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National Liberation Army (Colombia)

Key statistics

1964
First Recorded Activity
1965
First Attack
2024
Profile Last Updated

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How to Cite

Crenshaw, M., & Robinson, K. (2025). Mapping Militants Project. Rice University. https://doi.org/10.25613/G0K4-WF70

Mapping Militants Project. “National Liberation Army (Colombia).” Last modified December 3, 2024. https://mappingmilitants.org/node/465/

Profile Contents

Narrative

Narrative of the Organization's History

Organization

Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations

Strategy

Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics

Major Attacks

First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks

Interactions

Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences

Maps

Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps

Colombia

Main Tabs Group

Overview
Formed: 
July 4, 1964

Formed: July 4, 1964

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: January 7, 1965: The ELN seized Simacota, a small town in Santander. Following the attack, founder Fabio Vásquez Castaño along with Victor Medina Moron read the ELN’s proclamation and announced its existence as a group (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[1]

Last Attack: November 21, 2024: The ELN detonated an explosive attack at a civic reintegration site for former guerrillas guarded by the Colombian military in Anorí, Antioquia. (5 killed, 5 wounded).[2]

 

Brothers Fabio and Manuel Vásquez Castaño founded the National Liberation Army (El Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) in 1964. The brothers’ Marxist-Leninist group sought to defend Colombians whom they believed to be victims of social, political, and economic injustices perpetrated by the Colombian state. The Colombian military decimated the ELN in 1973; however, the group was able to rebuild from just 65 members. The ELN’s kidnapping practices and its involvement in the drug trade helped the group grow to over 4,000 members in 1999. Since its emergence in the drug trade, the ELN has also been highly active in illegal gold mining throughout both Colombia and Venezuela. Although the ELN’s numbers had been in a steady decline since 2000, the group has grown to an estimated 5,800 members, capitalizing heavily on the Venezuelan refugee crisis as well as absorbing dissident ex-FARC members and territories. The ELN began significant peace talks with the Colombian government in late 2022, though lateral tension between ex-FARC dissidents (i.e., those FARC members who have refused to demobilize and accept the 2016 FARC peace deal) and competing drug trafficking groups have risen against the ELN. After two decades of failed peace talks and broken ceasefires, President Petro’s Total Peace plan made historic progress for Colombian peace. In May 2024, the first of six peace agenda items was signed by the ELN and Colombian government in Caracas, Venezuela. However, the ELN rejected to renew the Bilateral, National and Temporary Ceasefire agreement, initiating a tense period between the ELN and Petro government upon its expiration on August 3rd, 2024. On September 18th, 2024, the Colombian government briefly ended the peace negotiations after the ELN’s fatal military base attack in the Arauca province. According to a joint Colombian government-ELN announcement, the sporadic peace process resumed on November 7th, 2024. The ELN’s growing influence in, and loyalty to, Venezuela has also fortified upon President Maduro’s disputed July 2024 election victory.

Narrative

The National Liberation Army (El Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) is Colombia’s oldest and largest leftist guerrilla group. It was formed in 1964 by brothers Fabio and Manuel Vásquez Castaño following the Colombian civil war, which spanned 1948-1958, known as La Violencia. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution and Che Guevarra, students, Catholic radicals, and leftist intellectuals joined the ELN to fight for a popular democracy in Colombia.[3] Fabio Vásquez Castaño was the former leader of the Brigada Pro Liberación Nacional José Antonio Galán student group which received direct support from the Cuban revolution leader, Fidel Castro.[4] As a result, Fabio Vásquez Castaño, alongside Manuel and other founding members of the ELN, sought to replace the Colombian government with a system that aligned with Marxist and anti-imperialist values.[5]

In July 1964, the insurgent group started training in the Province of Santander. Six months later, the insurgents took over Simacota, a small village in Santander, and officially announced themselves as the ELN.[6] The ELN spent the following years organizing and gathering recruits, many of whom were priests from the Catholic Church, alongside university students and leftist academics.[7] The ELN’s steady growth was halted in 1973 due to the government military offensive Operation Anorí.[8] The ELN’s near destruction became a pivotal moment for the group in which Priest Manuel Pérez and Nicolás Rodriguez Bautista, known as “Gabino,” took over central leadership.

While the ELN had previously shied away from kidnapping for ideological reasons, under Gabino and Pérez, it began kidnapping politicians and wealthy landowners for revenue to rebuild the militant group. In 1975 and 1976, the ELN’s main activities were bank robbing, kidnapping, and assassinating military members.[9] By the 1980s, ELN members had become expert kidnappers, operating on boats, vehicles, and airplanes. In the 1990s, the ELN started targeting and extorting the employees of local and foreign oil companies operating in its area of control.[10] In 1998 alone, the ELN earned $84 million from ransoms and $225 million from extortion of oil company employees.[11]

The ELN initially avoided the drug trade, unlike other Colombian militant groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Instead, the ELN focused on furthering its political goals.[12] However, this changed by the late 1990s. The ELN started taxing coca and marijuana growers, especially in the Bolivar Province, where the group had established its headquarters.[13]

In 1999, the ELN gained considerable strength with between 4,000 and 5,000 members and approximately 15,000 supporters.[14] However, the 2000s marked a period of decline due to the increasingly influential paramilitary forces, such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and Death to Kidnappers (MAS), who directly targeted leftist guerrilla groups. As a result, the ELN lost large amounts of territory in the Bolivar Province, including its former home base.[15] In 2001, the ELN started peace talks with the Colombian government, but the talks quickly failed. Some argue that Colombian President Pastrana was more interested in negotiating with FARC than with the ELN, and that this preference may have led to the failure of the 2001 peace talks.[16] After Pastrana left office, the ELN engaged in peace talks with the newly inaugurated Uribe administration. These peace talks, hosted in both Mexico and Cuba, also failed.[17] By 2009, the ELN showed signs of internal fragmentation; units disobeyed leaders’ orders and allied with drug traffickers for financial security.[18]

Beginning in 2009, reports of the ELN referred to the group as a weakened and forgotten force.[19] In 2012, the ELN was not invited to the peace talks between the FARC and the Colombian government. Analysts speculate that the Colombian government denied the ELN admission to the peace talks because the government no longer viewed the ELN as a threat.[20] The ELN responded to its exclusion from the peace negotiations by killing police officers and blowing up oil pipelines in 2012.[21] In 2013, the ELN continued to increase attacks and declared war on oil companies.[22]

In June 2014, the progression of FARC peace talks caused the Santos government to renew exploratory peace negotiations with the ELN.[23] Despite a continued targeting of oil pipelines, use of antipersonnel landmines, and the ELN’s severe injustices against civilians, the government continued its exploratory talks with the ELN through 2015.[24] In March 2016, the Colombian government and the ELN publicly declared their intentions to begin formal peace talks, but the ELN’s reluctance to abandon its lucrative kidnapping practices delayed the official negotiations.[25] FARC’s decreasing power in Colombia, per its successful 2016 peace negotiations, increased conflicts for territorial control between the ELN and the Gaitanistas (known as the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, the AGC, the Gulf Clan, and formerly known as Los Urabeños)—Colombia’s largest drug-trafficking paramilitary group. The ELN-Gaitanistas’ rivalry began the forced confinement of Chocó region residents to rising abuses in 2016.[26]

The ELN and President Duque’s government entered formal peace talks in February 2017 and later joined a four-month bilateral ceasefire, motivated by Pope Francis’ visit to Colombia in September 2017.[27] The government’s bombing of ELN encampments during the ELN’s 2018 Christmas Ceasefire incited the ELN’s fatal police academy bombing in January 2019.[28] The government suspended the formal peace talks following the police academy bombing.[29] In response to the attack, President Duque also called on Cuba to arrest and extradite the 10 ELN leaders who had been attending the peace talks in Cuba, but his request was rejected.[30] The suspended peace negotiations were followed by surging contestations over drug trafficking and illegal gold mining regions between the ELN and ex-FARC dissident groups, and the ELN and the transnational drug-trafficking Gaitanistas. [31]

Violence between the ELN and other armed groups continued into 2020, severely affecting and displacing Colombians.[32] UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s call for a global ceasefire due to the COVID-19 pandemic inspired the ELN’s temporary unilateral April ceasefire as an attempt to reignite the formal 2019 peace discussion.[33] The ELN’s strategic ceasefire failed to meet President Duque’s preconditions that the ELN release its hostages and halt criminal activity to renew peace talks.[34] As Duque’s government and the ELN communicated preliminary discussion requirements in July 2020, the ELN violently clashed with the Gaitanistas and ex-FARC dissidents by exploiting the government’s COVID-cautious policies to impose its territorial control.[35]

President Gustavo Petro’s election in 2022 emphasized his prioritization of Colombia’s peace—hoping to finally resolve the 60-year-long struggle between the ELN and the Colombian government.[36] The former guerrilla (of the defunct M-19), President Petro, introduced the Paz Total peace plan to restore formal peace talks with Colombia’s armed militant groups, utilizing the 2016 Peace Accords from FARC’s demobilization.[37] Petro dismissed the ELN’s warrants of arrest and extradition from President Duque and sent a negotiation team to Cuba, where the ELN delegates had been evading Colombian authorities.[38] The ELN reciprocated Petro’s action by releasing hostages and thus beginning a new opportunity for Colombian peace.[39]

The era of peace talks from 2022 to the present is characterized by temporary bilateral ceasefires, lateral armed group violence, and many peace dialogues between the ELN and the Colombian government in Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico.[40] The peace endeavors made substantial progress in the signing of the Bilateral, Temporary National Ceasefire in August 2023. The agreement began the first six-month ceasefire period for peace-building efforts and was renewed for a second six-month period in February 2024.[41] Ideological differences between the ELN’s Central Command and the ELN’s Nariño-based southern war front created the ELN dissident group—the Comuneros del Sur— and its independent pursuit of peace negotiations in May 2024.[42] The ELN’s Central Command strongly opposed and denounced the dissident group’s decentralized peace talks.[43]

The May 2024 peace negotiations round ended in the “biggest advance to date” for Colombia’s peace with the first of six peace accords signed by the ELN and government in Caracas, Venezuela.[44] The agreement addressed citizen participation in the peace process through the economic, political, environmental, educational, and cultural sectors.[45] The Bilateral, Temporary National Ceasefire protocol expired in August 2024 and placed uncertainty on the peace negotiations without its renewal.[46] The following contentious period included the ELN’s resumed kidnapping practices, pipeline bombings, and targeted military attacks.[47] The ELN’s military base attack killed two Colombian soldiers and injured dozens on September 17th and was followed by an official statement to end the Petro government’s peace processes with the ELN.[48] The ELN and Petro Government released a joint statement announcing the official resumption of the peace talks on November 7th, 2024.[49]

As Colombia’s peace talks with the ELN stop and start again, the ELN’s power in Venezuela has maintained its strength. The ELN has aided the Venezuelan government as a paramilitary group since first receiving support from Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 1999.[50] Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro, has continued to enable the ELN’s influence and behaviors in Venezuela, allowing its illegal gold mining and coca trafficking with the beneficial return of powerful and loyal non-state actors.[51] The ties between the ELN and the Venezuelan government have led to the ELN’s enduring commitment to the autocratic Maduro regime.[52] During the July 2024 election campaign, the ELN was reportedly seen on the streets of Venezuelan border states, pressuring and threatening Venezuelans to vote for Maduro.[53] Maduro’s heavily disputed victory is reported to indicate another likely six years of a Venezuelan safe haven for the ELN’s illicit practices (see “D. State Sponsors and External Influences” for more).[54]

Organization

Vertical Tabs

Leadership

The ELN’s highest level of leadership is the Central Command (COCE). As of 2024, the COCE is comprised of five national commanders: Antonio Garcia, Pablo Beltrán, Ariel, Ramiro Vargas, and Pablito.[55] The COCE oversees all ELN operations: political, military, financial, intranational, and international. Below the COCE is the National Directorate (DINAL); its 23 members serve as the point people between the COCE and the ELN’s Fronts.[56] The leadership system of the ELN is largely decentralized.[57] There are eight fronts to the ELN, each of which operates as an autonomous organization. According to Amnesty International, the group’s sub-units are “loosely united under a central authority.”[58] In addition to its eight official war fronts, the ELN also has urban militias in some of Colombia’s major cities, such as Medellín, Barranquilla, Bogotá, and Cali.[59] Below are notable leadership of the ELN:

 

Top Commanders, Past to Present:

Fabio Vásquez Castaño (1964-1973): Fabio Vásquez Castaño was a founding member of the ELN. In the 1965 seizure of Simacota, he read the ELN’s proclamation that established the group and outlined its goals. Vásquez Castaño pushed the ELN to be very active militarily, as he thought that political and ideological training would inhibit military advancement. After the military’s 1973 attack resulted in the deaths of ELN members, Fabio was dismissed from his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the ELN by Manuel Pérez and Gabino.[60] Fabio Vásquez Castano fled to Cuba after his expulsion, where he remained until his death at 79 years old in 2019.[61]

Manuel Vásquez Castaño (1964/5-1973): Manuel Vásquez Castaño was a founding member of the ELN, and second-in-command under his brother, Fabio Vásquez Castaño. Manuel Vásquez Castaño was killed alongside fellow ELN members in the 1973 Colombian military offensive, Operation Anorí.[62]

“El Cura Pérez,” also known as Father Manuel Pérez Martínez or “Poliarcho” (1969-1998): Father Torres’ death inspired Cura Pérez to join the ELN in 1969. After the exile of Fabio Vásquez Castaño in 1973, Pérez took leadership of the ELN with Gabino. Pérez’ extremism helped shape the ELN’s ideology via radical Catholic liberation theology. He also oversaw an increase in violent and illicit practices committed by the ELN.[63] He died in February 1998 from hepatitis B.[64]

“Gabino,” legal name Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista (1973-2021): Gabino joined the ELN in 1964 when he was 14. Gabino took part in the ELN’s first attack in 1965. In 1973, Gabino joined the Central Command and took joint leadership of the group alongside El Cura Pérez. Gabino was the Commander-in-Chief of the ELN and the highest member of the Central Command (COCE) when he fled to Cuba to evade his arrest in 2019.[65] Gabino retired from the ELN in 2021, though he is reported to remain in close contact with Antonio Garcia, the current head of the ELN.[66]

“Antonio Garcia,” legal name Eliécer Erlinto de Jesus Chamorro (1970s-Present): Antonio Garcia is the leader of the ELN’s Central Command (COCE) as the Commander-in-Chief of the ELN. Garcia joined the ELN in the mid-1970s. Following El Cura’s death in 1998, he became the ELN’s military commander. His responsibilities included military strategy and weaponry.[67] Garcia has been a member of the ELN’s Central Command since the 1980s. Garcia was one of the ELN’s negotiators, and he participated in peace talks after the government nullified his arrest warrant in 2006.[68] In March 2016, he was the leader of the ELN’s delegation to set the agenda for the following peace negotiations with the Colombian government.[69]. As of Gabino’s retirement in 2021, Antonio Garcia is now the head of the ELN.[70]

 

Prominent Active Members:

“Pablo Beltrán”, legal name Israel Ramírez Pinead (Unknown-Present): Beltrán is a member of the ELN’s Central Command (COCE) as the political commander and chief negotiator of the militant group.[71] Beltrán is also acknowledged as the COCE’s second-in-command.[72] In interview appearances, he frequently outlines the ELN’s mission, goals, and beliefs.[73] The Colombian government recognized Beltrán as a representative member of the ELN in 2007, which allowed him to join the negotiation team for the peace talks in Cuba in 2012.[74] In May 2019, Beltrán gave an interview in which he reaffirmed the ELN’s commitment to peace and criticized President Duque’s cessation of negotiations.[75] After the 2019 ELN police academy attack, Beltrán fled to in Cuba to evade his arrest.[76] President Petro’s dismissal of ELN leaders’ extradition and arrest warrants brought Beltrán to the negotiating table once again. Beltrán has led the ELN’s negotiations in the current peace talks with Petro’s government since 2022.[77]

“Ariel”, also known as Lorenzo Alcantruz, legal name Jaime Galvis Rivera (Unknown-Present): Ariel is a member of the Central Command (COCE) as the commander of finances. Ariel is a confirmed coordinator of the 2019 police academy bombing and has since continued his operations from the Colombia-Venezuela border region.[78] A sworn loyalty to the Venezuelan Maduro regime has enabled his acting position as ELN financier to expand the ELN’s illegal income operations.[79] He is also the alleged commander of the ELN’s urban front, The Camilo Torres Restrepo National Urban War Front (Frente de Guerra Urbano Nacional – FGUN).[80]

“Pablito,” also known as Carlos Marin Guarin, legal name Gustavo Anibal Giraldo Quinchía (Unknown-Present): Pablito is a member of the Central Command (COCE) as the relations commander over the ELN’s 8 national war fronts. In 2000, Pablito became a commander of the ELN’s Front of East War. He headed his ELN operations in Apure, Venezuela until 2008, when Colombian authorities captured him while he was using the alias “Carlos Marín Guarín.” In 2009, Pablito escaped from prison in Arauca, Colombia with the help of other ELN members. In 2016, Pablito joined the Central Command and managed the COCE’s war front relations. Pablito was confirmed as one of the orchestrators of the January 2019 police academy attack in Bogotá and has since fled Colombia to Venezuela.[81] Pablito’s loyalty to the Venezuelan-Maduro government largely advanced the ELN’s expansion into Venezuela.[82] Local newspapers reported that Pablito died in 2021, but this has not been confirmed.[83] As of 2024, Pablito remains in the INTERPOL Red Notice directory as a wanted individual in Colombia.[84]

“Ramiro Vargas”, legal name Rafael Sierra Granados (Unknown-Present): Ramiro Vargas is a member of the Central Command (COCE) as the commander responsible for the ELN’s international affairs. Vargas was involved in the exploratory talks with the Colombian government in 2002.[85] In 2006, President Uribe nullified Vargas’ arrest warrant, recognizing him as a spokesperson for the ELN as part of the peace process.[86] As of July 2019, Vargas was a member of the Central Command first overseeing the financier position, but now he organizes the militant group’s international connections.[87]

Alex Bonito, legal name Wilmer Galindo (Unknown-Present): Alex Bonito is the leader of the José Daniel Pérez Carrero Front of the ELN along eastern Colombia. Since 2017, the José Daniel Pérez Carrero Front has strengthened the ELN by capturing much of the former FARC territory between the Colombia-Venezuela border.[88] According to the International Crisis Group in 2019, Bonito is the local leader of the ELN guerrilla forces in the Venezuelan Amazonas state. Bonito oversees the ELN’s extensive illegal mining operations in the border regions.[89]

 

Prominent Past Members

Victor Medina Moron (1964-1966/7): Before founding the ELN, Medina was a leader of Santander’s Communist Party. Medina believed that, before delving into combat, it was important for the ELN to develop a sound political foundation. This led to conflict between Fabio Vásquez Castaño and Medina. In 1968, Fabio and Manuel Vásquez Castaño murdered Medina for disagreeing with their approach.[90]

“Father Torres,” also known as Father Camilo Torres Restrepo (January 7, 1966-February 15, 1966): Father Torres was a Roman Catholic Priest who studied the ELN from its inception and supported their goals and purpose. On January 7, 1966, Father Torres first joined the group in Santander. Weeks later Father Torres died in combat and became a martyr for the ELN.[91]

Jaime Arenas Reyes (1963-1968): Arenas quickly distanced himself from the group after joining the militant group’s guerrilla ranks in 1967. His book, La guerrilla por dentro ELN, exposed the ELN’s internal purges, militarism, and sectarianism and led to his murder by ELN leaders in Bogotá in 1971.[92]

Francisco Galán (1991-2008): Galán was a political spokesperson for the ELN from 1991 to 2008. In 2000, he was released temporarily to meet with President Pastrana’s negotiators and to discuss the prospect of peace between the ELN and the Colombian government.[93] In 2005, President Álvaro Uribe released Galán from prison for three months to participate in peace negotiations. In April 2008, the ELN renounced Galán’s status as spokesperson and member of the negotiating team because his actions in negotiations with the Colombian government were not representative of the ELN.[94] In 2020, the Colombian government released Galán from prison and named him an official “peace promoter” between the ELN and the Colombian government. His appointment and attempted mediation were rejected by the ELN.[95]

Size Estimates
  • 1972: 200 (Colombia Reports)[96]
  • 1973: 65 (Colombia Reports)[97]
  • 1990s: 8,000 (Christian Science Monitor)[98]
  • 1998: 4,000 (El País)[99]
  • 1998: 5,000 (Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War)[100]
  • 2001: 3,500 (Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War)[101]
  • 2006: 2,000 (Christian Science Monitor)[102]
  • 2008: 2,200-3,000 (The Washington Post)[103]
  • 2009: 1,500 (BBC)[104]
  • 2010: 5,000 (Colombia Reports)[105]
  • 2012: <1,500 (Colombia Reports)[106]
  • 2013: 1,380-3,000 (Tracking Terrorism)[107]
  • 2013: 3,000 (The Wall Street Journal)[108]
  • 2014: 2,500 (Pares)[109]
  • 2015: 2,000 (Voice of America News)[110]
  • 2015: 2,000 (BBC)[111]
  • 2015: 2,000 (Reuters)[112]
  • 2015: <2,000 (InSight Crime)[113]
  • 2017: 2,000 (Reuters)[114]
  • 2018: 3,000 (Colombia Reports)[115]
  • 2019: 2,402 (Reuters)[116]
  • 2020: 2,450 (Reuters)[117]
  • 2020: 5,400 (Journal of Americas)[118]
  • 2021: 5,000 (U.S. Department of State)[119]
  • 2022: >5,800 (Barron’s)[120]
  • 2023: <5,000 (CIA)[121]
  • 2024: 5,000-6,000 (CIA)[122]
Name Changes

There are no recorded name changes for this group.

Resources

In the ELN’s formative years, Cuba provided the group with weapons and financial support.[123] In the 1970s, the ELN relied on kidnapping for revenue to rebuild after its near destruction by the Colombian military’s 1973 Operation Anorí.[124] Additionally, the ELN profited from protection payments and ransoms.[125]

The ELN increased kidnappings in the 1980s.[126] Throughout the decade, the ELN secured millions of dollars from German oil contractors through extortion and kidnapping threats.[127] In the 1990s, the ELN also began extorting oil company employees. Together, kidnapping and extortion became the ELN’s primary source of revenue, bringing in $225 million in 1998 alone.[128] In the 1990s, the ELN began taxing coca and marijuana farmers, especially in the Bolivar Province, where it had territorial control.[129] Many units of the ELN reportedly established independent relationships with drug trafficking gangs in order to survive economically.[130] The extension of the Bilateral, National and Temporary Ceasefire shortly halted the ELN’s kidnapping practices in February 2024.[131] The government’s proposed multi-donor fund to finance the peace process led to the ELN’s misinterpretation that this fund would compensate for its forfeited kidnapping profits. The ELN announced its resumption of kidnapping in May 2024 as a result of its misinterpretation of the fund’s purpose to replace kidnapping profits.[132]

Kidnapping and extortion, although acknowledged under different names, were formal components of the ELN’s economic strategy. In 2000, ELN Commander Antonio Garcia said that the group financed its operations in four ways: donations, produce sales, voluntary contributions, and taxation.[133] ELN members, who were mostly working, wage-earning people, provided donations, according to Garcia. The commander continued to claim that the militant group engaged in community activities by growing produce to be sold for profit.[134] Voluntary contributions allegedly came from people who were not members of the ELN, but who shared the ELN’s ideas.[135] The ELN alleged that wealthy individuals were taxed to provide another source of the ELN’s income and people who refused to pay the tax were faced with “economic retention,” a policy that was widely understood to be the kidnapping of wealthy individuals.[136] Recent reports indicate that the ELN continues to rely on agricultural sales and taxation for its funding, citing the illegal taxation of goods from “coca, fish, milk to the gold they take from the so-called Venezuelan Mining Arc.”[137] The ELN’s sizable presence in Venezuela increased its involvement in drug trafficking and illegal mining, both of which have become fundamental financial resources for the militant group.[138]

Though its initial ideology opposed drug trafficking, the ELN have become owners of “one of the world’s most important cocaine production centers” along the Colombian-Venezuelan border.[139] The ELN’s favorable relationship with Maduro’s administration and FARC’s demobilization in 2016 advanced the group’s expansion and subsequent coca production in Venezuelan territory.[140] The militant group sells its coca profits to consumers such as the Mexican Sinaloa cartel, who are the largest purchasers of the ELN’s coca.[141]

Besides kidnapping, extortion, and drug trafficking, the ELN’s illegal gold mining activities in both Colombia and Venezuela are essential to the group’s financing.[142] Illegal gold mining is the ELN’s largest financial source; mining accounts for approximately 60% of the group’s income, according to an interview with a former ELN commander in 2018.[143] The ELN made an estimated 10 billion Colombian pesos from 2016 to 2018 by forcing illegal miners to turn over 10%-20% of their earnings to the ELN.[144] The group has retained its presence in Venezuela since the 1990s, though its territory has significantly expanded since 2000. ELN-held Venezuelan areas have grown at an increasingly faster rate since 2017 and have been generating profit from illegally mining gold throughout the country.[145] José Daniel Pérez Carrero Front commander, Alex Bonito, secured between 900,000 to 1 million pesos monthly from the Venezuelan gold mines, according to military intelligence in 2023.[146]

Control of the border between Venezuela and Colombia created additional income resources. ELN has profited from smuggling drugs— though the ELN denies its involvement with human trafficking.[147] The ELN has capitalized on refugees and displaced people who are fleeing internal Venezuelan conflict, as well as at-risk youth and poor indigenous populations. The group has drawn upon these populations to serve as a workforce in its mines.[148] The ELN’s growth across Venezuela into the Venezuelan-Guyanese border has also given the militant group another region to collect profit via smuggling fuel and other daily necessities.[149]

Locations

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

The ELN claims to operate in areas of Colombia that are “stateless” (areas that receive no government attention or assistance).[150] The ELN had its headquarters in the Bolivar province until 2000, when the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) seized ELN territory.[151] The group is most present in the northeastern region of Colombia, where there are many oil fields, gold mines, and smuggling operations.[152] Since the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016, the ELN has occupied former FARC territory used for coca production and trafficking.[153] The ELN has continued expansion into FARC’s previous territory, as a result of FARC’s formal disarmament in 2017, inflating the ELN’s reported activity in at least two-thirds of Colombia’s 32 departments as of 2022, compared to past reports of 9 departments in July 2019.[154]

The ELN is a transnational organization, and it has been active in Venezuela since 1990.[155] The ELN was named the “most significant armed group in both Colombia and Venezuela” by the U.S. Bureau of Counterterrorism in 2022 and the “most powerful guerrilla group” in Venezuela’s Bolívar state by InSight Crime in 2021.[156] As of June 2021, the ELN had nearly 40% of their forces stationed in Venezuela, with operations in at least 40 municipalities across 8 Venezuelan states.[157] The ELN’s organizational structure does not include Venezuelan-based war fronts. However, the ELN’s close ties to the Venezuelan government extend its Northern, Eastern, and Northeastern war fronts’ presence and control of illegal operations throughout Venezuela.[158] ELN operations are concentrated along the Colombian border departments of Norte Santander and Arauca and their adjacent Venezuelan states of Zulia and Apure, per its Colombian-based Eastern War Front.[159] Through its expanding illegal gold mining and smuggling operations, the ELN has pushed eastward across Venezuela into the Venezuelan-Guyanese border.[160] While the ELN rapidly expanded after 2016, the ELN’s territorial expansion plateaued as of 2021 due to conflicts with other armed groups.[161]

Strategy

Vertical Tabs

Ideology and Goals

The ELN began as a movement of students and Catholics, predominately radical priests, inspired by the Cuban Revolution.[162] These individuals believed that they represented the majority of Colombians: individuals with economic, political, and social grievances[163] Additionally, the group sought to combat foreign influence in Colombia, and aimed to institute a popular democracy in place of the republican Colombian government.[164]

Originally, the group did not engage in drug trafficking and kidnapping. ELN leader Priest Manuel Pérez refused to enter the drug trade because he opposed capitalistic excess.[165] Pérez shaped the ELN’s ideological foundation in line with his radical Catholic liberation theological perspective, which saw religion as a tool to reduce inequality between the privileged wealthy and the oppressed poor.[166] In 2000, ELN commander Antonio Garcia stated that kidnapping contradicted the ELN’s purpose but accepted that the ELN practiced “retention” (the term can be understood as a euphemism for “kidnapping”).[167]

Since the mid-1970s, the ELN has been involved in illegal activities, appearing to drift from its ideological roots.[168] Under ELN leader Gabino, the ELN increased its involvement in kidnappings, the drug trade, and extortion.[169] Drug trafficking has since become a powerful source of the group’s income, despite Gabino’s denial in a 2020 statement.[170] The ELN also illegally mines gold throughout both Colombia and Venezuela, a trade that generates the majority of the group’s income and further separates it from its philosophically radical origins.[171]

Following the peace deal between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government in 2016, the ELN began to shift its focus to the demobilization of its armed forces and reintegration to society. In May 2019, ELN commander Pablo Beltrán stated that the ELN’s goal is to end its conflict with the Colombian government and, in return, to assure protections and assistance for the poor throughout the country.[172] Despite the failure of the 2019 peace talks due to fatal retaliatory attacks between the Colombian government and the ELN, efforts reignited in 2022 and achieved unprecedented success. The first of six peace agenda items was signed in May 2024 and centered societal participation in peace.[173] Pablo Beltrán, ELN Chief Negotiator, stated that the militant group is seeking a “great national agreement,” reflecting the ELN’s desire for a meaningful conclusion to the peace talks.[174]

However, in early May 2024, the ELN rescinded its pledge to stop kidnapping and thus had placed tension on its commitment to peace.[175] The ELN later rejected the renewal of the Bilateral, National and Temporary Ceasefire in August 2024, citing its funding dependency on kidnapping profits and the government’s history of breached ceasefires.[176] Ideological differences in the negotiation approach and leadership structure between the ELN’s national Central Command (COCE) and the southern Nariño-based war front resulted in the Comuneros del Sur’s split from the group in May 2024.[177] The Colombian government agreed to negotiate with the ELN’s dissident group as an independent organization from the ELN.[178] The ELN’s Central Command denounced the splintered group’s talks, claiming the talks to be the Petro government’s work to produce internal division and to pressure the ELN’s central peace talks.[179]

Political Activities

The ELN’s reconciliation attempts have lasted nearly forty-years, pursuing its reintegration to civil society with nearly each elected president. The first attempts of the ELN’s peace talks began in 1987 as a process between the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB) guerrilla coalition and the Colombian government. The gradual demobilization of the CGSB’s members diminished its power, leaving the ELN and FARC until its departure from peace talks under the Gaviria administration in 1992.[180]

The second peace effort began under the following presidential administration. The Samper presidency initiated informal peace discussions between Colombian officials and ELN leaders. Eventually the parties reached a signed draft agreement for a National Convention between the ELN and the Colombian government in 1998.[181] The group intended that the National Convention be a venue for popular participation and collective effort to restructure the country and its institutions for greater social justice.[182] However, the death of ELN leader Manuel Pérez and a change in the Colombian presidency in 1998 complicated the development of the National Convention.[183] The ELN requested a demilitarized “Zone of Encounter” (ZOE) in 1999 but the Pastrana government rejected the demand.[184] The ELN responded to the rejection with a kidnapping campaign. The group hijacked and kidnapped an Avianca flight of 46 people in April 1999, as well as kidnapped approximately 140 parishioners attending mass in Cali in May 1999.[185] The ELN’s kidnappings caused the Pastrana government to suspend negotiations and temporarily revoked its political status.[186] However, in 2000, planning efforts started again with the aim of creating an inclusive democratic space wherein participants could reach a national consensus on the issues facing Colombia.[187]

Although the ELN and the government resumed negotiations, the 2000 negotiations ended in 2001 without agreement.[188] Both sides blamed the other for the failure. The ELN broke off negotiations due to the government’s campaign against its coca farms and the military’s alleged relationship with paramilitary organizations. Meanwhile, Pastrana’s government suspended the negotiations because of the ELN’s perceived lack of a will for peace and cooperation.[189] When the peace talks failed in 2001, so did the opportunity to create a ZOE or a National Convention.[190]

With the failure of negotiations with Pastrana’s government in 2001, the ELN adopted a new strategy to achieve its political goals. The group recognized and supported the Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA), a joint political party of the Independent Democratic Pole and the Democratic Alternative established in 2005, in opposition to the right-wing Colombian government.[191] In 2006, the PDA won 18 seats in the Congress of Colombia, 10 in the Senate and 8 in the House of Representatives.[192] Although it was not as successful in 2007, through Samuel Moreno Rojas, the PDA won Bogotá’s mayoral election.[193] Since 2008, internal conflict and polarity has negatively affected the PDA’s growth. In the 2018 election, the PDA only won 5 seats in the Senate, as well as 2 deputies.[194] In the 2022 Presidential election, the PDA joined the Historic Pact for Colombia Coalition with other left-wing and left-center Colombian parties and won the election with President Gustavo Petro, Vice President Francia Márquez, a plurality of Senate seats, and a significant number of Chamber seats.[195]

Despite the history of failed negotiations, the ELN entered into both informal talks and formal negotiations with the Colombian government throughout the terms of President Uribe from 2002 to 2010.[196] In 2002, the two groups began to plan for talks; however, the parties suspended informal negotiations in 2003.[197] In 2005, the ELN and Uribe’s government, with the support of external actors like Mexico and the Catholic Church, began preliminary talks in the hopes of later entering into formal negotiations.[198] The goal of these negotiations was not only the disarmament and demobilization the ELN, but also the implementation of political and socioeconomic change on the part of the government.[199] In the lead-up to official negotiations in 2008, Uribe’s government demanded that the ELN stop its kidnapping and military activities, a condition that the ELN refused to accept.[200] The ELN viewed the government’s push for its a ceasefire as an action that should occur as a result of the peace negotiations rather than a forced precursory item.[201] Without any promise to halt hostilities or kidnapping, the government refused to initiate official talks with the ELN; the negotiations broke down in 2008.[202]

In 2012, the ELN tried to secure a seat at a peace conference between the government of President Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).[203] Timochenko, a FARC leader, stated his explicit support for the inclusion of the ELN at the peace talks.[204] The ELN and the Colombian government formally entered peace negotiations in 2017. Anticipating Pope Francis’ visit to Colombia in 2017, the ELN proposed a bilateral ceasefire in June 2017, to which the Colombian government agreed in September 2017.[205] In October 2017, Santos’ government and the ELN formally entered the ceasefire, the first between the two actors.[206]

The bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the Colombian government ended in January 2019, with the change in power from President Santos to President Duque. In 2019, President Duque demanded that the ELN halt kidnapping and release hostages as a condition for the continuation of the peace talks, which the ELN refused.[207] The Colombian government suspended the peace talks indefinitely in January 2019 in response to the ELN’s deadly attack on a police academy in Bogotá.[208] In June 2019, President Duque called on the Cuba government to arrest and extradite ELN leadership who were present in Havana for the stalled peace talks.[209]

Since 2019, the Colombian government and ELN have held several periods of unilateral and bilateral ceasefires, peace dialogues, and attacks. The ELN has also substantially increased its affiliation with Venezuela’s Maduro government, even acting as informal agents alongside Venezuelan security forces on the border.[210] The ELN’s mutually beneficial relationship with Venezuelan local and state department officials has aided in its overall expansion in the territory.[211] Top ELN leaders and Central Command (COCE) members, Antonio Garcia and Pablito, have reportedly based their operations inside of Venezuela, using the nation as a political sanctuary from the Colombian authorities.[212]

President Gustavo Petro’s election in 2022 raised hopes that the 60-year struggle between the ELN and the Colombian government could be peacefully resolved.[213] President Petro, a former leftist guerrilla himself, introduced the Paz Total plan, or the Total Peace plan, to relaunch formal peace negotiations with Colombia’s armed militant groups.[214] In 2022, Petro dismissed Duque’s warrants of arrest and extradition for the ELN’s leadership and sent a negotiation team to the ELN leaders in Cuba; the ELN began to comply by releasing hostages.[215] The ELN’s southern war front, the Comuneros del Sur, dissented from the ELN in May 2024 due to its stated discontent with the Central Command’s “aggressive” approach.[216] The Colombian government has since successfully negotiated promising peace dialogues with the splintered group for the Nariño province’s peace.[217]

The ELN and Colombian government made unprecedented progress in signing the first peace agenda item in May 2024, which focused on civic participation in the peace efforts.[218] The ELN’s reneged commitment to halt kidnapping in May 2024 and rejected ceasefire renewal in August 2024 complicated the group’s perceived political ambitions.[219] The ELN cited its Organized Armed Group (GAO) designation by the Colombian government and the group’s dependence on hostage payments as barriers to resuming the peace talks.[220] The ELN’s attack on a military base on September 17th, 2024, called President Petro to suggest an end to the ELN’s peace talks.[221] The ELN and Colombian government announced the resumed negotiations on November 7th with a plan to meet in Venezuela from November 19th to 25th.[222]

The ELN’s Political Commander and Chief Negotiator, Pablo Beltrán, stated in a November 2024 interview that the peace process under Petro’s leftist government is under pressure with the upcoming 2025 presidential election, as Colombian presidents are limited to one 4-year term.[223] Beltrán stated that a right-wing president could erase the Petro government’s progress, as happened to Santo’s peace progress with Duque’s new government.[224]

The ELN has long been attached to Venezuela’s political autocratic regime, despite not having formal representation within its national or municipal governments. Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election further proved the ELN’s political loyalty to Nicolás Maduro, as the ELN was reported on the streets of Venezuelan border towns threatening citizens to vote for Maduro.[225]

Targets And Tactics

During its early years, the ELN avoided engaging in illegal activity for ideological reasons. Following its near destruction in 1973, the ELN shifted tactics and began robbing banks, assassinating military personnel, and kidnapping for ransom. By the 1980s, the ELN had become expert kidnappers. Kidnapping and extortion accounted for the majority of the group’s revenue.[226] Then, in the late 1980s and 1990s, the ELN joined the drug trade.[227]

In the 2000s, the ELN used kidnapping, extortion, bombings, assassinations, and hijacking to achieve its objectives.[228] The ELN primarily targeted oil company employees for their wealth and because of their foreign identity.[229] In 2013, the ELN declared war on oil companies for allegedly “plundering the country’s natural resources.”[230] The ELN attacked the infrastructure of local towns, including oil pipelines and electricity pylons.[231] In 2014, the ELN engaged in preliminary peace talks with the Colombian government. However, the group’s refusal to stop kidnapping for financing deferred the start of the talks until 2017.[232] Throughout the 2017-2019 peace talks, the ELN simultaneously carried out attacks while calling for peace and the cessation of military activities.[233] The ELN also continued to target oil companies and police officers during this period.[234]

In May 2024, the ELN retracted its pledge to stop civilian kidnapping, despite being a necessary condition of the Bilateral, National and Temporary Ceasefire, due to its reliance on ransom payouts.[235] Though the ceasefire averted violence targeting Colombian officials, the ELN increased targeting other organizations such as ex-FARC dissidents and the drug-trafficking Gaitanistas (known as the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, the AGC, the Gulf Clan, and formerly known as Los Urabeños).[236] The ELN’s targeting of other organizations is described as “violent clashes” via armed strikes and have displaced thousands of civilians.[237]

Akin to its recent activity in Colombia, the ELN targets non-government armed groups in Venezuela. Though, the ELN acts as an informal military power alongside the Venezuelan forces.[238] ELN-Maduro troops target ex-FARC dissidents in the border region; the HRW has reported the joint operation complicit to human rights abuses, observed through “killings, disappearances, child recruitment, and forced displacement.”[239]

Attacks

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

January 7, 1965: The ELN seized Simacota, a small town in Santander. Following the attack, founder Fabio Vásquez Castaño, along with Victor Medina Moron, read the ELN’s proclamation that announced their existence as a group (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[240]

October 13, 1998: The ELN’s José Antonio Galán Front blew up a pipeline in the Department of Antioquia (45+ killed, 70+ wounded).[241]

April 1999: The ELN hijacked an Avianca flight and forced it to land in a remote area of Colombia. The ELN then took all 43 passengers and crew hostage. Some were released immediately upon landing, but 35 persons were held hostage for over one year (0 killed, unknown wounded).[242]

May 1999: The ELN kidnapped 143-186 persons from a church in Cali. Eighty-four were released soon after, and five shortly after that. By September 10, 1999, the ELN had released all remaining hostages. This was the largest kidnapping incident in Colombian history (0 killed, unknown wounded).[243]

June 2011: An ELN member drove a car filled with explosives into Popayan in the province of Cauca. The bomb exploded before police could clear the surrounding area (1 killed, 16 wounded).[244]

Summer 2013: The ELN kidnapped a Canadian mining official, Gernot Wober, and held him for ransom. The ELN then released Wober to the Colombian government in exchange for entering preliminary peace negotiations (0 killed, 0 wounded).[245]

January 2014: The ELN blew up four crude oil holding pools in North Santander. The fires created by the explosion forced residents to flee their homes (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[246]

June-July 2014: The ELN successfully attacked 10 different pieces of energy infrastructure, including wells, pipelines, and mines in Colombia. The attacks were part of the ELN’s war on oil companies. They were also speculated to be an effort by the ELN to gain the Colombian government’s attention and secure a role in ongoing peace negotiations (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[247]

December 2014: The ELN kidnapped a Colombian mayor, Fredy Palacios, while he and 16 others were on a boat. The ELN claimed that the mayor was “stealing money from the municipal budget” and would be released following an organized corruption trial. Palacios was released in March 2015 (0 killed, unknown wounded).[248]

July 3, 2015: The ELN set off two explosions in Bogotá, one in the financial district and one in the industrial area (unknown killed, 8+ wounded).[249]

January 9-12, 2018: The ELN carried out at least 14 attacks after the Colombian government failed to extend its ceasefire with the group. In these attacks, the ELN bombed the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline in Colombia and killed members of the Colombian armed forces (3 killed, 2 wounded).[250]

January 28, 2018: The ELN attacked a police academy in Barranquilla. President Santos halted the government’s peace negotiations with the ELN following the attack, and he recalled the government’s delegation from Quito, Ecuador. (5 killed, 40+ wounded)[251]

January 17, 2019: The ELN set off a car bomb outside the General Santander School, a police academy. This attack was the deadliest car bomb since a FARC-detonated bomb in 2003. Authorities claim that the ELN’s weapons expert, Jose Aldemar Rojas, drove the car and died during the attack. President Duque reinstated Interpol’s warrants for the ELN delegation at the peace talks in Cuba and suspended the concurrent peace talks in response to this attack.(21+ killed, 24+ wounded).[252]

September 17th, 2024: The ELN attacked a military base in Arauca with the detonation of an explosive-filled truck, killing two and wounding twenty-seven. This fatal attack temporarily ended the ELN’s peace negotiations.[253]

Interactions

Vertical Tabs

Designated / Listed
  • United States Foreign Terrorist Organizations List: 1997 to Present[254]
  • European Union’s Common Position 2001/931/CFSP: 2002 to Present[255]
  • Canada’s Listed Terrorist Entities: 2003 to Present[256]
  • New Zealand’s Designated Terrorist Entities List: 2010 to Present[257]
Community Relations

In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the ELN stressed the value of community involvement. In 1998, the ELN pushed for a National Convention, which would have served as a venue for popular participation to tackle issues such as human rights, economic policy, drug trafficking, political participation, natural resources, and the armed forces.[258] The ELN met with members of civil society to sign an agreement focusing on humanitarian issues.[259]

Though the ELN aimed to improve civilians’ lives by addressing social issues and encouraging civil involvement, its violent methodology is highly controversial. In 1999, over 13 million Colombians marched in the No Más protests in 15 cities calling for peace and demanding a ceasefire between rebel groups, including the ELN, and the Colombian government.[260] The protests served as an illustration of the Colombian people’s dissatisfaction with guerrilla violence. Additionally, support for President Álvaro Uribe throughout his presidency (2002-2010) was an indication of Colombia’s negative sentiments about guerrilla activity in the country. Uribe’s crackdown on leftist guerrillas in Colombia increased his approval rating to 82%, symbolizing the Colombian public’s disapproval of guerrilla activity and organizations, including the ELN.[261] The ELN damaged its relationship with the Colombian community further through its 2019 attack on a Colombian police academy. The attack was highly condemned throughout Colombia, and there were widespread protests against the ELN in response.[262]

Despite skepticism of the renewed peace talks in 2022, the commitment to incorporate popular input into the ELN’s peace process constituted the talks’ primary agenda item.[263] The first signed agreement between the ELN and the Colombian government in May 2024 emphasized societal participation in the Total Peace plan.[264] The temporary ceasefire from October 2023 to August 2024 between the ELN and the Colombian government decreased the violence affecting civilians. However, conflicts between the ELN and other armed organizations continue to affect vulnerable, rural, and indigenous communities through displacement and forced recruitment.[265]

The ELN’s community involvement is not limited to its engagement with the Colombian populace. As the ELN has spread to Venezuela, it has formed relationships with the Venezuelan local communities. In 2019, the ELN was reported to provide social services, like food and infrastructure development programs, to local populations in Venezuela.[266] In return, the ELN recruits local support and workers for its illegal gold mines.[267] Often, these ELN recruits are children or minors from the indigenous communities who are virtually forced to live on the militant group’s violent frontlines.[268]

The ELN has participated in the repression of Venezuelans alongside the Maduro administration.[269] Venezuelan civilians voiced dissatisfaction with the Maduro regime’s ties to the ELN during the January 2019 protests against Maduro’s government.[270] However, Venezuelans have also expressed sentiments of increased safety in the presence of the ELN’s control.[271] The strict regulations from the militant group in the state of Apure have benefited rural communities with food, income, protection, political education, and social support, despite significant disappearances of indigenous members.[272] The recruiting of the Venezuelan ELN forces parallels the Colombian structure, targeting former FARC ideological bases in vulnerable and poor indigenous communities.[273]

Relationships With Other Groups

The ELN has had mixed relationships with several groups, insurgencies and drug-trafficking organizations alike. The ELN has been both rivals and allies with the April 19 Movement (M-19), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the People’s Liberation Army (EPL). Between 1987 and 1992, the ELN participated in the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB), an umbrella guerrilla coalition that originally included the M-19, the EPL, the ELN, and the FARC.[274] The CGSB was an ELN initiative, created in 1987, following the ELN’s refusal to join peace talks of 1984.[275] By 1991, the FARC and the ELN were the last remaining members of the CGSB as all of the other groups had demobilized and signed peace agreements with the Colombian government. The CGSB dissolved in 1992 after failed peace talks between the FARC, the ELN, and the Colombian government.[276]

Since 2008 and until FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN frequently cooperated with FARC. In May 2008, the ELN sent a letter to FARC’s Secretariat, a governing council of the group’s seven highest leaders, expressing its interest in cooperating.[277] The ELN’s choice to continue fighting amidst a hiatus in the 2008 peace talks prompted its decision to reach out to the FARC. The ELN was motivated to collaborate with the FARC because it believed that the two groups had common enemies: the Colombian state and paramilitaries.[278] However, peace talks began in 2012 and they excluded the ELN.[279] FARC’s chief commander, Timochenko, released a statement in May 2015 calling for the ELN’s inclusion in the negotiations, stating that it was “necessary and urgent for the government and for the Colombian people.”[280] The FARC and Colombian government’s peace talks, however, concluded without invitation to the ELN in 2016.[281]

The demobilization of the Colombian FARC militant group in 2016 led to the creation of many ex-FARC dissident groups (i.e., those FARC members who have refused to demobilize and accept the peace deal), falling under the “Ex-FARC Mafia” categorization.[282]

According to Colombian political publication La Silla Vacía in 2019, the ELN has since coordinated drug trafficking operations with ex-FARC dissidents.[283] The ELN and ex-FARC dissidents met in Venezuela in 2019, with top leaders allegedly attending the meeting.[284] Analysts speculate that they have agreed to a non-aggression pact after years of competition in the coca-producing Colombian Arauca region and Venezuelan Apure state.[285] Though there is no evidence of an official agreement between the national ex-FARC dissident fronts and the ELN, there are indications of non-aggression pacts between some ex-FARC dissident fronts and the ELN.[286] Thus, the ex-FARC Mafia’s various fronts have varied associations with the ELN.

The formation of the ex-FARC dissident group, the Segunda Marquetalia or FARC-SM, in 2019 called on the ELN for the renewal of the CGSB umbrella guerrilla coalition to no avail.[287] While FARC-SM failed to restore the guerrilla coalition, it has maintained a “makeshift alliance” with the ELN along the Colombian-Venezuelan border region.[288] Despite reported clashing between Colombian fronts in 2022, the ELN remains peaceful with the FARC-SM in Venezuelan territory, as per prior 2019 agreements with ex-FARC and ELN leaders.[289] Similarly, the 33rd ex-FARC Mafia front remains positively associated with ELN.[290]

FARC dissidents are chiefly split into two major dissident groups, the aforementioned Second Marquetalia, and the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central or EMC).[291] Whereas the ELN shares a casual alliance with the Second Marquetalia, the ELN is the EMC’s greatest rival.[292] Clashes between the EMC and the ELN forced the EMC out of its Venezuelan Apure territory in 2022, despite previously respected non-aggression pacts between the two groups.[293] Civilians are forced to bear the consequences of ELN-FARC dissident group violence and have been both experienced mass displacement and restrictive confinement of approximately 12,000 people in 2022, according to the Human Rights Watch report.[294] The ex-FARC Mafia’s 10th front aligns with the EMC, and thus clashes violently with the ELN.[295]

In addition to coordinating with ex-FARC dissidents, the ELN has recruited former FARC members.[296] FARC’s 2016 peace deal led to the ELN’s growth of 1,000 combatants by 2019, many of whom were former FARC members who refused to disarm and demobilize.[297]

The ELN has turned to other partners in the drug trade, beyond former FARC members, since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016. Beginning in 2016-2017, the ELN had collaborated with drug cartels, like Los Rastrojos, in order to maintain its income from illegal drug trafficking.[298] Since 2019, however, the Rastrojos have become minor rivals of the ELN and have lost substantial territorial influence. The Rastrojos are now at the cusp of absorption into the ex-AUC dissident group, the Gaitanistas (known as the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, the AGC, the Gulf Clan, and formerly known as Los Urabeños).[299] The ELN has also drawn close ties and support from the notorious Mexican Sinaloa drug cartel, as the ELN’s largest patron of Venezuelan coca.[300]

The ELN has both cooperated and competed with the Gaitanistas (known as the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, the AGC, the Gulf Clan, and formerly known as Los Urabeños), a Colombian’ paramilitary group and also Colombia’s largest drug cartel. InSight Crime reported collaboration between the ELN and the Gaitanistas in the coca production and trade in the town of Simití and a non-aggression pact in 2016.[301] However, since 2018, the Gaitanistas have become the ELN’s main rival.[302] From February to March 2019, clashes between the ELN and the Gaitanistas forced the confinement of approximately 2,800 people in Bojayá, a city along two major drug trafficking routes in northern Colombia.[303] Confrontations between the two groups have significantly increased since the COVID-19 pandemic as they fight to control major drug-trafficking and illegal mining areas in Colombia.[304] The ELN-Gaitanista rivalry has caused the ELN territory loss in its historically dominated departments and continues to both displace and confine thousands of civilians in the process.[305]

Similarly to the ELN’s relationship with the Rastrojos, the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) has lost its influential significance against the ELN and no longer poses a threat to the militant group or the Colombian government.[306]

With its significant presence in Venezuela, the ELN is in regular contact with local Venezuelan groups. The ELN’s growing presence in the Venezuelan illegal gold mining industry has created competition with sindicatos, or Venezuelan crime syndicates.[307] The ELN has pushed the sindicatos from their former mining territories, as well as taxed and bought the gold produced under these groups.[308] Therefore, the ELN has both cooperative and competitive relationships with the Venezuelan sindicatos.[309]

Although the ELN has faced some competition from sindicatos, it has cooperated with colectivos, Venezuela’s pro-Maduro paramilitary collectives.[310] The ELN has joined the Venezuelan collectives on several occasions, blocking humanitarian aid along the Colombian-Venezuelan border in 2018 and attacking a demonstration hosting self-declared President Juan Guaidó in January 2019. However, the ELN’s strongest ally in Venezuela remains to be the Maduro government itself.[311]

State Sponsors And External Influences

Venezuela as the ELN’s safe haven

The Venezuelan government shares an extensive political history with the ELN as the militant group’s most essential ally—though the current Maduro administration denies its affiliation with the Colombian-origin militant group.[312] In 1999, Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez, began an amicable relationship with the ELN and other insurgent groups upon his election.[313] During peace talks with the Colombian government in the mid-2000s, the ELN received support and assistance from Chávez. In January 2008, Chávez publicly declared the ELN, along with the FARC, to be “insurgent forces that have political protection” as opposed to their common designation as terrorist organizations.[314] In response, the ELN thanked the Venezuelan government for its recognition and legitimization of the ELN’s political motivations.[315] In February 2019, the ELN declared its commitment to defend Maduro’s government and to protect Venezuela in the case of a U.S. military intervention.[316] The alliance between the ELN and the Venezuelan armed forces, the Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (FANB), continues to affirm the ELN’s relationship with Maduro’s government.[317]

Although the ELN and the FANB faced disputes in 2018, the actors have continued to work as unofficial allies.[318] In 2020, the ELN and FANB worked together to critically damage the territorial control and influence of the anti-Maduro Rastrojos in Venezuela.[319] The ELN has further been described as a “paramilitary force” of Maduro’s government, sharing profits with Venezuelan officials to expand its illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, smuggling, and local taxing operations.[320]

Venezuela has also long served as a sanctuary for ELN members from the pursuit of the Colombian government.[321] The ELN’s current top leaders in the Central Command (COCE) have been reported to operate within Venezuela’s borders since as early as 2009.[322] The ELN utilizes its alliance and control of the Venezuelan border region to interfere with the nation’s electoral politics for the benefit of Maduro and his allies. In November 2021, the ELN forced Táchira state residents to vote for the pro-Maduro gubernatorial candidate, and in 2023, the ELN reportedly threatened Maduro’s political opponent, though the ELN denied this claim.[323]

Analysts are concerned about the ELN’s external relations transforming into a larger conflict. In particular, they have speculated that the ELN’s operations along the Colombian-Venezuelan border may generate tensions between Venezuela and Colombia, countries that have been historically hostile with each other. Since 2022, however, Colombian President Gustavo Petro has re-opened the Colombian-Venezuelan border and actively incorporated Venezuelan leadership into the Colombian Total Peace plan. Specifically, Petro’s peace plan relies on Venezuela as a sincere guarantor nation to aid the Colombian-ELN peace negotiations. Analysts maintain the importance of Venezuela’s position as an actor in Colombian peace, stating that “as long as the ELN is allowed to operate in Venezuelan territory, then there will be no peace.”[324]

As Colombia’s peace talks with the ELN weaken, the ELN’s power in Venezuela has maintained its strength. The ELN has aided the Venezuelan government as a paramilitary group since first receiving support from Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 1999.[325] Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro, has continued to enable the ELN’s influence and behaviors in Venezuela, allowing its illegal gold mining and coca trafficking with the beneficial return of powerful and loyal non-state actors.[326] The ties between the ELN and the Venezuelan government have led to the ELN’s enduring commitment to the autocratic Maduro regime.[327] During the July 2024 election campaign, the ELN was reported to be seen on the streets of border states, pressuring and threatening Venezuelans to vote for Maduro.[328] Nicolás Maduro’s heavily disputed re-election victory indicates another six years of a Venezuelan safe haven for the ELN’s illicit practices alongside Venezuela’s political and military forces.[329]

           

Cuba

Cuba has historically supported the ELN both financially and politically. During the ELN’s early years, Cuba supported the group financially by providing weapons to ELN militants.[330] However, Cuba stopped providing weapons and training to the ELN in 1991.[331] Cuba has since supported the ELN politically. Cuba hosted peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government from 2017-2019.[332] After the disintegration of the peace talks in 2019, Cuba the Colombian government’s extradition and arrest requests for the ELN’s peace delegation.[333] Since the restored peace dialogues in 2022, however, Cuba has supported the peace endeavors as a guarantor of the peace negotiations.[334] Cuba hosted the third round of talks in Havana, where the initial six-month Bilateral, National and Temporary Ceasefire agreement was signed in May 2023.[335]

 

The Catholic Church

The Catholic Church has influenced the ELN since the ELN’s creation in 1964. In its founding ideology, the ELN subscribed to Catholic Liberation Theology, a doctrine that combines Marxism with Jesus’ focus on the poor and oppressed to stress the needs of those communities.[336] The Catholic influence further developed the ELN’s ideology through its most influential members who were radicalized former priests–such as the martyred Father Torres or former ELN Central Command (COCE) leader, Father Manuel Peréz.[337] Although the ideology and actions of the ELN have changed over the group's lifetime, the ELN remains influenced by the Catholic Church. The ELN has historically called upon the Catholic Church to help it negotiate with the Colombian government. During the ELN's on-and-off talks with President Uribe's government from 2002-2008, the Catholic Church acted as a guarantor.[338] In 2015, the ELN asked the Catholic Church in Colombia to help it negotiate a ceasefire with the Colombian government.[339] In 2017, the ELN initiated a ceasefire in anticipation of the Pope Francis’ visit to Colombia.[340] The Catholic Church continues to act as a monitoring mechanism for ceasefires and negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government.[341] In January 2024, President Petro further stated his desire to “deepen” the Catholic Church’s involvement in the ongoing peace talks during his meeting with Pope Francis in the Vatican.[342]

 

Ecuador’s Severed Ties

The government of Ecuador has previously supported negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government, hosting peace talks between the ELN and Duque’s government in 2016.[343] However, the Ecuadorian government removed itself from the peace talks in 2018 after Colombian FARC dissidents held hostage and killed two Ecuadorian journalists and their driver.[344] Ecuador has since remained withdrawn from the ELN-Colombian peace process, as of July 2024.[345]

 

Other External Connections

Though there is no observable evidence that this group receives external support from the following foreign governments or third parties, these nations are tied to the ELN’s peace talks as guarantor nations and accompanying countries or organizations, respectively—Brazil, Chile, Norway, and Mexico as well as Germany, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and the Special Representative of the UN.[346]

Footnotes
Footnotes: 

 

[1] Osterling, Jorge P. Democracy In Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare. New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction, 1989.

[2] Torres, Mauricio. "Cinco Militares Mueren Tras Un Ataque Atribuido Al ELN En Antioquia, Reporta El Ejército de Colombia." CNN Colombia. November 21, 2024. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/11/21/militares-mueren-ataque-eln-antioquia-colombia-orix; Sánchez, Santiago T. "El ELN Asesina a cinco soldados cerca de un espacio de reincorporación en Antioquia, a dos años del inicio de los Diálogos de Paz." El País. November 21, 2024. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2024-11-21/el-eln-asesina-a-cinco-soldados-cerca-de-un-espacio-de-reincorporacion-en-antioquia-a-dos-anos-del-inicio-de-los-dialogos-de-paz.html; "Guerrillas Kill Four Colombian Soldiers As Peace Efforts Falter." Barron's. AFP - Agence France Presse, November 21, 2024. https://www.barrons.com/news/guerrillas-kill-four-colombian-soldiers-as-peace-efforts-falter-6a2a620b.

[3] “National Liberation Army (Colombia).” Terrorist Organization Profile. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism – University of Maryland. N.d. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=218; “Profiles: Colombia’s armed groups.” BBC Latin America & Caribbean. BBC News. 29 August 2013. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950

[4] "El Legado Del "Ché" Dentro Del Ejército De Liberación Nacional De Colombia/ The Legacy of Che within Colombia's National Liberation Army." CeDeMA.Org. Centro De Documentación De Los Movimientos Armados, October 8, 2008. https://cedema.org/digital_items/2869.

[5] Craig-Best, Liam. “Interview with ELN Commander Antonio García.” Colombia Journal. N.p. 27 August 2000. Web. 23 July 2015. https://web.archive.org/web/20040611154302/http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia25.htm; “National Liberation Army (Colombia).” Terrorist Organization Profile. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism – University of Maryland. N.d. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=218; Osterling, Jorge P. Democracy In Colombia : Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare. New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction, 1989; Sacquety, Troy J. PHD. "Forty Years of Insurgency: Colombia's Main Opposition Groups." Veritas 2, no. 4 (2006). https://arsof-history.org/articles/v2n4_40years_insurgency_page_1.html.

[6] Colombia Reports. "National Liberation Army (ELN)." Colombia Reports. Colombia Reports, May 14, 2022. https://colombiareports.com/eln/.

[7] García-Peña, Daniel. "The National Liberation Army (ELN) Creates a Different Peace Proces." Nacla.Org. The North American Congress on Latin America, September 25, 2007. https://nacla.org/article/national-liberation-army-eln-creates-different-peace-proces; Klobucista, Claire, and Danielle Renwick. "Colombia's Civil Conflict." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, January 11, 2017. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict.

[8] “ELN.” InSight Crime. N.p. N.d. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile; Edling, Zach. “ELN.” COLOMBIA REPORTS. N.p. 22 October 2012. Web. 30 July 2015. http://colombiareports.com/eln/

[9] “ELN INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA 1966-PRESENT.” ON WAR. N.p. N.d. Web. 12 August 2015. https://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr60/fcolombia1966.htm; “ELN.” InSight Crime. N.p. N.d. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile

[10] Sacquety, Troy J. PHD. "Forty Years of Insurgency: Colombia's Main Opposition Groups." Veritas 2, no. 4 (2006). Accessed June 2, 2024. https://arsof-history.org/articles/v2n4_40years_insurgency_page_1.html.

[11] “National Liberation Army (Colombia).” Terrorist Organization Profile. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism – University of Maryland. N.d. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=218

[12] McDermott, Jeremy. “Colombia’s ELN rebels show new vigour.” BBC. BBC News. 5 November 2009. Web. 23 July 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8341093.stm

[13] “ELN.” InSight Crime. N.p. N.d. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile

[14] McDermott, Jeremy. “Colombia’s ELN rebels show new vigour.” BBC. BBC News. 5 November 2009. Web. 23 July 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8341093.stm; “ELN.” InSight Crime. N.p. N.d. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile

[15] “ELN.” InSight Crime. N.p. N.d. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile

[16] Dayani, Martin. “Pastrana Shows ‘Disdain’ for the ELN.” Colombia Journal. N.p. 3 September 2001. Web. 31 July 2015. http://colombiajournal.org/colombia79.htm

[17] “ELN.” InSight Crime. N.p. N.d. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/eln-profile

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[20] Molinski, Dan. “Colombian Rebel Group Steps Up Violence.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company. 15 January 2013. Web. 23 July 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323596204578241902662204058

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