

Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen

AT A GLANCE

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HOW TO CITE

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SUMMARY

Formed: 1985

Disbanded: Group’s militant wing is not active.

First Attack: January 1994: HuA abducted two Indian security forces personnel in an attempt to force the Indian government to release three top HuA leaders. HuA killed the victims when the government refused to meet the group’s demands (2 killed, 0 wounded).¹

Last Attack: December 2015: HuM claimed responsibility for an attack on the districts of Handwor and Poonch located in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (10 killed, unknown wounded).²

OVERVIEW

Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM) is a Pakistani militant group that split from Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) in 1985. The group’s main goals are to establish Islamic, Pakistani rule of the disputed Kashmir and Jammu region, carry out attacks against India, and wage war against U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. To achieve these objectives, HuM employs various methods, including bombings, hijackings, kidnappings and executions of Indian soldiers, government officials, civilians, and foreign tourists. HuM has received support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) since its formation. The group is one of the oldest and closest allies of Al Qaeda. It also has links to Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the religious political party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Samiul Haq (JUI-S). HuM is not thought to be active, as it has not carried out a major attack since 2015.³ Its resources were significantly diminished after HuM militants split to establish Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) in 2000. Only a small number of militants remain loyal to the central HuM organization.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM) was founded by Fazlur Rehman Khalil in 1985 as a splinter group of the anti-Soviet militant Islamic group, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). The organization was created as a result of a leadership dispute that emerged after Maulana Irshad – the leader of HuJI – was killed in Afghanistan. HuM was initially formed to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and allegedly received support from the Pakistani and U.S. governments.⁴ HuM militants participated in the battle for Khost and the mujahedeen's assault on Gardez in 1991, during which several commanders were killed.⁵ Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in, HuM shifted its focus from opposing the Soviet Union to establishing Pakistani rule of Jammu and Kashmir through jihad.⁶

In 1993, HuM reunited with HuJI to form a new militant organization, Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA). Pakistani General Pervez Musharraf (who would later become the President of Pakistan) was allegedly instrumental in this merger. HuA subsequently joined the umbrella organization, United Jihad Council.⁷ In late 1993 and early 1994, Indian security forces arrested three of HuA's top leaders in quick succession. In response, HuA staged four hostage situations throughout 1994 and 1995 in an effort to secure the release of its leaders. The Indian government proved unwilling to negotiate with HuA, and all four attempts were subsequently unsuccessful.⁸ In 1997, the U.S. government designated HuA as a foreign terrorist organization. This decision was influenced both by reports of the hostage incidents and evidence that HuA had links to Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. HuA subsequently changed its name back to HuM in order to avoid the consequences of the U.S.'s ban.⁹ In February 1998, HuM leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil signed bin Laden's fatwa which called for attacks on U.S. and Western interests. Khalil also expressed that HuM would take revenge on the United States for its 1998 strikes against Bin Laden-linked training camps in Khost, Afghanistan. The strikes destroyed two HuM camps and killed between 9 and 21 HuM militants.¹⁰

In December 1999, HuM garnered international attention for hijacking Indian Airlines flight IC 814 from Kathmandu, Nepal to Delhi, India. After touching down several times, the hijackers forced the pilot to land in Kandahar, Afghanistan.¹¹ Afghan Taliban militants surrounded the plane and inserted themselves as negotiators between HuM and the Indian government. With the support of the Afghan Taliban, HuM successfully secured the release of three militants from the Indian government, including former HuA militants Maulana Masood Azhar and Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheik.¹² Sheik later went on to abduct and murder American journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002.¹³

In January 2000, following his release from jail, Azhar and many of his followers split off from HuM to form the rival group, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). There lacks consensus on Azhar's reasons for leaving HuM. Some sources claim ISI lost interest in funding HuM after Khalil's 1998 decision to join hands with Bin Laden.¹⁴ ISI may have offered Azhar assistance and funding to establish JeM following his release from prison. Azhar's departure weakened HuM's operations, resources, and membership. Approximately three quarters of HuM members defected to JeM from 1999-2001.¹⁵ Despite this split, HuM maintained close ties with a number of other groups, including Al Qaeda, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the religious political party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Samiul Haq (JUI-S).¹⁶

After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States re-designated the group as a foreign terrorist organization under the name HuM, given its connection to Osama bin Laden. Pakistan also banned HuM in November 2001.¹⁷ In 2003, HuM changed its name to Jamiat-ul-Ansar (JuA).¹⁸ Pakistan banned the group under its new name in November 2003 in response to U.S. pressure.¹⁹ Despite Pakistan's ban, JuA continued to openly defy the Pakistani government. During this time period, JuA used its monthly anti-American magazine as a platform from which to raise funds, coordinate events, and urge volunteers to fight U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁰ The group also continued to run militant training camps without interference from Pakistani authorities.²¹ Although the group did not issue an official statement changing its name, media outlets reflect that JuA reverted back to HuM sometime after 2003. After 2007, many HuM fighters allegedly left the group to join the Afghan Taliban. However, HuM commanders claimed that its leadership and network remained intact, although reduced.²²

In 2012, HuM's founder Fazlur Rehman Khalil established the militant group Ansar-ul-Ummah.²³ Despite Khalil's claims that the group operates independently from HuM, Pakistani and U.S. intelligence sources believe Ansar-ul-Ummah operates as an alias for HuM.

From its formation to 2013, HuM was active in conducting attacks on Indian interests. The U.S. State Department reported that there were no known attacks conducted by HuM in 2014. However, in December 2015, the group regained international attention by claiming responsibility for attacks in Handwara and Poonch.²⁴

As of August 2014, the U.S. State Department reports that HuM continues to operate training camps in eastern Afghanistan, which enable it to launch attacks in Kashmir. In addition to operating in Kashmir and Afghanistan, the State Department reports that HuM is allowed to operate freely in Pakistan with the permission of the Pakistani military and ISI.²⁵ Most recently, in January 2016, Indian security forces arrested five HuM militants in the Sopore area of northern Indian Administered Kashmir for planning attacks against Indian dignitaries and security forces.²⁶ HuM has not carried out an attack since 2015 nor has it made any public statements as an organization. The U.S. State Department has not published any new information on HuM since 2015. While the current operations of the group are unknown, it is likely the militant wing of HuM is no longer active.

In 2018, Fazlur Rehman Khalil announced his decision to join Pakistan's ruling centrist party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. Khalil's declaration suggests former Harkat militants and leaders may view politics - instead of militant activities - as a superior method to achieve their goals.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. LEADERSHIP

Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil (1985 to present): Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil was one of the cofounders of HuM's parent group, HuJI. In 1985, Khalil split from HuJI to form HuM—establishing himself as the group's first commander.²⁷ In 1993, Fazlur established a close relationship with then-Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar by coordinating between the Afghan Taliban and the Benazir Bhutto regime in Pakistan. On February 23, 1998, Fazlur became one of five signatories on Osama bin Laden's fatwa. This fatwa, entitled "The World Islamic Front

for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders,” served as Al Qaeda’s declaration of war against the United States and other Western democracies.²⁸

In 2000, Fazlur stepped down as the leader of HuM, passing the position to Farooq Kashmiri.²⁹ However, Khalil remained connected to the organization, and allegedly assumed the position of HuM Secretary General. Khalil was briefly arrested in May 2004 for transporting Pakistani militants into Afghanistan. In 2005, Khalil went into hiding to escape a second arrest. However, after being abducted and wounded in 2006, Khalil was treated at a local Pakistani hospital. Khalil was not arrested, despite the fact that he was allegedly wanted by the Pakistani government.³⁰ Khalil reportedly lived outside Islamabad in 2011 without any restrictions from the Pakistani government. He allegedly maintained links with the Pakistani Army.³¹ Since 2012, Khalil has served as the leader of the militant group Ansar-ul-Ummah (AuU). Although Khalil describes his group as a political party, both Pakistani and U.S. officials claim AuU serves as a front organization for HuM.³² As of 2018, Khalil served as the head of AuU and took part in local government elections.³³ In 2018, Khalil also pledged his support for Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), a centrist political party in Pakistan.³⁴

Abdelkader Mokhtari (1993 to Unknown): Abdelkader Mokhtari was a leader of HuM when the group merged with HuJI to form HuA in 1993. Mokhtari was originally an Algerian commander who gained recognition for his participation in the Bosnian war.³⁵

Sajjad Afghani (Unknown to Unknown): Sajjad Afghani was the commander of HuA in Jammu and Kashmir.³⁶

Nasarullah Manzoor Langaryal (Unknown to Unknown): Nasarullah Manzoor Langaryal was an early commander of HuM.³⁷ Langaryal later became associated with HuJI, a separate Pakistani Islamist fundamentalist group, in 1992.³⁸ He was arrested by the Indian army in 1993 and released from prison 18 years later in 2011.³⁹

Maulana Masood Azhar (Unknown to 2000): Maulana Masood Azhar served as the General Secretary, top ideologue, and chief orator of HuM. Following his arrest and subsequent release by the Indian government, Azhar left HuM in order to found the splinter group Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) in January 2000.⁴⁰ He recently helped orchestrate a suicide bombing in February 2019, killing 40 troops in Indian-administered Kashmir. As a result, the United Nations Security Council designated Azhar as a global terrorist in May 2019.⁴¹ Azhar is also a known associate of Al Qaeda.

Asim Umar (1990 to Unknown): Asim Umar oversaw an ISI-linked HuM facility that trained Kashmir and western jihadists, as well as suicide bombers that conducted operations against western forces in Afghanistan. Umar held this position from 1990 to 2004.⁴² In 2014, Umar was named head of Al Qaeda the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) by Al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 2016, the United States designated Umar as a global terrorist.⁴³

Farooq Kashmiri (February 2000 to Unknown): Farooq Kashmiri served as Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil’s second-in-command of HuM from 1985 to 2000. He was also head of the group’s military department during the 1990s.⁴⁴ When Khalil stepped down as the group’s leader in February 2002, Kashmiri assumed the role and became the second official leader of HuM.⁴⁵ Kashmiri’s current association with HuM is unknown.

Badr Munir (January 2005 to unknown): The U.S. State Department reported that Badr Munir assumed leadership of HuM in January of 2005. The reason for this leadership change in unknown.⁴⁶

Maulana Saadatullah Khan (1993 to Unknown): Maulana Saadatullah Khan helped facilitate the merger of HuA in 1993. He lead the group for four years before its breakup. Under his leadership from 1993-1997, the number of attacks in Kashmir increased dramatically.⁴⁷

B. NAME CHANGES

- 1993: Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA): HuM reunited with HuJI to form a new militant organization, Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA).⁴⁸
- 1997: Harkat-ul-Mujahdeen (HuM): HuM assumed its original name after the U.S. designated HuA as a terrorist organization. The intent of this name change was to avoid any sanctions associated with the new designation.⁴⁹
- 2003: Jamiat-ul-Ansar (JuA): HuM changed its name to Jamiat-ul-Ansar. Although the group did not issue an official statement changing its name, media outlets reflect that JuA reverted back to the name HuM sometime after 2003.⁵⁰
- 2014: Ansar-ul-Ummah (AU): The U.S. State Department reported that Ansar-ul-Ummah is a front organization for HuM.⁵¹
- The U.S. State Department identifies the following names as possible aliases and front organizations for HuM: Harkat-ul-Ansar, Jamiat-ul-Ansar, Al-Faran, Al-Hadid, Al-Hadith, and Ansar-ul-Ummah.⁵²

C. SIZE ESTIMATES

- 1993: One thousand members (University of Bradford)⁵³
- 2009: Several hundred (Australian Parliament)⁵⁴
- 2015: Several hundred (U.S. State Department)⁵⁵
- 2017: “Only a small number of cadres are reported to be active” (U.S. State Department)⁵⁶

D. RESOURCES

HuM primarily finances its operations through donations from wealthy individuals and grassroots fundraising in Pakistan. Many of these donations are directed through front organizations and Islamic charities in the United Kingdom, South Asia, and the Middle East.⁵⁷ HuM has developed organized methods of soliciting donations from sympathizers in Pakistan and Kashmir, including distributing magazine ads and pamphlets.⁵⁸ In addition, wealthy Pakistanis living abroad and Arab Sheiks around the world finance HuM.⁵⁹

A 1997 U.S. State Department report alleged that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and other Pakistani foreign agencies support and fund HuM and other militant groups.⁶⁰ However, the actual extent of official funding from Pakistani officials is unknown. In 2006, the U.S. State Department reported that HuM’s overt fundraising in Pakistan had been constrained under a fundraising ban by the Pakistani government

and the freezing of terrorist assets.⁶¹

HuM recruits men between the ages of 18 and 25 as trainees. Many of these men are students from Sunni madrassahs.⁶² Although the majority of HuM recruits came from madrassahs during the Soviet-Afghan war, this phenomena did not last. In of 2002, only 118 of the 800 “martyrs” of the organization came from madrassahs.⁶³ Most recruits are Pakistani, Kashmiri, and Afghani, HuM also attracts jihadists from other regions, such as Bangladesh, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the United Kingdom, and the United States.⁶⁴ New recruits are initially briefed at HuM headquarters in Kabul and then assigned to various training camps throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁶⁵ HuM’s largest training camp was located in Mashera, Pakistan. Although now closed, it once held the capacity to train 700 militants at a time.⁶⁶ The group’s last operational camp is reportedly located in Muzaffarabad, Kashmir.

E. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

HuM is based in Pakistan. The group largely operates out of Muzaffarabad and Rawalpindi, and it has other offices in various towns in Pakistan. HuM allegedly operates freely inside Pakistan.⁶⁷ The group trains militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan and engages in terrorist activity in Kashmir, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁶⁸ Additionally, militants trained at HuM facilities have reportedly taken part in terrorist operations in countries such as Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶⁹

STRATEGY

A. IDEOLOGY & GOALS

HuM is a Sunni organization, similar in ideology to Wahhabism and the Deobandi revivalist school of thought. Its ideology also reflects that of the Markaz-ud Dawa-wal-Irshad and the Afghan Taliban. Osama bin Laden and other members of Al Qaeda were also key sources of inspiration for the foundation of HuM's ideology. HuM maintains a strict interpretation of Islamic law, which identifies parliamentary democracy as a manifestation of the negative influence of the West on Islamic societies.⁷⁰ According to HuM leader Mualana Saadatullah Khan, the group’s primary motivations are to wage war on all non-believers and anti-Islamic forces.⁷¹

HuM was originally established in order to conduct jihad against Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan.⁷² Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, HuM shifted its goals to three new objectives. First, HuM seeks to bring Kashmir and Jammu under Pakistani control. They hope to establish an Islamic caliphate based on Shariah law within this territory. As part of this goal, HuM rejects all forms of democracy in Pakistan.⁷³ Second, HuM is committed to carrying out attacks against India. The group has advocated for the use of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal against India and has proposed the transfer of Pakistani nuclear weapons technology to other Islamic, anti-Indian states. HuM also strongly opposes any efforts

to normalize the relationship between Pakistan and India.⁷⁴ Third, HuM has pledged to support the Afghan jihad by waging war against U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Some elements within the group have advocated that HuM shift its focus and priorities to reflect the Al Qaeda-inspired mission of global jihad, particularly against the United States and Israel.⁷⁵

B. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Although HuM does not directly participate in politics, the group is ideologically aligned with Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F), a prominent radical Islamic political party in Pakistan and Kashmir.⁷⁶ HuM is also believed to be strongly influenced by the religious political party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Samiul Haq (JUI-S).⁷⁷

In 2017, HuM's founder Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil announced plans to launch his own political party, Islah-e-Watan, with the reported aim of "promoting peace and tranquility" in Pakistan. Few substantial measures have been taken since his announcement to establish the party. In 2018, Khalil publicly joined Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), a centrist political party in Pakistan. Khalil has been a strong supporter of Imran Khan, the party's leader and current Prime Minister of Pakistan.⁷⁸ The Pakistani government's embrace of Khalil has raised doubt over Imran Khan's assertion that the government has initiated a crackdown on terror groups and leaders in Pakistan. Some view the PTI's acceptance of Khalil as evidence of the country's general shift towards embracing religious extremism and former militants in the political realm.

C. TARGETS & TACTICS

HuM training camps educate militants in Islamist doctrine and guerilla tactics. In addition to HuM militants, these camps train jihadists from other transnational Islamic militant organizations.⁷⁹

HuM conducts most of its operations in Indian Administered Kashmir.⁸⁰ The HuM's main targets in this area include Indian security forces and Hindu communities, which the group intends to push out of the region. HuM has also murdered Kashmiri Muslims who did not support its goals. In addition to its operations in Jammu and Kashmir, HuM conducts attacks against U.S.-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan.⁸¹

HuM typically conducts bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings, with the use of machine guns, rockets, assault rifles, mortars, and explosives. Although the group has expressed an interest in commandeering Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in order to attack India, HuM has never controlled nuclear weapons.⁸² Some militants are also trained to carry out lower-intensity attacks, such as hit-and-run or suicide operations.⁸³

Throughout its existence, HuM has repeatedly changed its name in order to avoid the consequences of terrorist designations, such as sanctions and targeting. HuM also operates under aliases in order to mask certain activities. For example, using the name "Al-Faran," HuM has kidnapped and murdered foreigners in an effort to free imprisoned militant leaders.⁸⁴ Pakistan's government has claimed it can do little to combat groups acting under new names, as court orders have allowed banned groups to operate under aliases.⁸⁵

MAJOR ATTACKS

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

January 1994: HuA abducted two Indian security forces personnel in an attempt to force the Indian government to release three top HuA leaders. HuA killed the victims when the government refused to meet the group's demands (2 killed, 0 wounded).⁸⁶

June 1994: HuA abducted two foreign tourists. However, HuA released the hostages following substantial local outcry against the abductions (0 killed, 0 wounded).⁸⁷

October 1994: HuA abducted four foreign tourists in New Delhi and held them captive in Uttar Pradesh. However, Indian security forces were able to conduct a successful rescue operation and arrested the militant who had coordinated the abduction (0 killed, 0 wounded).⁸⁸

July 1995: Al-Faran (an alias for HuM) kidnapped five Westerners. One was reportedly killed in August and the rest in December later that year (5 killed, unknown wounded).⁸⁹

December 24, 1999: HuM hijacked Indian Airlines flight IC 814 from Kathmandu, Nepal, and ultimately landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan. With the support of the Afghan Taliban, HuM successfully secured the release of three Islamic militants from the Indian government (1 killed, 0 wounded).⁹⁰

November 2000: HuM attacked two Indian Army posts in Kashmir (30 killed, unknown wounded).⁹¹

February 1, 2002: Former HuA militant, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheik, was involved in the abduction and murder of U.S. journalist, Daniel Pearl (1 killed, 0 wounded).⁹²

May 8, 2002: HuM conducted a suicide car bombing attack outside the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi (15 killed, 20 wounded).⁹³

June 14, 2002: HuM conducted a suicide bombing attack outside the U.S. Consulate in Karachi (11 killed, 40 wounded).⁹⁴

June 9, 2004: JuA conducted an attack against a military convoy in Karachi, which was carrying the Karachi military commander (7 killed, unknown wounded).⁹⁵

November 2006: A JuA militant shot and killed a former special Police Officer in Kashmir (1 killed, 0 wounded).⁹⁶

February 2007: JuA orchestrated the kidnapping and beheading of a Hindu businessman in Sindh Province, Pakistan (1 killed, 0 wounded).⁹⁷

November 2007: HuM militants engaged Indian soldiers in a firefight in Kashmir (2 killed, unknown wounded).⁹⁸

February 23, 2010: HuM militants engaged in a battle with Indian security forces in Sopore, Kashmir. During the course of the battle, the militants blew up two houses (unknown killed, unknown wounded).⁹⁹

December 2015: HuM claimed responsibility for an attack in Handwora and Poonch in India, which resulted in the deaths of five Indian army troopers and five HuM militants (10 killed, unknown wounded).¹⁰⁰

INTERACTIONS

A. DESIGNATED/LISTED

- U.S. State Department: October 8, 1997 to present (Designated under the name HuA)¹⁰¹
- United Nations Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee: 1999 to present¹⁰²
- U.S. State Department: 2001 to present (Designated under the name HuM)¹⁰³
- United Kingdom March 2001 to present (Designated under the name HuA)¹⁰⁴
- United Nations Resolution 1333: October 6, 2001 to present (Designated under the name HuM).¹⁰⁵
- Pakistan: November 2001 to present (Designated under the name HuM)¹⁰⁶
- Australian Criminal Code: 2002 to present (Designated under the name JuA)¹⁰⁷
- Canadian Public Safety: November 27, 2002 to present (Designated under the name HuM)¹⁰⁸
- Pakistan: November 2003 to present (Designated under the name JuA)¹⁰⁹

B. COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Many of HuM's supporters reside in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions in the Kashmir valley. Some of the group's supporters include Arab veterans of the Afghan war.¹¹⁰ The United Nations Security Council reported in 2014 that "HuM has several thousand armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India's southern Kashmir and Doda regions."¹¹¹

HuM also has strong connections to several madrassahs in Pakistan. Many HuM leaders studied at the Binori Town madrassah in Karachi. The seminary and its graduates have been critical to the establishment and development of HuM. For example, HuM leader Maulana Fazl Rahman Khalil and HuM associate Asim Umar (now head of AQIS) have been affiliated with the Binori Town madrassah.¹¹² HuM militants have historically been regularly recruited from Pakistani madrassahs.

In response to mounting international pressure, Pakistan began a crackdown in 2019 on madrassahs affiliated with militant groups. By March 2019, over 182 madrassahs were taken over by the government.¹¹³ In addition, many more faced new regulations on the recruitment and education of students.¹¹⁴

C. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GROUPS

Throughout the late 1990s, HuM was closely aligned with the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda. There was a heavy presence of HuM fighters in the Taliban front lines leading up to and following the 9/11 attacks. 46 percent of Taliban prisoners captured by the Northern Alliance said that they were associated with one of the main Pakistani Harakat groups, which included HuM. In addition, 79 HuM militants were killed fighting alongside the Taliban in the initial days and months after the US invasion of Afghanistan.¹¹⁵

In addition to its support of the Taliban, HuM frequently channeled foreign fighters to Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan.¹¹⁶ As HuM grew in strength and independence, the group maintained its ties with Al Qaeda. HuM's original leader, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, shared a particularly close relationship with Osama bin Laden. In February 1998, Khalil signed bin Laden's fatwa, which declared war on Americans and called for attacks against U.S. and Western interests.¹¹⁷ HuM also helped al-Qaida members escape after U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan by organizing safe houses throughout Pakistan, including locations in Karachi.¹¹⁸ Prominent Al Qaeda militants, such as Commander Badr Mansoor, have also joined HuM and risen through the ranks as leaders.

In addition to working with Al Qaeda, HuM also cooperates with various militant groups from Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan. HuM's allies include Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. HuM is also a member the United Jihad Council, an umbrella organization which coordinates the communications and strategies of various groups within the global Jihad movement. Given its connections and participation in the council, HuM remains well connected and integrated into the jihadi network.¹¹⁹ HuM has also sent militants to fight in Bosnia, the Philippines, Chechnya, and Tajikistan. In the 1990s, HuM militants traveled to the Philippines to train members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). HuM militants also took part in operations against the Philippine government coordinated by the ASG and MILF.¹²⁰

In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described HuM as one of several terrorist groups that are part of a so-called "syndicate" in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the surrounding region. Other groups included in this syndicate are the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Lashkar e-Taiba.

D. STATE SPONSORS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

HuM has allegedly received support from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) since its formation.¹²¹ This was confirmed in June 2011 when U.S. analysts captured the cellphone of Osama bin Laden's courier. Upon tracing calls on the cellphone, U.S. analysts determined that HuM had been in contact with ISI.¹²² The relationship between ISI and HuM is believed to have been particularly strong following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. ISI reportedly assisted HuM associate Asim Umar in setting up jihad cells across India during the late-1990s.¹²³ In addition, five ISI agents were killed at HuM training camps during the 1998 U.S. strikes against Eastern Afghanistan.¹²⁴

HuM is reportedly able to move and operate freely within Pakistan's borders.¹²⁵ HuM's alleged relationship with ISI is consistent with the accusations of numerous U.S., European, Afghan, and Indian officials who claim that Pakistan supports certain terrorist groups in order to further its

national interests in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan. While the Pakistani government maintains partial influence over certain groups, this control does not extend to all militant activity. In certain instances, groups formerly focused on operating in Kashmir and India have conducted attacks against Pakistani targets.¹²⁶

MAPS

- Global Al Qaeda
- Pakistan – All
- Pakistan

¹ “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.,

<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkatul_mujahideen.htm>.

² “Stop Helping Forces, Harkat Tells Informers”. Kashmirdispatch.com. 16 Mar. 2017,

<http://kashmirdispatch.com/2015/12/04/1613/1613/>

³ “Information on Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) for the Review of the re-listing of Abu Sayyaf Group, Jamiat ul-Ansar and Al-Qa’ida in Iraq.” The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Feb. 2009, <ISBN 978-0-642-79137-5>.

⁴ “Information on Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) for the Review of the re-listing of Abu Sayyaf Group, Jamiat ul-Ansar and Al-Qa’ida in Iraq.” The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Feb. 2009, <ISBN 978-0-642-79137-5>.

⁵ Rassler, Don. “Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Harakat Movement: Reflections and Questions about the Pre-2001 Period.” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 11, no. 6, Dec. 2017.

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/655/html>

⁶ “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.,

<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkatul_mujahideen.htm>.

⁷ Profile: Harkat ul-Mujahedeen (HUM).” History Commons, n.d.,

http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=harkat_ul-mujahedeen.

⁸ “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.,

<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkatul_mujahideen.htm>.

⁹ “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.,

<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkatul_mujahideen.htm>.

¹⁰ Rassler, Don. “Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Harakat Movement: Reflections and Questions about the Pre-2001 Period.” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 11, no. 6, Dec. 2017.

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/655/html>

¹¹ “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.,

<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkatul_mujahideen.htm>.

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