Main Tabs Group

Overview
Formed: 
May 1, 2013

Disbanded: Active

First Attack: August 21, 2013: KSS is believed to have been involved in the Assad regime’s chemical weapons attack on the Damascus suburb of East Ghouta.  Some sources have alleged that the regime used KSS soldiers to surround the area under attack to prevent any rebel fighters' escape. The group has not commented on these allegations (350 – 1,429 killed, unknown wounded).[1]

Last Attack: February 15, 2021: KSS is believed to have been involved in a rocket attack on a coalition-run military base at Erbil International Airport, killing a civilian contractor with the coalition and wounding six others.[2] Shortly after that, Kurdish security forces arrested a militia fighter that claimed to have been recruited by KSS to carry out the Erbil attack.[3] A U.S. Defense Department-led investigation into the attack later determined that KSS and Kata’ib Hezbollah bore responsibility.[4] However, a lesser-known armed group named Awliya al-Dam – a potential affiliate of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, another Iraqi Shiite militia – had claimed responsibility for the barrage barely three hours after it took place (1 killed, 6 wounded).[5]

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) is an Iranian-backed, Iraqi Shiite militant group founded in May 2013 that operates in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, the group is a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and fights alongside the Iraqi government and other Shiite paramilitaries against the Islamic State (IS). In Syria, KSS is allied with the Assad regime, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Lebanese Hezbollah, and the other pro-Assad, predominantly Shiite armed groups operating against jihadists and other anti-government groups.

Narrative

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), or “The Masters of the Martyrs Brigade,” is a Shiite Islamist militant organization that operates in Syria and Iraq.[6] The group was founded in May 2013, although its formation's exact circumstances remain somewhat unclear. Some sources allege that KSS was created by two other Iraqi Shiite paramilitary organizations, Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and the Badr Organization, to recruit Iraqi and Syrian Shiites to fight anti-government forces in Syria. Others claim that Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani and Falih Khazali formed KSS after breaking away from KH.[7] Regardless, KSS remains close allies with both KH and the Badr Organization and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), from which it receives a significant portion of its funding.[8]

KSS first drew international attention in 2013 for its involvement in the Syrian Civil War, in which it has fought alongside the Assad regime and its allies. When KSS first appeared in Syria in May 2013, its forces were primarily concentrated in Damascus's southern suburbs. The group claimed – and continues to claim – that the purpose of its participation in the Syrian Civil War is to protect the Zaynab Shrine, a prominent Shia religious site located in the southern suburbs of Damascus.[9] However, the group has increasingly expanded its operations in support of the Assad regime to other areas of Damascus and southern Syria.[10] [11]

KSS has also been active in Iraq since 2013. The group is a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of armed groups comprised primarily of Shiite militias. However, the group has significant representation from Iraq’s other ethnic and religious communities. The Iraqi government formed the PMF in 2014 through the unification of existing armed groups under one flag to support the regular Iraqi Armed Forces’ campaign against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. KSS has fought IS in several of Iraq’s central and northern provinces, most notably in Salah ad-Din province.[12] Owing to its ties to Iran and other Iran-aligned actors, KSS is considered a member of the muqawama (“resistance factions” in Arabic), a term used to distinguish Iran-aligned Iraqi militias operating in Iraq and Syria against the U.S. and Israel.

In August 2013, KSS drew international scrutiny for its possible involvement in the Assad regime’s chemical weapons attack on the Damascus suburb of East Ghouta on August 21, 2013. Posts on KSS’s Facebook page confirmed that the group was operating in East Ghouta as late as August 20, leading many observers to speculate that the Assad government had used KSS to surround the area targeted in the attack to ensure that no rebel fighters escaped. Others claim that the group’s presence in the area was unrelated to the attack and that KSS was simply stationed near East Ghouta to protect a strategically important, government-controlled rail station located in the area. The group itself has not commented on the allegations, although it did announce on August 24 that eight KSS fighters had recently been killed in Syria.[13]

In September 2014, KSS fighters participated in operations on Syria’s southern front and have been active there since. The group operated in rural areas between Deraa and Damascus. In November 2014, rebel forces encountered KSS near Sheikh Maskin as the rebels advanced towards Damascus. By January 2015, the rebel groups had captured territory in that area previously under KSS control.[14]

In mid-October 2014, KSS again made headlines as one of the most outspoken critics of Saudi Arabia’s decision to execute Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr on sedition charges. KSS called on the Iraqi government to cut off diplomatic ties to Saudi Arabia. It also named “anything of Saudi origin,” whether human or material, as a legitimate future target for the group and threatened to “strike and destroy” Saudi Arabia.[15]

In February 2015, KSS participated in the Syrian government’s southern offensive alongside regime forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the IRGC. The offensive aimed to retake the southern provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. KSS’s participation in the offensive was chronicled in a documentary titled “The Men of God in Syria” that aired on Al-Anwar 2, an Iraqi news channel, in spring 2015.[16]

KSS again became the focus of regional attention in January 2016, when KSS fighters clashed with an Iraqi Army unit at a checkpoint in al-Tanoumah near Basra. The conflict's cause is unclear, while at least two people were wounded in the firefight. As a result of the clash, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi deployed an armored brigade of the Iraqi Army to Basra on January 17, 2016. Several Iranian-backed militias in the region, including KSS, the Badr Organization, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, and the Nujaba Movement formed the Council of the Islamic Resistance Factions in Basra on January 17 to protest the presence of the armored brigade; the brigade withdrew two days later.[17]

In August 2017, a dispute arose over whether the U.S.-led coalition had attacked KSS near at-Tanf, a U.S. military outpost on the tripartite Iraq-Jordan-Syria border. KSS stated that U.S. forces had killed at least 36 of its fighters and wounded 75 others. However, the U.S.-led coalition denied any confrontation between it and KSS had taken place and stated it was not in the area at that time; IS later claimed responsibility for the attack.[18]

On July 7, 2018, KSS’s presumed leader Abu Ala al-Walai announced he would send KSS militants to fight in Yemen’s civil war against government forces.[19] He released a statement proclaiming that he was a “soldier standing at the signal of Sayyid Abdel Malik al-Houthi,” the leader of Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthis) – a Shiite Islamist, Iranian-aligned rebel group that has fought against the Yemeni government on and off since 2004.[20] However, as of March 2021, there are no reports that KSS militants had fought in Yemen in any capacity.

On February 25, 2021, the U.S. conducted an airstrike on an unofficial border crossing and military facility operated by KSS and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) near Abu Kamal on the Iraq-Syria border.[21] Casualty figures from the strike vary: a KH-affiliated source reported the strike killed one person and severely wounded several others, Reuters reported that the strike killed “at least” 17 people, while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that the strike killed 22 “militiamen” of unknown affiliation.[22] The U.S. airstrike served as retaliation for an attack on February 15, when several 107mm rockets struck near a coalition-run military base at Erbil International Airport near the Kurdistan Regional Government’s capital of Erbil. The barrage killed a civilian contractor with the coalition and wounded six others.[23] Shortly after that, Kurdish security forces arrested a militia fighter that claimed to have been recruited by KSS to carry out the Erbil attack.[24] A U.S. Defense Department-led investigation into the attack later determined that KSS and Kata’ib Hezbollah bore responsibility.[25] However, a lesser-known armed group named Awliya al-Dam – a potential affiliate of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, another Iraqi Shiite militia – had claimed responsibility for the barrage barely three hours after it took place.[26] Kadhim al-Fartousi, a spokesman for KSS, later announced that the group had not participated in the attack on Erbil, and attempted to distance the group from the captured fighter’s confession to Kurdish security forces.[27] However, in the same statement, Fartousi refused to condemn the attack and issued a veiled threat against the Kurdistan Regional Government, warning them against “siding with the Americans” against the muqawama’s operations and “hosting the American military presence.”

Organization

Vertical Tabs

Leadership

There is some uncertainty about KSS’s leadership: some sources name Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani as the group’s leader, others point to Falah al-Khazali; however, most recent sources on the group’s activities identify Abu Ala al-Walai as KSS’ paramount leader. KSS itself has not commented on or clarified the confusion surrounding its leadership.[28]

Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani (May 2013-Present): Some sources identify Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani as KSS’s commander.[29] He is an Iraqi Shia who has reportedly been an affiliate of the Iranian Quds Force and the Badr Organization since the late 1980s.[30] Following his return to Iraq in 2003, he led a militant network fighting against American, British, and Iraqi coalition forces.[31] Some sources allege that Sheibani was a commander in the Shiite Iraqi militia Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) before splitting from the group to form KSS in 2013.[32] In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department listed Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani as an individual responsible for “threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq,” placing him under financial sanctions and seizing any property he held within the U.S.’s jurisdiction.[33]

Falih Khazali (May 2013-Present): Falih Khazali, also known as Mustafa Khazali, was previously the secretary-general of KSS; however, some sources claim that he is the group’s true founder and leader.[34] Like Sheibani, Khazali is thought to have been a member of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) before splitting away to form or join KSS.[35] Though KSS does not have a political wing, Khazali has held a seat in the Iraqi Parliament since April 2014 and is currently a member of the Fatah Alliance – a political bloc comprised of the political wings of several PMF affiliates.[36] He was re-elected for a second term in 2018.[37] As of March 2021, he was one of several spokespeople for KSS. [38]

Abu Ala al-Walai (2014-Present): Abu Ala al-Walai is the current secretary-general of KSS and, according to the most recent sources describing the group’s activities, has served as the group’s paramount leader since 2015.[39] Details surrounding al-Walai’s background are sparse; however, some sources allege that al-Walai was a member of Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) before joining KSS in 2014.[40]

Size Estimates
  • June 2013: 200 (The Washington Institute)[41]
  • Late 2013: between 500 and 1,500 fighters in Syria (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism)[42]
  • August 2017: 2,723 (The Washington Institute)[43]
Name Changes

KSS has not changed its name.

Resources

Little is known with certainty about KSS’s funding and resource procurement patterns, although the group is believed to receive substantial aid from the Iranian government.[44] As a PMF member, KSS has access to the Defense Ministry’s budgetary allocations for the PMF: Iraq’s 2021 federal budget included roughly $2.4 billion for the PMF – nearly 50% more than was allocated to the PMF in the previous 2019 budget.[45]

It is believed that the United States provides at least some of the funding and equipment the KSS receives from the Iraqi government.[46] For instance, reports surfaced in February 2016 that KSS used a U.S.-made M1 Abrams tank in the fight against IS in central Iraq.[47] It is unclear precisely how KSS acquired a U.S.-made tank. The Iraqi Defense Ministry itself may have supplied KSS with the tank. However, some observers have speculated that U.S.-made small arms and military vehicles are frequently stolen from Iraqi government stockpiles and sold on the black market to militias and private buyers.[48]

Locations

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

KSS operates in Iraq and Syria. When KSS first appeared in Syria in May 2013, its forces were primarily concentrated in Damascus's southern suburbs around the Zaynab Shrine.[49] However, the group has increasingly expanded its operations in support of the Assad regime to other areas of Damascus and the southern provinces of Daraa and Quneitra.[50] Additionally, KSS participated alongside Hezbollah, AAH, KSS, and LAFA in the Assad regime’s operations to recapture Aleppo in December 2016.[51]

With the beginning of IS’ offensive into northern Iraq, KSS moved the majority of its forces from Syria to participate in counter-IS offensives in Iraq, leaving roughly 500 troops in the Zaynab Shrine's vicinity in southern Damascus.[52] In Iraq, the group is believed to draw much of its support from Dhi-Qar province in southern Iraq.[53] The group has also fought in several of Iraq's central and northern provinces against the IS, most notably in Salah ad-Din province.[54]

Strategy

Vertical Tabs

Ideology and Goals

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada is a Shiite Islamist group that recognizes Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei as its marja’ – a position of intellectual and political leadership within the Shiite community held by an eminent cleric.[55] As such, KSS maintains a close ideological relationship with the Iranian theocracy and follows a Khomeinist ideology that draws upon the doctrines formulated by Ayatollah Khomeini, who established Iran’s post-revolutionary theocratic government. KSS shares much ideologically with other Shiite Islamist, Iranian-aligned groups within the PMF such as KH, AAH, and the Badr Organization.[56] Despite the considerable ideological overlap, KSS differs slightly from other Shiite Islamist groups in its immediate focus: KSS’s stated purpose is to protect Shia shrines and Mosques “around the globe” and initially dedicated itself to the protection of the Zaynab Shrine in southern Damascus.[57]

KSS is vehemently anti-American and has repeatedly accused the U.S. of funding and backing IS and engineering crises in the region.[58] Despite an alignment of goals during the fight against IS, KSS continued to oppose the U.S. following the jihadist group’s territorial defeat and continued to threaten American diplomatic and military installations in the country. In March 2020, KSS’ presumed leader Ala al-Walai stated that the group was prepared for any “American strikes on the [PMF],” and that the “[fasa’il – a term used by Iran-aligned elements of the PMF to distinguish themselves from the broader PMF] are ready to respond to any US aggression on Iraqi sovereignty.”[59]

KSS has called for the liberation of Jerusalem and an end to the occupation of “Zionist and Western” entities in the region.[60] KSS has also stated that it seeks to preserve Iraqi unity and achieve an end to sectarian strife.[61] To this end, KSS – like many other Iranian-backed militant groups – opposes Saudi Arabia’s influence in Iraq and has blamed Riyadh for allegedly supporting jihadist terrorism in Iraq.[62] It also named “anything of Saudi origin,” whether human or material, as a legitimate future target for the group and threatened to “strike and destroy” Saudi Arabia.[63]

Political Activities

KSS, unlike some of its counterparts, does not have an organized political wing and does not appear to have a developed political platform or agenda.[64] However, Falih Khazali has been a member of the Iraqi Parliament since 2014 and has been a member of the Fatah Alliance – a parliamentary bloc comprised of several Iran-aligned militant groups' political wings – since the bloc’s creation in 2018.[65]

Targets And Tactics

In Syria, KSS’s primary targets are Jabhat al-Nusra, elements of the Free Syrian Army, and other militant organizations operating in opposition to the Assad government.[66]

In Iraq, KSS primarily targets the Islamic State. Reports indicate that the group has been involved in several operations against IS in Salah ad-Din province.[67] Additionally, the group has also released statements claiming that it had “fought the U.S. occupation in Iraq.”[68] This claim is unconfirmed, as the group was not founded until May 2013 – almost two years after the U.S. pulled the bulk of its troops out of Iraq.

Very little is known about the weapon systems KSS has at its disposal. Observers speculate that the group was involved in the Syrian government’s chemical weapons attack on East Ghouta in August 2013. Some sources have alleged that government forces used KSS to surround the targeted area to prevent rebels from escaping. This allegation remains unconfirmed by either Syrian government forces or by KSS itself.[69]

KSS is vehemently anti-American and has repeatedly accused the U.S. of funding and backing IS and engineering crises in the region.[70] Although the United States and KSS are both aligned with the Iraqi government and share anti-IS objectives, KSS has refused to cooperate with U.S. forces in Iraq and has threatened to abandon the front lines if more U.S. forces are deployed to the country.[71] Following IS’s defeat in Iraq, KSS has continued to threaten American diplomatic and military installations in the country. In March 2020, nearly three months after a U.S. airstrike killed IRGC-QF commander Qasem Soleimani, Ala al-Walai stated that the group was prepared for any “American strikes on the [PMF],” and that the “[fasa’il – a term used by Iran-aligned elements of the PMF to distinguish themselves from the broader PMF] are ready to respond to any US aggression on Iraqi sovereignty.”[72]

Attacks

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization’s history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

August 21, 2013: KSS is speculated to have been involved in the Syrian government’s chemical weapons attack on the Damascus suburb of East Ghouta.  Some sources have alleged that the regime used KSS soldiers to surround the area under attack to prevent rebel forces from escaping the area. Neither the group nor the government has commented on these allegations  (350-1,429 killed, unknown wounded).[73]

February 2015: KSS participated in the Syrian government’s anti-rebel offensive in the southern provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. KSS fought alongside regime forces, Hezbollah, the IRGC, and other Shiite militias against elements of the Free Syrian Army and Jabhat al-Nusra (63-400 killed, unknown wounded).[74]

January 2016: KSS fighters clashed with an Iraqi Army unit at a checkpoint in al-Tanoumah near Basra. The circumstances precipitating the firefight, which wounded two Iraqi Army soldiers, remain unclear. Following the clashes, then Prime Minister Abadi responded by sending in an Iraqi armored brigade (0 killed, 2 wounded).[75]

February 15, 2021: KSS is believed to have been involved in a rocket attack on a coalition-run military base at Erbil International Airport, killing a civilian contractor with the coalition and wounding six others.[76] Shortly after that, Kurdish security forces arrested a militia fighter that claimed to have been recruited by KSS to carry out the Erbil attack.[77] A U.S. Defense Department-led investigation into the attack later determined that KSS and Kata’ib Hezbollah bore responsibility.[78] However, a lesser-known armed group named Awliya al-Dam – a potential affiliate of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, another Iraqi Shiite militia – had claimed responsibility for the barrage barely three hours after it took place (1 killed, 6 wounded).[79]

Interactions

Vertical Tabs

Designated / Listed
  • KSS has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by any nation or major international organization.
  • February 2020: The U.S. State Department sanctioned KSS under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).[80] INKSNA sanctions apply for two years and ban the U.S. government from procuring from, contracting with, providing assistance to, or issuing export licenses involving items related to the manufacture of WMDs for any organizations or companies deemed to be linked to the sanctioned entity.
  • July 2008: The U.S. Treasury Department listed Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani as one of the individuals responsible for “threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq,” placing him under financial sanctions and seizing any property he held within the U.S.'s jurisdiction.[81]
Community Relations

Little is known about KSS’s relations with the communities in which it operates.

Relationships With Other Groups

KSS is aligned closely with other Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite militias, including Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and the Badr Organization. KSS has participated in inter-militia summits with these groups, particularly when these meetings seek to form a united position among the militias on issues relevant to the groups’ shared political and military interests.[82]

Additionally, KSS, alongside KH, AAH, and the Badr Organization, is a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[83] The PMF is an umbrella organization of armed groups comprised primarily of Iraqi Shiite militias, though the organization has significant representation from Iraq’s other ethnic and religious communities. The Iraqi government formed the PMF in 2014 through the unification of existing armed groups under one flag to support the regular Iraqi armed forces’ campaign against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. The PMF is a formal part of the Iraqi Armed Forces and is ostensibly under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s control. However, most groups retain a significant degree of tactical and strategic independence.[84]

KSS also cooperates with KH and AAH in Syria, where the groups are fighting alongside the Assad regime forces, Hezbollah, and the Iranian IRGC against the IS, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Free Syrian Army, and other militant opposition groups. KSS also cooperates closely with Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) and Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya (LSR), two other Shiite militant groups that fight alongside the Assad government. Some sources suggest that KSS facilitates troops' recruitment for LAFA and LSR, which are also based around the Shi’a-majority areas near the Zaynab Shrine in southern Damascus.[85] However, other sources describe the groups as separate entities that merely coordinate.[86]

State Sponsors And External Influences

KSS is closely aligned with the Islamic Republic of Iran and is widely considered an Iranian proxy organization.  The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force (IRGC-QF) is believed to provide funding, material assistance, and training to several major Iraqi Shiite militias – including KSS.[87] The IRGC’s historical liaison to its proxies was Major General Qasem Soleimani, who led the IRGC’s Quds Force until his death in January 2020.[88] Moreover, the group holds Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei as its marja’ – a position of intellectual and political leadership within the Shiite community held by an eminent cleric.[89]

KSS is also a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of armed groups comprised primarily of Iraqi Shiite militias. However, the group has a significant representation of Iraq’s other ethnic and religious communities. The Iraqi government formed the PMF in 2014 through the unification of existing armed groups under one flag to support the regular Iraqi armed forces’ campaign against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. The PMF is a formal part of the Iraqi Armed Forces and is ostensibly under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s control. However, most groups retain a significant degree of tactical and strategic independence.[90]

Footnotes
Footnotes: 

[1] "Government Assessment of the Syrian Government's Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013". The White House, August 30, 2013; “SYRIA: REPORTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE" (PDF). U.K. Joint Intelligence Organisation. 29 August 2013; Gilbert, K. “The Rise of Shi’ite Militias and the Post-Arab Spring Sectarian Threat.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, October 2013.

[2] Khaleel, Sangar and Jane Arraf. “Rocket Attack in Iraq Kills a U.S. Military Contractor.” The New York Times, February 15, 2021.

[3] Hiwa, Shilani. “VIDEO: Kurdistan Region releases footage of suspect confessing to Erbil rocket attack.” Kurdistan 24, March 3, 2021; Knights, Michael. “Why Iran’s Proxies Fear Evidence.” The Washington Institute, March 25, 2021

[4] “US carries out air strike against Iran-backed militia target in Syria.” The National, February 26, 2021.

[5] Knights, Michael. “Rockets over Erbil: How to Respond to an Iraqi Militia Outrage.” The Washington Institute, February 16, 2021.

[6] Smyth, Phillip. “All the Ayatollah’s Men.” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2014.

[7] Smyth, Phillip. “All the Ayatollah’s Men.” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2014.; Smyth, Phillip. “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 27, 2013; Cigar, Norman. “Iraqi’s Shia Warlords and Their Militias.” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2015.

[8] Cigar, Norman. “Iraqi’s Shia Warlords and Their Militias.” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2015; Smyth, Phillip. “All the Ayatollah’s Men.” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2014.

[9] “Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, date unknown; Isakhan, Benjamin. “The Islamic State Attacks on Shia Holy Sites and the ‘Shrine Protection Narrative’: Threats to Sacred Space as a Mobilization Frame.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 32:4 (2020). 731-2.

[10] Gilbert, K. “The Rise of Shi’ite Militias and the Post-Arab Spring Sectarian Threat.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, October 2013.

[11] Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “The Return of Iraqi Shi’I Militias to Syria.” Middle East Institute, March 16, 2015.

[12] Weiss, Caleb. “Iranian-backed militia seen with US tank in Iraq.” The Long War Journal Threat Matrix, February 8, 2016; Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada- Threats to Saudi Arabia: Translation and Analysis.” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, October 17, 2014.

[13] Gilbert, K. “The Rise of Shi’ite Militias and the Post-Arab Spring Sectarian Threat.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, October 2013.

[14] Smyth, Philip. “Iraqi Shiite Foreign Fighters on the Rise Again in Syria.” The Washington Institute, May 29, 2015.

[15] Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada- Threats to Saudi Arabia: Translation and Analysis.” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, October 17, 2014; Nada, Garrett, and Mattisan Rowan. “Part 2: Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq.” The Wilson Center, May 3, 2018.

[16] Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. “The Return of Iraqi Shi’I Militias to Syria.” The Middle East Institute, March 16, 2015.

[17] Martin, Patrick. “Iraq Situation Report: January 12-19, 2016.” Institute for the Study of War, January 20, 2016.

[18] “Coalition Denies Bombing Iraqi Shiite Militia.” Reuters, August 8, 2017.

[19] Weiss, Caleb. “Iraqi Shia Militia 'Willing to Send Fighters to Yemen'.” Long War Journal, July 9, 2018.

[20] Blanche, Ed. “Iran’s Expansionist Designs Meet US Intrigue.” The Arab Weekly, July 22, 2018.

[21] Cooper, Helene and Eric Schmitt. “U.S. Airstrikes in Syria Target Iran-Backed Militias That Rocketed American Troops in Iraq.” The New York Times, February 25, 2021; “US carries out air strike against Iran-backed militia target in Syria.” The National, February 26, 2021.

[22] "US attacks 'Iranian-backed military infrastructure' in Syria." Al Jazeera, February 26, 2021; Stewart, Idrees Ali, Phil. "U.S. air strikes in Syria target Iranian-backed militia – Pentagon." Reuters, February 26, 2021; "Death toll update | 22 militiamen of Iraqi Hezbollah and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces in US strikes on Syria-Iraq border.” The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, February 26, 2021.

[23] Khaleel, Sangar and Jane Arraf. “Rocket Attack in Iraq Kills a U.S. Military Contractor.” The New York Times, February 15, 2021.

[24] Hiwa, Shilani. “VIDEO: Kurdistan Region releases footage of suspect confessing to Erbil rocket attack.” Kurdistan 24, March 3, 2021; Knights, Michael. “Why Iran’s Proxies Fear Evidence.” The Washington Institute, March 25, 2021

[25] “US carries out air strike against Iran-backed militia target in Syria.” The National, February 26, 2021.

[26] Knights, Michael. “Rockets over Erbil: How to Respond to an Iraqi Militia Outrage.” The Washington Institute, February 16, 2021.

[27] “The Sayed of the Martyrs Brigades to Rudaw: ‘We did not target Erbil, and those who want to stop the operations should not host the Americans’ (كتائب سيد الشهداء لرووداو: لم نستهدف أربيل وعلى من يريد ايقاف العمليات عدم استضافة الأميركان).” Rudaw, March 4, 2021.

[28] Smyth, Phillip. “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 27, 2013.

[29] Knights, Michael. “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Role of Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syria.” The Washington Institute, June 27, 2013.

[30] Smyth, Phillip. “All the Ayatollah’s Men.” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2014.

[31] Nada, Garrett, and Mattisan Rowan. “Part 2: Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq.” The Wilson Center, May 3, 2018.

[32] Smyth, Phillip. “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 27, 2013.

[33] “Treasury Designates Individuals, Entity Fueling Iraqi Insurgency.” Press Office, U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 9, 2008.

[34] Smyth, Phillip. “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 27, 2013.

[35] Cigar, Norman. “Iraqi’s Shia Warlords and Their Militias.” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2015.

[36] Smyth, Phillip. “All the Ayatollah’s Men.” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2014.

[37] Rasheed, Ahmed. “In Iraq's Parliament, Shi'ite Militia Leaders Plan to Call the Shots.” Reuters, November 13, 2018.

[38] Nada, Garrett, and Mattisan Rowan. “Part 2: Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq.” The Wilson Center, May 3, 2018.

[39] “An Iraqi faction threatens: a very harsh response awaits any American strikes (فصيل عراقي يتوعد: رد قاسي جداً بانتظار أي ضربات أمريكية). Shafaq News, March 28, 2020; Rwanduzy, Mohammed. “Muqtada al-Sadr receives PMF leaders in Qom to discuss US troop presence in Iraq.” Rudaw English, January 14, 2020; Isakhan, Benjamin. “The Islamic State Attacks on Shia Holy Sites and the ‘Shrine Protection Narrative’: Threats to Sacred Space as a Mobilization Frame.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 32:4 (2020). 731; Knights, Michael. “Biden’s Warning to Iran and Its Proxies: Implications of the Syria Strike.” The Washington Institute, February 26, 2021; ‘Laqa’ khas ma’a Abu Ala’ al-Wala’i amin ‘am Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’ [Exclusive interview with Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada leader Abu Ala al-Walai], 6 July 2017, 5:15–5:54, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNuVkz3ehYA.

[40] Nada, Garrett, and Mattisan Rowan. “Part 2: Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq.” The Wilson Center, May 3, 2018.

[41] Knights, Michael. “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Role of Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syria.” The Washington Institute, June 27, 2013.

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