Disclaimer: Differentiating between Iran, the IRGC, and branches within the IRGC is difficult given the overlapping nature of these entities. Perpetrators in this profile are referenced in the same manner as they appeared in the original source.
Emergence after the Islamic Revolution
In April 1979, just a couple months after the end of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini announced the demand for the Revolutionary Council to establish Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami, or officially known as the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.[6] Internationally, media outlets and world leaders used Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to refer to the organization but domestically, the IRGC is mainly referred to as Sepah-e Pasdaran or the Pasdaran. His initial vision for these Guards were to be the protectors of the Islamic Republic against potential dissidents as they expanded the ideology of the revolution. In the weeks following Khomeini’s proclamation, the Revolutionary Council dictated specific duties for the IRGC. These included assisting security forces against dissidents, defending the country against foreign activity, expanding the ideas of the Islamic Revolution, coordinating with the traditional Iranian military forces, and supporting sympathetic countries and organizations with financial, logistical, and military support.[7]
In its early days, the IRGC was used alongside other security forces to curb counterrevolutionaries across the country. The IRGC worked with regional Islamist paramilitary groups who sought to enforce the new sociopolitical order of the country. From the ranks of these paramilitary groups, the IRGC drew top fighters into its own organization for further training.[8] During this time period, Iranian college students captured the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and began a 444-dayhostage situation. Soon after the attack, the U.S. placed the first sanctions on Iran, banning all imports and freezing $12 billion Iranian assets.[9] These sanctions marked the beginning of an extensive line of U.S. sanctions placed upon Iran.
The IRGC in the Iran-Iraq War
Soon after its formation, the IRGC became an important force in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraqi forces invaded along the western border of Iran in September 1980, directing operations towards Iranian Air Force posts. Saddam Hussein and Iraqi politicians at large feared the expansion of Iranian revolutionary ideas into Iraq and the potential threat of Khomeini rallying the large Iraqi Shia population against the Sunni Ba’athist regime.[10] Prior to the Iraqi invasion in September 1980, the IRGC remained a volunteer militia that lacked formal training and experience.[11] The organization lacked the financial support of politicians and nationalists, who preferred the traditional military forces who had a deep history of combat training and legitimacy. When the ruling clerics voiced their full trust in the IRGC’s capabilities, the organization began garnering funds for proper training and equipment.[12]
The IRGC’s rise to success in the war was due to the relative weakness of the traditional army who had yet to rebound from its losses during the revolution.[13] The army was unable to push Iraqi forces back to the internationally-recognized border, thus the deployment of individual IRGC units was necessary for support. During the beginning of the war, the IRGC consisted of small units of fighters throughout the border cities who were fighting of their own volition.[14] In order to provide structure for these scattered units, commanders within the IRGC formed the Operation Headquarters of the South which coordinated larger operations involving all available forces.[15] By the end of 1981, the IRGC gained credibility and support throughout the Iranian government. A change in presidency shifted political support in favor of increasing IRGC operations seen after the success of the Basij militia.
In April 1980, Khomeini founded the Basij militia, which continues to operate as a volunteer paramilitary organization under the IRGC.[16] The Basij militia would provide the military training necessary for all citizens to engage in the armed defense of Iran, if need be.[17] In 1981, the Basij militia merged with the IRGC, bolstering the numbers and skill throughout the organization in the Iran-Iraq War.[18] The Basij militia was deployed with the regular Iranian army, having previously only assisted in keeping peace in major cities and towns.[19] Many of the recruits were young boys from poor backgrounds or forced into conscription.[20] In 1981, the Basij militia became a branch of the IRGC and operated under its command. After the war and with an uptick in social reform protests, the Basij militia mobilized for suppressing protests in schools, factories, and streets.[21]
In the early 1980s, the IRGC formed the Badr Corps, an Iraqi Shia militant organization, as the armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).[22] Iran used the Badr Corps to mobilize and arm the Iraqi Shia and anti-Saddam Hussein populations during the Iran-Iraq War. The IRGC’s ability to influence groups across Iranian borders compounded its credibility as a legitimate military organization among the ruling elite. After the war ended, Iran financed the SCIRI’s successor, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.[23] The IRGC-QF, after its formation in 1988, considered the Badr Corps an official unit and provided training and weapons for the Corps prior to 2003 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.[24]
The increase in government support for the IRGC enabled the organization to capitalize on its original goal, expanding the revolution to other countries. In the early 1980s, the IRGC established the Office of Liberation Movements (OLM) which deployed forces to Lebanon to assist in organizing the Shia militias into a larger movement – Hezbollah's predecessor.[25]As the OLM focused on the Lebanese Shia movement, it also absorbed SAVAK, Iran’s main intelligence organization at the time, which collected information on groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan. The combination of the OLM and SAVAK became the predecessor of the Quds Force intelligence wing.[26]
In the later years of the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC acted as a fully functioning security organization that fought alongside the military, and eventually usurped them in power and influence. When Ruhollah Khamenei took power as Iran’s supreme leader, he adamantly supported the IRGC which enabled the organization to increase its influence both economically and politically after the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988.[27]
In 1987, Kuwait requested American maritime protection as Iran stationed naval forces and placed naval mines in the Persian Gulf to cut off Iraqi resupplies.[28] The Reagan administration agreed to accept 11 Kuwaiti tankers into the U.S. Navy and began Operation Earnest Will, a 500-mile convoy from Kuwaiti waters to the Gulf of Oman.[29] Throughout the operation, these tankers were targets of Iranian missile attacks and naval mines. After an Iranian missile struck down a U.S. tanker anchored in Kuwait City, the U.S. Navy executed Operation Nimble Archer in which they shelled two platforms in Iran’s Rostam oil field.[30] These platforms were being used by the IRGC as bases for attacking shipping barges rather than oil supply. The IRGC Naval Forces also had fleets of smaller boats stationed throughout the Gulf that could maneuver around the convoy and obstruct the convoy’s route.[31] The success of the IRGC’s small boats and naval mines demonstrated Iran’s ability to contend with U.S. attacks despite weaknesses in Iran’s conventional warfare strategies.
After the U.S. shelling of Rostam, attacks between the two navies dwindled. However, tensions escalated when the U.S. mistook Iran Air Flight 655 as an Iranian fighter plane and killed 290 passengers in a missile attack in July 1988.[32] A month later, Iran and Iraq agreed to the U.N.-mediated ceasefire, ending the 8-year long war.
IRGC in the 90s
With Ayatollah Khamenei’s strong support of the IRGC, the organization looked to other Shia groups to expand influence. In 1992, the IRGC and Hezbollah began training Hamas fighters in suicide bomb tactics.[33] The IRGC also began expanding into the Iranian defense industry, and in several years, had become a commanding presence in the infrastructure, communications, and energy sectors.[34] Iran was in need of major reconstruction efforts after the war, and the IRGC, given its newfound strength and funding, was able to begin its economic expansion.
The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) rose in importance during the 1990s. The Quds Force is known to assist MOIS in carrying out operations to maintain Iranian national security. Some of Hezbollah’s most well-known attacks, specifically the Buenos Aires attacks in 1992 and 1994 were supplemented by MOIS support.[35] Hezbollah received logistical support from both MOIS and the IRGC throughout the operations, which heightened the cooperation between the IRGC and other government security forces within Iran. Under the Iranian constitution, the IRGC must comply with MOIS policies and is allowed to collect and analyze intelligence to support the MOIS in countering political opponents.[36] This relationship remains today as the MOIS helps the Quds Force manage communication and logistics with foreign entities in return for intelligence reports from the Quds Force.[37]
U.S. Presence and IRGC Fighters in the Syrian Civil War
In the early 2000s, the U.S. placed new sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, specifically its uranium-enrichment programs. The IRGC, allegedly, maintains a significant amount of control and oversight in Iran’s nuclear program, justified by its function of sustaining Iranian national security.[38] Through a series of asset freezes, the U.S. sanctioned several companies that were linked to the IRGC – either through ownership or affiliation – and were involved in nuclear energy.[39] These sanctions also blocked Iranian access to nuclear materials and placed Iran’s uranium-enrichment programs under international scrutiny. Some of these sanctions would be lifted with the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, however, these sanctions hindered Iran’s progress to create nuclear weapons for years. These sanctions also significantly damaged Iran’s economy, which in turn decreased available funds for the IRGC. During this time, the IRGC relied on its foreign fighters to expand the goals of the Islamic Revolution.[40]
After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, the IRGC capitalized on the opportunity to mobilize Iraqi Shia militias against the increased American presence.[41] The Quds Force worked with these militias to attack U.S.-led forces throughout Iraq, often staying in the houses of top-ranking Iraqi Shiite politicians for security and coordination.[42] The Iraqi branch of the IRGC’s Shia Liberation Army, the Hayderiyoun Division, was an IRGC-backed Shia militia that later grew in importance during the Syrian Civil War.
When the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, the IRGC encouraged the Syrian Shia minority to assemble into militias and defend holy Shia sites from rebel fighters. Within Syria, the town of Zabadani was especially critical for the Quds Force because it acted as an IRGC support hub for Hezbollah.[43] In Zabadani, located near the border between Syria and Lebanon, the IRGC could send logistical support and communicate quickly with Hezbollah forces nearby. Iran, in general, also had interests in maintaining the Assad regime since Syria supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq War.[44]
In 2012, the IRGC began deploying its own militias from the Shia Liberation Army (the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the Zaynibyoun Brigade and the Hayderiyoun Division) into Syria to fight Syrian rebel militias.[45] These militias were recruits and refugees, especially within the Afghan division, who were economically disadvantaged and took the competitive salaries offered by the IRGC. In addition to their proxy militias, the IRGC also sent its own soldiers into Syria as the conflict continued. In January 2012, Syrian rebels in the Farouq Battalion captured seven Iranians who were believed to be members of the IRGC.[46] The following February, Syrian rebels killed IRGC commander Hessam Khoshnevis who was traveling to Lebanon from Damascus.[47] In 2018, an estimate stated at least 2,100 Iranian soldiers died in the conflict.[48]
Implementation of the JCPOA and Beyond
In 2015, the U.S. brokered the JCPOA with Iran, Russia, China, the U.K., France, and Germany which lifted economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for a decrease in Iranian nuclear activities and consistent international monitoring of these nuclear programs. President Trump announced he would leave the JCPOA in May 2018 due to Iran’s continued destabilization in the region and reinforce strict sanctions against Iranian oil exports.[49] As of October 2022, the Biden administration seems open to resuming the deal with Iran, but the U.S. designation of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism and the IRGC designation as a terrorist organization hinders cooperation.[50] Some reports believe that if the Biden administration were to enact a new nuclear deal, sanctions that indirectly decreased monetary flows to the IRGC would be relieved, thus providing more pathways of funding for the organization.[51]
With the success of proxy militias in the Syrian Civil War, the IRGC continued to expand into new regions. Iran, most likely through the IRGC, sent weapons and training to Bahraini militias who later carried out attacks against Bahraini security forces.[52] Militias like Saraya al-Mukhtar continue to conduct attacks against Bahraini officials despite U.S. sanctions and Bahraini government crackdowns on terrorism.[53] Sometime between 2015 and 2019, IRGC officials assumed commanding positions within Ansar Allah in Yemen to assist in smuggling operations and training.[54] In 2018, the European Union discovered Iranian agents in several European countries plotting assassinations and bombings in Albania, Denmark, and France.[55] This global presence urged the U.S. to designate the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization the following year.[56] Since 2018, majority of the IRGC’s operations have remained in the Middle East region, with continued support for groups in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain.
In September 2022, Russian-deployed Iranian drones were discovered in Ukraine in the Ukraine War. Iran didn’t directly deny selling drones to Russia in the diplomatic aftermath.[57] Given that the IRGC oversees foreign operations, it is probable that IRGC officials were involved in the selling of these drones to Russia, even if sources only cite Iran as the perpetrator. As of October 2022, IRGC officials are on the ground in areas of Russian occupation in Ukraine to assist Russian forces in using the drones.[58] The deployment of IRGC personnel in Ukraine marks the first time Iran has participated in a war on the European continent
