014.[35]

Size Estimates
  • 2013: 9,000-10,000 (BBC)[36]
Name Changes

Suqour al-Sham has not undergone any name changes. There are, however, multiple different spellings that are commonly used to refer to the group, such as Suqur al-Sham and Suqor al-Sham. This group should not be confused with the “Desert Hawks,” a militant force in Syria that supports the Assad regime. 

Resources

Suqour al-Sham amassed Syrian military weapons through raids of regime compounds, defectors, or sales from corrupt officers. These weapons included rocket-propelled grenade launchers and machine guns.[37] 

Locations

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

Suqour al-Sham was formed in Jabal al-Zawiya in the province of Idlib. It expanded into the Aleppo and Damascus provinces in 2013.[38] 

Strategy

Vertical Tabs

Ideology and Goals

Initially, Suqour al-Sham’s leader, Ahmad Abu Eissa, was a proponent of a moderate Islamist state that would hold elections and guarantee full rights for minorities and seculars. After joining the Islamic Front umbrella group, however, Eissa recanted his statement and advocated for a completely Islamic state in Syria.[39] 

Political Activities

Suqour al-Sham was initially affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), though it began to distance itself from the FSA after the FSA-affiliated Supreme Military Council’s (SMC) political wing, the Syrian National Council (SNC), joined the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.[40]  On September 23, 2013, Suqour al-Sham joined the Islamic Coalition, a political group that opposed the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and called for opposition to the Assad regime to be run only by groups fighting inside Syria.[41]

In January 2017, Suqour al-Sham sent a representative to the Astana peace talks between Syrian opposition groups and the Assad regime.[42] Suqour al-Sham, along with the other militant groups represented, chose not to sign the ceasefire agreement negotiated by Russia, Turkey, and Iran.[43]

Targets And Tactics

Suqour al-Sham targeted the Assad regime since its founding. Additionally, the group actively fought the Islamic State (IS) until from January 2014 until a ceasefire with IS was signed on February 5, 2014.[44]

Suqour al-Sham utilized many small arms and IEDs, and it often attacked military outposts in order to gain weapons.[45] Suqour al-Sham also clarified that its car bombs were not martyrdom or suicide operations. Instead, the group gave cars that had been secretly rigged with explosives to suspected spies or Suqour al-Sham captives, and it remotely detonated these vehicles when they reached military checkpoints.

Attacks

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

May 28, 2012: Suqour al-Sham and the Shuhada Jebel al-Zawiyah Battalion attacked a government checkpoint outside the village of Mughara in Idlib province. The militants seized weaponry, including a tank and an anti-aircraft armored personnel carrier (unknown casualties).[46]

October 9, 2012: Suqour al-Sham fighters seized the town of Maarat al Nauman from government forces in the Idlib province (unknown casualties).[47]

May 2013: Suqour al-Sham coordinated with Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra) and other opposition groups to overrun several military camps in the Idlib province. According to Al-Nusra, the total opposition force included 2,000 fighters, 8 tanks, and an armored vehicle (unknown casualties).[48]

January 3, 2014: Suqour al-Sham joined members of the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front as part of an opposition assault against Islamic State (IS) positions across Syria. The initial attack pushed IS out of most of the Idlib province and city of Aleppo and weakened IS control in Raqqa province (unknown casualties).[49]

January 2, 2015: Suqour al-Sham coordinated with Al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham to attack an army post in the province of Idlib. This assault began a larger campaign to take control of the town of Ariha and the area surrounding Arbaeen Mountain in Idlib (unknown casualties).[50]

May 2015: Suqour al-Sham, as part of Ahrar al-Sham, helped take Idlib from regime forces. (unknown killed, unknown wounded) [51]

July 2017: Suqour al-Sham fought as part of Ahrar al-Sham against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) after HTS attacked Ahrar al-Sham. Analysts believe that these attacks were a part of HTS’ attempts to become the preeminent force in Idlib.[52]

February-April 2018: Suqour al-Sham fought alongside Jabhat Tahrir Souriya (JTS) against HTS. The fighting successfully pushed back HTS. Violence ended in April after due to a ceasefire, reportedly signed after Abu Issa al-Sheikh’s son was killed in the fighting. [53]

Interactions

Vertical Tabs

Designated / Listed

Suqour al-Sham has not been designated as a terrorist organization by any national governments or international organizations.

Since December 2015, the United Nations Security Council has made efforts towards the establishment of a list of terrorist groups active in Syria. Lebanon and Egypt support classifying Suqour al-Sham as such, but the Security Council has been unable to achieve a unanimous consensus.[54] 

Community Relations

The relationship between Suqour al-Sham and the communities in which it operated is unknown.

Relationships With Other Groups

Though Suqour al-Sham never announced a formal affiliation with Al Qaeda (AQ), it did coordinate attacks against the Assad regime with AQ affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.[55] Despite its coordination with Al-Nusra, Suqour al-Sham has opposed Al-Nusra’s successor group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and has fought against that group on numerous occasions.[56]

Suqour al-Sham opposed the Islamic State (IS) and began targeting the group on January 3, 2014.[57] However, the decision to target IS disgruntled many senior Suqour al-Sham leaders, such as the group’s top religious leader Abu Abderrahman al-Sarmini. In January 2014, Sarmini defected from Suqour al-Sham in protest of its attacks against IS. Conflict with IS also prompted Liwa Dawoud and Liwa Siyoof al-Haq, two of Suqour al-Sham’s strongest factions, to declare peace with IS, defect from Suqour al-Sham, and eventually form Jaysh al-Sham (the Army of the Levant) with deserting IS members.[58] In February, 2014 IS members assassinated of Suqour al-Sham’s top military commander, Mohamad al-Dik. The group was severely weakened by the assassination and defections.[59]  In February 2014, IS militants clashed with Suquor al-Sham members in the Sha’er oil fields in the province of Hama. IS successfully besieged 500 Suqour al-Sham militants in the fighting, prompting Suqour al-Sham to sign a ceasefire with IS within days of the start of the siege.[60]

During its existence as an independent militant organization, Suqour al-Sham was active in multiple Syrian opposition coalitions. It was affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2011, and it became a founding a member of the FSA-linked Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) umbrella organization in 2012.[61] In 2012, Suqour al-Sham leader Ahmad Abu Eissa was elected as the head of the SILF.[62] Despite its close ties to the Free Syrian Army, Suqour al-Sham did not take orders from the FSA’s Syrian National Council. Suqour al-Sham began to distance itself from the FSA in September 2013 when it joined the Islamic Coalition, a political group that called for the implementation of Shariah law in Syria.[63]

In late 2013, Suqour al-Sham helped found the Islamic Front, an umbrella group of 40,000-70,000 fighters that sought to replace the Assad regime with an Islamic government.[64] Suqour al-Sham left the SILF in November 2013 in order to join this new umbrella group.[65] Suqour al-Sham’s commander, Ahmad Abu Eissa, served as the Islamic Front’s leader until it collapsed in mid-2014 due to disagreements between Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam.[66]

Suqour al-Sham merged into Ahrar al-Sham on March 22, 2015, and its former leader, Ahmad Abu Eissa, became a deputy responsible for Ahrar al-Sham’s political affairs.[67] Since this first merger, Suqour al-Sham’s official standing vis-à-vis Ahrar al-Sham has been tumultuous. Suquor al-Sham left the group in 2016, only to join again in 2017 during clashes with Jund al-Aqsa before finally leaving a second time later that year. [68] Finally, it merged with Jabhat Tahrir Souriya (JTS), a later iteration of Ahrar al-Sham, into the Turkish-led National Liberation Front (NLF). [69]  This series of mergers and then breakages can be useful in understanding the higher-level relationships between various rebel groups on issues like major assaults, peace talks, and rebel infighting. However, it is perhaps more useful to consider Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham as consistently staunch allies with occasional efforts to change the formal, public image of their relationship. Reporting indicates that, regardless of the official state of their relationship at any given moment, Suqour al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham closely cooperated on military issues. 

State Sponsors And External Influences

There is some speculation that Saudi Arabia and Qatar provided financial support to Suqour al-Sham, largely due to both countries’ efforts to fund the Islamic Front. Analysts disagree on the extent to which Saudi Arabia influenced Suqour al-Sham. Some claim that Saudi Arabia played a large role in establishing the Islamic Front, an umbrella group that included Suqour al-Sham. However, other analysts argue that there is little evidence to support this claim aside from Saudi Arabia’s funding for Islamic Front member Jaysh al-Islam.[70] Additionally, Qatar reportedly financed the Islamic Front, an umbrella organization that included Suqour al-Sham.[71] 

In 2018, it was clear that Turkey was a major supporter of the group. Suqour al-Sham fought alongside the Turkish-supported Jabhat Tahrir al-Souriya (JTS); both groups later merged into the Turkish-led National Liberation Front. [72]

Footnotes
Footnotes: 

[1] Berman, Asher. "Rebel Groups in Jebel Al-Zawiyah." Backgrounders (26 July 2011): 2. Institute for the Study of War. Web. 29 July 2014.

[2] “The Fight between Idlib Province’s Major Factions Leaves More Human Losses.” The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (blog), March 3, 2018, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=86103. “New Rebel Coalition Brings Fresh Threat to Syria’s Splintering War | James Snell,” AW, accessed August 20, 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/new-rebel-coalition-brings-fresh-threat-syrias.... Joško Barić, “Syrian War Daily – 18th of April 2018,” Syrian War Daily (blog), April 18, 2018, https://syrianwardaily.com/2018/04/18/syrian-war-daily-18th-of-april-2018/. Joško Barić, “Syrian War Daily – 24th of April 2018,” Syrian War Daily (blog), April 24, 2018, https://syrianwardaily.com/2018/04/24/syrian-war-daily-24th-of-april-2018/.

[3] Lund, Aron. "The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 2: An Umbrella Organization." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., 15 Jan. 2014. Web. 27 July 2014.

[4] Berman, Asher. "Rebel Groups in Jebel Al-Zawiyah." Backgrounders (26 July 2011): 5. Institute for the Study of War. Web. 29 July 2014. Sinjab, Lina. "Guide to the Syrian Rebels." BBC News. N.p., 13 Dec. 2013. Web. 24 July 2014.

[5] Berman, Asher. "Rebel Groups in Jebel Al-Zawiyah." Backgrounders (26 July 2011): 2. Institute for the Study of War. Web. 29 July 2014.

[6] Syzbala, Valerie. A Power Move by Syria's Rebel Forces. Rep. Institute for the Study of War, 22 Nov. 2013. Web. 24 July 2014.

[7] “Factbox: Syrian rebels against opposition coalition.” Reuters. Thomas Reuters, 25 Sep. 2013. Web. 21 Jul. 2016. Oweis, Khaled Yacoub. "Insight: Saudi Arabia Boosts Salafist Rivals to Al Qaeda in Syria." Reuters. N.p., 01 Oct. 2013. Web. 07 Aug. 2014. “Key Syrian rebels reject National Coalition.” Al Jazeera. 25 Sep. 2013. Web. 7 Jul. 2016. Berman, Asher. "Rebel Groups in Jebel Al-Zawiyah." Backgrounders (26 July 2011): 2. Institute for the Study of War. Web. 29 July 2014.

[8] Syzbala, Valerie. A Power Move by Syria's Rebel Forces. Rep. Institute for the Study of War, 22 Nov. 2013. Web. 24 July 2014.

[9] Lund, Aron. The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 1: Structure and Support." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., 14 Jan. 2014. Web. 01 Jul. 2014. Hassan, Hassan. "Front to Back." Foreign Policy. N.p., 4 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2014.

[10] Lund, Aron. The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 1: Structure and Support." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., 14 Jan. 2014. Web. 01 Jul. 2014. Syzbala, Valerie. A Power Move by Syria's Rebel Forces. Rep. Institute for the Study of War, 22 Nov. 2013. Web. 24 July 2014. Lund, Aron. “Islamist Mergers in Syria: Ahrar al-Sham Swallows Suqour al-Sham.” Syria In Crisis. The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 23 mar. 2015. Web. 30 Apr. 2016.

[11] Abdallah, Daniel. “Does the Truce Between ISIS and Suqour al-Sham Mean an End to Syria’s Inter-Rebel War?” Syria Comment. Joshua Landis, 7 Feb. 2014. Web. 26 Jul. 2016

[12] Lund, Aron. "Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 6: Stagnation?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., 14 Apr. 2014. Web. 28 July 2014. Hassan, Hassan. "Front to Back." Foreign Policy. N.p., 4 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2014.

[13] Lund, Aron. "Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 6: Stagnation?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., 14 Apr. 2014. Web. 28 July 2014.

[14] Hassan, Hassan. "Front to Back." Foreign Policy. N.p., 4 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2014. Roggio, Bill. "Suqour Al Sham, ISIS Agree to Ceasefire." Long War Journal. Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, 5 Feb. 2014. Web. 27 July 2014.

[15] Lund, Aron. The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 1: Structure and Support." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. N.p., 14 Jan. 2014. Web. 01 Jul. 2014. Syzbala, Valerie. A Power Move by Syria's Rebel Forces. Rep. Institute for the Study of War, 22 Nov. 2013. Web. 24 July 2014. Lund, Aron. “Islamist Mergers in Syria: Ahrar al-Sham Swallows Suqour al-Sham.” Syria In Crisis. The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 23 mar. 2015. Web. 30 Apr. 2016.

[16] Lund, Aron. “Islamist Mergers in Syria: Ahrar al-Sham Swallows Suqour al-Sham.” Syria In Crisis. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 mar. 2015. Web. 30 Apr. 2016.

[17] “Islamist Groups Seize Syrian City Idlib for First Time,” Reuters, March 28, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-idlib-control/islamist.... Jennifer Cafarella and Genevieve Casagrande, “Syrian Opposition Guide,” October 7, 2015, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrian%20Opposition%....

[18] “How to Prevent Al-Qaeda from Seizing a Safe Zone in Northwestern Syria,” Washington Institute, accessed August 18, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-to-prevent-.... Al-Tamimi, Aymenn. “The Formation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Wider Tensions in the Syrian Insurgency.” CTC Sentinel Feb. 2017: 16-20. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Web. 30 April 2019. <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-formation-of-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-and-wider-ten....

[19] Tam Hussein, “Aleppo under Siege: Interview with Suqour Al-Sham- an Islamist Rebel Perspective,” MENA Etc (blog), accessed August 17, 2018, http://www.tamhussein.co.uk/2016/12/aleppo-under-siege-interview-with-su....

[20] “Calls to End Fighting as Jabhat Fatah A-Sham Takes on Former Allies in Northwest Syria,” Syria Direct, accessed August 28, 2018, https://syriadirect.org/news/calls-to-end-fighting-as-jabhat-fatah-a-sha....

[21] “How Al-Qa`ida Lost Control of Its Syrian Affiliate: The Inside Story,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, February 15, 2018, https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaida-lost-control-syrian-affiliate-inside-story/. “Facing Jihadist Attack, Syrian Rebels Join Bigger Faction,” Reuters, January 26, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels/facing-ji.... “The Jihadi Spiral,” Carnegie Middle East Center, accessed August 28, 2018, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/67911. Saleem al-Omar, “Al-Qaeda (Finally) Begins Its Conflict with the Opposition,” Atlantic Council, accessed August 28, 2018, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/al-qaeda-finally-begins.... “Syrian Rebels Flock to Ahrar amid Fighting with Former Al-Qaeda Group,” Middle East Eye, accessed August 9, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-rebels-flock-ahrar-al-sham-ami.... The New Arab, “Four Syrian Rebel Groups Merge with Former Al-Qaeda Affiliate,” alaraby, accessed August 27, 2018, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/1/28/four-syrian-rebel-group.... “5 Factions Join Ahrar Al_Sham Islamic Movement in the Battle against Fateh Al_Sham Front.” The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (blog), January 26, 2017, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=59855.

[22] AFP, “Syrian Rebels Arrive in Astana for Talks with Regime,” Dawn.com, January 23, 2017, http://www.dawn.com/news/1310225. “Soqor Al-Sham Spokesman to Qasioun: No Negotiations With Assad Before Ceasing Fire In Syria - Qasioun News Agency,” accessed August 20, 2018, https://www.qasioun-news.com/news/show/47125/.

[23] Wintour, Patrick. “Sponsors of Syria talks in Astana strike deal to protect fragile ceasefire.” The Guardian. 24 Jan. 2017. Web. 5 July 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/24/syria-talks-astana-russia-....

[24] “Rival Groups Clash in Syria’s Rebel-Packed Idlib,” Rudaw, accessed August 10, 2018, http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/16072017. al-Hamra, “Blow-by-Blow Breakdown of Ahrar Al-Sham and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham Clashes in Free Idlib,” Extra Newsfeed, July 20, 2017, https://extranewsfeed.com/blow-by-blow-breakdown-ahrar-al-sham-and-hayat.... “Idlib: tensions escalate between Ahrar al-Sham, Tahrir al-Sham,” accessed August 28, 2018, ://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/28044.

[25] “Why Ahrar Al-Sham Couldn’t Stand up to HTS’s Attack in Idlib,” Syria From Within | Chatham House, accessed August 6, 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/why-ahrar-al-sham-couldnt-stand-....

[26] “Syrian Islamist Factions Join Forces against Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham,” Al-Monitor, March 1, 2018, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/02/syria-liberation-front....

[27] “Syrian Islamist Factions Join Forces against Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham,” Al-Monitor, March 1, 2018, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/02/syria-liberation-front....

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