Main Tabs Group

Overview
Formed: 
March 2, 2017

First Attack: March 5, 2017: Days after its founding, JNIM attacked a Boulikessi military base in central Mali, close to the Burkina Faso border. JNIM militants killed 11Malian soldiers, burned vehicles, and stole arms (11 killed, unknown wounded).[1]

Last Attack: August 24, 2024: JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack in central Burkina Faso. The attack took place in the region of Barsalogho, about 40km (25 miles) north of the strategic town of Kaya, which analysts say is home to the last standing force protecting the capital, Ougadougou (~200 killed, >140 wounded).[2]

Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), also known as the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims, is a Salafi-Jihadist organization that formed in March 2017 when the Sahara branch of AQIM and Al Mourabitoun joined with Ansar Dine and the Macina Liberation Front (MLF). JNIM claims its aims are to incite Muslims to oppose oppression, expel occupying powers from the Sahel region and implement Islamic governance.[3] The group announced its merger in a video in which JNIM’s new emir, Iyad Ag Ghali, appeared alongside leaders from the other constituent militant groups and pledged allegiance to the emirs of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Qaeda (AQ), and the Taliban. The merger was allegedly in line with AQ’s doctrine of unity, as consolidation would allow the AQ affiliates to bring together resources and objectives to extend its area of operation. JNIM reportedly formalizes the previous collaboration among the constituent groups by establishing a hierarchical relationship in which AQIM oversees the allied militant groups. JNIM has targeted French forces, the UN Stabilization Mission, and local armies in the Sahel region. According to Vision of Humanity, JNIM is one of the deadliest and fastest-growing terrorist groups worldwide.[4]

Narrative

Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), also known as the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims, is a Salafi-Jihadist organization that formed on March 2, 2017, when the Sahara branch of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Mourabitoun joined with Ansar Dine and the Macina Liberation Front (MLF). The group announced its merger in a video in which JNIM’s new emir, Iyad Ag Ghali, appeared alongside leaders from the other constituent militant groups, and pledged allegiance to AQIM’s emir Abdelmalek Droukdel, AQ emir Ayman al Zawahiri, and emir of the Taliban Mullah Haibatullah.[5] The formation of JNIM was allegedly in line with AQ’s recent conclusion that Shariah law could not be fully implemented in areas where jihadists did not possess complete control; the merger allowed the AQ affiliates to bring together resources and objectives to extend its area of operation.[6]

JNIM aims to drive foreign (especially French and UN) forces out of Mali and to impose its version of Islamic law.[7] JNIM arose from cooperation between AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Al Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) and MUJAO to take control of territory in Northern Mali after the 2012 Tuareg rebellion. The groups coordinated to combat Malian forces and later counter French and UN forces that intervened to restore order.[8] While each of these groups were ultimately expelled from their territorial holdings in northern Mali in 2013, the establishment of JNIM allowed the militants to apply the resources and strategies implemented in Mali to a regional context.[9] JNIM reportedly formalizes the collaboration among the constituent groups by establishing a hierarchical relationship in which AQIM oversees the allied militant groups and provides strategic guidance, directions, and resources.[10] Moreover, some view JNIM activity as a means through which AQIM has sought to reassert its presence in areas it controlled prior to France’s 2013 intervention in Mali.[11] Although all members conform to JNIM’s strategy, Al Mourabitoun has claimed that it will remain operationally autonomous from the larger group.[12]

Since its formation, JNIM has clashed continually with French counter-terrorism forces in the Sahel region, deployed under Operation Barkhane.[13] In February 2018, French forces launched 3 simultaneous raids on JNIM forces and their affiliates in northern Mali, killing over 20 jihadi fighters and 6 JNIM leaders. In response, JNIM militants attacked the French embassy and army headquarters in Burkina Faso’s capital.[14] JNIM has also targeted the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, a partnership between Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad to curtail extensive terrorist activity in the region. In June 2018, JNIM launched the first attack on the G5 Sahel Joint Forces’ headquarters in Sevare, Mali.[15] JNIM has been involved in communal clashes among local ethnic groups in Mali. Many of the MLF fighters in JNIM are members of the Fula, one of the largest West African ethnic groups militants accordingly fought on the side of the Fulanis in a conflict with the Bambara militia, who were allegedly backed by the Malian army.[16][17]

According to the Global Terrorism Index 2024, Terrorism-related deaths caused by JNIM have reached their highest level since the group’s foundation in 2017, with 1,099 deaths recorded in 2023. This is nearly a fourfold increase over the 281 deaths recorded in 2022. Terrorism-related incidents climbed by 45 percent to 112 attacks compared to the previous year. As a result, JNIM’s lethality rate reached its peak with the group.[18]

Organization

Vertical Tabs

Leadership

The leadership structure of JNIM is organized in a top-down hierarchy with three primary levels: central leadership, regional commanders, and local area commanders.[19]

Iyad Ag Ghali (March 2017 – present): Ghali is a Tuareg Malian jihadist, founder of Ansar Dine, and emir of JNIM. In 2017, he appeared in the video announcing the group’s formation to pledge allegiance to AQ emir Zawahiri and AQIM emir Droukdel. The U.S. designated Ghali a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in February 2013.[20]

Hasan al-Ansari (March 2017 – March 2018): A co-founder of Al Mourabitoun and founding member of JNIM, Ansari was present in the official video announcing JNIM’s establishment. Ansari died during French raids on Tinzaouatene, in Algeria.[21]

Abu Abdul Rahman al Sanhaji (March 2017 - present): Sanhaji, long-time head judge and deputy leader of Al Mourabitoun, replaced Mokhtar Belmokhtar as leader of the group upon its merger into JNIM.[22] He appeared in the video announcing JNIM’s formation, representing Al Mourabitoun.

Yahya Abu Hammam (March 2017 - present): Hammam, also known as Djamel Okacha, served as head of AQIM operations in the Sahel and emir of AQIM in Timbuktu. He has been designated a terrorist by the U.S., France, Algeria, E.U., and U.N.[23] He appeared in the video announcing JNIM’s formation, representing AQIM’s Saharan branch.

Amadou Kouffa (March 2017 - present): The former emir of the MLF and a Fulani imam, Kouffa has previously advocated the implementation of Shariah law as the best means to combat abuses by local officials. He appeared in the video announcing JNIM’s formation, representing the MLF.[24]

Hamama Ould Khouier (2017 – present): also known as Hamza Tabankort, is the emir of al-Murabitoun, which merged with other groups to form JNIM in 2017, and was involved in JNIM hostage negotiations, including negotiations related to Western hostages.[25]

Hussein Ould Hammada (March 2017 – present): also known as Alhoussein Ould Hamada or Zakaria Tabankort, is the deputy leader of al-Murabitoun. Hammada worked closely with Khouier and was involved in several attacks and kidnappings of Westerners.[26]

Size Estimates

There are no publicly available size estimates for this group.

Name Changes

There are no recorded name changes for this group.

Resources

JNIM mainly finances its activities through five main sources: kidnapping, gold mining, livestock/motorcycle theft, infrastructure targeting, and fees and taxation of goods. JNIM’s primary source of funding comes from kidnapping for ransom.[27]

Beyond kidnapping, the group’s involvement in artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) serves both its governance and financial objectives. JNIM extracts revenue from the gold sector by exercising control over ASGM sites or transportation routes to and from mine sites. From 2018 to 2019, JNIM increased its presence in and around gold mines in eastern Burkina Faso.

Livestock heft is another significant source of funding for JNIM. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) estimates that the group made 440 million FCFA (US$739,200) in revenue from livestock theft in 2021. The group loots vehicles, motorcycles, and other goods when running checkpoints. They also target trucks with key resources such as food and fuel.[28]

JNIM disrupts local economies by targeting roads, bridges, markets, transportation, and other essential infrastructure. This is especially true for small or medium-sized cities, where governance is weaker and transport infrastructure is often neglected. Additionally, JNIM finances itself through taxation by controlling key transport and trafficking routes in Mali and Burkina Faso, where it taxes illicit goods such as fuel, pharmaceuticals, and food.[29]

To appear concerned about civilian livelihoods during a recession, JNIM loosened logging restrictions in the Baoulé reserves. JNIM fighters control the reserves and charge fees from illegal loggers. These fees help mobilize resources and force acknowledgment of JNIM’s control over the area.

Locations

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

JNIM’s influence and reach have grown from its traditional strongholds in northern and central Mali to encompass the western and southern parts of the country.[30] JNIM operates in the Sahel region, primarily in Algeria, Mali, and Niger, but also in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Chad.[31] The group has launched multiple attacks in central Mali, especially in Segou, Niono, Sevare, and outside the Malian capital, Bamako. According to an ACLED study from 2023, JNIM has rapidly transformed from a collection of regional jihadist militant groups into a cohesive and potent militant faction.[32]

JNIM’s territorial expansion strategy was initiated in 2022. Since then, JNIM has expanded its operations in neighboring West African coastal states, notably Togo and Benin. Their activities are primarily focused on the inland areas bordering Burkina Faso, particularly within the WAP complex of national parklands, now a base for their operations. In Benin, there has been a substantial increase in kidnappings, rising from 6 in 2020 to 49 in 2023, with most attributed to JNIM or similar jihadist groups. The group also expanded in southern Mali where the government had its last major stronghold. This trend aligns with JNIM's known tactics of expanding its influence in new areas by escalating kidnappings to gain leverage and intelligence.[33]

In an April 2017 interview, Ghali publicly announced JNIM’s list of “enemy” countries, which includes the US and European nations such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, in addition to various African nations in which it currently operates.[34]

Strategy

Vertical Tabs

Ideology and Goals

JNIM is a Salafi-Jihadist organization that seeks to replace established state authority with a conservative interpretation of Islamic law.[35] The group’s goals and ideological basis are closely aligned with those of AQIM, and it seeks to build up a Salafi-Islamist state while restoring the caliphate. The merger of various AQ affiliates into the JNIM was consistent with AQ’s new operational focus on “unity” as a means to fully and effectively implement Shariah law in areas where the jihadists previously had not possessed complete control. In some JNIM-controlled areas of central Mali, the organization has demanded that civilians accept jihadist governance, relocate to non-jihadist zones, or face violence.[36] In a video announcement, the new JNIM leaders declared their intent to stand united against the Crusader’s enemy.[37] Ghali has stated that JNIM’s military strategy is to expand its presence over larger territory and train militants against JNIM’s enemies while preserving relations with local communities.[38]

Political Activities

JNIM has no known political activities.

Targets And Tactics

Despite regional variations, JNIM has a fairly consistent tactical strategy, according to ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), which has been crucial to its expansion throughout the region. JNIM’s tactics can be broadly classified into two categories: direct confrontation with adversaries and economic warfare.[39]

In terms of direct combat, JNIM has previously targeted the Malian army, UN forces, locations popular with Westerners, and French counter-terrorism forces, declared to be JNIM’s historic enemy.[40] Ghali has publicly announced JNIM’s list of “enemy” countries, which includes countries in the African and American continents and Europe: US, Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden, Chad, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Niger.[41] The group employs suicide bombings, burns vehicles, holds hostages, and engages in gun battles. JNIM was responsible for an attack on a resort outside Bamako and strikes on the French embassy and army headquarters in Burkina Faso’s capital. In response to the formation of the G5 Sahel to coordinate regional anti-terror efforts, JNIM launched the first attack on the G5 Sahel’s Malian headquarters.[42]

JNIM employs several tactics to keep a high operational tempo. In the central Sahel region, JNIM uses a wide range of violence, including targeted assassinations, complex attacks, and large-scale military campaigns.[43] In March 2018, the group released a high-quality video highlighting the extent of its activities, the strength of its training camps, and paying tribute to its leaders. JNIM has also become involved in communal clashes among local ethnic groups. JNIM militants fought on the side of the Fulanis in a conflict with the Bambaras, in central Mali. The group claimed the Malian army supported the Bambaras’ military efforts.[44] In terms of economic warfare, JNIM relies on Illicit economies to finance its activities. Illicit economies enable JNIM to find local sources of revenue, which the group relies on more as it moves further away from its core in northern Mali.[45]

Attacks

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

March 5, 2017: Days after its founding, JNIM attacked a Boulikessi military base in central Mali, close to the Burkina Faso border. JNIM militants killed 11 Malian soldiers, burned vehicles, and stole arms (11 killed, unknown wounded).[46]

March 2017: JNIM fighters were involved in communal clashes between the Fulanis and Bambaras in central Mali. JNIM attacked Bambara farmers, claiming the group’s militia was backed by the Malian army (unknown casualties).[47]

June 20, 2017: JNIM attacked a resort popular with Westerners outside Bamako, Mali, taking hostages. Malian security forces, alongside French and UN forces, rescued the hostages (5 killed, unknown wounded).[48]

March 2, 2018: JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack on the French embassy and Burkinabe army headquarters in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (8 killed, 80 wounded).[49]

April 14, 2018: JNIM launched a complex but largely unsuccessful assault on the Timbuktu airport. JNIM sent four suicide car bombs hidden in UN vehicles into the airport and engaged in a gun battle with French and UN soldiers; one UN peacekeeper and at least 15 jihadists were killed (16+ killed, 17 wounded).[50]

June 30, 2018: JNIM claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing of the Malian headquarters of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, an international anti-terror task force. Two soldiers and a civilian were killed (4 killed, unknown wounded).[51]

January 20, 2019: JNIM carried out a complex attack on a MINUSMA base near Aguelhok in the Kidal region (10 UN peacekeepers killed, 25 wounded).[52]

June 9, 2019: JNIM attacked the Christian town of Sobane Da in the Mopti Region (35+ killed, unknown wounded).[53]

September 3, 2019: JNIM launched an IED attack on a civilian bus in Mopti. They later issued an apology, expressing regret for the deaths of “our brothers and sons” and stating that the IED was intended for the “French occupier and its acolytes.” (14 killed, 24 wounded).[54]

September 30, 2019: JNIM claimed responsibility for attacks on a FAMa post in Mondoro and a joint FAMa-G5 Sahel Joint Force base in Boulkessi. According to the mid-October reports from the Malian government, these attacks resulted in 38+ killed, 17 wounded, and 27+ missing personnel. JNIM claimed they killed 85 soldiers.[55]

March 19, 2020: JNIM launched a small-arms attack on the Malian army base in Tarkint, Mali (29+ killed, 5 wounded).[56]

July 22, 2022: JNIM carried out a small-arms attack on a military garrison near Bamako, where the transition President and other army officers reside, destroying several vehicles (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[57]

February 25, 2023: Militants from JNIM massacred “dozens” of civilians attending morning prayer at a mosque in Gourma province and simultaneously attacked a military base in the same town (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[58]

January 21, 2023 – December 15, 2023: JNIM has carried out at least eight attacks in southeastern Burkina Faso’s Gourma province. This matches the group’s previous peak rates over the past year in July and November 2023 (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[59]

January 27, 2024: Human Rights Watch reported that JNIM carried out two attacks on the villages of Ogota and Ouémbé, Mopti region in central Mali. According to the witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, JNIM targeted Ogota, which is mainly inhabited by ethnic Dogon, in retaliation for the presence of Dan Na Ambassagou militia nearby. The attacks resulted in at least 32 civilian deaths and the destruction of 350 homes (13+ killed, abducted 24 civilians, unknown wounded).[60]

June 11, 2024: JNIM claimed responsibility for the attack that killed more than 100 Burkina Faso soldiers in the Mansila area near the border with Niger (100+ killed, unknown wounded).[61]

August 24, 2024: JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack in central Burkina Faso. The attack took place in the region of Barsalogho, about 40km (25 miles) north of the strategic town of Kaya, which analysts said is home to the last standing force protecting the capital, Ouagadougou (~200 killed, >140 wounded).[62]

Interactions

Vertical Tabs

Designated / Listed
  • Government of United Kingdom: Nov. 1, 2017 to present[63]
  • The U.S. Department of State: 2018 to present[64]
Community Relations

JNIM has been working to cultivate a reputation as a “big tent” alliance to attract members from various ethnic and local community backgrounds. It frequently made appeals to a variety of ethnic constituencies through its media efforts, including Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, Songhai, and Bambara communities. This is partially reflected in JNIM’s decision to include the languages of different ethnic groups in its media outputs, which furthers the group’s narrative as an inclusive armed group that advocates for widespread community support. Additionally, by selecting leaders with ties to local areas of operation – such as representatives from the Tuareg, Fulani, and Arab communities – JNIM has been able to localize fighting and cultivate influence across a wide range of ethnically diverse territories.[65]

However, JNIM has also been involved in communal clashes among local ethnic groups in Mali. The largely pastoral Fulani community has clashed with the Bambaras, a Malian ethnic group, due to rising economic pressures since 2015. Many of the MLF fighters in JNIM are ethnic Fulanis; accordingly, the group fought on the side of the Fulanis in a conflict with the Bambaras group in central Mali. JNIM claimed the Malian army supported the Bambaras’ military efforts.[66]

As JNIM expands into southern Mali, the group now controls sizable areas in central Mali’s Mopti, Segou, and Timbuktu regions responds to grievances against the loggers, which often result in the killing of non-compliant bandits. According to the ACLED analysts, JNIM’s response to these grievances aims to build relationships with local communities seeking protection.[67]

Relationships With Other Groups

JNIM was formed through the merger of AQIM’s Sahara branch, Al Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front (MLF) into a unified militant alliance under a single emir. In the video announcing the group’s formation, JNIM emir Ghali pledged allegiance to Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ayman al Zawahiri, the emir of Al Qaeda (AQ), and Mullah Haibatullah, emir of the Afghan Taliban. JNIM reportedly operates under a hierarchical militant structure in which AQIM provides directions, strategic guidance, and resources to the allied militant groups.[68] While conforming to JNIM’s strategy, Al Mourabitoun allegedly remains operationally autonomous from the larger group, under the leadership of Sanhaji.[69] Initially, the JNIM collaborated with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Operational coordination between JNIM and ISGS started in November 2017.[70] For example, while ISGS took responsibility for the May 2019 ambush in Tongo Tongo, Niger, which resulted in the deaths of several Nigerien and U.S. soldiers, a local JNIM commander allegedly provided extra fighters for the assault and received a share of the captured loot. This unique "Sahelian exception" to typical conflicts between al Qaeda and Islamic State branches ended in the summer of 2019, as ideological clashes and divisive defections led to renewed hostilities. CSIS estimated that 731 JNIM and ISGS fighters were killed during the clashes between the two groups in 2019 and 2020. CSIS analysts anticipate ongoing local conflicts between JNIM and ISGS.[71] The CSIS analysts suggest that given the intensity of these conflicts, the JNIM-ISGS coordination is not likely to resume in the way seen before.[72]

Additionally, as an Al-Aq'ida (AQ) affiliate, JNIM has a strong rivalry with the Islamic State (IS) branches operating in North Africa and the Sahel region. The formation of JNIM coincided with IS’s loss of territory in Iraq and Syria and the weakening of its regional offshoots, indicating AQ’s strategy of taking advantage of IS’s weakness through JNIM.[73] IS’s recruitment of youth militants, particularly from Tunisia and Morocco, in addition to its aggressive use of social media for recruitment and propaganda purposes, challenges the dominance of AQ and its affiliates in North Africa.[74]

State Sponsors And External Influences

JNIM pledged allegiance to AQ emir Zawahiri and AQIM emir Droukdel in March 2017. The group draws much of its strategic direction from AQIM, AQ, and possibly the Taliban, at large.[75]

Footnotes
Footnotes: 

[1] “Mali: l’attaque contre la base militaire de Boulikessi revendiquée par l’organisation jihadiste d’Iyad Ag Ghali.” Jeune Afrique, 10 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[2] Al Jazeera Staff, “Up to 200 people killed in attack in central Burkina Faso,” Aljazeera, August 25, 2024 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/25/up-to-200-people-killed-in-attack-in-central-burkina-faso.

[3] “Deadliest terror groups in 2024,” Vision of Humanity, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/deadliest-terror-groups-in-2024/

[4] Eills, Jack, “Deadliest Terrorist Groups in 2023”, Vision of Humanity, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/deadliest-terrorist-groups-in-2023/

[5] Joscelyn, Thomas. “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 13 March 2017. Web. 06 July 2018.

[6] Joscelyn, Thomas. “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 13 March 2017. Web. 06 July 2018.

[7] “The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam Wa Al-Muslimeen, JNIM) - Mapping armed groups in Mali and the Sahel,” European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping/jnim 

[8] Chivvis, Christopher S. & Andrew Liepman. “North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response.” RAND Corporation, 2013. Web. 28 Oct. 2015.

[9] Nabli, Beligh. “L’unification du djihadisme sahelien.” L’Economiste Maghrebin, 06 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[10] Cristiani, Dario. “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects.” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 05 May 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[11] Cristiani, Dario. “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects.” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 05 May 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[12] Weiss, Caleb. “Analysis: Merger of al Qaeda groups threatens security in West Africa | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 18 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018; Cristiani, Dario. “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects.” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 05 May 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[13] Taylor, Alan. “Operation Barkhane: France’s Counterterrorism Forces in Africa.” The Atlantic, 24 Oct. 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[14] Weiss, Caleb. “Al Qaeda branch in Mali claims Burkina Faso attacks | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 03 March 2018. Web. 12 July 2018.

[15] “Al-Qaeda-linked Support Group claimed attack on Malia HQ of G5 Sahel force.” Africa News, 30 June 2018. Web. 01 July 2018.

[16] Weiss, Caleb. “Al Qaeda entity involved in communal violence in central Mali | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 27 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018; “Segou: Comment les djihadistes de Kouffa ont tue au

moins 10 miliciens Dozo?” Nord Sud Journal, 24 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[17] Cristiani, Dario. “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects.” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 05 May 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[18] Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2024: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, February 2024. http://visionofhumanity.org/resources

[19] Actor Profile: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), ACLED, November 13, 2023. https://acleddata.com/2023/11/13/actor-profile-jamaat-nusrat-al-islam-wa...

[20] “Terrorist Designations of Iyad ag Ghali.” U.S. Department of State, 26 Feb. 2013. Web. 12 July 2018.

[21] Weiss, Caleb. “JNIM confirms deaths of co-founder, senior leaders in French raids | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 4 March 2018. Web. 12 July 2018.

[22] Weiss, Caleb. “Analysis: Merger of al Qaeda groups threatens security in West Africa | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 18 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[23] Roggio, Bill. “US adds senior AQIM commander to terrorist list | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 16 Feb. 2013. Web. 12 July 2018.

[24] Joscelyn, Thomas. “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 13 March 2017. Web. 06 July 2018.

[25] “Terrorist and Hostage-Taking Related Designations of JNIM and al-Murabitoun Leaders,” U.S. Department of State, April 23, 2024, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-and-hostage-taking-related-designations-...(AAD).

[26] “Terrorist and Hostage-Taking Related Designations of JNIM and al-Murabitoun Leaders,” U.S. Department of State, April 23, 2024, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-and-hostage-taking-related-designations-...(AAD).

[27] "Non-state Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa – Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” ACLED, October 2023, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/JNIM-Non-s...

[28] "Non-state Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa – Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” ACLED, October 2023, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/JNIM-Non-s...

[29] "Non-state Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa – Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” ACLED, October 2023, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/JNIM-Non-s...

[30] "Non-state Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa – Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),”ACLED, October 2023, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/JNIM-Non-s...

[31] “Foreign travel advice: Senegal.” GOV.UK, n.d. Web. 12 July 2018; “The Surprising Suspects behind an Islamist Ambush.” Stratfor Worldview, 18 Oct. 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[32] Ani, Christian, “Timber logging drives JNIM’s expansion in Mali.” ISS, June 19, 2024. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/timber-logging-drives-jnim-s-expansion-in mali#:~:text=JNIM's%20expansion%20into%20southern%20Mali,sedentary%20farmers%20and%20modern%20slavery.

[33] Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2024: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, February 2024. http://visionofhumanity.org/resources

[34] “Mali: Mali: Le chef de Nusrat al-Islam dresse une liste de 11 pays ‘ennemis.’” Maliactu, 15 April 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[35] Thompson. Jared. “Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin”, CSIS, July 15, 2021, https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaa...

[36] Thompson. Jared. “Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin”, CSIS, July 15, 2021, https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaa...

[37] Joscelyn, Thomas. “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 13 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[38] “Mali: Mali: Le chef de Nusrat al-Islam dresse une liste de 11 pays ‘ennemis.’” Maliactu, 15 April 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[39] "Non-state Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa – Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” ACLED, October 2023, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/JNIM-Non-s...

[40] Maiga, Ibrahim and William Assanvo. “Mali’s jihadist merger: desperate or dangerous?” Institute for Security Studies, 03 April 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[41] “Mali: Mali: Le chef de Nusrat al-Islam dresse une liste de 11 pays ‘ennemis.’” Maliactu, 15 April 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[42] “Al-Qaeda-linked Support Group claimed attack on Malia HQ of G5 Sahel force.” Africa News, 30 June 2018. Web. 01 July 2018.

[43] "Non-state Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa – Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” ACLED, October 2023, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/JNIM-Non-s...

[44] Weiss, Caleb. “Al Qaeda entity involved in communal violence in central Mali | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 27 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[45] Nsaibia, Héni, Beevor, Eleanor, Berger, Flore, October 2023. Non-state Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/JNIM-Non-s...

[46] “Mali: l’attaque contre la base militaire de Boulikessi revendiquée par l’organisation jihadiste d’Iyad Ag Ghali.” Jeune Afrique, 10 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[47] Weiss, Caleb. “Al Qaeda entity involved in communal violence in central Mali | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 27 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018; “Segou: Comment les djihadistes de Kouffa ont tue aumoins 10 miliciens Dozo?” Nord Sud Journal, 24 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[48] Weiss, Caleb. “Al Qaeda group claims assault near Mali capital | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 20 June 2017. Web. 12 July 2018; Sangare, Idrissa and Adama Diarra. “Al Qaeda-linked group claims deadly attack at Mali resort.” Reuters, 18 July 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[49] Weiss, Caleb. “Al Qaeda branch in Mali claims Burkina Faso attacks | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 03 March 2018. Web. 12 July 2018.

[50] Weiss, Caleb. “Al Qaeda’s JNIM claims suicide assault in Timbuktu | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 20 April 2018. Web. 12 July 2018.

[51] “Al-Qaeda-linked Support Group claimed attack on Malia HQ of G5 Sahel force.” Africa News, 30 June 2018. Web. 01 July 2018.

[52] “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Mali,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/mali/#:~....

[53] “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Mali,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/mali/#:~....

[54] “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Mali,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/mali/#:~....

[55] “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Mali,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/mali/#:~....

[56] “JAMA‘AT NUSRAT AL-ISLAM WAL-MUSLIMIN (JNIM),” National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), October 2022, https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/jnim_fto.html

[57] “JAMA‘AT NUSRAT AL-ISLAM WAL-MUSLIMIN (JNIM),” National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), October 2022, https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/jnim_fto.html

[58] Karr, Liam. SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT WEEKLY UPDATE, ISW, DECEMBER 15, 2023 HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG/BACKGROUNDER/SALAFI-JIHADI-MOVEMENT-WEEKLY-UPDATE-DECEMBER-15-2023

[59] Karr, Liam. SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT WEEKLY UPDATE, ISW, DECEMBER 15, 2023 HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG/BACKGROUNDER/SALAFI-JIHADI-MOVEMENT-WEEKLY-UPDATE-DECEMBER-15-2023

[60] “Mali: Islamist Armed Groups, Ethnic Militias Commit Atrocities: Provide Accountability, Improve Protection for Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, May 8, 2024 https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/08/mali-islamist-armed-groups-ethnic-mi...

[61] "Al-Qaeda affiliate claims responsibility for June attack in Burkina Faso,” Aljazeera, June 16, 2024 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/16/al-qaeda-affiliate-claims-respo...

[62] Al Jazeera Staff, “Up to 200 people killed in attack in central Burkina Faso,” Aljazeera, August 25, 2024 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/25/up-to-200-people-killed-in-atta...

[63] “Foreign travel advice: Niger.” GOV.UK, n.d. Web. 12 July 2018.

[64] “Terrorist and Hostage-Taking Related Designations of JNIM and al-Murabitoun Leaders,” U.S. Department of State, April 23, 2024, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-and-hostage-taking-related-designations-...(AAD).

[65] "Non-state Armed Groups and Illicit Economies in West Africa – Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),” ACLED, October 2023, https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/JNIM-Non-s...

[66] Weiss, Caleb. “Al Qaeda entity involved in communal violence in central Mali | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 27 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[67] Ani, Christian, “Timber logging drives JNIM’s expansion in Mali.” ISS, June 19, 2024. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/timber-logging-drives-jnim-s-expansion-i...'s%20expansion%20into%20southern%20Mali,sedentary%20farmers%20and%20modern%20slavery.

[68] Weiss, Caleb. “Al Qaeda maintains operational tempo in West Africa in 2017 | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 05 Jan. 2018. Web. 12 July 2018; Waszkewitz, Hauke. “Jihadism’s staying power in North Africa.” Global Risk Insights, 20 March 2018. Web. 13 July 2018.

[69] Weiss, Caleb. “Analysis: Merger of al Qaeda groups threatens security in West Africa | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 18 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[70] Thompson Jared, Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, July 15, 2021. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaa...

[71] Thompson, Jared, “Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin,” CSIS, July 15, 2021. 

[72] Thompson, Jared, Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, July 15, 2021. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaa...

[73] Cristiani, Dario. “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects.” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 05 May 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[74] Cristiani, Dario. “Ten Years of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects.” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 05 May 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.

[75] Joscelyn, Thomas. “Analysis: Al Qaeda groups reorganize in West Africa | The Long War Journal.” The Long War Journal, 13 March 2017. Web. 12 July 2018.