

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

AT A GLANCE

Overview

Organization

Strategy

Major Attacks

Interactions

Maps

HOW TO CITE

Mapping Militant Project (MMP). "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps." Last modified November 2022.

OVERVIEW

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a Shiite organization operating in Iran, directed by the Ayatollah. The organization is structured into several branches and conducts operations domestically and internationally. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini formed the IRGC to protect the new government from coups and foreign interference. As the organization grew in numbers and political strength, it began supporting Shia organizations in other countries to move their Islamist agendas forward. The IRGC has several branches which includes the Quds Force, an elite force of fighters known for gathering intelligence and conducting foreign operations.

A. SUMMARY

Formed: April 22, 1979¹

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: November 7, 1979: Militants linked to Hezbollah bombed the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut.² Iranian intelligence and material support was allegedly given to Hezbollah by proxy of the IRGC (241 killed, unknown injured).³

Last Attack: September 24, 2022: The IRGC fired artillery at a Kurdish separatist group's base in northern Iraq.⁴ This attack came after the Kurdish group attempted to import weapons into Iran in addition to voicing its support for the large-scale protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini (unknown killed, unknown injured).⁵

B. NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Disclaimer: Differentiating between Iran, the IRGC, and branches within the IRGC is difficult given the overlapping nature of these entities. Perpetrators in this profile are referenced in the same manner as they appeared in the original source.

Emergence after the Islamic Revolution

In April 1979, just a couple months after the end of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini announced the demand for the Revolutionary Council to establish Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami, or officially known as the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.⁶ Internationally, media outlets and world leaders used Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to refer to the organization but domestically, the IRGC is mainly referred to as Sepah-e Pasdaran or the Pasdaran. His initial vision for these Guards were to be the protectors of the Islamic Republic against potential dissidents as they expanded the ideology of the revolution. In the weeks following Khomeini's proclamation, the Revolutionary Council dictated specific duties for the IRGC. These included assisting security forces against dissidents, defending the country against foreign activity, expanding the ideas of the Islamic Revolution, coordinating with the traditional Iranian military forces, and supporting sympathetic countries and organizations with financial, logistical, and military support.⁷

In its early days, the IRGC was used alongside other security forces to curb counterrevolutionaries across the country. The IRGC worked with regional Islamist paramilitary groups who sought to enforce the new sociopolitical order of the country. From the ranks of these paramilitary groups, the IRGC drew top fighters into its own organization for further training.⁸ During this time period, Iranian college students captured the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and began a 444-day hostage situation. Soon after the attack, the U.S. placed the first sanctions on Iran, banning all imports and freezing \$12 billion Iranian assets.⁹ These sanctions marked the beginning of an extensive line of U.S. sanctions placed upon Iran.

The IRGC in the Iran-Iraq War

Soon after its formation, the IRGC became an important force in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraqi forces invaded along the western border of Iran in September 1980, directing operations towards Iranian Air Force posts. Saddam Hussein and Iraqi politicians at large feared the expansion of Iranian revolutionary ideas into Iraq and the potential threat of Khomeini rallying the large Iraqi Shia population against the Sunni Ba'athist regime.¹⁰ Prior to the Iraqi invasion in September 1980, the IRGC remained a volunteer militia that lacked formal training and experience.¹¹ The organization lacked the financial support of politicians and nationalists, who preferred the traditional military forces who had a deep history of combat training and legitimacy. When the ruling clerics voiced their full trust in the IRGC's capabilities, the organization began garnering funds for proper training and equipment.¹²

The IRGC's rise to success in the war was due to the relative weakness of the traditional army who had yet to rebound from its losses during the revolution.¹³ The army was unable to push Iraqi forces back to the internationally-recognized border, thus the deployment of individual IRGC units was necessary for support. During the beginning of the war, the IRGC consisted of small units of fighters throughout the border cities who were fighting of their own volition.¹⁴ In order to provide structure for these scattered units, commanders within the IRGC formed the Operation Headquarters of the South which coordinated larger operations involving all available forces.¹⁵ By the end of 1981, the IRGC gained credibility and support throughout the Iranian government. A change in presidency shifted political support in favor of increasing IRGC operations seen after the success of the Basij militia.

In April 1980, Khomeini founded the Basij militia, which continues to operate as a volunteer paramilitary organization under the IRGC.¹⁶ The Basij militia would provide the military training necessary for all citizens to engage in the armed defense of Iran, if need be.¹⁷ In 1981, the Basij militia merged with the IRGC, bolstering the numbers and skill throughout the organization in the Iran-Iraq War.¹⁸ The Basij militia was deployed with the regular Iranian army, having previously only assisted in keeping peace in major cities and towns.¹⁹ Many of the recruits were young boys from poor backgrounds or forced into conscription.²⁰ In 1981, the Basij militia became a branch of the IRGC and operated under its command. After the war and with an uptick in social reform protests, the Basij militia mobilized for suppressing protests in schools, factories, and streets.²¹

In the early 1980s, the IRGC formed the Badr Corps, an Iraqi Shia militant organization, as the armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).²² Iran used the Badr Corps to mobilize and arm the Iraqi Shia and anti-Saddam Hussein populations during the Iran-Iraq War. The IRGC's ability to influence groups across Iranian borders compounded its credibility as a legitimate military organization among the ruling elite. After the war ended, Iran financed the SCIRI's successor, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.²³ The IRGC-QF, after its formation in 1988, considered the Badr Corps an official unit and provided training and weapons for the Corps prior to 2003 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.²⁴

The increase in government support for the IRGC enabled the organization to capitalize on its original goal, expanding the revolution to other countries. In the early 1980s, the IRGC established the Office of Liberation Movements (OLM) which deployed forces to Lebanon to assist in organizing the Shia militias into a larger movement – Hezbollah's predecessor.²⁵ As the OLM focused on the Lebanese Shia movement, it also absorbed SAVAK, Iran's main intelligence organization at the time, which collected information on groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan. The combination of the OLM and SAVAK became the predecessor of the Quds Force intelligence wing.²⁶

In the later years of the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC acted as a fully functioning security organization that fought alongside the military, and eventually usurped them in power and influence. When Ruhollah Khomeini took power as Iran's supreme leader, he

adamantly supported the IRGC which enabled the organization to increase its influence both economically and politically after the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988.²⁷

In 1987, Kuwait requested American maritime protection as Iran stationed naval forces and placed naval mines in the Persian Gulf to cut off Iraqi resupplies.²⁸ The Reagan administration agreed to accept 11 Kuwaiti tankers into the U.S. Navy and began Operation Earnest Will, a 500-mile convoy from Kuwaiti waters to the Gulf of Oman.²⁹ Throughout the operation, these tankers were targets of Iranian missile attacks and naval mines. After an Iranian missile struck down a U.S. tanker anchored in Kuwait City, the U.S. Navy executed Operation Nimble Archer in which they shelled two platforms in Iran's Rostam oil field.³⁰ These platforms were being used by the IRGC as bases for attacking shipping barges rather than oil supply. The IRGC Naval Forces also had fleets of smaller boats stationed throughout the Gulf that could maneuver around the convoy and obstruct the convoy's route.³¹ The success of the IRGC's small boats and naval mines demonstrated Iran's ability to contend with U.S. attacks despite weaknesses in Iran's conventional warfare strategies.

After the U.S. shelling of Rostam, attacks between the two navies dwindled. However, tensions escalated when the U.S. mistook Iran Air Flight 655 as an Iranian fighter plane and killed 290 passengers in a missile attack in July 1988.³² A month later, Iran and Iraq agreed to the U.N.-mediated ceasefire, ending the 8-year long war.

IRGC in the 90s

With Ayatollah Khamenei's strong support of the IRGC, the organization looked to other Shia groups to expand influence. In 1992, the IRGC and Hezbollah began training Hamas fighters in suicide bomb tactics.³³ The IRGC also began expanding into the Iranian defense industry, and in several years, had become a commanding presence in the infrastructure, communications, and energy sectors.³⁴ Iran was in need of major reconstruction efforts after the war, and the IRGC, given its newfound strength and funding, was able to begin its economic expansion.

The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) rose in importance during the 1990s. The Quds Force is known to assist MOIS in carrying out operations to maintain Iranian national security. Some of Hezbollah's most well-known attacks, specifically the Buenos Aires attacks in 1992 and 1994 were supplemented by MOIS support.³⁵ Hezbollah received logistical support from both MOIS and the IRGC throughout the operations, which heightened the cooperation between the IRGC and other government security forces within Iran. Under the Iranian constitution, the IRGC must comply with MOIS policies and is allowed to collect and analyze intelligence to support the MOIS in countering political opponents.³⁶ This relationship remains today as the MOIS helps the Quds Force manage communication and logistics with foreign entities in return for intelligence reports from the Quds Force.³⁷

U.S. Presence and IRGC Fighters in the Syrian Civil War

In the early 2000s, the U.S. placed new sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, specifically its uranium-enrichment programs. The IRGC, allegedly, maintains a

significant amount of control and oversight in Iran's nuclear program, justified by its function of sustaining Iranian national security.³⁸ Through a series of asset freezes, the U.S. sanctioned several companies that were linked to the IRGC – either through ownership or affiliation – and were involved in nuclear energy.³⁹ These sanctions also blocked Iranian access to nuclear materials and placed Iran's uranium-enrichment programs under international scrutiny. Some of these sanctions would be lifted with the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, however, these sanctions hindered Iran's progress to create nuclear weapons for years. These sanctions also significantly damaged Iran's economy, which in turn decreased available funds for the IRGC. During this time, the IRGC relied on its foreign fighters to expand the goals of the Islamic Revolution.⁴⁰

After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, the IRGC capitalized on the opportunity to mobilize Iraqi Shia militias against the increased American presence.⁴¹ The Quds Force worked with these militias to attack U.S.-led forces throughout Iraq, often staying in the houses of top-ranking Iraqi Shiite politicians for security and coordination.⁴² The Iraqi branch of the IRGC's Shia Liberation Army, the Hayderiyoun Division, was an IRGC-backed Shia militia that later grew in importance during the Syrian Civil War.

When the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, the IRGC encouraged the Syrian Shia minority to assemble into militias and defend holy Shia sites from rebel fighters. Within Syria, the town of Zabadani was especially critical for the Quds Force because it acted as an IRGC support hub for Hezbollah.⁴³ In Zabadani, located near the border between Syria and Lebanon, the IRGC could send logistical support and communicate quickly with Hezbollah forces nearby. Iran, in general, also had interests in maintaining the Assad regime since Syria supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq War.⁴⁴

In 2012, the IRGC began deploying its own militias from the Shia Liberation Army (the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the Zaynibyoun Brigade and the Hayderiyoun Division) into Syria to fight Syrian rebel militias.⁴⁵ These militias were recruits and refugees, especially within the Afghan division, who were economically disadvantaged and took the competitive salaries offered by the IRGC. In addition to their proxy militias, the IRGC also sent its own soldiers into Syria as the conflict continued. In January 2012, Syrian rebels in the Farouq Battalion captured seven Iranians who were believed to be members of the IRGC.⁴⁶ The following February, Syrian rebels killed IRGC commander Hessam Khoshnevis who was traveling to Lebanon from Damascus.⁴⁷ In 2018, an estimate stated at least 2,100 Iranian soldiers died in the conflict.⁴⁸

Implementation of the JCPOA and Beyond

In 2015, the U.S. brokered the JCPOA with Iran, Russia, China, the U.K., France, and Germany which lifted economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for a decrease in Iranian nuclear activities and consistent international monitoring of these nuclear programs. President Trump announced he would leave the JCPOA in May 2018 due to Iran's continued destabilization in the region and reinforce strict sanctions against Iranian oil exports.⁴⁹ As of October 2022, the Biden administration seems open to resuming the deal with Iran, but the U.S. designation of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism and the IRGC

designation as a terrorist organization hinders cooperation.⁵⁰ Some reports believe that if the Biden administration were to enact a new nuclear deal, sanctions that indirectly decreased monetary flows to the IRGC would be relieved, thus providing more pathways of funding for the organization.⁵¹

With the success of proxy militias in the Syrian Civil War, the IRGC continued to expand into new regions. Iran, most likely through the IRGC, sent weapons and training to Bahraini militias who later carried out attacks against Bahraini security forces.⁵² Militias like Saraya al-Mukhtar continue to conduct attacks against Bahraini officials despite U.S. sanctions and Bahraini government crackdowns on terrorism.⁵³ Sometime between 2015 and 2019, IRGC officials assumed commanding positions within Ansar Allah in Yemen to assist in smuggling operations and training.⁵⁴ In 2018, the European Union discovered Iranian agents in several European countries plotting assassinations and bombings in Albania, Denmark, and France.⁵⁵ This global presence urged the U.S. to designate the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization the following year.⁵⁶ Since 2018, majority of the IRGC's operations have remained in the Middle East region, with continued support for groups in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain.

In September 2022, Russian-deployed Iranian drones were discovered in Ukraine in the Ukraine War. Iran didn't directly deny selling drones to Russia in the diplomatic aftermath.⁵⁷ Given that the IRGC oversees foreign operations, it is probable that IRGC officials were involved in the selling of these drones to Russia, even if sources only cite Iran as the perpetrator. As of October 2022, IRGC officials are on the ground in areas of Russian occupation in Ukraine to assist Russian forces in using the drones.⁵⁸ The deployment of IRGC personnel in Ukraine marks the first time Iran has participated in a war on the European continent.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. LEADERSHIP

The Ayatollah directly commands the leader of the IRGC and the subsequent commanders of the different branches. He also has the power to select and remove new commanders to carry out his vision of protecting the security of the Islamic Republic.⁵⁹ The IRGC is separated into several branches.

Jarad Mansuri (March 1979 – May 1979): Mansuri was the first Acting Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, and he oversaw its formation into a structured organization capable of countering protestors in the Iranian Revolution. His short term was followed by several other Acting Commanders who maintained power for only a couple of months at a time.⁶⁰

Mohsen Rezaee (September 1981 - September 1997): Rezaee was the longest reigning commander since the IRGC's formation. Under his guidance, IRGC intelligence efforts supported deadly attacks and assassinations, including a bombing in Paris and the killing of a former Iranian prime minister. He also maintained stability within the organization as supreme leaders changed, from Ayatollah Khomeini to Ayatollah Khamenei.⁶¹ After his

command role in the IRGC, Rezaee served as the Vice President of Iran for Economic Affairs from August 2021 to March 2022.⁶²

Yahya Rahim Safavi (September 1997 – September 2007): Safavi served as commander-in-chief after Ayatollah Khamenei relieved Rezaee of the role.⁶³ He reexamined the IRGC's role in Iran, focusing the organization's major goals on defense, security, and cultural issues, with secondary goals being the development of Iran and rescue operations during natural disasters.⁶⁴

Mohammed Ali Jafari (September 2007 – April 2019): During the Iran-Iraq War, Jafari fought within the Basij militia and later became a Major General within the IRGC. After his appointment as commander-in-chief, he moved decision-making control to 31 new IRGC local command centers around the country in hopes of protecting themselves against the "internal enemy" which he saw as a greater threat than foreign powers.⁶⁵

Hossein Salami (April 21, 2019 – Present): Khamenei appointed Salami as commander after Jafari's removal. Salami has continuously spoken about Iranian-Israeli relations with threats to eliminate Israel if it would choose to go to war with Iran.⁶⁶

Qasem Soleimani (March 1998 – January 3, 2020): Soleimani was commander of the Quds Force and helped link the IRGC to Hezbollah to expand influence outside of Iran.⁶⁷ He was seen as one of the most powerful people within Iran with his control over the covert operations and attacks carried out by Quds Force agents. The Trump administration directed an airstrike to kill Soleimani as he flew into Baghdad Airport in early January 2020. His death increased tensions between Iran and the United States as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called this a criminal event from America.⁶⁸

Esmail Qaani (January 3, 2020 – Present): After the Iran-Iraq War, Qaani worked with the IRGC Ground Forces before joining the Quds Force, sometime in the late 1990s.⁶⁹ As Soleimani's deputy, Qaani was responsible for operations in the Khorasan Province, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. After Soleimani's death, Qaani took control of the Quds Force.⁷⁰

B. NAME CHANGES

There are no recorded name changes for this group, however the IRGC is referred to by several names. In Farsi, the IRGC is called Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami which leads to the shorthand Pasdaran or Guards.⁷¹

C. SIZE ESTIMATES

- 1979: 20,000 – 30,000 (Alemzadeh; British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies)⁷²
- 2007: 125,000 (Center for Strategic and International Studies)⁷³

- 2017: 255,000 (100,000 IRGC Ground Force, 20,000 IRGC Naval Forces, 30,000 IRGC Aerospace Force, 100,000 Basij militia, 5,000 IRGC-QF) (Congressional Research Service)⁷⁴
- 2020: 190,000 (150,000 IRGC Ground Forces, 20,000 IRGC Naval Forces, 15,000 IRGC Aerospace Force, 5,000 IRGC-QF) (International Institute for Strategic Studies)⁷⁵

D. RESOURCES

In the years after the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC acquired several factories and established companies in a variety of sectors, ranging from construction to agricultural production.⁷⁶ The industrial wing of these companies was named Khatam al-Anbiya and became the IRGC's engineering unit.⁷⁷ It was contracted by a variety of Iranian employers for the construction of highways, buildings, tunnels, and other infrastructure.⁷⁸ The money earned from these contracts would go towards defensive funding in the IRGC.⁷⁹ In 2007, the U.S. sanctioned the company's assets separate from the organization, and later, as an entity of the IRGC that supported instability in the region.⁸⁰

The IRGC receives funding from Iran in its yearly military budget.⁸¹ When the Iranian economy is prospering, more money is available to allot to the IRGC. With the long history of U.S. sanctions, Iran's military budget wavers depending on the year. In the early 2010s, Iran entered a recession due to strict international sanctions before ramping up spending from 2015 to 2018 after the implementation of the JCPOA.⁸² After the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2019 and placed new sanctions on Iran, defense spending decreased overall but has begun to climb since 2020. In 2020, the IRGC received \$6.96 billion dollars, about 34% of the military budget, and over twice the amount that Artesh, Iran's conventional military, received.⁸³

After the success of small, maneuverable boats against Operation Earnest Will, Iran built up the naval branch of the IRGC in the Persian Gulf.⁸⁴ The IRGC Navy (IRGCN) operates with the Iranian Navy and together, they control submarines, rocket vessels, and boats in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.⁸⁵ With the current estimate of Iranian naval material, the IRGCN and Iranian Navy can disrupt traffic in the Gulf but cannot prevent navigation for an extended period of time.⁸⁶ In 2016, several news sources reported Iranian interest in establishing naval bases in Yemen and Syria however neither base has been created as of 2022.

The IRGC also oversees several underground missile bases that store ballistic and cruise missiles for ground and naval use.⁸⁷ Iran first revealed a new missile storage facility in October 2019 and continued building more in undisclosed locations throughout the country.⁸⁸ In 2019, IHS Janes reported IRGC missile brigades operating bases in Karaj and Khorramabad that housed hundreds of short-range missiles.⁸⁹ After the dissolution of the JCPOA, Iran revamped its uranium enrichment program which the IRGC has an indeterminate amount of control over based on publicly available information.⁹⁰

The IRGC also profits from oil-to-money schemes through several networks. Previously, the Global Vision Group, a Russian-based company owned by Mohammad Amer Alchwiki, oversaw the transfer of oil from Iran to Syria and directed the profit to the Quds Force, Hezbollah, and Hamas.⁹¹ The Global Vision Group worked through a Russian-owned company, Promsyrioimport, to oversee Iranian oil shipments from the National Iranian Oil Company to Syria.⁹² Iranian oil exports sent to Syria result in a chain of money transfers from Iranian and Russian front companies who send these profits to the Quds Force. In November 2018, The US Office of Foreign Assets Control under the Trump administration designated Alchwiki and the Global Vision Group as sponsors of the Quds Force and Hezbollah.⁹³

The Quds Force also receives funding in a similar manner through two networks managed by Ali Qasir, Meghdad Amini, and Morteza Hashemi. Qasir and Amini direct front companies that sold millions of dollars' worth of valuable products, like gold, electronics, and foreign currency, and used this money to support the Quds Force and Hezbollah.⁹⁴ Hashemi laundered money for the Quds Force through companies in Hong Kong and mainland China.⁹⁵ These three men were designated pursuant in sponsoring or providing support for the Quds Force and Hezbollah in June 2022.⁹⁶ They'd previously been designated pursuant in 2018 and 2019 for similar measures.⁹⁷ Other groups, like the Talaqi Group and Hokoul also financially support the IRGC through Iranian petroleum shipments to Syria.⁹⁸

The Quds Force has expanded the operational capacity of the IRGC by establishing training bases in neighboring countries. In 2019, the US State Department reported a new IRGC base in Bayt Mubarak, Lebanon where Hezbollah has a strong presence.⁹⁹ At this training base, Quds Force officers could receive training on armored personnel carriers alongside Hezbollah officers.¹⁰⁰ In 2021, the Quds Force opened a training base in western Iraq where Iranian proxy militias, like Kata'ib Hezbollah, were located. This training base focused on the use of unmanned aerial vehicles with attached explosives.¹⁰¹ To bolster the fighting capacity of Ansar Allah militants, the IRGC allegedly flew Ansar Allah fighters to Syria for military training before returning to Yemen after several weeks.¹⁰²

E. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS

The IRGC mainly operates within Iran, however the Quds Force oversees operations across the Middle East and Central Asia. The IRGC has a long history of supporting Hezbollah and Hamas with logistical support and training beginning in the 1980s. The IRGC began by sponsoring armed Shia groups in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Now, the covert force has conducted operations in Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Bahrain, and Yemen – sometimes in conjunction with other armed groups or on its own.¹⁰³

In these countries, the Quds Force has established recruitment programs for enrollment into Shia militia groups that become supported by the IRGC.¹⁰⁴ In Lebanon and Palestine, the Quds Force works closely with Hezbollah and Hamas, training new militants near the

Syrian-Lebanese border. The IRGC exerts influence in Bahrain and Yemen through support for organizations like Saraya al-Mukhtar and Ansar Allah, providing funding, military training, and logistical support. The IRGC offers competitive salaries to economically disadvantaged Shia minorities, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which led to the creation of the Shia Liberation Army with its Iraqi, Afghani, and Pakistani divisions.¹⁰⁵ In Syria, the IRGC has recruited fighters as young as 15 who receive military and religious training in eastern Syria.¹⁰⁶

After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the IRGC followed in Iran's suit to internationalize its doctrines. The organization sent 2,000 Guards to Sudan in the early 1990s to train Shia militants from Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, under the name "Code 870" according to the former international relations director of the People's Mojahedin of Iran, Mohammad Mohaddessin.¹⁰⁷ The IRGC gained entry into Sudan through a deal in which Iran gave Sudan \$300 million dollars worth of weapons from China.¹⁰⁸

STRATEGY

A. IDEOLOGY AND GOALS

The Iranian regime was founded on velayat-e-faqih (the guardianship of the Islamic jurist), a sect of militant Shia Islamism. In this ideology, the Shia clergy presides over state power and the supreme leader should hold exclusive authority.¹⁰⁹ The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, under the constitution instituted by Ayatollah Khomeini, was formed to enforce velayat-e-faqih and protect Shia faith and control.¹¹⁰ As supreme leader, Khomeini reshuffled the chain of command, allowing the IRGC to report solely to the Ayatollah, bypassing the president and government-sanctioned military.¹¹¹ The IRGC's main function is maintaining Iranian national security, which includes the protection of the Ayatollah, the domestic and foreign interests of Iran, and sustaining connections to other organizations that are sympathetic to Iran.¹¹²

Internationally, the IRGC works to export the ideas of velayat-e-faqih to foreign organizations because of the Iranian interest to gain influence and power over the region. The Quds Force specifically focuses on maintaining ties to other sympathetic Islamist organizations through financing and operational reinforcements.¹¹³

After undergoing a major expansion after the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC functions as an institutionalized, armed organization that surpasses the size and strength of the regular Iranian military.¹¹⁴ However, the main goal of ensuring Iranian national security and maintaining Shia control has continued. The Quds Force, the foreign operations force within the IRGC, was entrusted with bolstering the network of Shia groups across the Middle East.¹¹⁵

The Political Bureau and Office of the Representative of the Supreme Leader work in tandem to refine and publish the ideology of the IRGC.¹¹⁶ The Office of the Representative of the Supreme Leader propagates information about velayat-e-faqih. To

bolster morale within ranks, the Office periodically sends 18,000 clerics to lecture on velayat-e-faqih concepts to the Guards.¹¹⁷

B. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

After Ayatollah Khomeini's death, the IRGC had to contend with President Rafsanjani's wishes to contain IRGC power and Khamenei's desire to expand IRGC influence abroad.¹¹⁸ Rafsanjani focused on militarizing the IRGC during the 1990s rather than expanding its political influence in Iran. When Mohammad Khatami assumed the presidency in 1997, the IRGC was able to expand politically. By 2003, former IRGC officials commanded city and town councils which established the foundation for political campaigns in future elections.

The Basij militia shifted from military activity to political intervention in the early 2000s. In the 2005 election in which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president, the Basij militia mobilized to suppress anti-government protests that declared the election corrupt.¹¹⁹ The IRGC and Basij militia directed their total support for Ahmadinejad in the final week of the election which influenced many of the conservative voters to cast their ballot for Ahmadinejad over the incumbent Rafsanjani.¹²⁰ Because of this overt support, the Iranian public believed Ahmadinejad won due to voting pressures from the Basij militia and the IRGC.¹²¹ In all Iranian elections, the interference of Iranian military, including statements of support, is illegal, but it remains unclear how this law affects the IRGC.¹²²

In 2009, Ahmadinejad was running for reelection against three other prominent candidates, including Mohsen Rezaee, the former commander of the IRGC.¹²³ The two other candidates were focused on reforming the Iranian republic into a country whose population experienced more social freedoms. Their platforms were echoed by their supporters who organized mass rallies to show their support, especially for reformist Mir Hussein Musavi.¹²⁴ In the final days before the election, IRGC commander Mohammad Jafari stated that any attempt at a political revolution against the Iranian regime would be met with the IRGC's military power, successfully crushing any more rallies in support of the reformists.¹²⁵

On election day, the Basij militia locked down the Interior Ministry as the votes were being counted and within hours, Ahmadinejad was announced as the winner. During this time, mobile phone and Internet services were disabled and no outside witnesses were present at the vote counting. Voter fraud complaints emerged from the public and from Mohsen Rezaee, who believed he should have gotten millions more votes than the Guardian Council reported. Despite his former IRGC leadership, Ahmadinejad was seen as the better candidate for advancing Khamenei's agenda and expanding the IRGC's operations. In this election, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the IRGC and Basij's involvement aside from threats and lockdowns, however Iranian citizens claimed the IRGC coerced voters through continued suppression and pressure tactics.¹²⁶

After the 2009 election, the IRGC stopped tampering in elections. In the 2013 and 2017 elections, there were no claims of IRGC involvement. In 2021, many Iranians skipped voting because they believed Ayatollah Khamenei engineered the election in support of the eventual winner, Ebrahim Raisi, a hardline conservative.¹²⁷ However, instead of relying on the IRGC for election tampering, Khamenei used his vetting power to place candidates that would support his agenda on the ballot. While the IRGC hasn't tampered in elections since 2009, former officials have taken political positions in the Iranian government. Most notably, Mohsen Rezaee served as the Vice President of Iran for Economic Affairs between 2021 and 2022.¹²⁸

C. TARGETS AND TACTICS

Prior to the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC lacked professional military knowledge for carrying out attacks or conducting warfare.¹²⁹ At the onset of the war, the IRGC was loosely organized into regional units that lacked central leadership and full political support from the new Iranian regime.¹³⁰ After establishing a headquarters and organizing the local units into an army-like pattern, the IRGC changed its tactics to mirror military attacks, soon challenging the strength of the traditional Iranian army.¹³¹ The Basij militia was deployed alongside the Iranian army troops while the Quds Force focused on transporting money and weapons to Iraqi Shia militant organizations.¹³² Since the war, the IRGC relies heavily on its intelligence networks and political influence to carry out its doctrine, through assassinations, attacks, and expanded influence throughout the Middle East.¹³³

When the Quds Force was created in 1988, Rafsanjani appointed commanders with previous intelligence experience to improve Iranian special operations and foreign expansion.¹³⁴ The Quds Force has provided training and funding for many prominent organizations, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and several smaller Shia militias. In exchange for funding, these organizations provide the Quds Force, and IRGC as a whole, with vehicles for conducting operations outside of Iran's borders. The larger network of Iranian-backed organizations has been named Iran's Axis of Resistance, which looks to assert Iranian influence in countries throughout the Middle East.¹³⁵

On the domestic level, the IRGC uses media sources to present itself as a positive presence in Iranian society. Aside from its main website, the IRGC publishes a weekly magazine, *Sobh-e Sadegh* that reports on current events centered around the IRGC's positive assistance in domestic affairs.¹³⁶ Each branch within the organization has its own website with several having their own periodicals as well.¹³⁷ The IRGC uses these publications as pathways for indoctrinating the Iranian population of its legitimacy as an institution for security.¹³⁸

In 2009, the Iranian Cyber Army, which the IRGC allegedly oversees, conducted cyber-attacks on websites linked to the Green Movement – a movement that wanted Ahmadinejad out of the presidential office for the 2009 election fraud claims.¹³⁹ In the following years, the group carried out additional attacks on websites that discussed the Iranian opposition movement, replacing their information with pro-Iranian and anti-U.S. graphics.¹⁴⁰ Iranian cyber-attacks have also targeted the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Germany,

and Israel.¹⁴¹ It is difficult to determine the degree to which the IRGC was involved in these attacks as they were performed by individuals with potential but unknown support from the larger organization.¹⁴²

The IRGC also commands several prisons and torture centers for punishing regime dissidents. In 2018, the IRGC-run Evin Prison and Rajai Shahr Prison were cited by human rights organizations for their cruel punishments of political opponents.¹⁴³ The IRGC also controls specific detention centers that torture prisoners with electrocution and flogging. The IRGC shares an indeterminate amount of oversight for the Ministry of Intelligence and Security which includes law enforcement forces and directs the arrests and detainment of dissidents.¹⁴⁴

MAJOR ATTACKS

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points over the group's history. Differentiating between the IRGC, branches within the IRGC, and alternate Iranian institutions is difficult given the overlapping nature of these entities. Perpetrators in this profile are referenced in the same manner as they appeared in the original source.

October 23, 1983: Militants linked to Hezbollah bombed the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut.¹⁴⁵ Iranian intelligence and material support was allegedly given to Hezbollah by proxy of the IRGC (241 killed, unknown wounded).¹⁴⁶

November 1986: The IRGC assisted Hezbollah in maintaining the detention of and eventual releases of hostages in Beirut, according to U.S. intelligence. Hezbollah held 104 foreign hostages between 1982 and 1992 however the strength of IRGC or Iranian support is undetermined (8 killed, 0 wounded).¹⁴⁷

August 5, 1991: Iranian agents assassinated the former Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in his house in Paris. The IRGC did not take credit however Iranian intelligence was allegedly used in conducting this operation (2 killed, 0 wounded).¹⁴⁸

June 25, 1996: Hezbollah's organization in Saudi Arabia bombed a U.S. Air Force housing complex. In 2006, a U.S. judge ruled that Iran was responsible for this attack because an Iranian military officer directed the operation. It is unclear if this officer was working for the IRGC or Iran's traditional military (19 killed, 500 wounded).¹⁴⁹

October 11, 2011: The U.S. Justice Department discovered a plan from the IRGC-QF to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in Washington, D.C. The Iranian agents involved were supposedly meeting with Mexican drug cartels for information about explosives to be used in the bombing (0 killed, 0 wounded).¹⁵⁰

July 18, 2012: Iranian agents conducted a suicide bombing at Sarafovo Airport (also referred to as Burgas Airport) in Sofia, Bulgaria. Both Hezbollah and IRGC-QF had ties to this attack but neither claimed responsibility (6 killed, 32 wounded).¹⁵¹

September 11, 2018: The IRGC launched seven missiles into a compound within Iraq's Kurdistan region. The IRGC later released a statement that the compound was being used by anti-Iran terrorists who were meeting at the Iranian headquarters for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (unknown killed, unknown wounded).¹⁵²

June 20, 2019: The IRGC shot down a U.S. drone claiming it flew into Iranian airspace, while the U.S. claimed the drone was flying in international territory during the strike. This incident marked the first attack claimed by Iran on U.S. materials in the region (0 killed, 0 wounded).¹⁵³

October 2021 - February 2022: IRGC member Shahram Poursafi plotted to kill former National Security Advisor John Bolton in retaliation for Qassem Soleimani's death in 2020. Poursafi contracted unknown individuals to photograph Bolton, and later, to eliminate him by any means necessary.¹⁵⁴ In August 2022, the FBI and US Department of Justice investigated this plot after one of the individuals came forward about the assassination plot.

March 13, 2022: IRGC militants fired ballistic missiles into Erbil, a Kurdish-majority region in northern Iraq. In its statement, the IRGC claimed it was targeting a strategic Israeli center in Iraq. Several days prior to this attack, Israel killed two IRGC members in an attack in Syria (unknown killed, unknown wounded).¹⁵⁵

August 23, 2022: Rockets fired by Iran-backed militants struck two US military bases in northeast Syria. This strike was a continuation of escalating warfare between the US and Shia militants in Syria thought to be supported by the IRGC (unknown killed, 3, wounded).¹⁵⁶

INTERACTIONS

A. DESIGNATED/LISTED

Following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979, the U.S. has implemented numerous sanctions against Iran and the IRGC. These sanctions range from oil and smuggling operations within the IRGC to larger human rights abuses occurring in Iran. Over the years, the U.S. has revoked and reimposed sanctions mainly dependent on Iran's nuclear program which the U.S. wished to monitor through the JCPOA.¹⁵⁷

- a. United States designated Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: January 19, 1984 - Present¹⁵⁸
- b. United States designated IRGC as Foreign Terrorist Organization (IRGC): April 15, 2019 – Present

- c. Saudi Arabia added IRGC and senior IRGC-QF officials to its list of individuals and groups suspected of involvement in terrorism: October 23, 2018 – Present¹⁵⁹
- d. Bahrain added IRGC and senior IRGC-QF officials to its list of individuals and groups suspected of involvement in terrorism: October 23, 2018 – Present¹⁶⁰
- e. Canada designated IRGC-QF as a terrorist entity: December 17, 2012

B. COMMUNITY RELATIONS

After the formation of the IRGC, the organization competed with local-level Islamic paramilitary groups, called committees, that had given themselves the power to seek justice in their communities. With about 1,000 committees operating throughout the country, they arrested anyone who they believed to be a threat to the new Iranian republic.¹⁶¹ The IRGC and these committees recruited from similar groups of volunteers, but the IRGC eventually won over members because of its direct connection to the new regime.¹⁶²

In April 1980, Khomeini founded the Basij militia, which continues to operate as a volunteer paramilitary organization under the IRGC.¹⁶³ The Basij militia would provide the military training necessary for all citizens to engage in the armed defense of Iran, if need be.¹⁶⁴ During the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij militia was deployed with the regular Iranian army, having previously only assisted in keeping peace in major cities and towns.¹⁶⁵ Many of the recruits were young boys from poor backgrounds or forced into conscription.¹⁶⁶ In 1981, the Basij militia became a branch of the IRGC and operated under its command. After the war and with an uptick in social reform protests, the Basij militia mobilized for suppressing protests in schools, factories, and streets.¹⁶⁷ As of 2022, the Basij militia has various units for different populations: university students, public servants, workers, etc.¹⁶⁸ These units act as a counterweight to the unions that operate in the same sphere (labor unions, student unions, etc.) in case mobilization against one of these groups is necessary.¹⁶⁹

During Ahmadinejad's presidency, the Basij militia infiltrated many Iranian universities by taking vacant professorial posts after many professors were offered early retirement or were suspended.¹⁷⁰ The Basij created the Lecturers' Basij Organization (LBO) which enabled the IRGC to consolidate power over curricula under the guise of giving career guidance to LBO members.¹⁷¹ The Basij also formed the Student Basij Organization (SBO) to balance the reformist movements in universities and the university administrations if their visions do not align with the IRGC's.¹⁷²

The Basij militia acquired government funding and built major construction projects in rural areas after 2006. Basiji volunteers renovated old schools, built new Islamic schools, added water pipelines, and improved agricultural practices to make rural areas more self-sufficient.¹⁷³

C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS

Disclaimer: Differentiating between Iran, the IRGC, and branches within the IRGC is difficult given the overlapping nature of these entities. Perpetrators in this profile are referenced in the same manner as they appeared in the original source.

Hezbollah

After the Iranian Revolution, Iran sought to increase its influence in other countries by proxy of the IRGC. The IRGC discovered a small Lebanese Shia militia, which would later become Hezbollah, and began to support them through funding and training.¹⁷⁴ Hezbollah adopted velayat-e-faqih and pledged allegiance to the Iranian Ayatollah.¹⁷⁵ In Hezbollah's early years, it carried out severe attacks like the 1983 suicide bombing of the U.S. and French barracks in Beirut, which were supported by Iranian intelligence.¹⁷⁶ The IRGC established training camps in eastern Lebanon sometime between 1982 and 1987 where Hezbollah militants received training from IRGC officials.¹⁷⁷ Unlike other Shia organizations receiving funding from the IRGC, Hezbollah managed to maintain its autonomy in decision-making because its revolutionary goals were fundamentally different from Iran's, in top cleric's opinions.¹⁷⁸

Kata'ib Hezbollah

The Quds Force uses Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), an Iraqi Shia group, for conducting operations in Iraq.¹⁷⁹ Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, KH's former leader, fought with the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War and later served as Qassem Soleimani's advisor prior to assuming his KH leadership position.¹⁸⁰ Through this sustained cooperation, the Quds Force under Soleimani's leadership was able to support KH fighters with training, financing, and intelligence, while using KH as a vehicle for carrying out operations in Iraq. Many sources suggest that the IRGC had a direct role in the formation of KH and maintains some degree of operational control. KH fighters swear an oath to Ayatollah Khamenei and accept Iran's velayat-e-faqih as their political ideology for executing their assignments.¹⁸¹ Hezbollah has also joined with the Quds Force established camps throughout Iran that were used to train KH militias, beginning in 2008. Despite Soleimani's death in 2020 and new KH leadership, the two organizations continue to cooperate with coordinated attacks and intelligence sharing.¹⁸²

Hamas

The IRGC also supplies money and training to the Palestinian group Hamas, despite Shia-Sunni differences. In 1992, the IRGC and Hezbollah hosted over 400 Hamas deportees in Lebanon and taught them how to create and deploy suicide bombs.¹⁸³ Over the years, cooperation between the three groups sustained with the growth of weapon smuggling operations and Iranian assistance in Hamas' rocket program.¹⁸⁴ However, when the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, Iran backed the Assad regime while Hamas supported the Sunni opposition, which led Iran to reduce its funding of Hamas.¹⁸⁵ After Iran mediated a reconciliatory meeting between Hamas and the Assad regime in 2017, the cooperation between the two organizations grew once more. In 2018, Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas commander in Gaza, stated that Hamas, the IRGC, and Hezbollah have consistent communication and coordination for military operations.¹⁸⁶ Hamas continuously states its

survival is a direct result of IRGC training, funding, and arms support which has enabled rocket manufacturing and attacks from Gaza.¹⁸⁷

Shia Liberation Army:

The Shia Liberation Army (SLA) is a group of forces that the Quds Force formed and funded to support the Assad regime and fight oppositions in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The SLA consists of the Fatemiyoun Division (Afghan Shia militia), the Zaynibiyoun Brigade (Pakistani Shia militia), and Hayderiyoun Division (Iraqi Shia militia).¹⁸⁸ For the Fatemiyoun Division, the Quds Force recruited Afghan Shia refugees and children living in Iran to fight against Assad opposition groups and ISIS in Syria.¹⁸⁹ The Afghan refugees living in Iran were economically vulnerable so the Quds Force was able to exploit them for Iranian use.¹⁹⁰ These three divisions were under Qassem Soleimani's command and were used to further the Quds Force presence in Syria and support of the Assad regime.¹⁹¹ During the peak of the Syrian Civil War, size estimates ranged from 1,000 to 20,000 fighters in each militia.¹⁹² In 2019, the United States designated the Fatemiyoun Division and the Zaynabiyoun Brigade as materially assisting the IRGC and committing human rights abuses due to the use of child soldiers within the militias.¹⁹³ After Soleimani's death in 2020, General Qaani took control over the SLA and continues to fund and train fighters within the divisions.¹⁹⁴ Information about the Hayderiyoun Division is lacking, and tends to be referred to as the Iraqi fighters of the SLA. The division has not been designated or sanctioned by the U.S. as of October 2022.

Saraya al-Mukhtar

The Bahraini Shia group, Saraya al-Mukhtar (SM), formed in 2011 with financing and training from the IRGC.¹⁹⁵ SM's goal is to remove the current Sunni Bahraini ruling family and return Bahrain into an Iranian province.¹⁹⁶ The IRGC and SM are linked through the shared ideology: in 2016, SM swore an oath to follow Khomeinism, which seeks to spread the ideas of the former Ayatollah Khomeini after the Iranian Revolution. The IRGC continues to support SM financially and logistically. Sources vary on the extent of this support however media support and potential military assistance is possible.¹⁹⁷ In late 2020, the Bahraini government convicted over 50 individuals who had committed terrorist acts that were directed by the IRGC.¹⁹⁸ A month later, the Trump administration designated SM as a terrorist group, claiming it was another vehicle through which Iran could exert its influence.¹⁹⁹

Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq

Qais al-Khazila was asked by Qassem Soleimani to lead a new Iraqi Shia militia that would later become Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). Since its inception, AAH has been on the receiving end of Iranian funding, training, and logistical support while it acts as a proxy in Iraq for Quds Force interests.²⁰⁰ After the U.S. withdrew from Iraq in 2011, AAH directed its fighters to support Iranian-backed militias fighting in the Syrian Civil War.²⁰¹ With continued Iranian support and violence, the U.S. designated AAH as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in January 2020, stating that the organization acts as a violent proxy for Iran.²⁰²

Ansar Allah

Quds Forces officials, Abdul Reza Shahlai and Abu Ali Tabatabai, assumed commanding positions in Yemen's Ansar Allah (also referred to as the Houthis) sometime in 2015 or 2019, depending on sources.²⁰³ In 2017, IRGC General Jafari confirmed the organization was helping Ansar Allah with structural advising. Further evidence shows that Quds Force officials, Hassan Pelarak and Hassan Moezzi, oversaw Ansar Allah military operations and supported smuggling networks that sent money and fighters through the Gulf of Aden beginning in 2020.²⁰⁴ These officials have also enabled the transportation of IRGC and Hezbollah personnel into Yemen to assist in weapon and material transfers.²⁰⁵

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Israel's defense minister, Benny Gantz, claimed that Iran also financially supports the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to escalate the attacks against Israel. Gantz also claimed that top PIJ officials met with Iranian leaders and IRGC commanders in Tehran between July and August 2022.²⁰⁶ Prior to Gantz's press conference, Iranian officials announced they were seeking to form closer ties with PIJ and the Palestinian resistance as a whole.²⁰⁷

Islamic State

The IRGC adamantly opposes the Islamic State, believing it to be an organization made and supported by its adversary states like the United States, Britain, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.²⁰⁸ After the IRGC's heavy involvement in Syria, the Quds Force sought to appeal to Iraqi Shia minorities as a welcoming organization in light of IS's Sunni preferences.²⁰⁹

D. STATE SPONSORS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

The IRGC and the state of Iran are intrinsically linked by the oversight of the Ayatollah in the organization's affairs. The IRGC directly reports to the Ayatollah of Iran who appoints senior commanders and increases political opportunities for the organization.²¹⁰ Generally, Iran uses the Quds Force for covert operations to create instability or prolong conflicts in the Middle East.²¹¹ With a military budget from Iran, the IRGC carries out its operations with the financial and political support of Iran. Iran's financial support depends on US sanctions: as sanctions hurt the Iranian economy, the military budget allocated for the IRGC decreases and vice versa.²¹²

MAPS

- Iraq
- Syria
- Afghanistan
- Global Shia Groups (if this map is a prototype yet or not; link to Ansar Allah, Hezbollah, Hamas, Saraya al-Mukhtar, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)

¹ Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137

² "The Beirut Bombing: Thirty Years Later." Marine Corps University, 2013. <https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/Brief-Histories/Beirut-Bombing-Thirty-Years-Later/>

-
- ³ Hurley, Lawrence. "U.S. top court rules Iran bank must pay 1983 bomb victims." Reuters. April 20, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-iran/u-s-top-court-rules-iran-bank-must-pay-1983-bomb-victims-idUSKCN0XH1R6>
- ⁴ "Amid Unrest, Iranian Guard Attacks Militant Group in Iraq." VOA News. September 24, 2022. <https://www.voanews.com/a/amid-unrest-iranian-guard-attacks-militant-group-in-iraq-/6761797.html>.
- ⁵ "Iran Fires on Separatist Groups Based In Northern Iraq." RadioFreeEurope. September 24, 2022. <https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-attack-iraq-kurds/32049538.html>.
- ⁶ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ⁷ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ⁸ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ⁹ Sen, Ashish Kumar. "A Brief History of Sanctions on Iran." *Atlantic Council*. May 8, 2018. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-brief-history-of-sanctions-on-iran/>.
- ¹⁰ Swearingen, Will D. Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War. *Geographical Review*. 78(4): 405-416. October 1988. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/215091>.
- ¹¹ Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137.
- ¹² Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137. ; "The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from an Iraqi View – a Lost Role or a Bright Future?" Center for Strategic & International Studies. July 30, 2020. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-iraqi-view-%E2%80%93-lost-role-or-bright-future>.
- ¹³ Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137
- ¹⁴ Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137
- ¹⁵ Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137
- ¹⁶ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.
- ¹⁷ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.
- ¹⁸ Silinsky, Mark D. "Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Its Foreign Policy and Foreign Legion." Marine Corps University. September 19, 2019. <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Iran%20Guard%20PDF.pdf>.
- ¹⁹ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.
- ²⁰ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ²¹ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.

-
- ²² Knights, Michael, Crispin Smith, and Hamdi Malik. "Profile: Badr Organization." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. September 2, 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-badr-organization>.
- ²³ Felter Joseph, and Brian Fishman. "Iranian Strategy in Iraq." Combating Terrorism Center. West Point University, October 13, 2008. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Iranian-Strategy-in-Iraq.pdf>.
- ²⁴ Felter Joseph, and Brian Fishman. "Iranian Strategy in Iraq." Combating Terrorism Center. West Point University, October 13, 2008. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Iranian-Strategy-in-Iraq.pdf>.
- ²⁵ Tabatabai, Ariane M. "After Soleimani: What's Next for Iran's Quds Force?" Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 13(1). January 2020. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/after-soleimani-whats-next-irans-quds-force/>.
- ²⁶ Tabatabai, Ariane M. "After Soleimani: What's Next for Iran's Quds Force?" Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 13(1). January 2020. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/after-soleimani-whats-next-irans-quds-force/>.
- ²⁷ "The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from an Iraqi View – a Lost Role or a Bright Future?" Center for Strategic & International Studies. July 30, 2020. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-iraqi-view-%E2%80%93-lost-role-or-bright-future>.
- ²⁸ Mobley, Richard A. "Deterrence Without Escalation: Fresh Insights into U.S. Decisionmaking During Operation Earnest Will." National Defense University Press. July 27, 2022. <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3106465/deterrence-without-escalation-fresh-insights-into-us-decisionmaking-during-oper/>.
- ²⁹ Mobley, Richard A. "Deterrence Without Escalation: Fresh Insights into U.S. Decisionmaking During Operation Earnest Will." National Defense University Press. July 27, 2022. <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3106465/deterrence-without-escalation-fresh-insights-into-us-decisionmaking-during-oper/>.
- ³⁰ Christ, David B. "Gulf of Conflict." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. June 2009. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3423>.
- ³¹ Christ, David B. "Gulf of Conflict." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. June 2009. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3423>.
- ³² Lendon, Brad. "In 1988, a US Navy warship shot down an Iranian passenger plane in the heat of battle." *CNN News*. January 10, 2020. <https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/middleeast/iran-air-flight-655-us-military-intl-hnk>.
- ³³ Levy, Ido. "How Iran Fuels Hamas Terrorism." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. June 1, 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism>
- ³⁴ Najdi, Youhanna and Mohd Azhari Bin Abdul Karim. "The Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Future of Democracy in Iran: Will Oil Income Influence the Process?" *Democracy and Security*. 8(1): 72-89. 2010. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602710>
- ³⁵ "Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile." Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. December 2012. <https://irp.fas.org/world/iran/mois-loc.pdf>.
- ³⁶ "Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile." Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. December 2012. <https://irp.fas.org/world/iran/mois-loc.pdf>.
- ³⁷ "Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile." Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress. December 2012. <https://irp.fas.org/world/iran/mois-loc.pdf>.
- ³⁸ Najdi, Youhanna and Mohd Azhari Bin Abdul Karim. "The Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Future of Democracy in Iran: Will Oil Income Influence the Process?" *Democracy and Security*. 8(1): 72-89. 2010. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602710>.
- ³⁹ Najdi, Youhanna and Mohd Azhari Bin Abdul Karim. "The Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Future of Democracy in Iran: Will Oil Income Influence the Process?" *Democracy and Security*. 8(1): 72-89. 2010. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602710>.
- ⁴⁰ Heras, Nicholas A. "A History of Quds Force Proxy-Shaping in Iraq." *Iran's Fifth Column: Iran's Proxy Network*. Middle East Institute. October 1, 2017.

-
- ⁴¹ Heras, Nicholas A. "A History of Quds Force Proxy-Shaping in Iraq." *Iran's Fifth Column: Iran's Proxy Network*. Middle East Institute. October 1, 2017.
- ⁴² Heras, Nicholas A. "A History of Quds Force Proxy-Shaping in Iraq." *Iran's Fifth Column: Iran's Proxy Network*. Middle East Institute. October 1, 2017.
- ⁴³ Holliday, Joseph. "Syria's Armed Opposition." Institute for the Study of War. March 2012. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf
- ⁴⁴ Holliday, Joseph. "Syria's Armed Opposition." Institute for the Study of War. March 2012. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf
- ⁴⁵ Saban, Navvar. "Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria." Atlantic Council. November 5, 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/factbox-iranian-influence-and-presence-in-syria/>.
- ⁴⁶ Holliday, Joseph. "Syria's Armed Opposition." Institute for the Study of War. March 2012. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf.
- ⁴⁷ Evans, Dominic and Mariam Karouny. "Iranian Guards commander killed in Syria." *Reuters*. February 14, 2013. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-iran/iranian-guards-commander-killed-in-syria-idUSBRE91D0EY20130214>.
- ⁴⁸ "Tehran: 2,100 Iranian soldiers killed in Syria and Iraq." *Middle East Monitor*. March 7, 2018. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180307-tehran-2100-iranian-soldiers-killed-in-syria-and-iraq/>.
- ⁴⁹ "Three reasons behind Trump ditching Iran deal." *BBC News*. May 8, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43902372>.
- ⁵⁰ Lee, Matthew and Aamer Madhani. "Biden administration responds to Iran's offer to resume nuclear deal." *PBS News*. August 24, 2022. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/biden-administration-responds-to-irans-offer-to-resume-nuclear-deal>.
- ⁵¹ "Nuclear Deal with Iran Would Gut IRGC Sanctions." Foundation for Defense of Democracies. August 23, 2022. <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/flash-briefs/2022/08/23/iran-nuclear-deal-guts-irgc-sanctions/>.
- ⁵² "Country Reports on Terrorism 2016." U.S. Department of State. 2017. <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2016/>.
- ⁵³ "Country Reports on Terrorism 2020." U.S. Department of State. 2021. <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/>.
- ⁵⁴ Zimmerman, Katherine. "An Overview: Iran and the Axis of Resistance's Investments in the Houthis." *Yemen's Houthis and the Expansion of Iran's Axis of Resistance*. American Enterprise Institute, 2022. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep40020.6>.
- ⁵⁵ "EU sanctions Iran over assassination plots." *France 24*. September 1, 2019. <https://www.france24.com/en/20190109-eu-sanctions-iran-over-assassinations-peoples-mujahedeen-france-bomb-plot>.
- ⁵⁶ "Country Reports on Terrorism 2019." U.S. Department of State. 2020. <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/>.
- ⁵⁷ Motamedi, Maziar. "Iran responds to Ukraine diplomatic demotion over Russian drones." *Al Jazeera*. September 24, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/24/iran-to-respond-to-ukraine-diplomatic-demotion-over-russia-drones>.
- ⁵⁸ Hardie, John and Behnam Ben Taleblu. "Iran Is Now at War With Ukraine." *Foreign Policy*. October 26, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/26/iran-ukraine-russia-war-drones-missiles-military-advisors-middle-east-nuclear/>. ; Barnes, Julian E. "Iran Sends Drone Trainers to Crimea to Aid Russian Military." *New York Times*. October 18, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/18/us/politics/iran-drones-russia-ukraine.html>.
- ⁵⁹ Banerjee, Udit. "Revolutionary Intelligence: The Expanding Intelligence Role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps." *Journal of Strategic Security* 8, no. 3 (2015): 93–106. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26465296>.
- ⁶⁰ Shahgaldian, Nikola B. "The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic." The RAND Corporation. March 1987. <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3473.pdf>.
- ⁶¹ Rubin, Michael. "Iran's Revolutionary Guards - A Rogue Outfit?" *Middle East Quarterly*. 2008. <https://www.meforum.org/1990/irans-revolutionary-guards-a-rogue-outfit>.

-
- ⁶² “Iran’s President Reportedly Dismisses Two Top Economic Officials.” *Iran International*. April 25, 2022. <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202204251117>.
- ⁶³ Rubin, Michael. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards - A Rogue Outfit?” *Middle East Quarterly*. 2008. <https://www.meforum.org/1990/irans-revolutionary-guards-a-rogue-outfit>.
- ⁶⁴ Wehrey, Frederic et al. “The IRGC’s Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution.” *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ⁶⁵ Sahimi, Muhammad. “A Hardliner’s Hardliner.” *Tehran Bureau*. January 21, 2010. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/01/a-hardliners-hardliner.html>.
- ⁶⁶ Gladstone, Rick. “Iran’s Supreme Leader Replaces Head of Revolutionary Guards.” *The New York Times*. April 21, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/world/middleeast/iran-revolutionary-guards-leader.html>.
- ⁶⁷ “Qassem Soleimani: US kills top Iranian general in Baghdad air strike.” *BBC News*. January 3, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50979463>.
- ⁶⁸ “Qassem Soleimani: US kills top Iranian general in Baghdad air strike.” *BBC News*. January 3, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50979463>.
- ⁶⁹ Alfoneh, Ali. “Who is Esmail Qaani, the New Chief Commander of Iran’s Qods Force?” *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. January 7, 2020. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force>.
- ⁷⁰ “Esmail Qaani: The new man leading Iran’s elite Quds Force.” *BBC News*. January 7, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51008996>.
- ⁷¹ “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.” *Britannica*. January 22, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-Revolutionary-Guard-Corps>.
- ⁷² Alemzadeh, Maryam. “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military’s survival.” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137.
- ⁷³ Cordesman, Anthony H. “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. August 16, 2007. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf.
- ⁷⁴ “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies.” Congressional Research Service. January 11, 2021. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf>.
- ⁷⁵ “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa.” *The Military Balance*. 2020. 120(1): 324-387, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2020.1707968
- ⁷⁶ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. “Economic Expansion: The IRGC’s Business Conglomerate and Public Works.” *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ⁷⁷ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. “Economic Expansion: The IRGC’s Business Conglomerate and Public Works.” *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ⁷⁸ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. “Economic Expansion: The IRGC’s Business Conglomerate and Public Works.” *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ⁷⁹ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. “Economic Expansion: The IRGC’s Business Conglomerate and Public Works.” *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ⁸⁰ “Treasury Targets Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.” *United States Department of the Treasury*. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg539>, February 10, 2010.
- ⁸¹ Bowman, Bradley and Ryan Brobst. “Iran Increases Funding for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.” Foundation for Defense of Democracies. April 29, 2022. <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/04/29/iran-increases-funding-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps/>.
- ⁸² Rome, Henry. “Iran’s Defense Spending.” *The Iran Primer*. United States Institute of Peace. July 21, 2020. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jun/17/iran%E2%80%99s-defense-spending>.

-
- ⁸³ Rome, Henry. "Iran's Defense Spending." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. July 21, 2020. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jun/17/iran%E2%80%99s-defense-spending>.
- ⁸⁴ Ajili, Hadi and Masha Rouhi. "Iran's Military Strategy." International Institute for Security Studies. 2020. <https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2019/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-december-2019january-2020/616-11-ajili-and-rouhi>.
- ⁸⁵ Kam, Ephraim. "Iran: Naval Bases in Syria and in Yemen?" Institute for National Security Studies. December 21, 2016. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08422>. ; "The IRGC Navy." *Iranwire*. April 9, 2019. <https://iranwire.com/en/features/65749/>.
- ⁸⁶ Kam, Ephraim. "Iran: Naval Bases in Syria and in Yemen?" Institute for National Security Studies. December 21, 2016. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08422>.
- ⁸⁷ "Iran's Revolutionary Guards tout new missile base in support of navy." *Al-Monitor*. March 15, 2021. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/03/iran-missile-base-underground-navy.html>.
- ⁸⁸ "IGRC Reveals Underground Missile Base." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. January 8, 2021. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jan/08/irgc-reveals-underground-missile-base>
- ⁸⁹ Cordesman, Anthony H. "The Iranian Missile Threat." Center for Strategic & International Studies. May 30, 2019. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-missile-threat>.
- ⁹⁰ "Iran says uranium enrichment ramped up to near weapons-grade at a second facility." *CBS News*. November 22, 2022. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-nuclear-uranium-enrichment-fordo-60-percent-near-nuclear-weapons-grade-iaea/>.
- ⁹¹ "Treasury Designates Illicit Russia-Iran Oil Network Supporting the Assad Regime, Hizballah, and HAMAS." *United States Department of the Treasury*. November 20, 2018. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm553>.
- ⁹² "Treasury Designates Illicit Russia-Iran Oil Network Supporting the Assad Regime, Hizballah, and HAMAS." *United States Department of the Treasury*. November 20, 2018. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm553>.
- ⁹³ "Treasury Designates Illicit Russia-Iran Oil Network Supporting the Assad Regime, Hizballah, and HAMAS." *United States Department of the Treasury*. November 20, 2018. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm553>.
- ⁹⁴ "Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Members Jointly Designate a Broad Range of Financiers of Terrorism." *United States Department of the Treasury*. June 6, 2022. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0806>.
- ⁹⁵ "Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Members Jointly Designate a Broad Range of Financiers of Terrorism." *United States Department of the Treasury*. June 6, 2022. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0806>.
- ⁹⁶ "Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Members Jointly Designate a Broad Range of Financiers of Terrorism." *United States Department of the Treasury*. June 6, 2022. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0806>.
- ⁹⁷ "Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Members Jointly Designate a Broad Range of Financiers of Terrorism." *United States Department of the Treasury*. June 6, 2022. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0806>.
- ⁹⁸ "Treasury Designates Vast Iranian Petroleum Shipping Network That Supports IRGC-QF and Terror Proxies." *United States Department of the Treasury*. September 4, 2019. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm767>.
- ⁹⁹ Topalian, Nohad. "IRGC establishes training base in Lebanon: US." *Al-Mashareq*. May 24, 2019. https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2019/05/24/feature-01.
- ¹⁰⁰ Topalian, Nohad. "IRGC establishes training base in Lebanon: US." *Al-Mashareq*. May 24, 2019. https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2019/05/24/feature-01.
- ¹⁰¹ Al-Omran, Faris. "IRGC establishes new drone attack training base in Iraqi desert." *Diyaruna*. September 9, 2021. https://diyaruna.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_di/features/2021/09/09/feature-01.
- ¹⁰² Al-Tamimi, Nabil Abdullah. "Houthi flown to Syria for military training by IRGC before returned to Yemen." *Al-Mashareq*. September 26, 2022. https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/features/2022/09/26/feature-01.

¹⁰³ “Profile: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,” *BBC News*. January 3, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47852262>.

¹⁰⁴ Alami, Mona. “Iran’s IRGC accelerating recruitment in Deir Zour, Syria: Expert.” *Al Arabiya News*. March 24, 2021. <https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2021/03/24/Iran-s-IRGC-accelerating-recruitment-in-Deir-Zour-Syria-Expert>.

¹⁰⁵ Hassan, Lila. “What is the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Why Does It Make The Taliban Nervous?” *FRONTLINE. PBS News*. July 20, 2021. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-the-fatemiyoun-brigade-and-why-does-it-make-the-taliban-nervous/>.

¹⁰⁶ Alami, Mona. “Iran’s IRGC accelerating recruitment in Deir Zour, Syria: Expert.” *Al Arabiya News*. March 24, 2021. <https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2021/03/24/Iran-s-IRGC-accelerating-recruitment-in-Deir-Zour-Syria-Expert>.

¹⁰⁷ Curtiss, Richard H. “Iranian Opposition Leader Charges Rafsanjani Regime Backing Algeria.” *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*. 10(9), May 31, 1992.

¹⁰⁸ Curtiss, Richard H. “Iranian Opposition Leader Charges Rafsanjani Regime Backing Algeria.” *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*. 10(9), May 31, 1992.

¹⁰⁹ Aarabi, Kasra. “What is Velayat-e Faqih?” *Tony Blair Institute for Global Change*. March 20, 2019. <https://institute.global/policy/what-velayat-e-faqih>.

¹¹⁰ “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” *Council on Foreign Relations*. May 6, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards>.

¹¹¹ “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” *Council on Foreign Relations*. May 6, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards>.

¹¹² “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” *Council on Foreign Relations*. May 6, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards>.

¹¹³ Alfonch, Ali. “The Evolution of Iran’s Qods Force Since 1979.” *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. June 3, 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/evolution-irans-qods-force-1979>.

¹¹⁴ “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” *Council on Foreign Relations*. May 6, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards>.

¹¹⁵ “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).” *United States Rewards for Justice*. <https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-qods-force-irgc-qf/>.

¹¹⁶ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. “The IRGC’s Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolutions.” *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.

¹¹⁷ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. “The IRGC’s Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolutions.” *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.

¹¹⁸ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. “The IRGC in Politics.” *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.

¹¹⁹ Alfonch, Ali. “The Basij Resistance Force.” *The Iran Primer*. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.

¹²⁰ “Iranian Election Results.” *Wilson Center*. June 28, 2005. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iranian-election-results>.

¹²¹ “Iranian Election Results.” *Wilson Center*. June 28, 2005. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iranian-election-results>.

¹²² “Iranian Election Results.” *Wilson Center*. June 28, 2005. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/iranian-election-results>.

¹²³ Addis, Casey L. “Iran’s 2009 Presidential Elections.” *Congressional Research Service*. July 6, 2009. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R40653.pdf>.

¹²⁴ Addis, Casey L. “Iran’s 2009 Presidential Elections.” *Congressional Research Service*. July 6, 2009. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R40653.pdf>.

-
- ¹²⁵ Addis, Casey L. "Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections." Congressional Research Service. July 6, 2009. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R40653.pdf>.
- ¹²⁶ Addis, Casey L. "Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections." Congressional Research Service. July 6, 2009. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R40653.pdf>.
- ¹²⁷ Yee, Vivian. "Iranian Hard-Liner Ebrahim Raisi Wins Presidential Vote." *The New York Times*. June 19, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/19/world/middleeast/iran-election-president-raisi.html>
- ¹²⁸ "Iran's President Reportedly Dismisses Two Top Economic Officials." *Iran International*. April 25, 2022. <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202204251117>.
- ¹²⁹ Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137
- ¹³⁰ Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137
- ¹³¹ Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137
- ¹³² Alemzadeh, Maryam. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the Iran-Iraq war: an unconventional military's survival." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2019. 46(4): 622-639, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2018.1450137
- ¹³³ Felter Joseph, and Brian Fishman. "Iranian Strategy in Iraq." Combating Terrorism Center. West Point University, October 13, 2008. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Iranian-Strategy-in-Iraq.pdf>.
- ¹³⁴ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Evolution of Iran's Qods Force Since 1979." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. June 3, 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/evolution-irans-qods-force-1979>.
- ¹³⁵ Mohseni, Payam and Hussein Kalout. "Iran's Axis of Resistance Rises." *Foreign Affairs*. January 24, 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-axis-resistance-rises>
- ¹³⁶ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹³⁷ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹³⁸ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹³⁹ "The Iranian Cyber Threat." United Against Nuclear Iran. September 2022. <https://www.unitedagainstinucleariran.com/history-of-iranian-cyber-attacks-and-incidents>.
- ¹⁴⁰ "The Iranian Cyber Threat." United Against Nuclear Iran. September 2022. <https://www.unitedagainstinucleariran.com/history-of-iranian-cyber-attacks-and-incidents>.
- ¹⁴¹ "The Iranian Cyber Threat." United Against Nuclear Iran. September 2022. <https://www.unitedagainstinucleariran.com/history-of-iranian-cyber-attacks-and-incidents>.
- ¹⁴² "The Iranian Cyber Threat." United Against Nuclear Iran. September 2022. <https://www.unitedagainstinucleariran.com/history-of-iranian-cyber-attacks-and-incidents>.
- ¹⁴³ "2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran." United States Department of State. 2018. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran/>.
- ¹⁴⁴ "2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iran." United States Department of State. 2018. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran/>.
- ¹⁴⁵ "The Beirut Bombing: Thirty Years Later." Marine Corps University. 2013. <https://www.usmcu.edu/Research/Marine-Corps-History-Division/Brief-Histories/Beirut-Bombing-Thirty-Years-Later/>.

-
- ¹⁴⁶ Hurley, Lawrence. "U.S. top court rules Iran bank must pay 1983 bomb victims." *Reuters*. April 20, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-iran/u-s-top-court-rules-iran-bank-must-pay-1983-bomb-victims-idUSKCN0XH1R6>.
- ¹⁴⁷ "CIA, Memorandum, Iran and US Hostages in Lebanon, August 1, 1988, Top Secret Umbra NOFORN, CIA." Central Intelligence Agency. August 1, 1988.
- ¹⁴⁸ Addis, Casey L. "Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections." Congressional Research Service. July 6, 2009. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R40653.pdf>.
- ¹⁴⁹ Hanna, Andrew and Garrett Nada. "Timeline: Iran's Assassinations and Plots." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. September 16, 2020. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/sep/16/timeline-iran-assassinations-and-plot>.
- ¹⁵⁰ "Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States." United States Department of Justice. October 11, 2011. <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-men-charged-alleged-plot-assassinate-saudi-arabian-ambassador-united-states>.
- ¹⁵¹ Reich, Aaron. "10 years since 5 Israelis, 1 Bulgarian killed in Burgas bus bombing." *The Jerusalem Post*. July 18, 2022. <https://www.jpost.com/israeli-news/article-712390>.
- ¹⁵² Wahab, Bilal. "Iran's Missile Attack in Iraqi Kurdistan Could Backfire." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. September 11, 2018. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-missile-attack-iraqi-kurdistan-could-backfire>.
- ¹⁵³ "Iran's Revolutionary Guard shoots down US drone." *Al Jazeera*. June 20, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/20/irans-revolutionary-guard-shoots-down-us-drone>.
- ¹⁵⁴ "Member of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Charged with Plot to Murder the Former National Security Advisor." US Department of Justice. August 10, 2022. <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/member-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-charged-plot-murder-former-national>.
- ¹⁵⁵ "Iranian Guards claim ballistic missile attacks in Erbil." *Al Jazeera*. March 13, 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/13/missiles-hit-iraqs-kurdish-capital-no-casualties-officials>.
- ¹⁵⁶ Loveluck, Louisa et al. "U.S. service members in Syria suffer 'minor injuries' in attack on bases." *The Washington Post*. August 24, 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/23/us-military-strikes-syria-iran-irgc/>.
- ¹⁵⁷ "Iran Sanctions." United States Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/iran-sanctions/>.
- ¹⁵⁸ "Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Iran." United States Bureau of Counterterrorism. 2020. <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/iran/>.
- ¹⁵⁹ "Saudi, Bahrain add Iran's Revolutionary Guards to terrorism lists." *Reuters*. October 23, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-bahrain-security-iran/saudi-bahrain-add-irans-revolutionary-guards-to-terrorism-lists-idUSKCN1MX288>.
- ¹⁶⁰ "Saudi, Bahrain add Iran's Revolutionary Guards to terrorism lists." *Reuters*. October 23, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-bahrain-security-iran/saudi-bahrain-add-irans-revolutionary-guards-to-terrorism-lists-idUSKCN1MX288>.
- ¹⁶¹ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹⁶² Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹⁶³ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.
- ¹⁶⁴ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.
- ¹⁶⁵ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.

-
- ¹⁶⁶ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹⁶⁷ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." *The Iran Primer*. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.
- ¹⁶⁸ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." *The Iran Primer*. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.
- ¹⁶⁹ Alfoneh, Ali. "The Basij Resistance Force." *The Iran Primer*. United States Institute of Peace. October 6, 2010. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force>.
- ¹⁷⁰ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹⁷¹ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹⁷² Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹⁷³ Wehrey, Frederic M. et al. "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities." *The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009.
- ¹⁷⁴ Robinson, Kali. "What is Hezbollah?" Council on Foreign Relations. May 25, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah>
- ¹⁷⁵ Hurley, Lawrence. "U.S. top court rules Iran bank must pay 1983 bomb victims." Reuters. April 20, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-iran/u-s-top-court-rules-iran-bank-must-pay-1983-bomb-victims-idUSKCN0XH1R6>.
- ¹⁷⁶ Hurley, Lawrence. "U.S. top court rules Iran bank must pay 1983 bomb victims." Reuters. April 20, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-iran/u-s-top-court-rules-iran-bank-must-pay-1983-bomb-victims-idUSKCN0XH1R6>.
- ¹⁷⁷ Levitt, Matthew. "Hezbollah's Regional Activities in Support of Iran's Oroxy Networks." Middle East Insitute. July 26, 2021. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks#pt2>.
- ¹⁷⁸ Levitt, Matthew. "Hezbollah's Regional Activities in Support of Iran's Oroxy Networks." Middle East Insitute. July 26, 2021. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks#pt2>.
- ¹⁷⁹ Knights, Michael. "The Evolution of Iran's Special Groups in Iraq." *CIC Sentinel*. 3(11). November 2010. <https://etc.westpoint.edu/the-evolution-of-irans-special-groups-in-iraq/>.
- ¹⁸⁰ Knights, Michael. "The Evolution of Iran's Special Groups in Iraq." *CIC Sentinel*. 3(11). November 2010. <https://etc.westpoint.edu/the-evolution-of-irans-special-groups-in-iraq/>.
- ¹⁸¹ "Kata'ib Hezbollah." United Against Nuclear Iran. 2022. <https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/report/kataib-hezbollah>.
- ¹⁸² "Kata'ib Hezbollah." Counter Extremism Project. 2022. <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/kata%E2%80%99ib-hezbollah>.
- ¹⁸³ Levy, Ido. "How Iran Fuels Hamas Terrorism." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. June 1, 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism>
- ¹⁸⁴ Levy, Ido. "How Iran Fuels Hamas Terrorism." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. June 1, 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism>
- ¹⁸⁵ Levy, Ido. "How Iran Fuels Hamas Terrorism." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. June 1, 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas-terrorism>
- ¹⁸⁶ Lobel, Oved. "Iran's role in the latest Gaza conflict." Australian Strategic Policy Institute. June 18, 2021. <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/irans-role-in-the-latest-gaza-conflict/>.

-
- ¹⁸⁷ Lobel, Oved. "Iran's role in the latest Gaza conflict." Australian Strategic Policy Institute. June 18, 2021. <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/irans-role-in-the-latest-gaza-conflict/>
- ¹⁸⁸ Schneider, Tobias. "Rising Profile." *The Fatemiyoun Division: Afghan Fighters in the Syrian Civil War*. Middle East Institute. 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19959.5>.
- ¹⁸⁹ Hassan, Lila. "What is the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Why Does It Make The Taliban Nervous?" FRONTLINE. *PBS News*. July 20, 2021. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-the-fatemiyoun-brigade-and-why-does-it-make-the-taliban-nervous/>.
- ¹⁹⁰ Hassan, Lila. "What is the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Why Does It Make The Taliban Nervous?" FRONTLINE. *PBS News*. July 20, 2021. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-the-fatemiyoun-brigade-and-why-does-it-make-the-taliban-nervous/>.
- ¹⁹¹ Schneider, Tobias. "Introduction." *The Fatemiyoun Division: Afghan Fighters in the Syrian Civil War*. Middle East Institute. 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19959.5>.
- ¹⁹² Hassan, Lila. "What is the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Why Does It Make The Taliban Nervous?" FRONTLINE. *PBS News*. July 20, 2021. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-is-the-fatemiyoun-brigade-and-why-does-it-make-the-taliban-nervous/>; McInnis, J. Matthew. "Chapter 3 Proxies: Iran's Global Arm and Frontline Deterrent." *Deterring Iran After the Nuclear Deal*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. March 1, 2017. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23152.8>.
- ¹⁹³ "Treasury Designates Iran's Foreign Fighter Militias in Syria along with a Civilian Airline Ferrying Weapons to Syria." United States Department of the Treasury. January 24, 2019. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm590>.
- ¹⁹⁴ "As Part of Iran's Ongoing Policy of Deploying Its Afghan Shi'ite Militia Across the Middle East, IRGC Reportedly Training Fateimyoun Brigade in Drone Use In Syria." Middle East Media Research Institute. September 22, 2022. <https://www.memri.org/reports/part-irans-ongoing-policy-deploying-its-afghan-shiite-militia-across-middle-east-irgc>.
- ¹⁹⁵ Ukkasha, Mohamad. "Bahrain-Iran Foreign Relations: A Brief Case Study – Analysis." *Eurasia Review*. December 10, 2021. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/10122021-bahrain-iran-foreign-relations-a-brief-case-study-analysis/>.
- ¹⁹⁶ Abdulla, Namo. "What is Bahrain's Saray al-Mukhtar Militia?" *VOA News*. December 19, 2020. https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_what-bahrains-saraya-al-mukhtar-militia/6199751.html.
- ¹⁹⁷ "Bahrain." International Crisis Group. August 29, 2022. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-us-trigger-list/flashpoints/bahrain>.
- ¹⁹⁸ Abdulla, Namo. "What is Bahrain's Saray al-Mukhtar Militia?" *VOA News*. December 19, 2020. https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_what-bahrains-saraya-al-mukhtar-militia/6199751.html.
- ¹⁹⁹ Abdulla, Namo. "What is Bahrain's Saray al-Mukhtar Militia?" *VOA News*. December 19, 2020. https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_what-bahrains-saraya-al-mukhtar-militia/6199751.html.
- ²⁰⁰ Wyer, Sam. "The Resurgence of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq." Middle East Security Report 7, Institute for the Study of War, December 2012.
- ²⁰¹ Knights, Michael. "Profile: Asain Ahl al-Haq." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. April 27, 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-asaib-ahl-al-haq-0>.
- ²⁰² "State Department Terrorist Designations of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Its Leaders, Qays, and Laith al-Khazali." United States Department of State. January 3, 2020. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-asaib-ahl-al-haq-and-its-leaders-qays-and-laith-al-khazali/index.html>
- ²⁰³ Zimmerman, Katherine. "An Overview: Iran and the Axis of Resistance's Investments in the Houthis." *Yemen's Houthis and the Expansion of Iran's Axis of Resistance*. American Enterprise Institute. 2022. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep40020.6>.
- ²⁰⁴ Zimmerman, Katherine. "An Overview: Iran and the Axis of Resistance's Investments in the Houthis." *Yemen's Houthis and the Expansion of Iran's Axis of Resistance*. American Enterprise Institute. 2022. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep40020.6>.
- ²⁰⁵ Zimmerman, Katherine. "An Overview: Iran and the Axis of Resistance's Investments in the Houthis." *Yemen's Houthis and the Expansion of Iran's Axis of Resistance*. American Enterprise Institute. 2022. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep40020.6>.

-
- ²⁰⁶ “Iran Gives Millions of Dollars to Islamic Jihad To Attack Israel - Gantz.” *Iran International*. August 11, 2022. <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202208118361>.
- ²⁰⁷ “Iran’s Supreme Leader’s Aide Urges Closer Ties With Palestinian Militant Outfit.” *Iran International*. August 4, 2022. <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202208043697>.
- ²⁰⁸ Aarabi, Kasra. “Beyond Borders: The Expansionist Ideology of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. February 2020. <https://institute.global/sites/default/files/2020-01/IRGC%20Report%207012020.pdf>.
- ²⁰⁹ Esfandiary, Dina and Ariane Tabatabai. “Iran’s ISIS Policy.” The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 2015. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_publication_docs/INTA91_1_01_Esfandiary_Tabatabai.pdf.
- ²¹⁰ “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.” Council on Foreign Relations. May 6, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards>.
- ²¹¹ “Country Reports on Terrorism 2016: Iran.” United States Bureau of Counterterrorism. 2017. <https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2016/>.
- ²¹² Rome, Henry. “Iran’s Defense Spending.” The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. June 17, 2020. <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jun/17/iran%E2%80%99s-defense-spending>.