Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) is an Iranian-backed, Iraqi Shia paramilitary organization. Its name can be translated as the “Brigades of the Party of God,” and the group is also known as the Hezbollah Brigades. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis initially established KH in 2003 as an umbrella organization comprised of five other militant groups: Kata’ib Karbala, Kata’ib Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, Kata’ib Zeid Ibn Ali, Kata’ib Ali al-Akbar, and Kata’ib al-Sajjad.[5] Kata’ib Hezbollah assumed its present form as a centralized group in 2007 when it announced the merger of these five organizations.[6] Prior to founding KH, Muhandis was a member of the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development (Badr Organization), another Iranian-backed militant group that has operated in Iraq and Syria. In the Badr Organization, Muhandis worked closely with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah during the Iran-Iraq War and throughout the 1990s.
When Muhandis founded KH in 2007, he retained close ties with Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC. Hezbollah provided training in guerilla warfare and weapons for early KH recruits, and many analysts believe that the IRGC was directly involved in KH’s formation.[7] Under Muhandis’s leadership, KH established smuggling networks to transfer Iranian weapons and equipment to Iraq, which are likely still in use.[8] The United States designated KH as a terrorist organization in 2009.[9]
KH is a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, “Hashd al-Shaabi” in Arabic), which formed in 2014 as part of Iraq’s efforts to counter the Islamic State (IS). PMF is an umbrella group composed of approximately fifty Iraqi militias, most of which are Shia.[10] Lacking a strong military, the Iraqi government partnered with the militias to liberate IS-held territory.[11] In 2016, the Iraqi Parliament passed legislation making PMF an official part of the state security apparatus.[12] Despite the PMF’s military successes, the umbrella group is often criticized for elevating Shia militias above the Iraqi state and prioritizing Iranian interests. PMF forces have also been condemned for committing atrocities against civilians.[13] Though its future is unclear, PMF remains a major political and military actor in Iraq.[14]
KH founder Muhandis co-founded the PMF and became the organization’s de facto head, which pushed KH into a dominant role.[15] KH staffs the PMF’s 45th, 46th, and 47th brigades.[16] To increase their numbers without compromising secrecy, KH and other PMF leaders established small, local brigades exclusively dedicated to fighting in Iraq, such as the KH sub-group Saraya al-Difa al-Shabi (KH-SDS) that formed in April 2014.[17]
KH has pledged loyalty to Ayatollah Khamenei and is one of the most powerful of PMF’s many Iran-backed groups.[18] Along with senior commanders of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and the Badr Organization, KH leaders hold positions on PMF Commission, PMF’s decision-making body.[19] While the PMF is nominally subordinate to the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office, the IRGC exerts significant influence over KH and bankrolls many of its operations [20][21] Some analysts label KH as a de facto branch of the IRGC.[22]
2007-2011: Kata’ib Hezbollah targets U.S. coalition forces in Iraq
From 2007 to 2011, KH focused most of its resources on fighting U.S. coalition forces in Iraq. According to U.S. diplomat Ali Khedery, KH was responsible for “some of the most lethal attacks against U.S. and coalition forces throughout the [U.S.-led war in Iraq].”[23] The group was particularly known for using deadly roadside bombs and improvised rocket-assisted mortars (IRAMs).[24] Initially, KH did not target the Iraqi army or government. However, KH threatened reprisals against the Iraqi government and its forces following the government’s approval of a U.S.-Iraq Security Partnership in November 2008.[25] After U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, KH refused to heed the Iraqi government’s calls for all militant groups in the country to demilitarize. The group cited ongoing instability in Iraq as justification for its refusal to lay down its arms.[26]
2012-2017: Kata’ib Hezbollah targets other armed groups in Iraq and Syria
KH’s operations between 2012 and 2017 largely fall into two categories: those broadly against Sunni rebel groups and Sunni-held areas and those against the Islamic State (IS). In Syria, KH operations were equally focused on Sunni rebel groups and IS, while KH’s primary adversary in Iraq was IS.
KH’s general operations in Syria
KH was among the first Iraqi Shia organizations to send troops to support Bashar al-Assad’s government in the Syrian civil war. KH officially announced its presence in Syria in March 2013, but its fighters served earlier in Syrian front groups.[27] For example, KH and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), another major Iraqi Shia paramilitary group, established the front group Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) in 2012. LAFA was almost entirely comprised of Iraqi fighters, but was based in Damascus, Syria.[28] In 2013, KH and AAH also formed the front group Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN).[29] Within a year of their formation, LAFA and HHN became virtually independent, and KH began operating in Syria under its own banner against the Iraqi government’s wishes.[30]
KH’s intervention in the Syrian civil war appears to have been motivated primarily by it’s loyalty to Iran. Though KH propagandists and public figures often stated that the group sought to defend Syrian Shia and Shiite shrines in Syria from sectarian violence, KH’s motives were likely far more politically motivated.[31] As a member of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”, KH and other Iraqi fasa’il (Arabic for armed group) intervened on Assad’s behalf to secure the regime from internal opponents.[32] KH is believed to maintain a contingent force of roughly 2,500 fighters in Syria and is also thought to have been an effective combatant.[33]
In 2014, KH began expanding its activities in Syria after IS seized Mosul, Iraq, and rebel-held Aleppo, Syria. This expansion of KH operations was directed by Iranian IRGC-Quds Force commander, Major General Qassim Suleimani. Suleimani reportedly argued that “the road to liberate Mosul [was] through Aleppo.”[34] In cooperation with Hezbollah and the Badr Organization, KH created local militias, such as Fawj al-Imam al-Hijjah near Aleppo, to solidify Syrian Shia control in strategic villages.[35] Reports also suggest that KH filled combat roles and executed attacks against Sunni rebel groups as part of Assad’s 2012-2016 siege to retake Aleppo from a litany of jihadist and secular opposition forces.[36] By the end of 2015, KH claimed to have sent over 1,000 fighters to Aleppo alone, sustaining only 40 casualties.[37] As of June 2024, KH maintains a presence in Syria.[38] Additionally, the KH-staffed 45th, 46th, and 47th PMF brigades are stationed in the Jazira and Badia regions, which lie on the Iraq-Syria border.[39]
KH’s campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq
In Iraq, KH joined the newly established Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in 2014. KH founder Muhandis became the de facto head of PMF, propelling KH to a central role in the umbrella group.[40] To expand their influence in Iraq, KH and other PMF leaders established small, local brigades exclusively dedicated to fighting in Iraq, such as KH sub-group Saraya al-Difa al-Shabi (KH-SDS).[41]
In 2014 and 2015, KH and many PMF brigades combined forces to counter the IS advance into the Anbar Province and northern Iraq.[42] In June 2014, KH and AAH first recaptured Samarra, Iraq, an important holy site in Shia Islam.[43] Then, in August 2014, KH, AAH, and other PMF militias successfully broke the IS siege of Amerli supported by U.S. airpower and Kurdish Peshmerga forces.[44] In March 2015, KH played a critical role to retake Tikrit, a city north of Samarra. An estimated 30,000 fighters from KH, PMF, and Iraqi security forces operated in conjunction with Iraqi air support to recapture Tikrit in one of Iraq’s largest offensives against IS up to that date. [45]
In May 2016, KH, PMF, and Iraqi forces began the campaign to retake Fallujah, Iraq, the largest IS-held city near Baghdad.[46] The Iraqi Ground and Air Forces spearheaded the operation, with backing from the United States. Though the U.S. supported these counter-IS operations, it withheld air support from select PMF groups, including KH, in protest of Shia militias entering Sunni cities.[47] As a result, PMF leadership and the Iraqi Joint Operations Command released statements assuring that Shia militants would not enter Fallujah.[48] Initially, KH and other PMF groups focused on encircling and securing the outskirts of Fallujah.[49] But, according to some reports, KH and PMF members wore Iraqi Army uniforms so that U.S. airstrikes would continue in their areas of assault.[50] Ultimately, KH was heavily involved in the city's seizure and became a part of its permanent security apparatus.[51]
In late 2016 and early 2017, KH also played a significant role in Iraq’s operation to retake Mosul in what would become the largest military operation in Iraq since the U.S.-led 2003 invasion.[52] To bolster its forces, KH reportedly redirected 2,000 of its fighters from Syria to the Mosul campaign.[53] The offensive began in mid-October 2016. Iraqi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces converged on the eastern part of the city with support from Iraqi and U.S. airstrikes.[54] KH and PMF forces concentrated on Mosul’s western axis to block IS fighters from escaping to Syria.[55] These forces began their offensive with Tal Afar, a smaller city west of Mosul populated mainly by Sunni Muslims and ethnic Turkmen.[56] On November 20, 2016, KH and the Badr Organization led PMF militants to completely encircle Tal Alfar with assistance from Kurdish Peshmerga forces.[57]
By the end of 2016, PMF had taken back dozens of IS-held villages surrounding Tal Afar, and KH claimed it was advancing west to clear the Syrian border region of IS weapons caches.[58] In January 2017, Iraqi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces ultimately recaptured eastern Mosul and began to redirect their efforts to the western axis alongside PMF and KH.[59] In joint operations backed by U.S. air support, Iraqi forces fully recaptured Mosul by the end of July 2017 and Tal Afar by the end of August 2017.[60] In November 2017, under direction from Iran, KH also returned to Syria to assist in liberating the border town Abu Kamal (or Al Bukamal), one of the last IS strongholds.[61] The liberation of Abu Kamal carried significant importance for Iran because of its strategic location along the Iranian supply route from Tehran to Lebanon.[62]
During KH's participation in the campaign against IS, the group indiscriminately targeted Sunni civilians in areas recovered from IS.[63] For example, in the months after KH recaptured Samarra, Amnesty International recorded over 107 kidnappings of Sunni men, 30 of which were executed.[64] In Tikrit, locals reported that KH systematically burned homes, looted, and kidnapped residents.[65] In 2016, Human Rights Watch documented some of the worst violence perpetrated by KH, including torture, executions, and mass “enforced disappearances.”[66] Reports find that KH and other Shia militias targeted Sunni civilian populations in “blind revenge” for IS attacks.[67] KH continuously denied allegations of indiscriminate violence against Iraq’s Sunni population. In 2015, the Iraqi Interior Ministry opened an investigation into the reported abuses, but no consequences were levied against the group.[68] When KH helped seize Fallujah from IS in 2016, it publicly attempted to justify atrocities against Sunni civilians by arguing that the majority of Fallujah’s Sunnis had actively supported IS.[69]
At the end of 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced victory over IS.[70] Drawing upon their growing influence in Iraq, KH and PMF further inserted themselves into local economies and politics. Along with the Badr Organization and other PMF groups, KH sent members to run in local and parliamentary elections. KH and PMF also permanently embedded themselves in Iraq’s security apparatus by establishing offices and checkpoints in areas they had helped liberate. KH leveraged its checkpoints to pillage northern Iraqi cities’ cement and oil industries – especially those of Sunni-majority Baiji and the Turkmen-majority cities of Kirkuk and Tuz Kurmatu.[71]
2018-2021: Kata’ib Hezbollah returns to targeting U.S. forces
As IS influence declined in late 2018 and early 2019, KH returned its focus to opposing the U.S. presence in Iraq. Although KH tacitly relied on U.S. support in its campaign against IS, KH vehemently maintained its anti-American sentiments. In August 2018, tensions rose between the U.S., Israel, and Iran after Iran transferred short-range ballistic missiles to PMF and KH-controlled areas in Iraq.[72] At the beginning of September, PMF member Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) fired rockets at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The same day, KH allegedly conducted a rocket attack near the U.S. Consulate in Basra, which was evacuated and closed indefinitely.[73] In response to these attacks, the U.S. stated that it would hold Iran responsible for attacks carried out by Iran-backed militias. The U.S. State Department also designated the Iranian IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in April 2019.[74]
The escalation continued in May 2019 when a drone attack destroyed oil pumps in Saudi Arabia. Although Houthi rebels in Yemen initially claimed responsibility for the attack, U.S. reports concluded that KH likely launched the drones from Iraq. One day after the drone attack, the U.S. State Department removed all non-essential government employees from Iraq.[75]
From July to September 2019, Israel responded to KH’s escalations against coalition targets with multiple anonymous airstrikes against PMF weapons depots. One of these airstrikes targeted a KH convoy. Israel never publicly claimed responsibility for the strike, but U.S. and Iraqi reports confirmed Israeli involvement.[76] KH leader and founder Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis responded by declaring that the U.S. was “the first and last party responsible” for the airstrikes and that PMF would use “all means at its disposal” to defend its interests.[77]
In late 2019, KH shifted strategies to respond to domestic unrest in Iraq while continuing to counter U.S. influence. Beginning in October, anti-government protestors demonstrated in Baghdad and across Iraq’s southern provinces. Their grievances centered on government corruption and failure to foster economic opportunity and provide public services.[78] As the movement progressed, protestors condemned Iran for enabling government corruption and interfering in Iraqi affairs through PMF.[79] Iraqi security forces forcefully cracked down on protests with tear gas and live ammunition. Over 100 people died because of the violence in the first six days of demonstrations.[80]
By January 2020, over 600 protestors had died, with thousands of injuries and an unknown number of arrests and torture cases.[81] Early reports suggested that PMF snipers stationed on rooftops were responsible for a significant number of the deaths. Iraqi Interior Ministry spokesman Saad Maan released a statement that Iraqi security forces did not fire on protestors and that all mass shooting deaths were the responsibility of militant groups. PMF spokesman Ahmed Jassim al-Asadi denied any PMF presence. The extent of KH and PMF involvement in the crackdown remains unknown. Nonetheless, the continued escalation of violence only reaffirmed and reemphasized protestors’ demand for the removal of Iranian influence in Iraq.[82]
Amidst growing domestic discontent, KH worked under the direction of IRGC Major General Qassim Suleimani to refocus attention away from Iranian interference in Iraq. Suleimani's plan was for KH to provoke a U.S. military response and draw Iraqi anger away from Iran. In early October 2019, the IRGC transferred Katyusha rocket launchers and shoulder-fired missiles to KH. In a meeting weeks later, Suleimani tasked KH with forming another low-profile militia that could evade U.S. detection. He also instructed KH leader Muhandis to use KH’s drone capabilities to identify U.S. military and personnel targets in Iraq.[83]
On December 27, 2019, KH launched a rocket attack on the Iraqi K-1 Air Base near Kirkuk. This attack departed from previous months of indirect fire that targeted Iraqi military bases with a U.S. presence.[84] The attack killed an American contractor and wounded multiple U.S. and Iraqi troops.[85] Two days later, the U.S. retaliated with airstrikes against three KH bases in Iraq and two in Syria. According to KH, the airstrikes killed at least 24 fighters and destroyed ammunition depots holding rockets and drones.[86] KH denied responsibility for the attack near Kirkuk. In response, the group drew upon a surge in anti-U.S. sentiment among Iraqis to incite countrywide demonstrations and dampen the anti-corruption and anti-Iran/PMF tendencies that had been motivating Iraq’s ongoing protest movement.[87] Following the airstrikes, KH-led, pro-Iran protesters breached the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and set fire to perimeter buildings.[88] The protestors withdrew after Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi denounced the U.S presence in Iraq and promised “dangerous consequences.”[89]
Escalation continued on January 3, 2020, when the U.S. conducted a drone strike on a convoy carrying IRGC and PMF personnel near Baghdad International Airport. The strike killed KH leader Muhandis and the head of the Iranian IRGC-Quds Force, Major General Qassim Suleimani.[90] The strike drew sharp admonition from Iraq and Iran, both of whom condemned the strike as a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty and warned of “harsh retaliation.”[91] On January 5, 2020, the Iraqi Parliament passed a resolution calling for the removal of U.S. troops from the country.[92]
In February 2020, Ahmad al-Hamidawi (Abu Hussein), a KH commander, succeeded Muhandis as secretary-general. Soon after, the U.S. Department of State placed sanctions on al-Hamidawi after labelling him a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.[93] Al-Hamidawi was not Muhandis’s chosen successor. The former leader intended for his long-time compatriot Abdul Aziz al-Mohammedawi (Abu Fadak) to lead KH and the PMF in case of his death. Al-Mohammedawi, who was friendly with Qasem Soleimani, was also the favored candidate of the IRGC.[94] However, he is reportedly “uncharismatic (…) afraid of public speaking, [and] struggles to build relationships beyond his immediate circle.”[95] Moreover, KH is a group that prizes secrecy, but al-Mohammedawi’s tactics are often brash and blatant. These factors pushed KH’s governing Shura Council to select al-Hamidawi over Muhandis’s picked successor.
Later that month, KH nominated al-Mohammedawi, to be the new military leader of the PMF.[96] However, several leading figures within KH opposed the nomination, including the new Secretary-General al-Hamidawi and Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, who runs the Sheibani Network smuggling operation.[97] Additionally, several of the Sistani-aligned “shrine units” within the PMF opposed al-Mohammedawi’s nomination, who they believed would expand Iranian influence in Iraq. Irreconcilable divisions emerged between the followers of Iraqi Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and Iranian Grand Ayatollah Khamenei. Disagreements were heightened because international sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic reduced Tehran’s ability to support Iraqi militants, thereby weakening the pro-Iran faction. While al-Mohammedawi eventually overcame political challenges and was appointed Chief-of-Staff, in April 2020, the Sistani-aligned shrine unit militias left the PMF.[98] As of June 2024, al-Mohammedawi continues to lead the PMF and hold much influence within KH. As PMF Chief-of-Staff, he has reasserted KH’s preeminence within Iraq’s Shia militant movement and greatly expanded PMF control of the government.[99]
On March 11, 2020, a rocket attack against Camp Taji, a coalition military installation near Baghdad, killed a U.S. soldier, a British soldier, and a U.S. contractor. The attack injured at least twelve others.[100] The U.S. held KH responsible for the attack and responded with strikes on five KH weapons sites across Iraq.[101] KH, however, did not claim responsibility. Instead, the group issued a statement that called for the responsible party to “be proud” and claim the attack itself.[102] Eventually, Usbat al-Thaireen, a new, lesser-known armed group, took responsibility. However, the U.S. claimed that Usbat al-Thaireen was a front for KH and other Iran-backed militias. The U.S. alleged that the group was created to allow PMF plausible deniability for attacks since the PMF technically exists as part of Iraq’s state security forces.[103] At the end of March, the Pentagon issued a directive to create plans to destroy KH by targeting group leaders, bases, and weapons. KH responded that any actions by the U.S. would be met by “full force” retaliation against Americans and any Iraqis aiding the U.S.[104]
In May 2020, Mustafa al-Kadhimi became the new Prime Minister of Iraq. During his first months in office, Kadhimi showed receptivity to the demands of anti-government protestors and openness to taking a stronger stance against Iran-backed militias.[105] On June 25, 2020, Kadhimi ordered a raid on a KH base in southern Baghdad, citing intelligence that KH planned to attack the Green Zone, an area that houses Iraqi and foreign government buildings.[106] Iraqi security forces detained at least 14 KH members. In response, KH entered the Green Zone, storming a Counter Terrorism Service building to demand their release.[107] In a show of force, on June 26th, al-Mohammedawi led 150 KH fighters in a dozen armed vehicles to the Prime Minister’s residence in the Green Zone.[108] All but one of the KH detainees were released. This incident greatly weakened Kadhimi’s credibility and showcased the strength of the PMF in Iraq, which is .[109] Al-Hamidawi released a defiant statement shortly after securing the release of his fighters in which he emphasized KH’s autonomy from the state and its loyalty to Iran-backed Islamic resistance.[110]
Human rights activists, journalists, and government officials have accused KH of being responsible for the July 2020 assassination of Iraqi researcher and advisor to the PM, Kadhimi Hisham al-Hashimi.[111] Hashimi was known to criticize militant groups, including KH, as well as the government for its handling of extremism. He received multiple death threats from KH and other militant groups, but the responsible party remains unclear.[112]
KH was one of several Iran-backed militias that agreed to a unilateral “ceasefire” on strikes against U.S. diplomatic and military targets in Iraq in October 2020.[113] Mohammed Mohie, a spokesman for KH, said that attacks against the U.S. in Iraq would halt while the militias waited for the U.S.-led coalition to detail its timeline for its complete withdrawal from Iraq, but reiterated that “this truce is conditional, and the condition is that we will accept [the U.S.’s] retreat.”[114] Mohie added that he was speaking on behalf of the “Iraqi Resistance Coordination Commission,” an umbrella group that reportedly governs the activities of all anti-U.S. militias in Iraq.[115] Mohie’s statement on the commission’s behalf suggests that KH wields considerable authority among the Iran-aligned Iraqi militias. However, it is unclear what authority the commission wields over its participants’ activities. In May 2021, the commission issued a statement saying that it rejects the ongoing Iraq-U.S. strategic dialogue and status of forces negotiations and promises to escalate attacks against Coalition installations in Iraq.[116]
On February 25, 2021, the U.S. conducted an airstrike on an unofficial border crossing and military facility operated by KH and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), another Iraqi militia, near Abu Kamal on the Iraq-Syria border.[117] Casualty figures from the strike vary: a KH-affiliated source reported the strike killed one person and severely wounded several others, Reuters reported that the strike killed “at least” 17 people, while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that the strike killed 22 “militiamen” of unknown affiliation.[118] The U.S. airstrike served as retaliation for an attack on February 15, when several 107 mm rockets struck near a coalition-run military base at Erbil International Airport near the Kurdistan Regional Government’s capital of Erbil. The barrage killed a civilian contractor with the coalition and wounded six others.[119] A U.S. Defense Department-led investigation into the attack later determined that KH and KSS bore responsibility.[120] However, a lesser-known armed group named Awliya al-Dam – a potential affiliate of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, another Iraqi Shiite militia – had claimed responsibility for the barrage three hours after it took place.[121]
In May 2021, Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) arrested Qassim Musleh, the PMF operations head for Anbar province and a close affiliate of KH.[122] CTS arrested Musleh for his alleged involvement in attacks on Iraqi and coalition military installations as well as the murder of Ihab al-Wazni, an activist who was killed near his home in Karbala earlier that month.[123] The arrest was prompted by the popular movement #WhoKilledMe, which exerted pressure on the Iraqi government and even attacked the Iranian consulate in Karbala.[124] Attempting to mirror al-Mohammedawi’s victory over Prime Minister Kadhimi the year prior, KH fighters attempted to enter the Green Zone and demand Musleh’s release.[125] This time, however, the Iraqi military prevented the militants from entering the Green Zone.[126] In response, KH and other PMF militias publicized doctored footage claiming they had taken command of the Green Zone and freed Musleh.[127] This claim was largely believed by local and foreign observers and was re-publicized by international media outlets like the Associated Press and the Washington Post, displaying KH’s information warfare capabilities.[128] Iraqi authorities actually released Musleh two weeks later after a high court dismissed his case due to a “lack of evidence.”[129]
On July 29, 2021, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), Esmail Qaani visited Baghdad and Najaf to convey Ayatollah Khamenei’s new orders to Iraqi militant leaders.[130] The visit was necessitated by rapidly escalating hostilities with the U.S., particularly by KH, because lower-level commanders were violating the October 2020 ceasefire and launching drones strikes against U.S. bases.[131] The evident lack of discipline and coordination within Iraq’s muqawama (resistance movement) stemmed from the ongoing leadership crisis sparked by Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis’s deaths in 2020. KH, in particular, had seen infighting between PMF Chief-of-Staff al-Mohammedawi and KH Secretary-General al-Hamiwdawi, reducing organizational efficacy. Initiated by al-Mohammedawi and likely with Iranian backing, al-Hamidawi was ousted in a 14-19 Shura Council vote two days before Qaani’s visit.[132] However, the Secretary-General rejected the vote, seriously fracturing the Shura Council. After significant mediation by the IRGC-QF, al-Hamidawi was allowed to retain his position as KH Secretary-General.[133] Qaani gave directions to restore discipline, adhere to the ceasefire, and focus on winning Iraq’s October parliamentary election.[134]
2021-2024: Kata’ib Hezbollah’s Political Involvement
In October 2021, KH’s Harakat Hoquq party (Hoquq Movement) suffered a decisive defeat in the Iraqi parliamentary elections—winning just one of the 32 races it competed in.[135] Overall, the Fateh Alliance, PMF’s political coalition, performed poorly, winning only 17 seats compared to the 48 the bloc held in 2018.[136] The election reflected changing public opinion toward PMF groups. The popularity formerly enjoyed by KH and other PMF militias during the fight against IS ebbed because of their violent repression of Iraqi protestors and loyalty to Iran.[137]
The Sadrists, one of the Sistani-aligned shrine units that split from the PMF in 2020, won the most seats in the parliamentary election.[138] Led by Moqtada al-Sadr, a cleric from an influential Shia family, they achieved victory by aligning with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Sunni National Progress Party. However, the Sadrist government was short lived.
Faiq Zaydan, a Muhandis affiliate and Supreme Judicial Court Justice, issued rulings that changed government formation rules from a simple majority (165 seats) to a two-thirds majority (218 seats), forcing the Sadrists to include the Fateh Alliance in the ruling coalition.[139] Zaydan also reactivated a 10-year-old case that threatened Kurdistan’s right to independently export oil, threatening the prosperity of al-Sadr’s Kurdish allies.[140] The court eventually deemed independent Kurdish oil exports to be illegal, hamstringing the region’s economy.[141] Kurdish oil production was also targeted by PMF and IRGC forces, which launched military strikes against Kurdistan.[142]
In June 2022, just months after a decisive electoral victory, all 73 Sadrists resigned their MP seats in protest.[143] Most of the vacated seats went to Fateh Alliance candidates, which gave them enough control over parliament to form a Shia, Iran-friendly government under Prime Minister al-Sudani. In this seat reallocation, KH’s Hoquq Movement gained five seats, now holding a total representation of six MPs.[144] As of 2024, al-Sudani still serves as the Prime Minister of Iraq.
Since the beginning of al-Sudani’s term, KH member and PMF Chief-of-Staff Abdul Aziz al-Mohammedawi has taken steps to expand the PMF’s influence over the Iraqi state. One of the ways al-Mohammedawi has achieved this is by using state funds to strengthen the PMF. The militant dominated parliament passed legislation granting PMF fighters state pensions and the right to be prosecuted only in PMF military courts.[145] These enhanced benefits have contributed to skyrocketing enlistments for PMF militas, leading to a 95% increase in total registered fighters in 2023.[146] Additionally, the al-Sudani government’s 2023 budget includes a $305 million capital injection to the Muhandis General Company (MGC), the PMF conglomerate named after the former KH leader, and a $1.2 million secret expenses fund, a black budget like that given to the Iraqi National Intelligence Service.[147]
Al-Mohammedawi is also positioning the PMF to take over Iraq’s military command. Prime Minister al-Sudani approved a substantial increase in the number of PMF officer trainees accepted into Iraqi service academies (from 10 to over 400 trainees).[148] As PMF head, Al-Mohammedawi nominates KH fighters, as well as trusted affiliates from other PMF militias, to officer training programs. This further cements KH’s influence within the PMF. Additionally, Muhandis planned to establish PMF command colleges, staff colleges, and service academies prior to his death, to attain complete autonomy and supremacy within Iraq’s security apparatus.[149] Given al-Mohammedawi’s adherence to Muhandis’ plans so far, this could also be his ultimate objective. The combination of economic and military privileges accrued to the PMF by al-Mohammedawi during the al-Sudani government is the beginning of an IRGC-style organization in Iraq, with KH at the helm through its leadership of the umbrella group.
KH’s Continued Military Activities
In addition to politics, KH has continued to attack the U.S. military presence in Iraq. On August 15, 2022, the al-Tanf military base was struck by two Iranian KAS-04 drones.[150] No American casualties were reported. While KH did not claim credit for the attack, it’s considered “the key operator of fixed-wing drones in Iraq.”[151] Additionally, the KAS-04 was put on display by Jazira Operations Command units during a PMF parade, indicating that KH was likely behind the attack.[152] KH’s hesitance to claim the attack can be pointed to a desire to avoid provoking U.S. counterstrikes in Iraq, which could sour the sympathetic al-Sudani government’s electoral odds.[153]
On March 27, 2023, KH kidnapped Elizabeth Tsurkov, an Israeli-Russian doctoral student at Princeton, who was conducting research on the Sadrist movement, on suspicion of being a spy.[154] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly held KH responsible.[155] KH security chief Abu Ali al-Askari, an alias of Hoquq Movement head Hossein Moanes Jabbar al-Hijami, didn’t deny the group’s involvement and merely stated that KH will attempt “to find out the fate of the Zionist prisoner or prisoners in Iraq.”[156] However, other militant groups have implicitly or explicitly praised KH for their role in the kidnapping through posts on the social media platform Telegram.[157] Despite U.S. pressure against al-Sudani, Tsurkov has not been released as of June 2024.
On May 14, 2023, KH forces fought with Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service leading to at least two deaths and two injuries, alongside the destruction of several vehicles.[158] Both KH and the Counter Terrorism Service are officially entities of the Iraqi government, and their open combat indicates Baghdad’s low degree of control. The next day, KH and Iraqi Federal Police officers exchanged machine gun fire in Albu Aitha, a suburb of Baghdad.[159] When the Iraqi Security Media Cell reported the fight, they refrained from condemning KH for the conflict.[160]
Reaction to the October 7th Gaza Crisis
KH Secretary-General, al-Hamidawi, released a statement on October 10, 2023, congratulating the “mujahedin of the Islamic Resistance of Palestine on their great victories” and pledged to assist in the fight against the “Pagans” by preparing “rockets, drones, and special forces” to hit U.S. bases.[161] On October 18, in retaliation for the explosion at al-Ahli hospital in Gaza, KH struck the U.S. al-Asad Air Base with two drones.[162] The attack resulted in minor injuries for U.S. coalition forces.[163] After October 18, KH regularly bombarded U.S. military installations throughout the Middle East. On October 23, Hossein Moanes, the head of the Hoquq Movement, called on the al-Sudani government to remove U.S. forces from Iraq.[164]
On October 26, 2023, Moanes used his online militant alias, KH security chief al-Askari, to reaffirm KH’s commitment to “a long exhaustion war against the enemy [Israel and its allies].”[165] Moanes is the spokesperson for the Special Operations branch of KH. In the aftermath of Muhandis’s death in 2020, KH leadership was divided between Secretary-General al-Hamidawi, who heads Special Operations, and PMF Chief-of-Staff al-Mohammedawi. Immediately following Muhandis’ death, KH suffered from divisive infighting between the two factions.[166] However, the leadership dispute has settled into a relatively cooperative “non-hierarchical brotherhood.”[167] Continuing the aggressive rhetoric, on November 4, a day before U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Iraq, al-Askari threatened that “Antony Blinken, the son of the Jew, the foreign minister of America if not the Zionist minister of war. His visit is not welcomed in the Iraq of Ali and Hussein (peace be upon them). If he comes, we will face it with unprecedented escalation.”[168]
Between October 2023 and February 2024, the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, a cover used by many Iran-backed groups, claimed 178 attacks against U.S. bases—of which KH is likely responsible for a significant proportion.[169] However, most of these attacks resulted in no fatalities or casualties as they aimed to destroy military assets or harass and demoralize American soldiers. On Christmas day, 2023, however, KH launched a drone strike against U.S. forces in northern Iraq, causing three injuries.[170] Within 13 hours of the attack, U.S. retaliatory strikes were conducted against three KH military facilities, likely killing multiple militants.[171]
On January 28, 2024, KH fired a rocket against Tower 22, a U.S. logistics support base in Jordan that houses 350 Army and Air Force personnel.[172] The rocket exploded a container-style housing unit, killing three service members and injuring over 40 others.[173] KH denied responsibility for the attack. However, Pentagon Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh pinpointed KH, stating that the attack "has the footprints of Kataib Hezbollah.”[174] Given the high payload of the rocket used in the Tower 22 attack, analysts at the Washington Institute conclude that KH tactically decided to kill, not harass, U.S. soldiers.[175] KH’s choice of target—a U.S. base in the relatively neutral Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan—was an intentional message to push the U.S. to cease supporting Israel and pressure Jordan to choose a side in the Israel-Hamas conflict.[176] However, KH quickly recognized that the attack was taken more seriously by the U.S. than anticipated and plausible deniability would not suffice to protect them from severe retaliation. On January 30, KH Secretary-General al-Hamidawi announced that his organization would suspend “military and security operations against the occupation forces [United States] in order to prevent embarrassment to the Iraqi government.”[177]
KH leadership hoped that a unilateral ceasefire would appease American officials.[178] However, on February 2nd, the U.S. retaliated against KH with sweeping strikes on seven militant facilities in Iraq and Syria, destroying 80 of 85 targets.[179] On February 7th, U.S. forces killed senior KH leader Abu Baqr al-Saeedi in Baghdad.[180] Despite significant U.S. actions and criticism from other militant groups, KH has publicly held firm to its unilateral ceasefire—suggesting IRGC involvement.[181]
From January 30 to April 21, KH did not claim any attacks against U.S. targets. On April 5, 2024, KH secretary general al-Mohammedawi made a public visit to Tehran after an Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus which killed IRGC-Quds Force senior commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi.[182] Al-Mohammedawi stated that the purpose of his visit was to “renew our covenant [i.e., loyalty to the Supreme Leader] and wait for the Leader’s decision.”[183] A few weeks after the visit, on April 21, KH attacked the U.S. al-Asad Air Base in Iraq’s Anbar region.[184] No U.S. casualties were reported.[185] There is some evidence of grassroots opposition to the ceasefire from KH fighters.[186] A KH affiliate group announced on the Telegram social media platform that the al-Assad attack marked the end of the ceasefire.[187] A few days later, however, KH officially announced that there was no change to the ceasefire policy.[188] The KH statement is likely false, as Iran vowed revenge for Israel’s April 2nd attack on its Syrian embassy, which would likely involve unleashing KH and other members of Tehran’s “axis of resistance” against U.S. and Israeli targets.[189]
