Islamic State in Somalia

Main Tabs Group

Overview

Formed:

January 1, 2015

Formed: 2015

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: On April 25, 2016, ISS took responsibility for an IED attack against an African Union convoy in Mogadishu. (unknown casualties)

Last Attack: On January 1, 2025, ISS attacked a military base in Somalia’s northeast region of Puntland. (22 killed, several injured)

The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS, also referred to as IS-Somalia and ISSP) is a branch of the Islamic State operating in Somalia. It is led by Abdul Qadir Mumin. In 2022, the group was estimated to comprise 500-700 fighters, supported by an unknown number of sympathizers. It has been the target of US military air strikes since 2017.

Narrative

After the 1991 collapse of the Siad Barre regime, Somalia struggled to establish effective governance, resulting in prolonged periods of fragmentation. Various armed groups and militias exploited the power vacuum, and these cycles of violence enabled the rise of the Islamic State.[1]

The formation of ISS (Islamic State in Somalia) was prompted by the Islamic State’s campaign to persuade the Somali jihadist organization Al Shabaab to align with IS instead of al-Qaeda. Despite internal dissent within Al Shabaab, leader Abu Ubaidah rejected IS overtures in September 2015. Meanwhile, Abdul Qadir Mumin, an Al Shabaab commander in the mountains of the largely autonomous Puntland region of northeastern Somalia, began to promote himself as the commander of a separate entity. He then pledged allegiance (or bay’ah) to the Islamic State self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2015.[2] Shortly after, about 20 of the 300 total Al Shabaab members in the region also defected to IS.[3] While ISS pledges of allegiance in 2015 and 2016 to the Islamic State were initially unrecognized, IS officially recognized the Somalia group in 2018.[4]

Relations between ISS and Al Shabaab have remained hostile over the years. ISS initially praised Al Shabaab members and avoided direct criticism of the leadership.[5] However, when Al Shabaab leaders refused to shift their allegiance from al-Qaeda violent clashes between Al Shabaab and ISS began immediately and have continued. In December 2018, ISS reported clashes between the two groups in which 14 Al Shabaab members were killed. Two days later, the IS-sponsored Amaq News Agency released a video depicting ISS ambushing Al Shabaab fighters in a small-scale skirmish. Notably, this clash marked the first time ISS officially claimed an attack on Al Shabaab, despite earlier confrontations. The video released was also the first visual documentation of such clashes to be made public.[6]

Mumin’s remote mountainous location, in the Bari region of Puntland, allowed the group to survive Al Shabaab’s initial attacks and also enabled Mumin to recruit additional militants, particularly from clans marginalized by the Puntland regional authorities. As a result, when Al Shabaab confronted Mumin, local clan forces ambushed the Al Shabaab fighters and permitted Mumin’s escape.[7]

While the Mumin-led ISS has been the most visible IS presence in Somalia, other pro-IS cells also emerged in southern Somalia, some of which pledged loyalty to al-Baghdadi even before Mumin and his group. The southern cells have had limited operational capacity and pose a lesser threat, and connections between the southern groups and Mumin’s ISS are unclear.[8]

ISS emerged as a significant threat to the security of Somalia in October 2016 after capturing and holding the port city of Qandala.[9] ISS retained control of the town until Somali maritime forces and clan militias expelled them in December 2016.[10] The Qandala incident marked the first time ISS held territory within Somalia, and it was particularly notable due to Qandala’s strategic location, which offered port access on the Gulf of Aden and potential connections to Yemen.[11]

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) executed its first air strike against ISS in November 2017.[12] As ISS continued its rapid growth and expanded its reach over the years, counterterrorism efforts intensified, largely through air strikes, as the U.S. coordinated with the Somali government.[13] In January 2021 U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew U.S. special forces from Somalia, although President Joe Biden returned them in 2022. The second Trump administration has declared that special forces will stay in Somalia.

In February and March 2025 AFRICOM, in coordination with Somali government forces, struck multiple ISIS targets in Puntland, including south of Bosaso and in the Golis Mountains. Several airstrikes have been aimed at eliminating key figures within ISS. Notably, a U.S. airstrike in 2024 targeted the group's leader, Abdulqadir Mumin, though it remains unclear whether the operation was successful.[14] In fact, Mumin is thought to now oversee all ISIS affiliates in Africa. In February 2025 Islamic State attack planner and recruiter Ahmed Maeleninine was killed along with 13 other high-ranking operatives.[15]

Local forces have also been active against ISS; in December 2016, for example, Puntland Security Forces (PSF) destroyed an ISS base in a village 30 kilometers south of port town Qandala.[16] In May 2020, the PSF also implemented significant counterterrorism measures against ISS, capturing and killing numerous ISS members.[17] In February 2025 a Puntland military offensive, with air support from the UAE, inflicted serious losses on ISS.[18]

ISS is at a significant manpower disadvantage in comparison to its rival Al Shabaab, a key target of U.S. and Somali as well as allied counterterrorism efforts: for example, ISS was estimated to have only 200-300 members as of March 2023.[19] However, in February 2025 Voice of America reported that “Recent intelligence assessments have further warned IS-Somalia has more than doubled in size over the past year and may now have as many as 1,600 fighters, bolstered by an influx of fighters from Ethiopia, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania and Yemen.”[20]

In November 2019, following the death of first IS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISS swore allegiance to the newly named leader of IS, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.[21] In March 2022, after the death of Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi in a U.S. military operation, ISS pledged allegiance to the new IS leader Sheik Abu-al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and further consolidated its relationship with the IS core.[22]

Because of this relationship, the ISS threat goes beyond Somalia: it became a key part of the global Islamic State financial network and its reach extends to IS affiliates across Africa and beyond. Thus the U.S. has also attempted to curb ISS activity not only through military action but also through the imposition of sanctions, for example on Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf –head of the ISS finance office since late 2019. The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also designated Yusuf as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).[23] These measures block all transactions of U.S. property and assets linked to Yusuf and aim to disrupt ISS activities such as revenue generation through extortion and the distribution of funds to IS branches.[24]

Much support to ISS from the Islamic State takes the form of propaganda. While there is no official media wing for the ISS branch, the central Islamic State has initiated a widespread propaganda campaign in Somalia, aiming to attract discontented individuals to the Somalia branch.[25] The central IS media apparatus, including Amaq, has released numerous photos and videos from Somalia. In addition, other official IS provinces have released videos about or featuring ethnic Somali fighters.[26]

ISS transnational outreach messaging is often delivered in local languages and dialects and it aims to recruit foreign fighters: for example, the group released a video narrated entirely in Amharic, the majority language in Ethiopia. While many Ethiopians are bilingual in Arabic and Amharic, the video likely targeted the transnational Amhara ethnolinguistic community.[27] ISS released a video in January 2019 eulogizing several deceased fighters including at least one Canadian citizen and several regional foreign fighters, although most militants were local Somalis (including some from Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and Djibouti, both areas with predominantly Somali populations).[28]

Since 2022 the ISS al-Karrar financial office has been a crucial financial hub for the Islamic State, one of nine regional offices, moving money from Yemen to Afghanistan to fund weapons purchases and pay IS fighters in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo.[29] However, in the wake of the Islamic State caliphate’s collapse in the Middle East in December 2017, ISS was thought to no longer receive the same funding and resources as during the peak days of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.[30]

ISS has generally engaged in small-scale attacks, including assassinations and attacks in Mogadishu. In 2018, authorities confirmed that ISS carried out more than 15 attacks, surpassing totals from 2016 and 2017. Notably, out of the 45 claimed operations (including the 15 confirmed), 14 occurred in Mogadishu and three occurred in the capital’s outskirts. 12 more occurred in Afgooye, and the group also reported operations in towns such as Bosaso, Baidoa, Bay, Qandala, Jarur in Puntland, and Quf Jadud in western Somalia.[31]

During May 2020, ISS attacks increased. The group claimed four attacks in May, a number that is small compared to other IS branches worldwide but a relative increase from previous months: ISS claimed only four attacks in February and March, and three in April. Three of the four claims in May were part of the Islamic State’s global “Battles of Attrition” campaign, which aimed to demonstrate IS resilience in the face of global opposition and led to increased activity in IS branches across the world.[32]

Beyond the apparent lack of resources to conduct major operations, ISS also appears to have minimal capacity for governance. Even during the 2016 capture of Qandala, it did not attempt to govern or establish any political structure within the town. The choice to forego a government structure was also likely due to a large number of civilians fleeing Qandala during the fighting.[33]

Nevertheless, in recent years ISS has grown rapidly in size and funds. In 2024, reports claimed that the group had doubled in size.[34] Additionally, ISS became central to the financial integration of Islamic State African operations at large, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Uganda, and South Africa.[35] ISS has also been discussed as an international threat. In February 2025, a Swedish court sentenced four men to prison for supporting IS in Somalia, including recruitment, training, and propaganda.[36] However, the court dismissed charges that the four were plotting a terrorist attack in Sweden.

Organization

Vertical Tabs

Leadership

Abdulqadir or Abdiqadir Mumin (2015-present): Mumin founded ISS in 2015 when he defected from al-Shabaab and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Born in Somalia, Mumin spent several years in Europe, first in Sweden and later becoming a citizen of the United Kingdom. In the UK, Mumin gained a reputation as a radical preacher.[37] In 2010, Mumin came under scrutiny by MI5—the UK’s domestic counterintelligence and security agency—due to concerns that Mumin was radicalizing UK citizens in mosques in London and Manchester.[38] As a result, Mumin returned to Somalia to join Al Shabaab.[39] By 2012, he had been sent to the remote northern Puntland region to recruit members. In October 2015 he broke from Al Shabaab to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. In August 2016 the U.S. Department of State designated Abdiqadir Mumin as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).[40] In June 2024, Mumin was targeted in a US airstrike. While there is speculation that he might have been killed, his death has not been confirmed.[41]

Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf (2019-present): As the head of the ISS finance office, Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf has played a significant role since late 2019.[42] Yusuf has been directly involved in the delivery of foreign fighters, supplies, and ammunition for ISIS and has orchestrated the financial operations of ISS by leveraging local communities and financial institutions. Under Yusuf’s guidance, the ISS financial office also serves as a hub for distributing funds and guidance to IS branches and networks across Africa and has even transmitted funds to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K).[43]

Bilal al-Sudani (2015-2023): Bilal al-Sudani was a senior ISIS financial operative and key facilitator for the group’s operations in Africa, particularly for ISS. He was considered one of the most important figures managing the group’s finances in the region and played a central role in funding ISIS activities across Africa and possibly beyond, including in Afghanistan. [44] Before aligning with ISS, al-Sudani was affiliated with Al Shabaab, and he was designated as a terrorist by the U.S. government in 2012.[45] When he shifted allegiance to ISS in 2015, he brought most of his contacts with him and thus was able to become a significant figure within ISIS’s broader network.[46] He was killed in a U.S. special operations raid in January 2023. His death was seen as a major blow to ISIS’s financial and operational infrastructure in the region. [47] His successor is Abdulrahman Fahiye Isse.[48]

Size Estimates

2015: 200 (The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point)[49]
June 2017: 70 (The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point)[50]
November 2017: 200 (United Nations)[51]
February 2022: 500-700 (The Combating Terrorism Center) [52]
July 2022: 200-280 (United Nations)[53]
March 2023: 200-300 (The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point)[54]
February 2025: 1600 (Voice of America)[55]

Name Changes

There are no recorded name changes for this group; however, it is known by several other names:

Islamic State in Somalia (ISS)
IS-Somalia
ISIS in Somalia
Abnaa ul-Calipha
Mahad Moalim
Wilayat al Somal
Wilayat Sumaal
ISIS in East Africa
ISIL Somalia

Resources

ISS has typically obtained funds through extorting financial institutions and local businesses.[56] Its main mechanism is imposing taxes on local Puntland communities using threats to enforce compliance. ISS also seizes food and other essentials through raids on Puntland towns that refuse support.[57] In the first half of 2022, ISS is said to have extorted almost $2 million from local businesses, related imports, livestock, and agriculture.[58] According to the U.S. Treasury Department, since 2022, the Somali branch has likely been ISIS’s key source of revenue, bringing in approximately $6 million, primarily through extortion and exploiting the Somali financial system to launder money via businesses, hawalas, banks, and mobile money transfers.[59] Furthermore, as financial support from ISIS declined, ISS increasingly turned to the illicit taxation of large companies.[60] In particular, the group intimidates and even assassinates Somali businessmen and civilians who do not financially support or provide supplies to the organization.[61]

The group’s regional General Directorate of Provinces, known as the al-Karrar Office, plays a central role in overseeing ISIS’s provincial branches and coordinating the movement of funds across regions.[62] Al-Karrar is one of nine regional Islamic State offices.[63] According to the United Nations, the Islamic State’s most successful regional financial offices include al-Karrar, al-Furqan, and al-Siddiq.[64] Bilal al-Sudani was a key figure responsible for regional financing until his death in January 2023. Since late 2019, ISS’s finance office has been led by ISIS affiliate Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf. [65] In July 2023, the United States sanctioned Yusuf, who reported to al-Karrar Office emir Abdiqadir Mumin and ISIS-Somalia emir Abdirahman Fahiye Isse Mohamud, both of whom had also been sanctioned by the U.S. government.[66]

The group often uses Hawala systems and cryptocurrency. Hawala systems use local brokers to facilitate informal international money transfers for a percentage-based fee. A sender gives cash to one Hawaladar, who notifies another in the recipient’s location to deliver the funds. The two later settle their accounts, sometimes through legitimate banking channels. These transfers are largely unregulated and secretive, making them difficult to target.[67] Cryptocurrency transfers also comprise many international transfers between IS operatives. In early 2023, a United Nations report found that al-Karrar was sending $25,000 per month in cryptocurrency to of their offices, the Afghan-based Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), with a July 2024 report finding that al-Karrar was the ISKP’s top revenue source overall. This is notable because ISKP is one of branches responsible for the deadliest attacks.[68]

Through the Al-Karrar financial office, Yusuf was directly involved in the delivery of foreign fighters, supplies, and ammunition for ISIS, and he orchestrated the financial operations of ISS by leveraging local communities and financial institutions. The ISS financial office also serves as a hub for distributing funds and guidance to IS branches and networks across Africa, and has even transmitted funds to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K).[69] ISS’s Al-Karrar was also found to have transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars to IS operatives in South Africa, who subsequently transferred cash to other operatives in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Specifically, South African operatives sent the funds to branches in Mozambique and the DRC and also other IS offices such as al-Siddiq and al-Furqan, which are two offices aligned with operations in Central Asia and West Africa.[70] The office also facilitated the flow of funds to Afghanistan via Yemen, Kenya, and a cell in the United Kingdom for eventual use by ISIL-K to acquire weapons and pay fighter salaries.[71]

Regarding weaponry, ISS’ access to arms and explosives has been described by the Somali government as limited, with Somali officials describing weapons seized from the group as “old and unsophisticated.”[72] However, ISS has also capitalized on illegal financial flows by utilizing maritime smuggling networks in Northeast Somalia and operating across the Red Sea to acquire light weaponry. For example, according to United States intelligence, ISS member and weapons smuggler Abdirahman Mohamed Omar reportedly completed over $2 million in transactions as of November 2022. These transactions include procuring weapons such as AK-47 machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades for ISS.[73] Additionally, local security forces have intercepted boats filled with arms originating from Yemen and intended for ISS use.[74]

Locations

ISS is predominantly located in the Golis and Bari mountains of Puntland in northern Somalia, a semi-autonomous region bordering on the Gulf of Aden.[75] As of November 2017, its territorial holdings were thought to be small areas in these mountains, where there are few civilians.[76] Its most loyal followers remain in northern Somalia but ISS also has a presence in the capital, Mogadishu, as demonstrated by the attacks it has conducted there.[77] In addition, ISS by 2019 had expanded into southern Somalia and conducted an increasing number of armed attacks in the region.[78]

In the Bari mountains, ISS operated a training camp named after Bashir Abu Numan, a former Al Shabaab commander who switched allegiance to the Islamic State but was later killed by Al Shabaab in 2015.[79] In April 2016, ISS released a propaganda video showcasing the camp through the Islamic State’s Al Furat Media. The video displayed about 12 fighters doing physical and weapons training exercises and featured ISS leader Abdiqadir Mumin giving a speech to the militants.[80]

In September 2019, ISS also showcased the Dawoud al Somali training camp in Puntland’s Bari mountains, named after another killed ISS military leader. Photos showed the new recruits undergoing basic physical and weapons training.[81]

The United Nations also noted the existence of training camps for foreign fighters, particularly Buurta Istiqbaalka in the Cal Miskaat Mountains of Puntland.[82]

Strategy

Vertical Tabs

Ideology and Goals

ISS’ main objective is to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Somalia aligned with the global jihadist ideology of the Islamic State.[83] In particular, Islamic State ideology is rooted in an extremist interpretation of Islamic scripture that adheres to “the Prophetic methodology,” meaning that the group follows the prophecy and example of Muhammad.[84] The ultimate strategic goal of the broader Islamic State is to rule all historically Muslim lands in a caliphate that triumphs over the West, Its ideology emphasizes violent jihad and strict religious enforcement.

As a regional affiliate of ISIS, ISS supports the broader mission by targeting Somali government officials, rival groups such as Al Shabaab, and Western interests in the region. The group seeks to weaken state structures and expand its operations, ideology, and influence. A key part of this strategy involves generating revenue to support the wider ISIS network and distinguishing itself from competitors like Al Shaabab, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda.[85]

For example, on December 25, 2017, ISS released a video urging attacks against Western states and calling on Muslims (particularly those located in East Africa) to join the ISS cause, with an ISS fighter telling potential supporters that killing an “infidel” would serve as their “ticket out of hell.”[86]

Political Activities

There are no recorded political activities for this group.

Targets And Tactics

ISS mainly carries out small, sporadic attacks and assassinations, primarily directed at Somalia government officials and security forces, civilians affiliated with the government, Puntland security forces, African Union Mission in Somalia peacekeepers, business owners resisting extortion demands, and Al Shabaab.[87]

The most common operations are targeted assassinations, primarily aimed at officers of the country’s National Intelligence and Security Agency. Many of its assaults also involve clashes with Somali security forces. It has only targeted African Union forces in four claimed attacks, and has only targeted one government employee, a financial officer in Afgooye. The group also attacked a government office in Bay.[88]

In terms of weapons use, ISS has claimed responsibility for at least five improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Somalia, including its first-ever claim in the country on April 25, 2016. The group also frequently uses hand grenades and firearms in its attacks.[89] ISS has also used suicide bombings as a tactic, particularly car bombings.[90]

Several factors make Somalia attractive for expansion by the greater ISIS network, which enhances its capabilities. Somalia has a weak central government with a GDP ratio of 2.5%, which is one of the lowest globally, and it relies on development assistance and grants. Such weaknesses ensure that ISS is less likely to be outnumbered or overpowered.[91] The proximity to Yemen and the Red Sea are also advantageous for ISS as there are inherent benefits for smuggling routes and maritime activity.[92] Finally, due in part to the economic struggles of the nation, local grievances make the population well suited for recruitment.[93]

Attacks

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

April 25, 2016: ISS claimed its first attack in Somalia when the IS-affiliated news outlet Amaq took responsibility for an IED attack against an African Union convoy in Mogadishu (unknown casualties).[94]

October 26, 2016: Approximately 50 ISS members captured Qandala, a port town in Puntland’s Bari region on the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden with a population of nearly 20,000. Prior to moving into the city, ISS cut the town’s communications off, according to local civilians.[95] During the occupation of the town, ISS leader Abdulqadir Mumin was seen in the city holding talks with local elders.[96] ISS retained control of the Bari district town for a few months, until Somali maritime forces and clan militias expelled the militants in late December 2016 after two major clashes with ISS in prior days.[97] The militants then fled to Gurur, a town in the mountainous areas south of Qandala, and were pursued by Somali troops.[98] The Qandala incident marked the first time ISS held territory within Somalia, and was particularly notable due to Qandala’s strategic location, which offered port access on the Gulf of Aden and hence potential connections to Yemen.[99] The attack also captured media attention, enforcing the broader Islamic State’s narrative diverting attention from its losses in Iraq and instead maintaining the image of expansion and global territorial control (unknown casualties).[100]

January 28, 2017: Heavily armed ISS militants stopped a truck carrying nearly two dozen passengers about 15 miles from Qandala, detaining nine individuals, including off-duty soldiers returning from areas where Somali military forces were battling ISS militants. On February 1, Somali residents found three decapitated bodies with signs of torture near Qandala (3+ killed, unknown wounded).[101]

February 8, 2017: ISS claimed responsibility for an attack on the Village Hotel in Bosaso, the capital of Somalia’s Bari region, when militants stormed the hotel and engaged in a violent shootout with the hotel’s security guards. Reports varied as to the number of attackers, with Reuters identifying three while Somalia media asserted there were seven (6 killed, unknown wounded).[102]

May 25, 2017: ISS claimed its first suicide bombing at a security checkpoint in Bosaso.[103] According to local media, the bomber was first intercepted at a military checkpoint near the Juba Hotel in Bosaso. As security personnel approached, the militant detonated his explosives (5 killed, 12 wounded).[104]

May 18, 2020: ISS detonated an improvised IED on a Somali military vehicle in Mogadishu (unknown casualties).[105]

October 27, 2020: ISS launched an attack against Somali soldiers in Mogadishu (1 killed, 3 injured). [106]

September 25, 2021: An ISS member assassinated two policemen in Mogadishu (2 killed, 0 wounded).[107]

April 19, 2022: ISS detonated an adhesive IED in Mogadishu, injuring Somali police officers and damaging their vehicle (0 killed, unknown wounded).[108]

February 11, 2024: ISS attacked military bases in Puntland, Somalia (100 killed, 60 wounded).[109]

December 31, 2024: ISS attacked security force bases in the Bari region of Puntland using suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide vests (18 killed, unknown wounded).[110]

January 1, 2025: 12 ISS militants attacked a military base in Puntland. The attack used booby-trapped vehicles, killing military personnel from the Puntland forces among others. (22 killed, unknown injured).[111]

Interactions

Vertical Tabs

Designated / Listed

August 11, 2016: The U.S. Secretary of State designated ISS leader Abdiqadr Mumin as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in accordance with Executive Order 13224.[112]
February 27, 2018: The U.S. Secretary of State designated ISS as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in accordance with Executive Order 13224.[113]
September 17, 2019: The Australian Government designated ISS as a terrorist organization under its Criminal Code Division 102.[114]

Community Relations

Regarding recruitment, ISS has aimed to target clans marginalized by the Puntland regional authorities. As a result, the group aims to recruit primarily in northern Puntland, rather than Somali capital Mogadishu, where it executes many of its attacks.[115]

ISS has expanded its ranks by using forced recruitment and kidnapping, typically targeting young boys between the ages of 10 and 15, and indoctrinating them to become ISS militants.[116] However, most ISS members are not Somali. Reports suggest that foreign fighters likely outnumber Somali recruits, with Ethiopians reportedly making up the largest demographic within the group.[117]

The group also interacts with the local community through taxation, as ISS has traditionally gained funds through the extortion of financial institutions and local businesses.[118] Its main mechanism is imposing taxes on local Puntland communities, using threats to enforce compliance. ISS also seizes food and other essentials through raids on Puntland towns that refuse to support the group.[119] In addition, the group intimidates and even assassinates Somali businessmen and civilians who do not financially support or provide supplies to the organization.[120] In the first half of 2022, ISS is said to have extorted almost $2 million from local businesses, related imports, livestock, and agriculture.[121]

Relationships With Other Groups

When ISS formed in 2015, Mumin swore full allegiance to IS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. ISS pledges of allegiance in 2015 and 2016 to the Islamic State were initially unrecognized. During his time as the first caliph of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi did not formally accept Mumin’s bay’a (or pledge of allegiance) to IS, likely due to the fact that ISIS often waits for new groups to prove their viability before granting formal recognition.[122] However, after another video pledge in December 2018, IS acknowledged the Somalia group and its attacks in the IS weekly publication, al-Naba.[123] In 2019, following the death of al-Baghdadi, ISS swore allegiance to the new leader of ISIS, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.[124] In March 2022, after Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was killed in a U.S. military operation, ISS pledged allegiance to the new IS leader Sheik Abu-al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi and further consolidated its relationship with the IS core.[125]

Over time links between ISS and the central Islamic State grew stronger as ISS became a key financial, operational, and logistical hub for IS operations in Africa and even globally. After 2020, when the Islamic State lost its foothold in Syria and Iraq following the defeat of its self-proclaimed caliphate, its center of operations apparently shifted to Somalia.[126] Munim has even been rumored to be the new caliph of IS. ISS has become the key financial hub of IS operations. Its financial office, al-Karrar, transfers funds to IS branches throughout Africa as well as further afield. ISS is also a major recruiter of foreign fighters, for example, from Morocco and Tanzania. According to a UN report in July 2024, the Al-Karrar office is in many ways the connective tissue for a regionally and globally dispersed organization.[127]

Al Shabaab and ISS have a historically hostile relationship. The conflict between the two groups began online when ISS sought to lure Al Shabaab away from parent organization al-Qaeda to join the IS caliphate. ISS communications initially praised Al Shabaab members and avoided direct criticism of its leaders.[128] However, Al Shabaab resisted efforts to shift their allegiance from al-Qaeda, instead working to eliminate IS sympathizers and factions across Somalia. In accordance with parent organization al-Qaeda’s global strategy, its affiliates (including Al Shabaab) have aimed to suppress rival “provinces” since 2015, prompting Al Shabaab to aggressively target ISS. The organization arrested and killed numerous suspected IS supporters, including Al Shabaab commander Abu Nu’man Sakow.[129]

Physical clashes between Al Shabaab and ISS began in November 2015 when al-Shabaab militants killed eight ISS militants, including the leader Bashir Abu Numan, in southern Somalia. Attacks continued in December 2015, when Al Shabaab intelligence wing the Amniyat killed several more ISS members. Shortly after, Al Shabaab launched more attacks on ISS militants in Puntland and Quinyo Barrow in late December 2015. Most attacks were directed towards ISS militants in southern Somalia, while Mumin’s stronger faction avoided most clashes due to its distance from al-Shabaab’s main areas of operation.[130] Mumin’s remote mountainous ISS camp in Puntland enabled his group to withstand Al Shabaab’s offensive.[131]

In December 2018, Al Shabaab publicly accused ISS of jeopardizing the jihadi cause in Somalia and urged its followers to “attack and eliminate the deadly ‘disease’ of IS.”[132] In early 2019, several armed clashes occurred, particularly in the Bari region in northeast Somalia.[133] In 2023 ISS was said to possess only a fraction of Al Shabaab’s strength and numbers.[134] However, as ISS has grown into a major hub in the Islamic State network, its ability to challenge Al Shabaab has also increased. According to the International Crisis Group in September 2024, Al Shabaab has largely regarded ISS as a nuisance and as a source of division within jihadism, not as a serious threat. However, despite much larger numbers, it has not been able to crush ISS largely because it is occupied with its fight against the Somali government.[135]

ISS has also collaborated with Somali pirates. Pirate kingpins were reported to assist ISS by smuggling weapons and potentially personnel across the Gulf of Aden. For example, kingpin Mohamed Garfanje, who leads the Hobyo-Haradhere Piracy Network, aided ISS in acquiring light weaponry through maritime smuggling networks in Northeast Somalia and operating across the Red Sea.[136] Other piracy networks smuggled people to ISS bases in Qandala, Puntland.[137]

State Sponsors And External Influences

There is no observable evidence that this group receives external support from foreign governments or third parties, other than the Islamic State.

Footnotes

Footnotes:

[1] Special Eurasia. “Somalia: Clash between the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab,” February 22, 2024. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2024/02/22/somalia-islamic-state-al-shabaab/.

[2] Hummel, Kristina. “Sub-Saharan Africa’s Three ‘New’ Islamic State Affiliates.” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 1 (January 23, 2017). https://ctc.westpoint.edu/sub-saharan-africas-three-new-islamic-state-affiliates/.

[3] Australian National Security. “Islamic State Somalia.” Accessed July 9, 2024. https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/.

[4] Australian National Security. “Islamic State Somalia.” Accessed July 9, 2024. https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/.

[5] Jason Warner and Caleb Weiss. “A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia.” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 10 (November 2017). https://web.archive.org/web/20180908175734/https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/11/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss10-18.pdf.

[6] Caleb Weiss. “Islamic State Video Purportedly Shows Fight with Shabaab.” FDD’s Long War Journal, December 18, 2018. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/12/islamic-state-video-purportedly-shows-fight-with-shabaab.php.

[7] J. Peter Pham. “US Strikes on ISIS in Somalia Underscore Threat, Vulnerabilities.” Atlantic Council, November 6, 2017. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-strikes-on-isis-in-somalia-underscore-threat-vulnerabilities/.

[8] Jason Warner and Caleb Weiss. “A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia.” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 10 (November 2017). https://web.archive.org/web/20180908175734/https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2017/11/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss10-18.pdf.

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