Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP, also referred to as IS-K or ISIS-K) is a branch of the Islamic State (IS) that seeks to establish an Islamic state in “Khorasan Province,” which includes regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. The group was formed by members of several existing militant organizations – including Al Qaeda, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – who began defecting to the Islamic State in late 2014. IS Central officially announced the formation of ISKP in January 2015.[5] This Narrative Summary is organized chronologically with subheadings that outline each phase of ISKP’s development.
2010-2015: ISKP’s beginnings
Before 2010, many ISKP militants had fought for other militant organizations, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In 2010, the majority of these militants fled Orakzai Agency in Pakistan to the Nangarhar province in Afghanistan to escape the Pakistan Army’s major anti-terror operation, Khwakh Ba dee Sham.[6] After arriving in Nangarhar with their families, the militants claimed to be refugees, or muhajerin, and demanded hospitality from the local Pashtun population. However, as they settled into their new home, the muhajerin continued to carry weapons and display their allegiance to Pakistani militant groups such as the TTP. After TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud died in November 2013, the TTP fragmented. As a result, many of the muhajerin militant groups in Nangarhar began to operate autonomously from the TTP, splitting into smaller, more ruthless factions.[7]
Throughout 2014, these groups operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan as apolitical armed gangs, engaging in extortion and kidnappings for ransom. The mujaherin’s predatory behavior further strained their relationship with the TTP and the Taliban. In 2014, leaflets encouraging militants to defect to IS were found in multiple rural provinces, as well as in cities such as Kabuland Jalalabad.[8] One sign of IS’s growing influence in Afghanistan came in March 2014, when nine former Yemeni and Saudi Al Qaeda leaders defected to IS.[9] Shortly thereafter, several other militant groups operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan – including the Al Tawhid Brigade, Ansar ul-Khilafat Wal-Jihad, and Jundullah – pledged allegiance to IS.[10] The IS position in Afghanistan solidified in July 2014, when Afghan national Rahim Muslim Dost, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee with connections to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, publicly declared his allegiance to IS.[11] This announcement coincided with the release of a booklet called Fata (victory), which advocated the violent establishment of an IS in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.[12]
In the months to follow, the Khorasan chapter grew in strength as TTP commanders defected from the TTP to join IS, following the contentious appointment of Mullah Fazlullah as the leader of the TTP.[13] For example, in October 2014, Hafiz Saeed Khan (who was originally considered most likely to succeed the TTP’s Hakimullah Mehsud) and Shahidullah Shahid (the main spokesman of the TTP) both pledged allegiance to IS. Additionally, the TTP chiefs of Kurram Agency, Khyber Agency, Peshawar, and Hanugu district – who collectively maintained TTP control over the central FATA – defected to IS. This loss for the TTP was an extremely valuable victory for IS, as it provided the group control over Afghanistan’s strategic travel and trade routes stretching from Peshawar to Khyber Pass.[14]
On January 10, 2015, Kahn, Shahid, and the four former TTP chiefs of the central FATA released a video in conjunction with an expanded group of former Taliban commanders and leaders from other jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The video reaffirmed their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the then-caliph of IS, and declared themselves to be the new administrators of the official IS province in Afghanistan. The men, who had appointed Hafiz Saeed Khan as their leader, also claimed to be backed by an even broader network of groups in Khyber, Kunar, and Dir. Immediately after the release of the video, 50 militants from the Amr Bil Maroof group joined the ranks of Kahn’s group. On January 26, senior IS leader and spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani backed this statement, and subsequently named Kahn as the emir for the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP).[15] Adnani encouraged all militants in Khorasan (a historic name for the region including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia) to unite under ISKP.[16] Kahn and his deputy, Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, utilized their existing connections to recruit from the eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan. ISKP quickly attracted new recruits, due to the appeal of its international reputation.[17]
2015: ISKP expansion in Afghanistan
The official establishment of ISKP spurred IS and the Afghan Taliban to officially declare war on one another in January 2015. IS accused the Taliban of relying on a small ethnic and nationalist base for its support, which lacked a widespread Islamic appeal.[18] Concurrently, the Taliban’s base continued to degrade as large numbers of its militants defected from the Taliban to join ISKP.[19]
Within Nangarhar, Afghanistan, the ISKP franchise first took root in the Mamand area of Achin district near the strategically advantageous Tirah Valley corridor, a popular and relatively unregulated militant crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, by February 2015, locals were flying the black IS flag from residences in seven districts in southeastern Nangarhar. In the following month, ISKP also expanded into Afghanistan’s Logar province, establishing a training base and attacking multiple Sufi shrines.[20]
Meanwhile, about five hundred miles southwest of Nangarhar, Abdul Rauf Khadim was leading a parallel effort to establish an IS front in Helmand province. Although Khadim’s cell was well-financed and approximately three hundred men strong, the Taliban surrounded its position. Without access to open supply routes and safe havens in Pakistan, the cell fell to the Taliban by early February 2015.[21]
As the Taliban began to realize the potential threat ISKP posed to its control over the Nangarhar region, it attempted to shut down muhajerin educational institutions and confiscated a shipment of weapons in Mamand. In March and April 2015, the Taliban entered a brief period of inconclusive negotiations with ISKP. By mid-May 2015, the Taliban had become the minority group in the Mamand Valley, Achin, Deh Bala, Kot, and Nazian districts, and was forced to withdraw and regroup.[22]
In May 2015, ISKP established its headquarters in Mamand under the supervision of visiting IS leaders.[23] From mid-May to early July 2015, villagers viewed the group as a benign and positive alternative to the Taliban. Unlike the Taliban, ISKP provided its own food and shelter and did not impose a tax. It also initially allowed both male and female schools to remain open.[24] Furthermore, ISKP commanders claimed that the group had no quarrel with the Afghan government and was instead focused on opposing the Taliban and its link to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Government of Pakistan’s intelligence and covert action agency. With ISKP in power, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and government personnel enjoyed newfound freedom of movement. Viewing ISKP as a valuable counterweight to its longtime enemy, the Taliban, the Afghan government refrained from challenging ISKP for its first two formative months in Nangarhar. In return, ISKP did not attack ANSF or government personnel during May and June 2015.[25]
By the end of June 2015, ISKP had captured or contested much of the Taliban’s territory in Nangarhar and was in control of eight of Nangarhar’s 22 districts. ISKP subsequently attempted to expand and consolidate its control through a variety of cruel tactics, including summary justice, forced displacement, and executions of clerics and elders.[26] Despite attempts by the Taliban to convince IS to leave Afghanistan, local and top-level leadership insisted that the Taliban disband itself and pledge allegiance to the IS caliphate. The Taliban then issued a fatwa and gathered new support from local tribal elders and political elites in order to launch a defensive campaign against ISKP in late June 2015. On July 16, 2015, after killing a dozen Taliban soldiers and detaining 80 locals, ISKP slaughtered an additional ten tribal elders accused of supporting the Taliban.[27] This execution, during which the men were blindfolded and then blown up in a field of explosives, brought international attention when ISKP released the gruesome footage from the attack in a propaganda video.[28]
As ISKP grew more violent, villagers not aligned with ISKP fled their homes for safer locations, such as Jalalabad or Taliban-controlled areas in western Nangarhar. Once the original residents had been displaced, ISKP confiscated abandoned property and allowed ISKP affiliated militants from Kunduz and Helmand to resettle in the area.[29] As a result, ISKP became so entrenched in Nangarhar that it was virtually impossible for the Government of Afghanistan and its security forces to control the area.
ISKP’s ranks continued to grow as Afghan and Pakistani Taliban militants defected to the group in order to escape the pressure of their respective countries’ counterinsurgency operations, such as the Pakistani military’s operation Zarb-e-Azb. Many of the militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan had grown dissatisfied with their own organizations’ nationalist aims and sought a more extreme and global group. The Islamic State attracted Salafi militants in particular, who identified with the ideology and goals of the group.[30] ISKP also partnered with jihadist militant group Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), which increased its operational capacity and broaden its base of its support in Pakistan.[31]
2015-2020: ISKP’s mounting external threats
In July 2015, the Afghan government decided to combat ISKP. The government’s new strategy coincided with U.S. airstrikes against three top ISKP leaders in July 2015, for which it claimed to have provided intelligence support. The Afghan government subsequently announced its official plan to join the United States in combating ISKP. It also established a new unit tasked with fighting the group. In turn, ISKP shifted its policy of tolerance toward the Afghan government to one of open aggression, particularly given its now secure position in Nangarhar. ISKP condemned the Afghan Government for its persecution of Pakistani militants; cooperation with the Pakistan Army and ISI; and support of local, Taliban-backed uprisings against ISKP. Even so, most of its resources were directed at combating the Taliban.
By early autumn of 2015, ISKP was losing favor with Nangarhari locals. Citizens became disillusioned with the group as it engaged in violent tactics and enforced Sharia law with brutal punishments. Examples included school and clinic closures, public executions, killings of tribal elders, kidnappings for ransom, destruction of Sufi shrines, and cigarette bans.[32] One of ISKP’s most unpopular policies was its ban on poppy cultivation, which was an extremely important source of income for many families in Nangarhar. Additionally, rumors began to circulate that local families would be forced to provide ISKP militants with brides, without dowry payments or consideration for tribe and family lineage. Ultimately, this ISKP repression increased public support for the return of the Taliban.[33]
Recognizing this opportunity to strike, the Taliban launched counter-offensives during summer and autumn of 2015. Throughout late 2015 and into 2016, the Taliban and ISKP groups battled for control in Nangarhar, each banishing or brutally executing the losing group’s fighters and sympathizers. Districts such as Chaparhar changed hands multiple times.[34]
On January 4, 2016, the Taliban initiated a large-scale operation against ISKP and succeeded in expelling ISKP from Chaparhar and Bati Kot in only three days. Ultimately, from December 2015 through February 2016, the combined effectiveness of Taliban attacks, local uprisings, U.S. drone strikes, and ANSF and government-aligned militia operations halted ISKP’s territorial expansion. Although ISKP still controlled Achin, Deh, Bala, Kot, and Nazian, the group’s power significantly diminished.[35]
By March 2016, a large number of ISKP fighters and their families had begun to retreat into Pakistan’s Khyber and Orakzai agencies. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced to the Afghan Parliament that ISKP had been defeated in eastern Afghanistan. However, toward the end of March, it was reported that ISKP fighters had begun to return to Nangarhar.[36]
In late June 2016, ISKP used its strongholds in Achin, De Bala, and Pakistani sanctuaries to launch a large offensive against ANSF in central Nangarhar. With approximately 600 fighters, ISKP overran six ANSF posts in Kot. However, it sustained severe casualties (estimates ranging from 50 to 250 killed) from both ANSF ground forces and U.S. airstrikes. In July 2016, the ANSF launched a series of offensive operations against ISKP in partnership with local militias. Some attacks reclaimed territory from ISKP, while others yielded little gain.[37]
Throughout the remainder of 2016, ISKP dug into its remaining districts in Achin, Kot, Nazyan and Deh Bala. They held firm until mid-March 2017, when U.S. and Afghan special forces intensified their offensives against ISKP. In April 2017, the combined special forces launched Operation Hazma, which targeted ISKP in both Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.[38] The combination of ground offensives and night raids with heavy air strikes was particularly effective. In particular, in their 2017 campaign, Afghan and U.S. forces were almost completely successful in clearing Kot of ISKP forces. This was a major blow to ISKP’s territorial control and severed one of ISKP’s main supply routes.[39] However, Afghan and U.S. forces were less effective in Mamand and Pekha, where ISKP was entrenched in caves and mountainous terrain.[40]
In addition to territorial losses, ISKP suffered increased casualties. On April 13, 2017, the United States dropped the most powerful conventional bomb in its arsenal on an ISKP cave complex, reportedly killing four commanders and 94 militants.[41] Then, on April 27, 2017, U.S. and Afghan special forces launched a operation of bombings and commando raids that killed over 30 militants in the heart of ISKP territory. Although the U.S. and Afghan forces were successful in removing several high-value ISKP targets, ISKP managed to exaggerate the raid’s collateral damage for propaganda purposes.[42] Despite these setbacks, on April 2, 2017, ISKP captured nearly half of Chaprarhar in a coordinated offensive against the Taliban while retaining control over most of the Nazyan and Deh Bala districts.[43]
Beginning in October 2017, ISKP and Taliban forces fought for control of the northern Afghan province of Jowzjan. In 2015, Taliban commander Qari Hekmat had defected with his fighters to the Islamic State, taking control of his home district of Darzab in southern Jowzjan.[44] Qari Hekmat overran neighboring Taliban forces in early October 2017. In response, the Taliban mobilized hundreds of fighters in a series of offensives against the northern ISKP enclave.[45] ISKP forces held their ground from December until July 2018 when the Taliban launched a massive offensive and a U.S. drone strike killed Qari Hekmat. Darzab was overrun within weeks, and IS presence was fully quashed by August 2018.[46] Nevertheless, the group continued launching major assaults in Kabul, Heart, and Jalalabad in 2018, particularly on high-profile targets, including voter registration centers and Shiite religious and cultural centers.
2019 was a year of harsh setbacks for ISKP. Following its defeat in Jowzjan and intense fighting across the rest of Afghanistan, the frequency and lethality of the group’s attacks fell sharply.[47] Additionally, in May, IS central announced new provinces in India (al-Hind) and Pakistan: areas where attacks had previously been attributed to the Khorasan branch.[48] In November 2019, U.S., ANSF, Taliban, and local forces succeeded in ousting ISKP from Naganhar province. Both the Taliban and local tribal leaders claimed that without their parallel efforts against ISKP, the ANSF operation would not have been possible.[49] The Afghan government, however, took full credit for the victory and proclaimed that the Islamic State had been “obliterated” in Afghanistan.[50] However, this optimism was misplaced: by the end of the year, many ISKP fighters had evaded capture and withdrawn to Kunar Province or Pakistan. A United Nations Security Council report from January 2020 asserted that 2100 fighters remained in Kunar, and that the Islamic State branch “has proved resilient and continues to pose a threat.” [51]
However, by 2020, ISKP had lost its remaining territory in Afghanistan. After the fall of ISKP in Nangarhar, the Taliban began an advance toward Kunar to eliminate its presence there. In late March 2020, after a month of heavy fighting, the Taliban successfully ousted ISKP from its last territorial stronghold in Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) captured Aslam Farooqi, the leader of ISKP.[52] He would not be officially replaced until June 2020, when IS central leadership appointed Shahab al-Muhajir to head the Khorasan branch.[53]
Despite these territorial losses, ISKP maintained the capacity to execute sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan and was able to continue its brutal terrorist attacks. For example, the group allegedly killed 24 in a Kabul maternity ward in May 2020, and claimed responsibility for attacks on a tutoring center and Kabul University in October and November respectively.[54] ISKP demonstrated a renewed capacity for sophisticated attacks in a raid on a Nangarhar provincial prison in August 2020. A group of ISKP gunmen freed dozens of IS and Taliban prisoners—killing 30 and wounding 50 Security Force personnel in the process.[55]
ISKP’s modus operandi remained focused on sporadic terrorist attacks throughout the next year. Despite losing its territorial holdings, a May 2021 UN Security Council report found a remaining presence in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces of 1500 to 2200 “core” fighters and many in decentralized cells. ISKP also attempted to refill its ranks by encouraging hardline Taliban members (who were disillusioned by the prospect of negotiated peace with the US) to defect.[56]
2021-2024: Shifts in ISKP strategy under Taliban rule
In August 2021, the United States began withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan. Despite an agreement between the United States and the Taliban about the distribution of power in Afghanistan post-withdrawal, the Taliban immediately began to regain territorial control, eventually toppling the Afghan government and taking political control of the country. Amid the chaos, thousands of people – including U.S. citizens and Afghans– scrambled to evacuate from Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul.[57] ISKP targeted the airport in a terrorist attack, killing over 150 Afghan civilians and 13 U.S. military personnel.[58]
The transition to Taliban rule likely aided ISKP’s operations and recruitment. Over the course of 2021, ISKP increased its attacks from 60 in 2020 to 334 in 2021, gaining ground across the Khorasan region. Throughout early 2022, ISKP continued its strategy of one-off attacks against Shiite civilians and Taliban personnel.[59] ISKP successfully increased its presence in Kabul, northern Afghanistan, and eastern Afghanistan, particularly the Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. However, the group still lacked overall territorial control in the country. Despite maintaining a strong presence in some areas, ISKP did not have enough widespread power to pose a viable challenge to the Taliban government.[60]
During early 2022, ISKP expanded attacks to several cities in Afghanistan for the first time, including Kandahar, Charikar, and Kunduz. These new attacks, combined with continued attacks in Kabul and Jalalabad, aimed to undermine the Taliban its claim that it was in full control of Afghanistan. ISKP violence also sought to destabilize the Taliban and pressure it to invest resources and capabilities to protect targeted cities. While these attacks were initially effective, ISKP cells remained weak and were ulimately eliminated by the Taliban.[61]
Under Taliban rule, ISKP shifted its strategy in two ways. First, the group began conducting fewer but more impactful attacks. As the Taliban targeted ISKP-held areas, the montly average of ISKP attacks decreased from twenty-three per month during the Taliban’s first year in control of Afghanistan to four per month between September 2022 and June 2023.[62] Despite this decline, ISKP continued to target high-profile individuals (including foreign actors on Afghan soil) and carry out successful suicide missions, reflecting a shift to more impactful attacks.[63]
Second, ISKP strategy began to look beyond Afghanistan and adopt a more global focus. ISKP amplified its propaganda campaign by establishing an independent media structure and generating content in several languages, including English, Arabic, Farsi, Pashto, and Urdu.[64] These publication languages signaled a new broadening of ISKP’s targets for propaganda. Rather than just focusing on the Taliban and Afghanistan, ISKP content now could reach neighboring countries, including India and Iran; prominent actors in the Middle East, including Israel and Saudi Arabia; and major global adversaries, including China, Russia, and the United States.[65]
Additionally, ISKP began expanding its operations abroad. The group planned violence against a new set of targets, including citizens and diplomats from countries it considered to be supporters of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. This included an attack on the Russian embassy in Kabul in September 2022; transnational attacks in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; and an attack on a Russian concert hall in March 2024. In general, these attacks have inflicted mass casualties against primarily civilian targets.[66]
ISKP also expanded its foreign logistics and financial networks. According to reports from the United Nations, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Turkish judicial documents, ISKP has allegedly used Turkey as a hub for moving fighters, coordinating logistics, and finding targets.[67] In particular, ISKP operatives capitalized on sleeper cells in Turkey and the influx of Afghan refugees entering the country via Iran to conduct financial transfers through Turkey.[68]
ISKP also sought to increase its presence in India. For example, ISKP aimed to capitalize on controversy surrounding remarks made by Indian politicians about the Prophet Mohammad. As a result, the group released statements denouncing the Taliban’s June 2022 bilateral talks with the country. ISKP attacked a Sikh temple in Kabul in June 2022, and the group claimed responsibility for attacks in Tamil Nadu and Mangalore in late 2022. Although the IS branch based in India – known as Islamic State Hind Province – had not made inroads in the country, ISKP remained committed to recruiting Indian Muslims and inspiring violence in India.[69]
Looking ahead, ISKP faces major challenges in carrying out attacks in South Asia. ISKP and its networks in South Asia lack a dedicated structure for planning and executing external operations. Moreover, security pressure from the Taliban makes it difficult for ISKP to organize complex external attacks from its base of power in Afghanistan. ISKP has attempted to increase its recruitment in the region nonetheless.[70] By March 2024, Iraqi security officials believed that ISKP was actively working to build a local network of jihadist cells aimed at facilitating violence abroad..[71]
