Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH, “League of the Righteous” in Arabic) is an Iran-backed Shiite militant organization. It is also sometimes called the Khazali Network. AAH was formed in January 2006 by Qais al-Khazali as a splinter group from a Shiite militia operating in Iraq known as the Mahdi Army. AAH is often referred to as one of the “Special Groups,” a term used by the U.S. military to denote the Iranian-controlled Shiite militias operating in Iraq.[3]
Before founding AAH, Khazali commanded a brigade within nationalist Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi or JAM). The Mahdi Army was a Shiite militia established in 2003 in response to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. By 2004, Khazali and his followers within the Mahdi Army began to act independently of the group’s leadership. Most notably, Khazali and his faction continued to fight U.S. troops in the summer of 2004 despite Sadr’s order to the Mahdi Army to lay down its arms.[4] While Khazali ultimately reconciled with Sadr, he split from the Mahdi Army with most of his brigade in early 2006. In establishing a new splinter group, Khazali sought greater autonomy and an opportunity to challenge Muqtada al-Sadr for authority among the Shiite armed groups.[5]
Coinciding with his split from Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army, Khazali and his armed group were recruited by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC began training a new coalition of militias in Iraq, and it invited Khazali to serve as the head of this “Special Groups Network,” which became known as the Khazali Network.[6] The militant group operating under the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) name and with Khazali as its leader was first active in Iraq as early as July 2006, immediately after Khazali took over as head of the Iranian Special Groups Network. There is some uncertainty regarding the relationship between AAH and Khazali’s Special Groups Network. Evidence suggests that AAH and the Khazali Network are two names for the same militant organization. However, it is possible that AAH was one of multiple affiliates comprising the Khazali Network. [7] Given the overlapping leadership of AAH and the Khazali Network, this profile treats these two entities as different names for the same militant group.
Since its inception, AAH has relied heavily on Iranian funding, training, and logistical support. The group is one of Iran’s most influential and capable proxies in Iraq, carrying out Tehran’s agenda and promoting its interests.[8] Shortly after the group’s creation, AAH elements fought alongside Hezbollah, another Iranian proxy militant organization, in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War.[9] AAH’s fighters in Lebanon were extensively trained and funded by the IRGC.[10]
At its inception in 2006, AAH’s main targets were U.S. coalition troops in Iraq. Between 2006 and 2011, the group claimed responsibility for over 6,000 attacks on U.S. forces.[11] Following an attack in March 2007 in which five Americans were killed in Karbala, Iraq, U.S. forces captured Khazali and Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq. Akram al-Kabi, a close confidante of Khazali’s and one of the AAH’s top military commanders, temporarily assumed command of the organization until Khazali’s release in early 2010.[12]
In 2008, Muqtada al-Sadr demanded that Kabi re-unite AAH with the Mahdi Army, but Kabi refused.[13] After the Iraqi Army seized Basra from the Mahdi Army and other Shiite militia groups in 2008, the Mahdi Army negotiated peace with the government, while many of AAH’s leaders fled to Iran. While in Iran, exiled AAH members received additional training and logistical support from the Iranian government and IRGC.[14] AAH members who remained in Iraq continued to target coalition forces and the former Mahdi Army members.[15]
In December 2009, AAH orchestrated Khazali’s release in exchange for the remains of one accomplice of Peter Moore, a British computer consultant whom AAH kidnapped along with his four bodyguards in May 2007.[16] Moore’s four bodyguards were killed by AAH while in captivity.[17] In February 2010, the group took another Western hostage, U.S. Department of Defense contractor Issa T. Salomi. Salomi was released in March 2010 in exchange for the release of four AAH fighters whom the Iraqi government had imprisoned.[18]
Shortly after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki invited the group to enter the political process. AAH began to reorient itself toward formal politics and away from militancy in this new context.[19] The group sought to rebrand itself as an Iraqi nationalist political party. AAH shifted its goals from solely removing the U.S. military presence in Iraq to maintaining a Shiite-controlled Iraqi state, expanding Iranian influence in Iraq, eclipsing the Sadrists as the most influential Shiite group in Iraq, and providing social services to Iraq’s Shiite population. AAH also expanded its operations and established a political office in Beirut, Lebanon, cementing its close ties to Hezbollah. Despite its new focus, the group did not renounce its former militancy and refused to surrender its weapon caches to the Iraqi government.[20]
In 2012, AAH attempted to garner support for its pro-Iranian political agenda by launching a campaign in which it distributed over 20,000 posters of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, throughout Iraq.[21] The group also conducted a series of assassinations of Sadrist leaders, hoping to weaken the group and take its place as the preeminent Shiite political faction in the country.[22] At Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s request, AAH formed a political wing, al-Sadiqoon (“the sincere ones” in English), ahead of the 2014 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[23] Al-Sadiqoon’s leader, Adnan Fihan al-Dulaimi, who is not known to be a member of AAH, appeared in military fatigues in videos published through AAH-affiliated Al-Ahed TV and carries the title “sheikh,” indicating a background in religious studies.[24]
Al-Sadiqoon won a single seat in Iraq’s 2014 parliamentary elections and allied itself with Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qanoon (“State of Law” in English) coalition.[25] Hassan Salem Abbas Jabr held Sadiqoon’s first and only parliamentary seat from 2014 to 2018, representing Baghdad province. The extent of Hassan Salem’s connection to AAH proper is unclear. However, he notably appeared alongside several AAH leaders at a memorial service in 2019.[26] After AAH’s entrance into politics, the group remained partnered with Maliki and his political coalition. AAH quickly earned itself a reputation for being the military muscle behind Maliki’s Shiite political bloc.[27] For instance, in 2013, the Maliki government allegedly used AAH fighters to police Anbar province instead of the formal Iraqi police.[28]
Beginning in 2013, AAH focused on countering the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, participating in battles in the Salah al-Din, Ninewa, Anbar, Najaf, Diyala provinces and Baghdad in Iraq,[29] and along the Syria-Iraqi border and Aleppo in Syria.[30]
AAH fought alongside other militia groups, Iraqi security forces, and U.S. troops as a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, Hashd as-Shaabi in Arabic). Founded in 2014, the PMF is a state-sponsored umbrella group composed of approximately forty Iraqi militias, the largest number and most powerful of which are Shia.[31] Lacking a strong regular security force, the Iraqi government partnered with sectarian militias, some of which had existed for decades, to assist in liberating IS-held areas.[32] For AAH, the PMF apparatus was an important source of influence and recruitment. As a constituent group within the PMF, AAH gained many recruits amongst the Shia tribes of southern and central Iraq.[33]
AAH was deployed to some of the most highly-contested areas in Iraq in the battle against IS. For instance, the group led the Shiite militias in the battle for Amerli in 2013-2014 and Samarra in 2015-2016.[34] In retaliation, IS carried out a suicide attack at a soccer match sponsored by AAH in a town south of Baghdad in March 2016.[35]
Along with AAH operations against the Islamic State, the group was accused of human rights violations in Iraq. In late 2013 and early 2014, reports surfaced of AAH fighters jailing or executing anti-Maliki Sunni Arab tribesmen in southern and central Iraq. Human Rights Watch reported that AAH fighters killed 109 Sunni men in the outskirts of Baghdad between March 2014 and July 2014.[36]
In Syria, AAH had three goals: to defend the Assad regime, weaken and turn back the advance of the Islamic State (IS), and secure Iranian strategic interests. In 2013, AAH worked in conjunction with Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), another Iranian-backed Shiite militia group, to establish Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (Nujaba), which served as a front organization to channel AAH and KH fighters into Syria.[37] Run by Akram Kabi, Nujaba operates as its own Iran proxy group as of 2025.[38] Iran continued to provide logistical and financial aid in support of AAH’s operations during this time, sharing an estimated 1.5-2 million USD with the group each month.[39]
As a member of the PMF, AAH cooperated with U.S. forces to target IS. Despite the group’s opposition to the United States during its occupation of Iraq, AAH shifted its anti-U.S. position. In 2015, an AAH spokesman released a statement that communicated the group’s willingness to accept a U.S. military presence in Iraq to combat IS insofar as the U.S. presence operated under the supervision of the Iraqi government.[40] In March 2016, reports surfaced that AAH was in possession of several U.S. vehicles and military equipment, including at least two M113 armored personnel carriers.[41] However, on March 21, 2016, AAH released an anti-U.S. statement via its television channel, al-Ahad: “if the U.S. administration doesn’t withdraw its forces immediately, we will deal with them as forces of occupation.” The statement was likely released in response to an announcement made by the United States that it sent additional troops to Iraq to bolster coalition efforts against IS.[42]
In 2017, AAH played integral roles in multiple PMF-led offensives against IS. AAH’s most notable efforts were in offensives against the Islamic State near al-Qa’im and Kirkuk.[43] Photos of the al-Qa’im offensive show the AAH using expensive military equipment, including what appeared to be an Iranian T-72 tank.[44] During the offensives, AAH also continued to engage in sectarian targeting and violence, reportedly raiding Sunni homes in Kirkuk.[45]
AAH also participated in recapturing the town of Abu Kamal on the eastern border of Syria in November of 2017.[46] While this episode occurred as part of the counter-IS campaign in Syria, it illustrates how Iran has used its proxy forces to pursue strategic depth in the Middle East. Abu had great strategic value: its seizure created a land route from Iran to Lebanon, allowing Iran to directly supply ordnance to Hezbollah.[47] After the operation, Khazali traveled to the Israel-Lebanon border with a Hezbollah escort and emphasized his group's willingness “to stand united with the Lebanese people and the Palestinian cause in the face of the Israeli occupation.”[48] This appearance demonstrated the extensive links between the various Iran-backed militant groups, such as AAH and Hezbollah, allowing the movement of ordnance and troops between Iraq and Lebanon through an Iranian-supported network.
While AAH’s everyday combat activities against IS in Iraq decreased in frequency and scope after 2017, the group continued to conduct military operations in Iraq. Since 2017, the group has operated primarily in Salah ad-Din, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Ninewa provinces and in Baghdad.[49] PMF brigades known to be under AAH and its affiliates control the 41st, 42nd, and 43rd PMF brigades.[50] In addition to controlling individual groups, AAH and its associated militia groups control PMF regional commands. The PMF has 12 regional commands, each of which controls PMF operations within an area of Iraq. As of March 2024, the Baghdad operations commander is Hussein al-Samahi, an AAH affiliate, and the Salah ad Din operations commander is Safaa al Saadi, an AAH affiliate.[51]
As the fight against IS in Iraq progressed, AAH also invested further in parliamentary politics.[52] In January 2018, AAH’s political affiliate al-Sadiqoon joined the Fatah al-Mubin coalition (“Manifest Victory” in Arabic). The Fatah coalition consisted primarily of the political wings of PMF units supported by Iran.[53] In the 2018 elections, the Fatah coalition won 47 out of 329 seats, the second most behind Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoon alliance (which won 54 seats). Of Fatah’s 47 total seats, AAH’s political wing al-Sadiqoon won 14.[54] Spokesmen for AAH indicated a clear desire to expel U.S. forces during the run-up to the election. This rhetorical campaign culminated in Fatah’s instrumental role in orchestrating the passage of a January 2020 parliamentary resolution calling on the government to expel U.S. troops from Iraq.[55] This turn to politics did not preclude militia retribution and action against Iraqi ethnic minorities. Despite the IS loss of territory, the 42nd PMF was accused of killing eight Sunni civilians in al-Farhatiyah in October 2020 while also forcing Christian civilians to leave their home in Ninewa province. [56]
In response to growing internal discontent in Iraq, AAH sought to suppress demonstrations and intimidate protesters. Beginning in October 2019, anti-government protestors demonstrated in Baghdad and across Iraq’s southern provinces. Their grievances centered on government corruption and failure to foster economic opportunity and provide public services.[57]As the movement progressed, protestors condemned Iran for enabling government corruption and interfering in Iraqi affairs through the PMF.[58] Iraqi security forces forcefully cracked down on protests with tear gas and live ammunition, and over 100 people died as a result of the violence in the first six days of demonstrations.[59]
By January 2020, the death toll from the protests was over 600, with thousands of injuries and an unknown number of arrests and torture cases.[60] Iraqi Interior Ministry spokesman Saad Maan released a statement that Iraqi security forces did not fire on protestors and that all mass shooting deaths were the responsibility of militant groups.[61] PMF spokesman Ahmed Jassim al-Asadi denied any PMF presence.[62] However, experts assess that AAH sought to suppress demonstrations and intimidate protesters as they believed the systemic change to Iraq’s political system the protesters demand would diminish AAH influence within the country. Activists and observers, including the U.S. government, accused AAH of using violent tactics to disperse and intimidate protesters in Baghdad, Nasiriyah, and other major cities. Observers accused AAH of deploying snipers on top of roofs overlooking major protest sites.[63] AAH and other major militias were also blamed for the disappearances and killings of prominent protest movement leaders and civil activists in Iraq.[64] AAH spokespeople and Khazali denied all accusations levied against the group.[65]
On January 3, 2020, the United States conducted a drone strike killing IRGC QF Commander Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani and KH leader and Deputy PMF Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.[66] In response to the strike, Khazali released several statements across social media supporting Iran’s response on January 8 and vowed an “earthshattering” response by the Iraqi groups.[67] AAH also partnered with militias to form the Usbat al-Thaereen (English: League of the Revolutionaries).[68] Experts also observed a spike in attacks against U.S. bases following the drone strike.[69] As part of the wave of attacks, AAH rockets struck the U.S. Embassy in November and December 2020 and several sites in Erbil in February 2021 (see the major attacks section for more details on AAH affiliated strikes).[70] AAH and other militias also began using front organizations for their operations. AAH utilized the Ashab al-Kahf (though Ashab al-Kahf now appears to be a front group that shares ties with both AAH and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba[71]), Liwa Khaibar and Quwwat Dhu Faqar brands in its attacks. [72] AAH and its allies also utilized different social media channels, most often on Telegram, to take credit for attacks and give themselves plausible deniability.[73]
In May 2020, Mustafa al-Kadhimi was appointed Prime Minister of Iraq with the support of Muqtada al-Sadr over the objection of the Iran backed militias. The appointment was especially insulting to the Iran backed groups given Kadhimi’s past roles with the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, which the PMF saw as partially responsible for the Soleimani drone strike.[74] Once in office, Kadhimi cracked down on the Iran backed militias amid their escalation in force against the United States following the Soleimani drone strike. His office attempted to control PMF groups, remove corrupt and militia backed officials from the government and security services, and cut off militia illicit funding streams.[75] Khazali criticized Kadhimi’s efforts, calling his actions illegal.[76]
This period was also marked by internal divides between AAH and KH. Between October 2020 and February 2021, KH agreed to a partial ceasefire, limiting its kinetic activity against the United States. However, AAH ignored the ceasefire and continued to attack U.S. bases to force the United States out of the country. KH attacked AAH illicit business interests to coerce AAH into following its guidance and adhering to the ceasefire.[77] The KH-AAH confrontation also played out in public, with KH criticizing AAH’s continued use of force against the United States, and also claiming that AAH attacks did no damage, while AAH argued that KH was ineffective at pressuring the United States to leave Iraq.[78]
During this period, IRGC-QF control over the militias appeared to decrease and relations with AAH fractured. Observers argued that Esmail Ghaani, Soleimani’s successor as head of the IRGC-QF, was unable to exert the same degree of authority over the IRGC’s Iraqi proxies, leading to observed disagreements in strategy between the two throughout 2020.[79] In November 2021, Khazali made statements critical of Iran’s support for the proxy groups in Iraq. However, experts assess that by December 2021 Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, with the support of Ayatollah Khamanei and a shifting strategy that prioritized influencing Iraqi politics instead of kinetic action, attained full control of the PMF activities – and in 2022, Khazali made statements praising his leadership.[80] As of 2025, Khazali regularly travels to Tehran to meet with Khamenei and has been seen publicly and prominently with Iranian leadership.[81]
Prior to the October 2021 elections AAH, Badr, and KH, among others again formed the Fatah alliance. Sadr dominated the election, winning 73 seats to Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qanoon coalition 33 and the Fatah Alliance’s 17. The result was a disaster for AAH and the Iran backed groups, as it significantly diminished their power in the parliament and represented a rejection of their message and ties to Iran. The Fatah coalition called the elections fraudulent.[82]
In response to the electoral failure, AAH and its associated militias ramped up efforts to disrupt Iraq. AAH and Badr organized protests beginning October 19, 2021 demanding a recount of the ballots. On October 31 (reports indicate either October 30 or 31), an unidentified militia launched four Katyusha rockets at the Green Zone in Baghdad. Experts believe that AAH was likely responsible for the attacks based on the launch location and that they were aimed at the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). On November 5, AAH supporters and protestors clashed with Iraqi security forces. Between 1 and 3 were killed and over 100 were injured.[83] On November 6, Khazali gave a speech threatening Kadhimi, claiming he would pay for the deaths of the AAH supporters.[84]
On November 7, two to three quadcopter drones matching those used in previous Iran backed militia operations attacked the residence of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi in the green zone in Baghdad in an apparent assassination attempt. While AAH and its counterpart militias denied involvement, experts assess that AAH was responsible and that the operation was carried out with support from KH and the knowledge of Qais al-Khazali and Laith al-Khazali (Qais’s brother and military leader within AAH – see leadership for more details on Laith al-Khazali). Kadhimi escaped the attack unharmed, while several members of his security team were injured.[85]
The 2019 protests, the strikes against Soleimani and Muhandis, and the 2021 election results put AAH and the other Iran backed groups in a difficult position and threatened their dominance over the Iraqi political space. However, with the support of the IRGC QF (and specifically IRGC QF Commander Esmail Ghaani), AAH, the PMF, and Iran utilized political maneuvers and targeted kinetic action to expand their influence over Iraq. The strategy began with Ghaani, in partnership with Nouri al-Maliki, meeting with Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Court’s head Judge Faiq Zaydan in January 2022. In February 2022, Zaydan and the court ruled that a simple majority in parliament was not sufficient to appoint the President, and instead, a two-thirds majority was required to form a government, effectively preventing Sadr from excluding the Iran backed political parties from his government.[86] The change prevented Sadr from forming a government, and in June 2022, Sadr instructed his 73 members of parliament to resign in June 2022.[87] In August, he announced he would be stepping back from politics, leading to mass protests in the green zone of Baghdad and clashes between the PMF and Sadr backed groups.[88] With Sadr out of the picture, AAH, the Fatah Alliance, and Maliki installed Mohammad Shia al-Sudani as Prime Minister.[89] Experts assess Khazali benefited more than any counterparts (with former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in a close second). The end result of Sudani in power gave Khazali and AAH extreme influence over the Prime Minister’s office and other areas within the government and demonstrated his use to Ghaani.[90]
In the period following Sudani’s appointment, AAH and the other militias purged the government, including the security forces of those loyal to Kadhimi. AAH took key positions within the government to maximize its influence including in Counter Terrorism Service, National Security Service (NSS), several border crossings and airports, the Communications and Media Commission, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Oil, the Petroleum Contracting and Licensing Directorate, and in the Prime Minister’s office.[91] Some of the officials that took these roles were previously associated with AAH attacks. For example, Adnan Fayhan al-Dulaymi, the Governor of the Babil province, led a January 2007 attack on Karbala that killed five Americans (four were executed),[92] and the NSS Deputy Director, Ahmed al-Tayyar, was an AAH fighter. [93]
AAH’s political resurgence marked the beginning of a shift away from a public kinetic centric strategy, but did not necessarily immediately end all AAH militia activity. For example, on November 7, 2022, AAH members, in coordination with Nujaba, KH, and the IRGC QF killed an American aid worker, Stephen Troell in Baghdad.[94] AAH fighters also engaged in active combat against Muqtada al-Sadr supporters and Saraya al-Salam (Muqtada al-Sadr’s armed group and a follow on from the Mahdi Army) in 2022 and 2024. During the August 2022 protests, AAH soldiers clashed with Sadr supporters in Basra, while unidentified militias attacked the AAH headquarters in Kut, Babil, Maysan, and Basra.[95] In February 2024, experts concluded that the assassination of a senior AAH leader and commander of the 43rd PMF brigade in Maysan was organized and carried out by Sadr supporters.[96] The assassination coincided with the killing of a Sadr supporter and the shelling of the AAH headquarters in Hilla city.[97] Between December 2023 and February 2024, clashes between Saraya al-Salam and AAH killed approximately 200 people across Iraq and included the burning of AAH headquarters and gunfights in the streets.[98]
Besides the clashes with Sadr backed forces, the lack of kinetic action, especially against the United States, distinguished AAH from its counterparts, especially following Hamas’ terrorist attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, and the ensuing war in Gaza. In response to Israel’s war in Gaza, the IRGC QF partnered with the militia groups in Iraq to form the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). The IRI is effectively a collection of the major militia groups in Iraq, including AAH, KH, Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), and others.[99] Experts agree that the IRGC QF is controlling these groups, ensuring that they coordinate and that all attacks are claimed under the IRI brand, making it difficult to assign responsibility to individual groups.[100] The group set up the al-Aqsa joint operations room in October 2023 to coordinate responses to Israel’s war.[101] IRI has carried out hundreds of attacks since then, targeting U.S. and Israeli forces, military installations, and diplomatic sites, using a mix of indirect fire rockets and UAVs.[102] According to experts, despite this drastic increase in Iran proxy activity, AAH is not responsible or directly involved in most attacks. Instead, AAH is likely focused on their political sway within Iraq and providing logistical support for Nujaba, KH, and KSS efforts.[103] Experts also believe that AAH could have been involved in strikes in October 2023 against the Baghdad airport and December 2023 against the U.S. embassy, considering the Baghdad location, the lack of claim by IRI, and the style of the attack (further details on these operations can be found in the major attacks section).[104]
On several occasions since the beginning of the war in Gaza, IRI members have criticized Khazali and AAH for not undertaking combat operations. In November 2023, KH Secretary General Abu Hussein praised the militias fighting against the United States and Israel, naming KH, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, Nujaba, and KSS – leaving out AAH. Likewise, Akram Kabi of Nujaba said that the groups needed to be more aggressive. AAH responded by reminding KH that AAH plays a role within the resistance and that Nujaba’s attacks in Iraq had failed to kill any U.S. soldiers.[105] Khazali and AAH appear to want to appeal to both their hardline base, as well as more moderate Iraqis and the international community. Instead of directly calling for violence against Israel, Khazali often demands international action to end the violence in Gaza.[106]
While AAH and the Iran backed groups have long held ties to the Assad regime in Syria, the Iran backed militant groups were forced to flee the country in December 2024 when Assad fell to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).[107]AAH and partners were vocal opponents of leaving Syria to be taken by HTS, given the key role and effort they previously put in to stabilize the country.[108] In the months following the fall of Assad, the IRGC and Iran backed groups opposed the normalization of relationships between Iraq and the new Syrian government. Khazali and AAH were vocal opponents of normalizing relationships and Khazali pushed Prime Minister Sudani to not meet with Interim Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in Spring 2025.[109] Despite this pressure, Sharaa met with Sudani in April 2025.[110] The meeting between Sudani and Sharaa demonstrated the limits of IRGC and Iranian backed militia influence over the Iraqi government, and the lack of militant activity could signal Iran backed PMF weakness.
In late 2024 and early 2025, the Iran backed government coalition began splitting into two parts. The first group includes Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawlat al-Qanoon and Khazali’s Sadiqoun. The second group includes Hadi al-Ameri’s Badr, Prime Minister Sudani, and Faleh Fayyad (the chairman of the PMF).
A central reason for the split is a debate over two proposed laws that would govern the PMF. First, the PMF Authority Law, which is supported by Ameri, Sudani, and Fayyad, would give the Prime Minister (in effect Sudani) more power over the PMF and allow Fayyad to remain in his role. This law is opposed by Maliki and Khazali.[111] The second law, the PMF Service and Retirement Law, which is supported by Maliki, Khazali and KH, would force Fayyad out of his position and allow Iran backed militias to install a new leader. Experts assess that this could allow the PMF to further develop toward an Iraqi IRGC, which is a long-term goal of Khazali and other militias. The law also increases the PMF budget.[112] As part of the debate, AAH conducted a public campaign against Fayyad, including accusing him of ties to Turkey.[113]
