Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is a Palestinian Sunni Islamist militant group operating primarily in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. The al-Quds Brigades serves as PIJ’s military wing.[3] PIJ’s goal is to liberate Palestine and establish an Islamic caliphate through jihad and violence: the group rejects “any peaceful solution to the Palestinian cause,” and affirms “the Jihad solution and the martyrdom style as the only choice for liberation.”[4] The group was founded in 1979 by Fathi Abd al-Aziz al-Shiqaqi in Egypt. Shiqaqi, a physician from Rafah, along with other young Palestinian students in Egypt, formed the group as a splinter from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.
Fathi al-Shiqaqi moved to Egypt from Rafah, Gaza, in 1974 to attend school. While in Egypt studying, Shiqaqi joined the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, a precursor to Hamas, that was based in Egypt and became friends with other Islamist Palestinians.[5] During his time in Egypt, Shiqaqi regularly wrote about the Palestinian struggle, Islam, and an Islamic Jihad Project.[6] Shiqaqi attended and regularly organized meetings and engagements with the young Palestinian students living in Egypt. They discussed and read Islamic and western leaders, including Sayyid Qutb, Vladimir Lenin, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky.[7] Shiqaqi became close with Ramadan Shallah, a future head of PIJ (met in 1977), and Abd al-Aziz Awda (met in 1974 or 1975), a leading preacher who would become PIJ’s spiritual guide.[8]
In Shiqaqi’s writing, he called for violent uprising against Israel and the need to mimic the Iranian revolution in Palestine. Shiqaqi regularly complimented Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the former leader of Iran, and criticized the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood for its nonviolence and its focus on Islamic morality (i.e. criticizing deviant behavior) instead of revolution.[9] In 1979, Shiqaqi was detained twice by Egyptian authorities, spending four months in jail. During this period, Shiqaqi either left or was expelled from the Muslim Brotherhood due to his continued press for immediate Palestinian Islamic violent uprising and jihad – especially in his manifesto “Khumayni al-Hall al-islami wa-l-Badil” (Khomeini: the Islamic solution and the alternative).[10] Erik Skare, an expert on PIJ, assesses that Shiqaqi was influenced by Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb, Izz al din al Qassem, and the secular Palestinian movements that all adopted or pushed for violent and immediate uprising.[11]
In March 1979, Shiqaqi presented his plan to create a violent Islamist group, named the Islamic Vanguards (al-Talai al-Islamiyya in Arabic) to undertake jihad against Israel to his followers.[12] Debate remains on whether this was PIJ’s inception moment or whether Shiqaqi formed PIJ when he moved to Gaza in the early 1980s. According to Erik Skare, around 60 people joined the initially formed group.[13] Reports during its initial period are sparse.
In its early years, PIJ focused on recruitment, spreading its message, and building relationships with other groups and countries. Shiqaqi created and joined circles with other Islamic Palestinian activists, many of whom viewed the slightly older Shiqaqi as their leader, and who would later become central figures within PIJ.[14] In 1980, PIJ had an informal relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad.[15] It also received financial support from and established communications channels with Fatah.[16] In 1981, following the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by Egyptian Islamic Jihad, PIJ was forced out of Egypt and much of its leadership returned to Gaza.[17]
In Gaza, PIJ expanded its networks and challenged established secular and religious organizations in Palestine. On several occasions PIJ supporters got into fist fights with supporters of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Center (both groups were Hamas precursors) in Palestine. In one such clash between PIJ and Muslim Brotherhood supporters, PIJ spiritual leader Abd Aziz al-Awda was sent to the hospital. Like in Egypt, the two groups differed on the use of violent Jihad.[18] Despite these clashes, support for PIJ continued to slowly grow in Gaza.[19]
PIJ targeted university campuses and mosques for recruitment, including al-Salam Mosque in Rafah, the Hassan al-Banna Mosque in Beach camp, the al-Rahman Mosque in al-Shujaʿiyya, and the ʿIzz al-Din al-Qassam Mosque in Beit Lahiya. Shiqaqi and Awda often preached on jihad at the Beit Lahiya and Teh al-Salam mosques.[20] PIJ popularity was concentrated around these few centers. A significant portion of PIJ was made up of young, highly educated, Palestinians, who struggled to get jobs due to the lack of economic opportunity.[21] PIJ created several formal student and youth bodies to recruit students. In 1981, PIJ created the Independent Islamists, a student election list for the group, and followed it up with two separate student bodies, the Islamic Student Movement and the Revolutionary Islamic Current.[22] These groups were, in turn, followed by formal student parties: the Islamic Group and the Palestinian Islamic Youth Institution. Members of these student organizations often became PIJ fighters, commanders, and bomb makers.[23]
During the 1980s, Shiqaqi and PIJ continued to publish bulletins, magazines, and books. Publications included “al-Nur,” “al-Talia al-Islamiyya,” “al-Haqiqa,” “al-Bayan,” and “Sawt al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya.” PIJ constantly changed the names of its publications to avoid requiring permits from Israel. Most of the publications were produced at low cost and sometimes handwritten and spread on leaflets. The books and pamphlets were printed in the United Kingdom and other nations abroad and shipped back to Gaza.[24] During this time period, PIJ regularly met in the homes of its members, without a formal structure.[25] Shiqaqi also traveled throughout Gaza, meeting with supporters and rivals to discuss Jihad.
Beginning in 1983, PIJ began recruiting experienced Palestinian fighters and commanders to increase its kinetic operations and improve its access in the West Bank. In August 1983, Shiqaqi was arrested by Israeli authorities and held in the Gaza Central Prison until July 1984 – the same location as many Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and other Palestinian groups. In prison, Shiqaqi and PIJ recruited members of other Palestinian Groups. These included Misbah al-Suri from the Palestine Liberation Front, who would organize a major PIJ prison break; Issam Brahma from Fatah, who would establish the first PIJ cell in the West Bank; and Ziad al-Nakhala from the Arab Liberation Forces, who is the current Secretary-General of PIJ. These officials, among others, each brought in members from their own networks in the West Bank in Gaza.[26]
PIJ isolated attacks against Israeli military outposts and individual civilians began between 1982 and 1985. Most operations were conducted by individuals or small cells associated with PIJ. Skare points out that operations often went unclaimed at the time and were carried out by loosely organized cells, making it difficult to identify the first PIJ operation.[27] PIJ fighters utilized knives, grenades, and other small arms to primarily target Israeli military personnel.[28] Some PIJ members claim that the first PIJ operation was likely a grenade attack that killed three Israeli soldiers at the Abu Khadra Compound in Gaza in 1982,[29] while others, like Nicolas Dot-Pouillard and Eugenie Rebillard point to 1984 as the first.[30] PIJ fighters also stabbed an Israeli student in Hebron in 1983, threw grenades at Israeli soldiers in 1984, stabbed an alleged Palestinian collaborator in Firas Market in Gaza in 1986, killed an Israeli Army captain in his car in 1986, and killed two Israeli taxi drivers in 1986.[31] During this period, PIJ established its primary targets: Israeli civilians and soldiers, planning operations against both.[32] For a full list of major operations and analysis on PIJ targets and tactics, see the major attacks and targets and tactics sections.
During the 1980s, PIJ operations were sporadic, and the number of attacks and casualties differed significantly from year to year. In 1986, PIJ conducted 21 operations, while it only attempted five attacks per year in both 1987 and 1988.[33] These shifts can be attributed to a lack of resources, individual members were largely financing and organizing operations themselves,[34] and the unorganized structure of the group: PIJ operated as a loose collection of individual cells that each had a limited connection with PIJ leadership.[35] While the impact of these kinetic operations was limited, by the late 1980s, U.S. intelligence assessed that PIJ began to play a more significant role and was pushing Fatah and the secular groups aside.[36] Assessments stated that PIJ was both involved and not involved in organizing protests during the First Intifada. During this period, Israeli operations against PIJ began,[37] and a a 1987 engagement between one of the major early PIJ cells led by Misbah al-Suri (a Palestinian fighter recruited by Shiqaqi in prison), and an Israeli counterterrorism unit. Suri and his cell were killed, but PIJ celebrates it as the beginning of the First Intifada and the Battle of al-Shujiyya.[38]
In 1988, Shiqaqi and several other PIJ leaders, including Ramadan Shallah, were deported from Gaza. The group set up offices in Lebanon and by 1992began to develop a more formal structure to manage PIJ operations.[39] The structure was made up of the General Assembly, which elects the Shura Council, which in turn elects the Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General. The Secretary General and Shura Council oversaw the day to day operations and oversaw the PIJ Political Bureau. The leadership also formed the military wing, the Qassem Brigades (precursor to the current military wing, the Quds Brigades), which was overseen by a small military council and led by Mahmud Khawaja. Khawaja was a key figure in the 1980s and 1990s within PIJ and helped create the first PIJ military wing.[40] While the structure gave PIJ leadership more direct control over operations in Gaza and the West Bank, regional and local military commanders were allowed to operate freely. Due to this forced exile, Shiqaqi and PIJ leadership largely missed the First Intifada. The non-violent approach of the First Intifada also contradicted Shiqaqi’s vision of a violent jihad uprising against Israel. However, the First Intifada drew more recruits to PIJ.[41]
PIJ conducted its first major attack on an Israeli population center in 1989. On July 6, a PIJ fighter overpowered an Israeli bus driver and drove a full passenger bus off a cliff in Tel Aviv. The attack killed 14 and wounded 27 individuals.[42] PIJ continued to conduct operations utilizing small arms between 1990 and 1992 including an attack on an Israeli tour bus in Egypt that killed 9,[43] an assault on an Israeli convoy near the Lebanese border that killed 4,[44] an attack against an Israeli Army training camp that killed four,[45] and several pipe bombings and stabbings in Jerusalem.[46]
Skare argues that exile allowed PIJ to establish relationships with Iran, Libya, Syria, Jordan, Sudan and Lebanon. Forced out of Gaza and the West Bank, PIJ officials were forced to build ties with host countries in exile and were given freedom to travel across the Middle East. PIJ first established an office in Tehran in the 1990s and began receiving direct financial support in 2000 (for details on relationships between PIJ and state sponsors, please see the State Sponsors and External Influences Section).[47] PIJ also received significant material, financial, and training support from Lebanese Hezbollah in the early 1990s. Hezbollah provided trainings to PIJ fighters in Syria, Libya, and Algeria, including on bomb making and deployment – including suicide bombs attacks.[48] Like Iran, PIJ opened an office in Syria and began receiving material support from the Syrian government in 1997.[49] PIJ also received funds from the Libyan government.[50] These state sponsors played a critical role in sustaining and growing PIJ and helped expand its operations during the Second Intifada in the early 2000s.[51] In addition to formal offices, Shiqaqi, Awda, and other senior PIJ officials traveled throughout the Middle East and even to the United States (Awda and Shallah), building relationships with foreign governments and preaching to Palestinians on jihad.[52]
During the early 1990s, PIJ relations with other Palestinian groups improved. In 1991, Hamas and PIJ carried out their first joint operation together. In 1992 PIJ and Hamas signed a charter of brotherhood and cooperation and the two groups collaborated and shared information. While the formal agreement was never implemented, both agreed on the continued need for violence and opposition to the Oslo accords – which formally ended the PLO’s fight against Israel and established the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank.[53] Experts assess that the continued split was due to Hamas’ interest in increasing its participation in the electoral and governance system in Gaza – while PIJ refused to join.[54] PIJ was willing to work with any groups, ignoring exact ideological or religious affiliation, as long as they were committed to armed struggle against Israel.[55] During this period, PIJ called for Palestinian and Islamist unity in armed struggle to undermine the peace process.[56]
PIJ began using suicide bombings in 1993. Anwar Aziz, a PIJ member, drove his car into an Israeli military vehicle and detonated a bomb. The attack killed Aziz and injured three others.[57] The tactic then became central to PIJ and Hamas strategy. PIJ began targeting high density areas, Israeli military outposts and first responders aiding bombing victims. For example, In January 1995, PIJ fighters set off a bomb at the Sharon Junction in Beit Lid, Israel, and set off a second bomb when emergency personnel arrived. The bombing killed twenty and injured 66.[58] In March 1996, on Purim, a PIJ and Hamas suicide bomber attacked central Tel Aviv killing 20 and injuring over 100.[59] PIJ continued to utilize small arms and knives as well.[60] PIJ conducted a total of 78 attacks between 1993 and 1997.[61] For a full list and detailed analysis of major PIJ operations see the major attacks and targets and tactics sections.
These operations occurred despite major PIJ internal disputes and leadership changes that first emerged in 1990. There are a several mutually reinforcing reasons behind the disputes. Experts assess that Shiqaqi’s strong grip on power pushed several other senior PIJ leaders away, including Ahmad Muhanna, who left to create Hezbollah Palestine.[62] Others, including members such as Abu Taha, argue that several PIJ leaders lost their seats in the Shura Council elections and were unhappy with the results. Some analysts argue that Shiqaqi’s relationship with Iran and openness to Shia sects within PIJ caused splits.[63] Awda, who had long been PIJ’s spiritual guide, supported statements criticizing Shiqaqi’s leadership in 1993, and he was eventually forced out of or left PIJ in 1995.[64] At the time, PIJ had only meager support within Gaza and the West bank and received only 3 percent support in 1998 in public opinion polls.[65]
PIJ also faced significant financial challenges. Several within PIJ, including Shura Council Secretary Sami al-Arian, who were based in the United States at the time, both pushed for greater financial accountability, though the Shura Council remained split on how to manage PIJ finances. Under pressure to find money, and even with Shura Council member opposition, Shiqaqi made a deal with Iran to support PIJ.[66] Additionally, Arian and Ramadan Shallah financed PIJ from the United States. Combined these funding streams stabilized and alleviated PIJ financial challenges.[67]
During this period, PIJ also came under increasing pressure from Israel. In 1992 and 1993, Israel, with support from the PA, deported and detained a wave of PIJ leaders.[68] In 1996, in response to PIJ attacks, Israel and the PA targeted PIJ and Hamas leaders in the West Bank and briefly sealed off each area..[69] Additionally, Israel began targeting senior PIJ leaders: in 1995, Mahmud Khawaja, the first head of PIJ’s military wing was killed,[70] and in October, 1995 Shiqaqi was killed in Malta.[71]
Ramadan Shallah was quickly elected Secretary General of Islamic Jihad. At the time of Shiqaqi’s death, Shallah was lecturing on economics in Nablus. Shallah had just left his role as an adjunct professor at the University of South Florida. The move shocked the university community, as Shallah was a respected non-violent professor who lectured on Palestinian issues and economics.[72] Despite living in the United States, Shallah was a central PIJ member. He co-ran the World Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a small think tank in Florida, and he used WISE to provide support for Islamic Jihad.[73] Erik Skare assesses that Shallah was elected to the role due to his long-standing key role within PIJ, his ideological expertise, and his goal to put the fractured organization back together.[74]
Under Shallah, PIJ began creating more cells within the West Bank and undertook the 1996 Purim bombing to avenge Shiqaqi’s death.[75] Nevertheless, PIJ remained fairly quiet under Shallah between 1996 and 1999 – launching12 attacks total.[76] The decrease in attacks was due to the effectiveness of Israel’s crackdown on the West Bank and Gaza as well as continued PIJ infighting. During this time period, PIJ and Hamas both engaged with Arafat. PIJ also were reportedly invited to participated in the Palestinian Cabinet in 2000.[77] PIJ also continued to build its relationships with other Middle Eastern nations at this time, [78] and was designated by the U.S. Government designated PIJ a Foreign Terrorist Organization.[79]
Islamic Jihad played a central role in the Second Intifada (also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada) between 2000 and 2005 – mainly through its reformed military wing, al-Quds Brigades.[80] PIJ conducted hundreds of operations, including waves of suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets – often coordinating with Hamas, Fatah, and other Palestinian militant groups. PIJ’s first Second Intifada related attack occurred in November 2000, when a PIJ car bomb killed two in Jerusalem.[81] In 2001, PIJ and Hamas coordinated actions and vastly increased the number of operations. [82] In 2001, most PIJ attacks involved small groups of individual gunmen or suicide bombers attacking busy Israeli population centers and military establishments. See major attacks for a list of major PIJ operations in 2001.
2002 was PIJ’s deadliest year during the Second Intifada with around 100 killed in PIJ operations. As in 2001, PIJ relied on small and suicide bombers to carry out attacks. In three bus and bus station bombings in March, April, and June, PIJ killed 32 and wounded 90.[83] Other major attacks during 2002 included an October car bomb in Karkur that killed 19 and a November raid by PIJ on the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron which killed 12.[84] In addition, PIJ were asked to join Arafat’s cabinet in 2002 – though they do not appear to have joined.[85] See major attacks for a list of major PIJ operations in 2002. The prolific nature of PIJ operations prompted Israeli invasions of the Jenin Refugee camp and Ramallah in April 2002 (Operation Defensive Shield). Israeli operations killed and captured significant PIJ members, operations from both Jenin and Ramallah continued.[86]
Israel assessed that many of PIJ’s operations in 2001 and 2002 were carried out by a semi-autonomous PIJ cell led by Iyad Sawalha and Mahmud Tualbe, based in the Jenin Refugee Camp in the West Bank.[87] While the cell regularly communicated with Shallah and PIJ leadership in Damascus and often discussed arms production, financing requests, and policies it held significant operational freedom. Local commanders could decide targets and methods and could make go/no go decisions for operations based on the outlook on the ground.[88] This led to minor clashes with PIJ leadership.[89] While the Jenin Cell was dismantled by the Israeli security forces, the model was replicated by other PIJ groups during the Second Intifada.[90]
Throughout the Second Intifada, PIJ leadership was based in Damascus and received extensive external support.[91] PIJ received direct reward funding from Iran and the Syrian Assad government. The Syrian government set up training camps for PIJ fighters in Ein Sahab and allowed Shallah to directly send funds to PIJ cells in the West Bank and Gaza.[92] Israel also accused the Syrian government of aiding PIJ and Hamas weapons smuggling.[93] In Lebanon, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) organized training camps for PIJ and other actors at the cost of $50 million per year.[94]
PIJ operations and strategy within the Second Intifada remained consistent in 2003. While PIJ was responsible for fewer casualties, as compared to 2002, it carried out some of its deadliest operations in partnership with Hamas, Fatah, and others. On January 5, Hamas, Fatah, and PIJ orchestrated two suicide bombings in downtown Tel Aviv, killing 23 and injuring over 100.[95] In October, on Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish holiday, a female PIJ suicide bomber attacked a restaurant in Haifa, killing 19 and injuring 60.[96] On June 17, Israel, Hamas, PIJ, and Fatah agreed to a truce. While there were sporadic incidents during the truce, the agreement held until August 20, when a suicide bomber struck a bus in Jerusalem, killing 18. Both Hamas and PIJ claimed the attack (though Israeli police blamed Hamas).[97] Israel conducted significant operations against Hamas and PIJ in Spring 2003. This included air strikes against Mohamed Hindi, a PIJ leader, who, as of 2025, served as its Deputy Secretary General.[98] See major attacks for a list of major PIJ operations in 2003.
Following fewer operations in 2004 and 2005 and increased Israeli operations, in February 2005, PIJ, Hamas, and Israel agreed to a ceasefire. Some sporadic violence continued in fall 2005 and an April 2006 bombing that killed 11 in Tel Aviv.[99] Israeli operations against PIJ also continued on an ad-hoc basis.[100] Despite the decreased kinetic action, PIJ took steps to plan for and guarantee its future. It formed the Joint Operation Room for the Palestinian Factions of Resistance with Hamas, which continued to operate in 2020.[101] However, PIJ elected to boycott the 2006 elections due to their views on deficiencies with the system and Palestinian democracy.[102] Hamas participated and won these elections, though Fatah remained in control of the government in Gaza and the West Bank. In response to this, Hamas violently overthrew the Fatah leadership and took control of Gaza.[103]
In December 2008, PIJ and Hamas announced an end to the calm period with Israel and launched hundreds of rockets at Israel. PIJ was responsible for at least 200 rockets. The number of PIJ operations increased after the killing of PIJ commander by Israel in December.[104] At the time, the Arab League accused Israel of war crimes, and claimed that only around 30 PIJ fighters and commanders were killed in Israeli operations in response to the rockets.[105] While not the first use of rockets (the first recorded fatal PIJ use of indirect fire rockets was in 2005[106]), the large scale use of rockets marked a shift in PIJ and Hamas strategy and they remain central to to PIJ operations. See the resources section for a list of PIJ rockets.
Following a relatively quiet between 2009 and 2013, with only a few minor attacks and hunger strikes,[107] in March and July 2014, PIJ and Hamas launched hundreds of rockets at Israel from Gaza, and in July, Israel responded by invading Gaza.[108] Throughout the war, Hamas and PIJ launched over 5,000 rockets. Israel responded with rocket attacks against PIJ fighters and leadership and moved armor and soldiers into Gaza. The Hamas and PIJ rocket attacks did limited damage in Israel – killing four civilians in total. The war ended in August 2014, when Israel, Hamas, and PIJ agreed to an Egyptian moderated ceasefire.[109] Israel continued to crack down on PIJ and Hamas following the war, including mass arrests.[110] PIJ carried out several lone wolf stabbing attacks against Israeli citizens in 2014.[111]
With the beginning of the war in Syria in 2012, Islamic Jihad temporarily moved its headquarters from Damascus to Tehran.[112] The move coincided with PIJ acknowledgment that Iran was its central source of arms.[113] Despite this move, the relationship between Tehran and PIJ leadership was tense. Iran wanted PIJ and Hamas to support Assad in Syria, but PIJ remained neutral, while Hamas aided rebel groups fighting Assad.[114] The split continued for several years, as PIJ once again refused an Iranian request to support an ally, in this case, the Houthis in Yemen. In response, Iran briefly completely cut off PIJ support, but returned it in 2016, providing $70 million to PIJ.[115] In addition, in 2014, Iran supported Hisham Salem, a PIJ commander, in splitting off from PIJ to form Harakat al-Sabireen, an Iran proxy in Gaza.[116] Iran also provided some support to smaller Palestinian groups to provide a counterweight and alternative option to the influence of Hamas and PIJ.[117]
In 2016 and 2017, PIJ again refused to participate in Palestinian local elections.[118] In 2017, PIJ and Hamas held talks on forming a Palestinian unity government, but failed to reach an agreement.[119] Israel once again conducted operations against Islamic Jihad and Hamas, while both groups launched rockets at Israel.[120] Throughout 2018, PIJ, Hamas, and Israel clashed alongside popular Palestinian protests. Thousands of Gazans protested their treatment by Israel along the border fence. Around these marches, PIJ and Hamas launched mortars and rockets at Israel, which responded with air strikes.[121]
In fall 2018, Ziad al-Nakhala replaced Ramadan Shallah as PIJ Secretary General. Nakhala had served as Shallah’s deputy since 1995.[122] He was a long-time military leader within PIJ who was recruited by Shiqaqi in prison in the 1980s.[123] Nakhala helped improve Iran-PIJ relationship. By 2019, PIJ and Hamas were receiving around $100 million per year from Iran and began receiving significant military resources, including rocket systems.[124] Iran also allowed its proxy in Palestine, Harakat al-Sabireen, to fold in 2019 – signaling its commitment to PIJ.[125]
Clashes between PIJ and Hamas and Israeli forces continued on and off in 2019, 2020 and 2021. In November 2019, PIJ once again clashed with Israel. During talks between Hamas and Israel, the PIJ commander for Gaza launched rockets in Israel – aiming to undermine peace talks. In response, the Israelis killed the commander, and PIJ subsequently fired rockets at Tel Aviv, injuring several Israelis. In total, PIJ launched over 450 rockets at Israel and at least 25 PIJ fighters were killed.[126] In February 2020, PIJ attempted to place an explosive device on the Gaza wall and the following day launched hundreds of rockets at Israel. Several Palestinians and Israelis were injured in the engagement.[127] In May 2021, Hamas and PIJ again clashed with Israel, launching rockets on “Jerusalem Day,” an Israeli holiday commemorating the Six-Day War.[128]
PIJ continued to conduct operations between 2022 and 2023 and was able to respond to significant Israeli attacks, both with and without Hamas support. Between March and April 2022, Hamas and PIJ carried out a series of stabbings and shootings in Israel, killing approximately 14 and injuring 23.[129] In August 2022, PIJ clashed with Israeli security forces following preemptive strikes against PIJ. The fighting killed 48 and injured over 400 and was ended by an Egyptian brokered ceasefire.[130] PIJ launched over 1000 rockets without Hamas support during the period.[131] In May 2023, Israel destroyed much of the Quds Brigades leadership in clashes with PIJ.[132] In response, PIJ launched over 100 rockets at Israel.[133]
PIJ played a central role in the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack. Under the cover of hundreds of rockets, PIJ, Hamas, and other fighters crossed the Gaza Fence via hang gliders, tunnels, and vehicles. They attacked Israeli military outposts, kibbutzes, and other settlements in Southern Israel. PIJ fighters attacked the Be’eri kibbutz, killing 105 and abducting 30, the Nir Oz kibbutz, killing 46 and abducting 72, and the Nahal Oz military outpost, killing 66. PIJ and Hamas fighters primarily utilized small arms, grenades, and other explosive devices. While the attacks primarily targeted unarmed Israeli civilians, PIJ and Hamas fighters also engaged directly with Israeli security forces and soldiers. PIJ fighters abducted around 30 hostages out of 252.[134] While the exact number of individuals killed by PIJ in the operation is unclear, it is likely PIJ’s deadliest attack.
The October 7 attacks set off a war in Gaza between Israel and Palestinian militant groups. Israel responded to the attack with widespread airstrikes in Gaza targeting Hamas and PIJ leadership, fighters, and outposts. Following the immediate wave of airstrikes, Israel began ground operations on October 13 and launched a large-scale invasion on October 27. The goal of these operations was to rescue hostages and destroy Hamas.[135] Israel, Hamas, PIJ, and other militant groups are engaged in brutal urban warfare and Israel has conducted near constant airstrikes against Hamas and PIJ leadership. Israel has destroyed much of Hamas’ and PIJ’s ability to conduct kinetic operations, including killing most of Hamas’ leadership structure. PIJ leadership have suffered fewer casualties than Hamas (with a note that the PIJ Gaza Commander was killed in May 2023, prior to the war).[136]
The war is marked by urban combat and civilian casualties, and PIJ have been involved in numerous rocket attacks, suicide bombings, and battles with Israeli forces. During combat, PIJ fighters have used various tools, including IEDs, small arms, artillery rockets, and anti-tank rockets.[137] In addition to operations in Gaza and the West Bank, PIJ was involved in incursions in Lebanon, Syria, and a bombing in Tel Aviv during the war.[138] Throughout the duration of the war, Islamic Jihad used its hostages as a tool against Israel. On several occasions, PIJ released videos of the hostages, showing their condition and forcing false confessions.[139]
In October 2025, Hamas, PIJ, and Israel agreed to a ceasefire in the war in Gaza. As part of the agreement, Hamas and PIJ are returning all of the living and killed hostages.[140] Despite the ceasefire, clashes between PIJ, Hamas, and Israeli forces continue, with both sides conducting operations against each other – with at least 400 killed since the start of the ceasefire.[141] Despite Israeli efforts and the ceasefire, Hamas and PIJ remain entrenched and in power in Gaza.
Unlike Hamas, several senior members, including Leader Ziad al-Nakhala, of PIJ have survived the war in Gaza and Israeli targeting. In 2025, following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, PIJ evacuated its offices in Damascus, where PIJ leader, Ziad al-Nakhala was based.[142] However, in fall 2025, Israeli media reported that PIJ was seeking to reconstitute and was growing in strength in Palestinian refugee camps in Syria – PIJ denied this report.[143] PIJ leadership appear to be based in Egypt.[144]
